¹ Cf. Sumner, B. H., ‘The Secret Franco-Russian Treaty of 3 March 1859’, in E.H.R. LXVIII (1933).Google Scholar

² Cf. Mosse, W. E., ‘The Triple Treaty of 15 April 1856’, in E.H.R. LXVII (1932).Google Scholar

³ Cf. Mosse, W. E., ‘England, Russia and the Roumanian Revolution of 1866’, in Slavonic Review, XXXIX, December 1960.Google Scholar

⁴ Cf. Clark, C. W., ‘Prince Gorchakov and the Black Sea Question 1866’, in A.H.R. XLVIII, no. 1 (1942).Google Scholar

⁵ Cf. Mosse, W. E., The European Powers and the German Question 1848–1871 (Cambridge (1958), 259 f.).Google Scholar

⁶ Even the British attitude seemed to have become softer since the death of Palmerston in 1865. Russell, individually, might be not totally averse to meeting Russian wishes, cf. Brunnow to Gorchakov, 30 April/12 May 1866, no. 91 très secrète, in the archives of the Foreign Ministry in Moscow.

⁷ W. E. Mosse, op. cit. 308 ff.

⁸ Widow of one of the tsar’s uncles and a former Württemberg princess, she had for ten years been a prominent champion of German interests at the Russian court.

⁹ Prince Heinrich VII Reuss, the North-German Minister.

¹⁰ Stremaoukhov, head of the Asiatic Department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, had already explained to Reuss Russia’s desire to see the Black Sea opened to the flags of war of all nations. No congress, he said, was needed. The Russian Government would simply issue a declaration stating that, in its view, the much ignored treaty of Paris had ceased to operate with regard to the Black Sea. With open support from Prussia, no opposition need be feared. British protests would probably remain platonic. Russia was unlikely either to refortify Sevastopol or to maintain a strong squadron in the Black Sea. She would content herself with the resumption of her sovereign rights and the removal of the stain of 1856 (Reuss to Bismarck, 9 September 1870, printed in Rheindorf, K., Die Schwarze Meer (Pontus) Frage 1856–71 (Berlin, 1925), 149 f.).Google Scholar

¹¹ This cryptic observation, as would soon appear, referred principally to the manner in which arrangements relating to the Danubian Principalities had been repeatedly set aside with the connivance or at least acquiescence of the powers. In the second place, Gorchakov was alluding also to a number of alleged violations of the neutrality of the Black Sea in connexion with the entry into the Straits—with the consent of the Porte—of small naval vessels of different nationalities.

¹² ibid.

¹³ ‘Werden sie [Russian wishes] in dem Umfang gehalten, wie sie ohne Kongress faktisch durchführbar sind, ist es um so leichter... ’(Bismarck to Reuss, telegram, 16 September 1870, ibid. 149 ff.). In the light of Stremaoukhov’s and Gorchakov’s explanations, the subsequent surprise expressed by the Prussian Government at the mode of procedure adopted by Russia appears disingenuous.

¹⁴ For the sake of convenience, this term is used to describe the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy after 1867.

¹⁵ The incorporation of Rome.

¹⁶ Reuss to Bismarck, 2 December 1870, confidential, ibid. 151 ff. Reuss received his account of the meeting directly from one of the participants.

¹⁷ As the Council was breaking up, some of the Ministers were in fact asking themselves whether a decision which might have serious consequences had not been too lightly taken (ibid.).

¹⁸ Gorchakov to Brunnow 19/31 October 1870, printed in Pad. papers C. 245 (1871), Correspondence respecting the Treaty of March 30, 1856 (hereafter quoted as Corr.), no. 1.

¹⁹ In this dispatch Gorchakov remarked that Granville would not contest the fact that the treaty of 1856 had undergone serious modifications. With the precedent of the principalities before her, what value could Russia attach to the efficacy of the treaty and the pledge of security she believed herself to have obtained by the neutralization of the Black Sea? The balance of power established in the east by the treaty of 1856 had been disturbed to the detriment of Russia: her present resolution had no object other than to restore it. The British Government would not consent to leave the safety of its shores to the mercy of an arrangement which it no longer respected. It was too equitable not to concede to Russia the same duties and the same rights (the same to the same, 20 October/1 November 1870, ibid. no. 2).

²⁰ The Russian ambassador in London.

²¹ Granville to Buchanan, 9 November 1870, ibid. no. 3.

²² The British ambassador at St Petersburg.

²³ ‘I have no doubt, however, that on the first favourable opportunity, Russia will claim the abrogation of the stipulations of the Treaty of Paris, which close the Black Sea to her ships of war’ (Buchanan to Clarendon, 16 June 1870, F.O. 65/802, no. 226, confidential).

