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IV. England, Italy, the Nile Valley and the European Balance, 1890–91

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 March 2010

G. N. Sanderson
G. N. Sanderson
Affiliation:
University of Khartoum
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Extract

In the negotiations relating to eastern and north-eastern Africa which Lord Salisbury conducted with Germany and Italy in 1890 and 1891, the desire to safeguard the waters of the Upper and Middle Nile usually played the predominant part. But this problem could not be solved in isolation from the more general considerations of Britain's position towards the powers of the Triple Alliance and, less directly, towards France. It was important that disputes relating to the upper basin of the Nile should not be permitted to disrupt the friendly relations with Germany and Italy which were themselves the diplomatic guarantee of Britain's continued presence in Egypt and indeed, since the Mediterranean Agreements of 1887, the main foundation of Salisbury's foreign policy. But it was equally important that the friendly settlement of these disputes should not result in alignments with Rome and Berlin so close as to destroy the generally tolerable relations with France which enabled Salisbury to avoid complete commitment to the Triple Alliance and an excessive dependence upon German goodwill. The history of the Anglo-Italian controversy and the immediate consequences of its settlement, which took place over a period of nearly two years, reveals more explicitly than the much briefer negotiation with Germany the perturbing influence of international rivalry in Africa upon Salisbury's delicate adjustments in Europe. For Salisbury the problem was complicated, rather than simplified, by the fact that Britain's rivals in Africa were friends nearer home.

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Articles
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The Historical Journal , Volume 7 , Issue 1 , March 1964 , pp. 94 - 119
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1964

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References

1 I am unable to accept, so far as the Upper Nile is concerned, the recent contention by Dr D. R. Gillard that ‘Salisbury's comprehensive programme presented to Hatzfeldt on 13 May had nothing to do with the protection of British interests in Uganda and the Upper Nile’ ( Gillard, D. R., ‘Salisbury's African Policy and the Heligoland offer of 1800’, E[nglish] H[istorical] R[eview], LXXV, 297, 631–53Google Scholar). Cf. my own article in E.H.R. LXXVIII, 306, 49-72.

2 Cf. Salisbury to Malet, 23 February 1887: ‘We have willingly ranged ourselves with the Central European Powers But when [Bismarck] wants us-as he evidently does-to quarrel with France downright…. I think he is driving too hard a bargain’ ( Cecil, Lady G., Life of Robert, Marquis of Salisbury, IV (1932), 41)Google Scholar.

3 At the very end of April 1890 Salisbury began seriously to interest himself in the fate of the Tana-Juba hinterland, which he had previously been content to leave to arbitration ([Die] G[roue] P[olitik der europaischen Kabinette], VIII, no. 1675, Hatzfeldt to Caprivi, 30 April 1890).

4 Gillard, , op. cit. 638–42Google Scholar, 651-3. Cf. Hollingsworth, L. W., Zaiuribar wider the Foreign Office, 1890-1913 (1953), 17-20, 25–9Google Scholar.

5 G.P. VIII, no. 1676, Hatzfeldt to Marschall, 14 May 1890. The Letters of Queen Victoria, III, I (1930), 613–14Google Scholar, Salisbury to the Queen, 10 June 1890. Salisbury's remarks simplify a complex situation and perhaps exaggerate the sharpness of the dilemma. But the dilemma nevertheless existed.

6 Cf. Salisbury's remarks at a time when Berlin still seemed indifferent to the Heligoland offer: ‘It does not seem likely that the German Emperor will accept any terms which will be acceptable to our Companies and missionaries…. It will not be practicable or desirable to come to any agreement which is not acceptable to them’ (The Lettert of Queen Victoria, III, I, 607, Salisbury to the Queen, 24 May 1890).

7 By the Anglo-French Declaration of 10 March 1862.

8 Salisbury's excuse to Waddington (which Waddington was inclined to accept), that he had simply forgotten all about the long-dormant French interest in Zanzibar, should probably not be taken seriously. Lady G. Cecil states that the French reaction ‘had not been unforeseen’, and that ‘the propitiatory terms to be offered were brought forward with a smooth rapidity which suggests a plan prepared’ ( Cecil, , op. cit. IV, 318). Cf. D[ocuments] D[iplomatiques/ F[rançai], Ire Série, VIII, no. 91, Waddington to Ribot, 21 June 1890; no. 132, same to same,26 July 1890Google Scholar.