²⁴ Buchanan to Granville, 15 August 1870, F.O. 65/803, confidential; 21 September 1870, F.O. 65/804, no. 354, confidential; and 18 October 1870, ibid. no. 406, secret and confidential.

²⁵ Elliot to Granville, 23 August 1870, F.O. 78/2124, no. 164. For the language held by Ignatiev, cf. Goriainov, S., Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles (Paris, 1910), 194 ff.Google Scholar

²⁶ Gladstone to Granville, 4 October 1870, The Political Correspondence of Mr Gladstone and Lord Granville 1868–76, ed. Ramm, A. (1952), I (Camden third series, vol. LXXXI), 136.Google Scholar

²⁷ Granville to Elliot, 6 October 1870, F.O. 195/959, no. 207.

²⁸ The British ambassador at Constantinople.

²⁹ The same to the same, ibid. no. 208, confidential. The inquiry was the result of consultations between Granville and Gladstone, cf. Granville to Gladstone, 8 October 1870, Ramm op. cit. 141.

³⁰ On 25 October.

³¹ Elliot to Granville, 17 October 1870, F.O. 78/2125, no. 242, confidential.

³² Gladstone to Hammond, 28 October 1870, P(ublic) R(ecord) O(ffice) in London, G(ifts and) D(eposits), 39/58.

³³ Elliot to Granville, 17 October 1870, F.O. 78/2125, no 242, confidential.

³⁴ On 14 November.

³⁵ Gladstone’s notes on decisions of the cabinet, 10 November 1870, Add. MSS. 44638 (in the British Museum, London).

³⁶ Printed in Ramm, op. cit. 134 ff.

³⁷ Granville to the Queen, telegram, 11 November 1870, R(oyal) A(rchives) at Windsor Castle, H 4/162. I have to acknowledge the gracious permission of Her Majesty the Queen to make use of material from the Royal Archives, Windsor Castle.

³⁸ Granville to Buchanan, 10 November 1870, Corr. loc. cit. no. 4.

³⁹ Buchanan to Granville, 16 November 1870, Corr. no. 25. Buchanan, another of the ‘ Palmerstonian’ ambassadors, had received much of his diplomatic training in tussles with Bismarck in Berlin. His language, on this occasion, did not err on the side of moderation. He noted with satisfaction that during the reading of Granville’s note, Gorchakov’s feet and legs shook with a nervous tremor (the same to the same, private and most confidential, 16 November 1870, R.A. H 4/175 abstract). Gorchakov, with some justice, remarked during the interview that the British Government would never have made concessions in response to diplomatic requests but was too prudent and desirous of peace not to accept a fait accompli (ibid.). He also argued, again with some justice, that he was surprised at the sentiments at present expressed by the British Government with regard to the abrogation of treaties, ‘ as they had accepted without remonstrance the changes which had taken place in Germany in 1866 by the extinction of the German Confederation and the Kingdom of Hanover’ (the same to the same, 16 November 1870, Corr. no. 25).

⁴⁰ The same to the same, 15 November 1870, ibid. no. 24.

⁴¹ The same to the same, 16 November 1870, F.O. 65/805, no. 464, reporting telegram. Commercial men felt that the emperor could not recede from the position he had taken up (ibid.). This did not prevent a widespread feeling that Gorchakov had opened the question ‘clumsily and indiscreetly’ (the same to the same, 15 November 1870, ibid. no. 462, reporting telegram). Persons attached to the Foreign Office described the circular as ‘an impotent attempt’ which would not be supported by action and would end in failure if it met with decided opposition from England (the same to the same, 14 November 1870, ibid. no. 458, reporting telegram). This last statement is probably exaggerated. Buchanan was trying to influence the British Government in favour of an uncompromising stand.

⁴² Standard, 15 November 1870.Google Scholar

⁴³ Morning Post,16 November 1870.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ The Times, 16 November 1870.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ Pall Mall Gazette, 16 November 1870.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ Saturday Review, 19 November 1870.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ Daily News, 17 November 1870.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ ‘You see our old friends the Russians are in the field again. They have greatly committed themselves, I think, by the manner of this proceeding. Also there is something revolting in the choice of the moment when we ought all to have been considering how to do our best to stop the War’ (Gladstone to Lady Herbert, 16 November 1870, Add. MSS. 44539, copy). ‘ I shall not be surprised if Gortchakoff’s pen drives heavily. He has I think committed both the crime and the blunder’ (Gladstone to Granville, 17 November 1870, Ramm, op. cit. 158).

⁴⁹ ‘Notwithstanding the stiff accounts from St Petersburg] I feel confident in the strength j of the position we have taken up’ (the same to the same, 18 November 1870, ibid. 159).