9 The Anglo-French Agreement of 5 August 1890. Cf. Cecil, , op. cit. IV, 318–22Google Scholar; and Salisbury's remark to Waddington: ‘Chaque fois que vous etes venu, vous m/avez arrachi une concession; j/avaia commence par Tombouctou et j/ai fini a Say’ (D.D.F. I, VIII, no. 136, Waddington to Ribot, I August 1890). It was not until 1893, when French military enterprise had begun to outstrip Salisbury's concessions, that the Colonialist Group in France began to accuse Ribot of having been ‘jockeyed’ by Salisbury into accepting worthless ‘light land’.

10 Lytton to Salisbury, 29 June 1890 ( Cecil, , op. cit. IV, 318)Google Scholar.

11 Salisbury was particularly embarrassed by the Parliamentary Questions which followed the unauthorized publication of the ‘Banes’ of die Anglo-German Agreement in the St James's Gazette on 11 June.

12 Langer, W. L., The Franco-Russian Alliance (Cambridge, Mass., 1929), PP, 77–8Google Scholar;Cecil, , op. cit. IV, 296–300Google Scholar; The Letters of Queen Victoria, III, I, 611-15.

13 Cecil, , loc. cit and pp. 153–5Google Scholar.

14 By the Treaty of Uccialli. Italy had been in treaty relationship with Menelik since May 1883.

15 Cecil, op. cit. IV, 395–6Google Scholar, citing the correspondence.

16 [Public Record Office], F[oreign] Offfice], 78/4243, Baring to Salisbury, no. 405, 15 December 1889. Cf. F.O. 78/4307, same to same, no. 23, 18 January 1890: S[aliabury] P[apen], Egypt 1890, Baring to Harrington, 19 January 1890.

17 F.O. 78/4307, loc. cit.; S.P. loc. cit. F.O. 78/4308, Baring to Salisbury, no. 87,15 March 1800 (cf. F.O. 78/4306, Salisbury to Baring, no. 53, 7 March 1890, enclosing War Office to F.O., 4 March).

18 F.O. 78/4309, Baring to Salisbury, no. 102, 23 March 1890; no. 117, I April 1890; no. 137, 19 April.

19 F.O. 141/274, Salisbury to Baring:, no. 60, 14 March 1890, enclosing Salisbury to Dufferin, no. 60,7 March. Cf. C. Zaghi, ‘La Conferenza di Napoli tra l'Italia e I/lnghilterra’ (hereafter cited as: Zaghi, ‘Conferenza’), Ratugna di Politica Internationale, III (1936), 663–4Google Scholar.

20 Zaghi, , ‘Conferenza’, 664–5Google Scholar. Idem. ‘Il Problema di Casala e l/Italia’ (hereafter cited as: Zaghi, ‘Problema’), Storia e Politica Internationale (1940), 2, pp. 413-14, citing Tomielli to Crispi, 7 March 1890. F.O. 141/279, Dufferin to Salisbury, Tel. no. 21, 21 March 1890. Cf. F.O. 78/4318, Brackenbury to Francis Bertie, 27 March 1890-‘He [dal Verme] ia a friend of mine-and a very good fellow’.

21 F.O. 141/274, Salisbury to Baring, no. 76, 26 March 1890. The map had probably been brought by dal Venue.

22 G.P. VIII, no. 1972, Hatzfeldt to A[uswirtiges] A[mt], 26 March 1890, and minute by the Emperor; no. 1974, Solms-Sonnenwalde (Rome) to Caprivi, 8 April.

23 Zaghi, , ‘Problema’, 414–15Google Scholar, 417 citing dal Verme to Pisano Dossi (Crispi's chef de cabinet), 28 March 1890; dal Verme to Crispi, 20 April (both letters are printed, ibid. 430-2, 437-42). Verme, L. dal, ‘L/ltalia nel libro di Lord Cromer’, Nuova Antoiogia, aeries 5, CXXXVII (10 1908), 373–4Google Scholar.

24 F.O. 78/4313, Salisbury to Baring, Tel. no. 27, 28 March 1890. Cecil, , op. cit. IV, 327–8Google Scholar, citing Salisbury to Bating, 28 March 1890; Baring to Salisbury, 4 April.

25 Cecil, , op. cit. IV, 328–30Google Scholar, citing Baring to Salisbury, 4 April 1890; Salisbury to Baring, 25 April. F.O. 141/274, Salisbury to Baring, no. 98, 25 April 1890, enclosing Salisbury to Dufferin, no. 98, 23 April. F.O. 78/4313, Baring to Salisbury, Tel. no. 49, 2 May 1890; Salisbury to Baring, Tel. no. 39, 3 May.