⁵⁰ Granville’s ‘docquet’ at the end of his dispatch to Buchanan.

⁵¹ Granville wrote: ‘The despatch [of 10 November] of which the whole pith was your’s, seems to have had a great success. I trust that our subsequent action will not come up to the Pall Mall standard of what we ought to do. But would not a little strengthening of the Mediterranean Fleet have a good effect? I mean an addition, not a transfer. It would have: an effect on Russia who cannot wish for war, and would not compromise us’ (Granville to Gladstone, 18 November 1870, ibid. 160).

⁵² Between France and Prussia.

⁵³ The wisdom of Gladstone’s view was soon to be demonstrated by a telegram from Buchanan: ‘ I venture to recommend that no armed demonstration should take place till next week. I...am not without hopes that an answer will be given to your note, stating that it was not intended to carry out the declaration without the assent of the Powers, and expressing a desire to negotiate in a conference or otherwise’ (Buchanan to Granville, 19 November 1870, F.O. 65/802, no. 472, reporting telegram).

⁵⁴ Gladstone to Granville, 19 November 1870, Ramm, op. cit. 161.

⁵⁵ ‘While it is not easy to find smashing objections to a Congress, it would be very desirable to see what could really be adopted as an arrangement equitable to all the parties’ (the same to the same, 20 November 1870, ibid. 162).

⁵⁶ He was about to resign from the cabinet on grounds of ill-health.

⁵⁷ Bright to Gladstone, private, 17 November 1870, Trevelyan, op. cit. 417–18. On the following day, after receiving a reassuring communication from Gladstone, Bright wrote: ‘ Your letter is a great relief to me. The bluster of the newspapers has aroused my fears, and I wrote to you yesterday under their influence—forgive me for supposing there was danger of your becoming too much involved in the Russian question. But there are people who seem always to hunger for war, and Governments are too often moved by them, and drift on to positions from which there seems no honourable retreat.’

He favoured reviewing the part of the treaty objected to by Russia: ‘When I remember the treatment of Russia, by England and France in 1854, I am not much surprised that, when France is down, and England almost helpless in this matter, Russia should speak in uncivil tones’ (Bright to Gladstone, 18 November 1870, Gladstone Papers in the British Museum, London, Add. MS. 44112, fol. 163).

⁵⁸ The Queen to Granville, telegram, 20 November 1870,. A. H 4/97. On the same day the Queen wrote to the Foreign Secretary that the object of British policy must be ‘ to do nothing precipitate so that we may not be driven into a war for so unsatisfactory a cause as in fact the upholding of a Mohammedan State with so little real intrinsic power must in the abstract be called’ (the same to the same, 20 November 1870, printed in The Letters of Queen Victoria, 2nd ser. (1926), n, 85 f.).Google Scholar

⁵⁹ Possibly as the result of some official hint, there was, however, a change in the tone of The Times. On 21 November, for the first time, the paper spoke of Russia’s conduct with sorrow rather than anger. On the following day, it expressed a hope that the tsar and his counsellors would realize ‘that wisdom and morality require that the claim of Russia to violate Treaties whenever it suits her, should be quietly abandoned, if not actually retracted’ (The Times, 22 November 1870). The following day, for the first time since the beginning of the crisis, the paper did not refer editorially to Gorchakov and his circular. The Opposition, on the other hand, had shifted its attack from the form to the substance of the Russian claim. The Standard declared that there was some danger of the real issue between the powers and Russia being lost sight of or relegated to second place in the excitement produced by the manner in which Russia had chosen to act. This must not be: ‘The neutralization of the Black Sea was the sole useful and beneficial result of the Crimean War. Are we to be told that it is a mere question of form whether we permit Russia to break the Treaty? The violation of it is, in all future time, a sufficient cause of war simply because it means the subversion of all for which England and France fought in 1854–5, tne restoration of Russia to the identical position of which, in the interests of peace, she was deprived by the Treaty of Paris’ (Standard, 22 November 1870).

⁶⁰ ‘Whether our voice [wrote Russell] be for peace, as I hope, or for war which may become inevitable, I am of the opinion that 100,000 men of the Militia, in addition to the Militia Reserve should be embodied, and that we should thus obtain the means of filling with flesh and blood the skeletons of our attenuated regiments’ (The Times, 22 November 1870).

Whilst favouring military precautions, Russell did not consider the substance of the Russian demand to be unreasonable. At the beginning of the crisis he wrote to Granville: ‘The form of the Russian Circular is very insulting to the Powers to whom she bound herself in 56. As to the substance, I retain much of my Vienna heresies—I thought at the time that the restriction as to navigating the Black Sea with men of war was too degrading to a Power like Russia, and left the Porte too superior in the Bosphorus’ (Russell to Granville, 16 November 1870, P.R.O. G.D. 29/79).