26 Cf. Hornik, M. P., Dor Kampf der Grossáchie um den Oberlauf des Nil (Vienna, n.d.? 1938), 42–3Google Scholar; Bourgin, G., ‘Francesco Crispi’, in Let Politiques d/Expansion Imperialists (Paris, 1949), 139–40Google Scholar. F.O. 45/646, Dufferin to Salisbury, no. 47, 7 March 1890; cf. ibid, same to same, no. 86, 14 May 1890.

27 F.O. 141/379, Salisbury to Baring, Tel. no. 41, 5 May 1890. Verme, Dal, op. cit. 374Google Scholar.

28 When Baring pointed out, rather late in the day, that Egyptian territory could not legally be alienated without the consent of die Sultan, Salisbury ignored this difficulty and simply ruled that any agreement ‘should take the form of a mutual engagement by Italy on one side & England & Egypt—or England on behalf of Egypt on the other, not to occupy on the wrong side of the agreed line’ (F.O. 141/279, Baring to Salisbury, Tel. no. 60, 13 May 1890; F.O. 78/4313, minutes on this Tel. by Bertie and Salisbury). This deliberate confusion of British and Egyptian rights was to become an important weapon of British diplomacy in 1894-95.

29 F.O. 78/4313, Baring to Salisbury, Tels. no. 69, 24 May 1890; no. 76, 4 June; no. 80, 11 June. F.O. 78/4310, Baring to Salisbury, no. 193, la June, enclosing dal Verme to Baring, II June. Zaghi, , ‘Problema’, 417–19Google Scholar; ibid. 443-7, 452-4. dal Verme to Crispi, 25 May and 3 June.

30 F.O. 84/2038, Dufferin to Salisbury, no. 37, 23 June 1890. F.O. 78/4313, Baring to Salisbury, Tel. no. 80, II June.

31 Marder, A. J., The Anatomy of British Sea Power (New York, 1940) 1 141-2. 172–3Google Scholar.

32 ‘Der militirische Wert von Italiens Bundeagenosaenschaft hlngt zumeist davon ab, ob England der vierte im Bunde ist…’ (Memorandum by Caprivi, 23 April 1891, G.P. VII, no. 1412).

33 Cf. infra, p. 114.

34 Salisbury to Sir Philip Currie, 18 August 1892 ( Cecil, , op. cit. IV, 404–5)Google Scholar.

35 Notifying Dufferin in April 1890 of the suggestion that Baring should negotiate during his leave, Salisbury first wrote that ‘a small conference should be held’; but then deleted ‘small conference’ and wrote ‘informal consultation’ (F.O. 45/648, Salisbury to Dufferin, Tel. no. 25, 24 April 1890).

36 F.O. 84/2038, Dufferin to Salisbury, Tel no. 37,23 June 1890, and minutes by Currie and Salisbury; Salisbury to Dufferin, Tel. no. I Africa, 25 June; Dufferin to Salisbury, no. 9 Africa, 21 July; Salisbury to Dufferin, no. 32 Africa, 31 July. Dufferin moved just as slowly; he did not transmit Salisbury's query to Crispi until 13 August (F.O. 70/439). The bases of the Anglo-German Agreement had been fully agreed by 17 June.

37 It has not been possible to ascertain the exact date of this decision; but it was certainly earlier, and probably some days earlier, man 31 August.

38 Salisbury to Dufferin, 12 August 1890 ( Cecil, , op. cit. IV, 374–5Google Scholar; cf. ibid. 372-3). D.D.F. I, VIII, no. 163, Ribot to Montebello, 26 August 1800; cf. Albertini, L., The Origins of the War of 1914 (English edn., 1952), i, 69. G.P. VIII, no. 1862, Memo, by Caprivi, 15 May 1890; no. 1863, Marschall to Hatzfeldt, 24 May; nos. 1870, 1887, Hatzfeldtto A. A., 16 July, 1 August; nos. 1888, 1800, Holstein to Hatzfeldt, 2 and 3 August; no. 1893, Hatzfeldt to A.A., 9 August; no. 1894, Marschall to Hatzfeldt, 10 August; no. 1806, Solms-Sonnenwalde to Caprivi, 26 August. S.P. Italy 1890-2, Dufferin to Salisbury, 15 August. In Holstein's view a Franco-Italian partition of Tripoli would lead to ‘sofortigen Balkanbrand und Trennung Italiena vom Dreibund’ (G.P. VIII, no. 1890)Google Scholar.

39 G.P. VIII, no. 1977, Hatzfeldt to Caprivi, 29 August 1890. Deym to Kálnoky, 27 August 1890 (cited Hornik, , op. cit. 63Google Scholar).