Gorchakov, however, ought to withdraw his circular: ‘I do not see why we should make a war out of Gortchakoff’s Circular. But I do think that unless the Circular is withdrawn, we ought not to enter into any Conference with a Russian Minister or Representative. Russia must be deemed a Power which gives no faith in Treaties. She sets up, as you say, a principle which enables her to set at nought every Treaty future as well as past. Her seal and signature are good for nothing’ (the same to the same, 18 November 1870, ibid.).

⁶¹ The Times, 23 November 1870. The Morning Post, on the other hand, whilst considering Russell to be right in the military sense, deprecated any action which might appear as a threat at the moment when delicate negotiations were in progress (Morning Post, 23 November 1870).

⁶² Then President of the Poor Law Board.

⁶³ Granville to Gladstone (20 November 1870), Ramm, op. cit. 161.

⁶⁴ First Lord of the Admiralty.

⁶⁵ The same to the same, 21 November 1870, ibid. 163. The crisis, as usual, had found England unprepared. Granville told Gladstone: ‘I suspect the Cabinet will be thirsty to talk about army and navy. Our organization requires some overhauling. Russell and Cardwell [Secretary of State for War] both say that Dover Castle cannot at this moment... resist an Ironclad’ (the same to the same, 20 November 1870, ibid. 161).

⁶⁶ Childers had been in Cambridge, ‘where residents and visitors were all in the same cry’ (the same to the same, 21 November 1870, ibid. 163).

⁶⁷ ibid. In his farewell letter to Bright, Granville wrote: ‘Our views on the Eastern question are the same as to the end, although it is probable we might differ as to some of the means’ (Granville to Bright, 21 November 1870, printed in Fitzmaurice, Lord E., The Life of Lord Granville (2nd ed. 1905), 11, 28 f.).Google Scholar

⁶⁸ On 17 November, Gladstone wrote to Granville that the day of the cabinet need not be fixed ‘till the answer comes and till you find it is an answer’. A meeting of the cabinet could be arranged, at Granville’s discretion, any afternoon ‘on the day you name’ (Gladstone to Granville, 17 November 1870, ibid. 158). Two days later, referring to a meeting of the cabinet, he repeated that he ‘should be loath to have one before there is a real practical question to dispose of, such as the answer of Gortchakoff is likely to raise’ (the same to the same, 19 November 1870, ibid. 161). Granville summoned a cabinet to meet on the 23rd. The meeting was finally postponed until the 25th.

⁶⁹ ‘I will frankly own that I am much disgusted with a good deal of the language that I have read in the newspapers within the last few days about immediate war with Russia’ (ibid.).

⁷⁰ The same to the same, 22 November 1870, ibid. 165 f.

⁷¹ ‘Do not [Gran ville urged] appear as peaceable as you are to our colleagues or to the Foreign Representatives. I am come round to the absence of warlike preparations, although there is much to be said for them’ (Granville to Gladstone, 23 November 1870, ibid. 167).

⁷² He wrote to Granville: ‘I have half an idea that it might be well I should see Brunnow either with you or alone. All know the mischief done by the Russian idea of Lord Aberdeen and the Opposition are in the habit of studiously representing me as his double, or his heir, in pacific traditions. This I do not conceive to be true and possibly I might undeceive B[runnow] a little’ (Gladstone to Granville, 23 November 1870, ibid. 166 f.).

⁷³ Elliot to Granville, telegram, 17 November 1870, R.A. H 4/179. The Turkish reaction completely falsified Elliot’s earlier forecast which, however, may have been influenced by wishful thinking.

⁷⁴ The same to the same, telegram (2), 17 November 1870, ibid. H 4/178. Aali’s language convinced Elliot ‘that he desires avoiding a rupture if the Powers consider it can be done without too much loss of credit’ (the same to the same, telegram, 20 November 1870, ibid. H 4/199).

⁷⁵ Granville to Gladstone, 18 November 1870, Ramm, op. cit. 159.

⁷⁶ ‘The Turks seem to be temperate’ (Gladstone to Granville, 19 November 1870, ibid. 160f.).

⁷⁷ Buchanan reported that the news from Constantinople had ‘greatly increased the arrogance of the official class of Russians’ (Buchanan to Granville, 23 November 1870, F.O. 65/805, no. 489, reporting telegram). The acquiescence of Turkey considerably weakened the force of the British remonstrance.

⁷⁸ Lyons to Granville, telegram, 14 November 1870, R.A. I 67/32.

⁷⁹ For the discussions in the Council of Ministers of 14 November 1870, cf. Haus-Hof und Staats Archiv, Vienna, Ministerrath für gemeinsame Angelegenheiten Präsid. Sektion Dep. I R. M. Protokoll 1869–71, xxx, 275.

⁸⁰ Beust to Chotek, 16 November 1870, Corr. no. 27.

⁸¹ Granville to Bloomfield, 30 November 1870, F.O. 120/481, no. 115.

⁸² King William declared: ‘ Ich habe aber immer diese Frage als vor einen Kongress gehörig nach unserem Frieden mit Frankreich betrachtet. Jedenfalls habe ich nie daran gedacht, dass eine Kündigung ohne vorhergegangene Verständigung mit den Unterzeichnem möglich sei’ (marginal note on Reuss to Bismarck, 9 November 1870, Rheindorf, op. cit. 152 f.).

⁸³ Bismarck pleaded for delay on the ground that, a few weeks later (i.e. after the final defeat of France) Prussia would be in a better position to support Russia (Bismarck to Reuss, telegram, 8 November 1870, Bismarck, , G[esammelte] W[erke] (6 vols. in 8, Berlin, 1924 et seq.) VI b, 590). Gorchakov replied that delay was impossible. All necessary steps had been taken, ‘et le moment est venu de mettre à l’æuvre les bonnes dispositions que vous nous avez manifestées à diverses reprises sur cette question de dignité et d’honneur national—et dont je puis dire vous avez même pris l’initiative (against which Bismarck observed in the margin: ‘In dieser Form sicher nicht!’) (Reuss to Bismarck, 9 November 1870, Rheindorf, op. cit. 153 f.).Google Scholar

⁸⁴ Although critical of Gorchakov’s methods, Bismarck was resolved to honour his promises. From Prussian Headquarters in Versailles he informed the Foreign Ministry in Berlin: ‘Die russische Form ist nicht geschickt, aber wir können gegen die Sache nicht auftreten. Europa hat Frankreichs Angriff auf uns nicht gehindert, und England seiner Neutralität einen für uns ungünstigen Charakter verliehen. Dass Oesterreich nicht dasselbe tat, hinderte nur Kaiser Alexander. Der König ist letzterem dankbar, wir haben an dem Vertrag von 56 wenig Interesse und nur einen äusserlichen, von England damals bekämpften, Anteil’ (Bismarck to Foreign Ministry, telegram, 18 November 1870, ibid. 154). Bismarck accordingly arranged for Prussian papers to publish Beust’s dispatches of 1867 and other correspondence tending to show that Austria-Hungary supported Russia (Bismarck to Thile, telegram, 14 November 1870, ibid.). The Russian minister in Berlin received an assurance that Prussia would not join in any action directed against Russia(Bismarck to Foreign Ministry, 18 November 1870, ibid.).

⁸⁵ ‘Es wird sich dann zeigen, ob die Meinung des Landes wirklich so kriegerisch ist, wie die der Hauptstadt in diesem Augenblick.’

⁸⁶ Bernstorff to Bismarck, confidential, 18 November 1870, [Die] G[rosse] P[olitik der europäischen Kabinette] (Berlin, 1922), 11, 12.Google Scholar

⁸⁷ ‘Man sieht mit äusserster Spannung der Entscheidung in Versailles entgegen, wovon, wie man überzeugt ist, die ganze Wendung der Dinge abhängt. Wenn wir mit den andern Vertragsmächten die einseitige Aufkündigung Russlands für unzulässig erklären und jedes Einverständnis mit ihm verleugnen, so glaubt man, dass Russland sich besinnen wird. Wo nicht, hält man den Krieg für unvermeidlich, welcher sich fast über ganz Europa erstrecken dürfte, und worin England jedenfalls tatsächlich der Bundesgenosse unserer Feinde sein würde’ (the same to the same, telegram, 19 November 1870, ibid. 13).

⁸⁸ On 20 November.

⁸⁹ Bismarck, G.W. op. cit. 604.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Russell’s mission to Versailles, ‘ to ascertain a little of what was going on’, had been decided on before the Russian action (Granville to Gladstone, 15 October 1870, Ramm, op. cit. 147 f.). Gorchakov’s circular greatly enhanced its importance. On 12 November, Granville informed the Queen it was proposed ‘merely to send Bismarck the British answer to Gorchakov’s circular and to tell him that Russell would give him all further explanations he might require’ (Granville to the Queen, 12 November 1870, R.A. H 4/167; Q.V.L. op. cit. 82f.). Bismarck attached great importance to Russell’s visit. He told the Foreign Ministry in Berlin: ‘Sagen Sie den Diplomaten, die fragen sollten, dass wir uns erst nach Russells Herkunft äussern wüirden’ (Bismarck to Foreign Ministry, telegram, 18 November 1870, Rheindorf, op. cit. 154).

⁹² Odo Russell to Granville, telegram, Versailles, 21 November 1870, dispatched at 9.42 p.m., received at 3 a.m. the following day, in F.O. 65/807.

⁹³ Bismarck was, in fact, delaying his offer of mediation in the hope of striking a bargain with England about the Franco-Prussian war: ‘He repeatedly said that in his opinion in politics “one hand should wash the other” (dasseine Hand die andere waschen muss) and seemed to wait anxiously and attentively for my reply. Of course I took no notice and turned a deaf ear to his insinuations and dealt with the question on its own merits only, without offering him any other advantage for Germany but the choice between Peace and War with Russia on our part’ (the same to the same, private, 30 November 1870, R.A. I 67/54, copy).

When Gladstone heard of Russell’s language, he expressed disapproval. He was much concerned to see the envoy had won Bismarck ‘by a representation about our going to war which really had not the slightest foundation’ (Gladstone to Granville, 6 December 1870, Ramm, op. cit. 176).

Granville, however, defended Russell’s conduct: ‘I am afraid our whole success has been owing to the belief that we would go to war, and to tell the truth I think war in some shape or other sooner or later, was a possible risk after our note. In any case, I would reassure nobody now. Promising peace is as unwise as to threaten war. A sort of sentiment that the bumps of combativeness and destructiveness are to be found somewhere in your head has helped us much during the last five months ‘ (Granville to Gladstone, 8 December 1870, ibid. 179 f.).

⁹⁴ Bismarck to Bernstorff, telegram, 22 November 1870, G.P. op. cit. 16f.

⁹⁵ Buchanan to Granville, 22 November 1870, F.O. 65/805, no. 842, reporting telegram.

⁹⁶ Odo Russell to Granville, telegram, 22 November 1870, F.O. 65/799.

⁹⁷ Granville to Loftus, 24 November 1870, Corr. no. 35.

⁹⁸ Granville to Gladstone, 23 November 1870, Ramm, op. cit. 167.

⁹⁹ Granville to Loftus, 24 November 1870, Corr. no. 35.

¹⁰⁰ Granville to Odo Russell, 25 November 1870, Corr. no. 37. On 25 November also, Gorchakov’s reply to Granville’s note had been delivered at the Foreign Office. In it Gorchakov, whilst maintaining his circular ‘in principle’, repeated Russia’s readiness ‘to join in any deliberation having for its object the general guarantees destined to consolidate the peace of the East’, and expressed the conviction that ‘fresh guarantees would be obtained if, a permanent cause of irritation between the two Powers [Russia and Turkey] being removed, their mutual relations were to be re-established on the basis of a good and solid understanding’ (Gorchakov to Brunnow, 8/20 November 1870, ibid. no. 36).

¹⁰¹ Buchanan to Granville, 25 November 1870, F.O. 65/805, no. 496.

¹⁰² Granville to Odo Russell, 27 November 1870, Corr. no. 39.

¹⁰³ That Gladstone seriously believed in the possibility of war is shown by a letter to Earl Spencer in which he wrote: ‘I trust the war cloud is floating away’ (Gladstone to Spencer, 28 November 1870, Add. MSS. 44539, copy). Cf. also Gladstone’s letters to Rt. Hon. C. E. Fortescue of 26 and 28 November 1780, ibid, copies).

¹⁰⁴ This was the ostensible reason for the resignation of Otway, the disgruntled under-secretary at the Foreign Office. ‘ We have now [he wrote] at the instance of Prussia accepted a Conference with the other Powers co-signatories of the Treaty of 56. We have done this after our reply to Prince Gortchacow’s note, and after the Russian rejoinder, containing no retraction of a claim which has given just offence, created great alarm, and caused that intimation from our Government to Russia which was hailed with almost universal satisfaction in this country. I cannot but think that we neither go in well nor shall we come out well of this conference. I fear that it will entail on us humiliation or war... ’(Otway to Gladstone, private, 27 November 1870, Add. MSS. 44428).

¹⁰⁵ Granville to Gladstone, 5 December 1870, Ramm, op. cit. 174 f. Three days later Granville repeated: ‘I shall decline telling him our views till after the first conference’ (the same to the same, 8 December 1870, ibid. 179).

¹⁰⁶ ‘He [Brunnow] was perfectly aware that public opinion in England must be satisfied as well as that in Russia’ (the same to the same, 5 December 1870, ibid. 174).

¹⁰⁷ On 5 December, Brunnow communicated to Granville the draft of his proposed statement, and readily accepted the Foreign Secretary’s alterations (ibid. 176, n. 1).

¹⁰⁸ Elliot to Granville, private, 18 November 1870, G.D. 29/102.

¹⁰⁹ The same to the same, private, 21 November 1870, ibid. Elliot set to work to convince Aali and thought he had been successful. ‘Aali is I think beginning to incline a good deal to my opinion that it may be well to modify the rules for closing of the straits against ships of war so as to leave the sultan the power of inviting them in case of danger’ (the same to the same, private, 2 December 1870, ibid.).

¹¹⁰ ‘I think Elliot hits the point in the suggestion that the Sultan should not resume an unbounded discretion but one to be exercised in case of menace, or to use our word in the Naval Reserve Act, in case of “emergency” (Gladstone to Granville, 3 December 1870, Ramm, op. cit. 170).

¹¹¹ Granville to Gladstone, 5 December 1871, ibid. 172 f.

¹¹² Granville relied much on the opinions formerly held by Clarendon. Brunnow had told him unofficially that ‘there appeared to him to be only one [possible equivalent]—that to which Clarendon had given the preference, and which has been raised in some of our newspapers—viz. the opening instead of the shutting of the Black Sea, with a reservation of the Sultan’s Sovereign power’ (ibid. 175). Granville believed that Clarendon ‘was for opening the Black Sea, but he had another and in my opinion an objectionable plan—that the Porte should allow us to make a Malta or Sebastopol of Trezibond’ (the same to the same, confidential, 6 December 1870, ibid. 176). Curiously, a similar plan seems to have developed in Bismarck’s fertile brain. At any rate, he asked Odo Russell whether England wished to acquire a naval station in the Black Sea—to which he saw no objection (Odo Russell to Granville, private, 18 December 1870, R.A. I 67/104, copy). Gladstone adhered to his opinion. ‘In the “Poritus” question I should say that a part of the Sultan’s rights is more than the whole; as Elliot seems to think. He has a title to the whole: but if he cannot use them entire, and can use a portion, he may prefer the latter’ (Gladstone to Granville, 6 December 1870, Ramm, op. cit. 176f.).

¹¹³ ‘Our colleagues seem to prefer the simple restoration to the Sultan of his Sovereign power as to the passage into the Black Sea’ (Granville to Gladstone, 8 December 1870, ibid. 179 f.).

¹¹⁴ Granville to Gladstone, 10 December 1870, ibid. 181 f.

¹¹⁵ ‘Aali admits that his ambassador is more pugnacious than there is any occasion for’ (Elliot to Granville, private, 9 December 1870, G.D. 29/102).

¹¹⁶ For a paraphrase of the Turkish warning, see Granville to Bloomfield, 2 December 1870, F.O. 120/481, no. 135.

¹¹⁷ Apponyi to Granville, private, 29 November 1870, G.D. 29/82.

¹¹⁸ Granville to Bloomfield, 1 December 1870, F.O. 120/481, no. 137.

¹¹⁹ Some days before, Granville had told Gladstone: ‘The best but most unlikely compensation we could get for concession on the convention, would be Prussia joining the tripartite treaty’ (Granville to Gladstone, 5 December 1870, Ramm, op. cit. 172 f.).

¹²⁰ The same to the same, 10 December 1870, ibid. 181 f.

¹²¹ Granville told Russell: ‘Sound Count Bismarck as entirely from yourself whether Prussia disposed to accede to Tripartite Treaty’ (Granville to Russell, 7 December 1870, F.O. 64/737, no. 35, most confidential, reporting telegram).

¹²² Bismarck replied that the German Parliament would refuse to ratify ‘an engagement of this kind which, in the present temper of the people of Germany, would be very unpopular’. Germany would resist’ any engagement to fight for other nations abroad... the conquests made by others will be indifferent to them’ (Odo Russell to Granville, private, 18 December 1870, R.A. I 67/104, copy).

¹²³ Gladstone to Granville, 12 December 1870, ibid. 185. This was strange doctrine when applied to the Luxembourg guarantee of 1867 or even the Belgian guarantee of 1839. It was at variance with the doctrine of a guarantee propounded by Canning in 1823 (cf. Headlam-Morley, J. W., ‘Treaties of Guarantee’, The Cambridge Historical Journal, 11, 2 (1927), 163). Gladstone was not justified in the assumption that Turkey neither would nor could take up arms in her own defence. Whether she would or would not require a British subsidy was hardly relevant to the argument. Finally, Gladstone conveniently overlooked the fact that what the tripartite treaty guaranteed was not the Ottoman Empire but the strict enforcement of the treaty of Paris.Google Scholar

¹²⁴ Granville to Gladstone, 10 December 1870, Ramm, op. cit. 181 f.

¹²⁵ Ramm, op. cit. 188, n. 6.

¹²⁶ Elliot to Granville, telegram, 20 December 1870, R.A. H 5/58, reporting telegram. Aali’s original suggestion had been that all the Powers should consent to adhere to the treaty of 15 April (the same to the same, 13 December 1870, ibid. H 5/53, reporting telegram).

¹²⁷ Granville to Gladstone, 23 December 1870, Ramm, op. cit. 189 f.

¹²⁸ Turkish objection to the cancellation was decided. ‘Aali’s opinion... is... that if the Treaty of April were now to be cancelled, we should be regarded, in the East at least, as turning the left cheek to Russia after having received her slap on the right one...’(Elliot to Granville, private, 30 December 1870, GD 29/102).

¹²⁹ Granville to Gladstone, 23 December 1870, Ramm, op. cit. 189f.

¹³⁰ Gladstone to Granville, 25 December 1870, ibid. 191 f.

¹³¹ Protocols of Conferences respecting the Treaty of March 30, 1856, Parl. papers (C. 267), 1871, hereafter quoted as Prot.

¹³² Aali Pasha to Musurus, communicated to Granville on 9 January 1871. P.R.O., G.D. 29/91.

¹³³ Prot. op. cit.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ Rumbold to Granville, 19 March 1871, F.O. 65/820, no. 28.

¹³⁷ On a February.

¹³⁸ Part. Debates, CCIV, cc. 83 ff.

¹³⁹ As Lord Cairns pointed out in the House of Lords five days later, Gladstone, contrary to the impression conveyed in his speech, was not, at the time, a member of the government. On the contrary, his attitude ‘if not one of opposition, was one of very careful, and frequently hostile, criticism of the Government of the day’ (ibid. c. 242).

¹⁴⁰ What Gladstone did in fact say in the House of Commons on 6 May 1856 was somewhat different and shrouded in ambiguity: ‘I believe no part of the treaty is more popular in this House and in the country, and many look upon this arrangement as the principal glory of thetreaty of peace. For my own part, I confess I view it with far different feelings, independent of the question that neutralisation appears to be welcomed in terms not altogether justified by the facts of the case. Where ships of war are allowed to a certain extent to be kept up, and, as far as I can understand, available for war purposes, I can find no one to tell me what would be the application of that system of neutralisation in time of war. In a state of peace no doubt the arrangement would work well, and so would all systems, but when we come to times of difficulty, when Russia may again be at war, when she may unhappily have resumed her supposed scheme of aggression upon Turkey, or when the Porte may be at war with any Power, then I believe you will find that neutralisation means nothing more than a series of pitfalls, which, when you come to test them, you will find to be deeper than you expected’ (ibid. CXLII, cc. 97 f.).

This was somewhat different from what Gladstone now wished the House to believe.

¹⁴¹ An assertion which Gladstone was soon obliged to retract.

¹⁴² This was nothing less than an attempt deliberately to mislead the House. In fact, Austria, Turkey, France and Italy had, for different reasons, expressed their readiness to follow any British lead. The element of truth behind Gladstone’s assertion is that, with the possible exception of Austria, no Power desired war. The Turkish Government was satisfied that war had been averted. ‘ Aali speaks with the most lively gratitude of the line you have followed throughout the whole proceeding and if, when Parliament meets, you should be reproached with not having broken with Russia, or, which would have come to the same thing, insisted upon a retraction of the Gorchakov declaration, you may feel that Turkey at least would not have thanked you for taking such a course, which would have been very ruinous to her’ (Elliot to Granville, private, 27 January 1871, G.D. 29/102).

The accuracy of Gladstone’s statement was challenged privately by Otway—a ‘Palmer-stonian’ under-secretary at the Foreign Office, who subsequently resigned (Gladstone to Granville, 14 February 1871, Ramm, op. cit. 219).

¹⁴³ Parl. Debates, CCIV, cc. 98 ff. Some days later, commenting on Gladstone’s speech in the House of Lords, Lord Cairns challenged the accuracy of the Prime Minister’s remarks with regard to Clarendon and Palmerston (ibid. cc. 240 ff.). Granville in reply was forced to admit that in 1855 Clarendon had strongly favoured neutralization and that there was ‘no evidence whatever that Lord Clarendon changed his opinions’. At the same time, Granville was able to adduce some evidence to suggest that Palmerston from the first had regarded neutralization as only a temporary expedient (ibid. cc. 247 f.).

¹⁴⁴ This victory, however, may well have been bought at a price. It has been claimed that, from his handling of the Black Sea crisis was born ‘a popular distrust of Gladstone's leadership in foreign affairs, a seed of grumbling that he had let the country down, which later events sprouted and Disraeli's dexterity watered, till it cast a shadow at the polls in 1874’ (Ensor, R. C. K., England 1870–1914 (Oxford, 1936), 5).Google Scholar