40 Salisbury to Baring, 31 August 1890 ( Cecil, , op. cit. IV, 330–1)Google Scholar.

41 F.O. 170/442, Dufferin and Baring to Salisbury, Tel. unnumb., 30 September 1890; Salisbury to Baring, Tel. unnumb., 3 October; Dufferin and Baring to Salisbury, Tel. unnumb., 7 October. Zaghi, , ‘Conferenza’, 665–6Google Scholar.Verme, Dal, op. cit. 374–5Google Scholar. Dal Verme took part himself in this negotiation, and his account at this point is very circumstantial, being probably based on his own working notes or diaries.

42 F.O. 170/442, Salisbury to Baring, Tel unmimb., 10 October 1800. F.O. 170/426, Memorandum by Dufferin, 10 October; Dufferin to Salisbury, no. 175, 17 October. Verme, Dal, op. cit. 375–6.Google ScholarZaghi, , ‘Conferenra’, 666Google Scholar. S.P. Egypt 1890, Baring to Salisbury, II October. The British and the Italian accounts differ as to what passed at the private Dufferin-Crispi interview on the 10th. According to dal Verme, Crispi announced immediately after this meeting that Dufferin had accepted a compromise, only to be met a few minutes later by the flat rejection from London. Dufferin was at pains to explain, notably in his memorandum dated 10 October, that his views had never really differed from those of Baring. But it looks as if Dufferin had not been over-vehement in his disagreement with Crispi; and that it had been his role throughout to humour the Italians while Baring made the unpalatable demands.

43 S.P. loc. cit.

44 Zaghi, , ‘Conferenza’, 666–8Google Scholar. F.O. 45/647, Dufferin to Salisbury, no. 171, 16 October 1800. S.P. Italy 1800-2, Dufferin to Salisbury, 13 November-‘Crispi was in a real fright lest it should be supposed that die suspicion of a cloud had arisen between Italy and England, as it would tell so greatly against him at the elections’. F.O. 170/432, Salisbury to Dufferin, no. 219A, 15 October 1890. G.P. VIII, no. 1981, Hatzfeldt to Caprivi, 15 December 1890.

45 Menclik Was already beginning to challenge the Italian interpretation of Art. xvii of the Treaty of Uccialli (Archives du Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Paris: Mémoires at Documents Afrique 138, Abyssinie 5, Menelik to Sadi Carnot, 30 October 1890). By December 1890 the Italian Agent Antonelli was lamenting that in Abyssinia twelve years of work were in ruins and that ‘tout etatt a recommencer’ (ibid. Governor Obock to Colonies, 7 December 1890). Cf. Bourgin, , op. cit. 140–1Google Scholar; Homik, , op. cit. 48–9Google Scholar.

46 In 1894 Crispi wanted’ an understanding with England on the basis of a common action… under the Egyptian ftag'—Stillman to Wallace, 15 February 1894, cited History of’ ‘The Times’, III (1947), 253. Cf. G.P. VIII, no. 1991, Billow to Caprivi, 24 April 1894; no. 1996, Billow to A.A., 21 July 1894. Hornik sees as die key to his policy ‘die Hofmung auf Parallel-aktion, die Hofmung, gemeinsam mit England das Igyptiache und sudanesische Problem losen zu dorfen und einen entsprechenden Teil der Beute einzuhetmsen’ (op. cit. 73).

47 F.O. 141/274, Salisbury to Baring, no. 60, 14 March 1890, enclosing Salisbury to Dufferin, no. 60, 7 March. Zaghi, , ‘Problema’. 413–14Google Scholar, citing Tornielli to Crispi, 7 March 1890. For the motives of this proposal, cf. Zaghi, , ‘Conferenza’, 663–4Google Scholar.

48 Zaghi, , ‘Problema’, 415–17Google Scholar, citing dal Verme to Pissno Dossi, 29 March 1890, and da] Verme to Crispi, 20 April. The two letters are printed ibid. 431-3, 437-42.

49 Local inquiries through Baring completely failed to substantiate the report of a threatening Dervish concentration at Kassala; nor did the Italian War Ministry know anything of such a threat. The rumours of this incident which circulated in Rome did not enhance Crispi's prestige- ‘originelle aber unpraktische Versuche’, sneered the Austrian Ambassador. Zaghi, , ‘Conferenza’, 668–9Google Scholar(for the ‘time-limits proposal, of which there is no trace in the English documents). Idem,’ I Protocolli italo-britannici del 1891 (hereafter cited as: Zaghi, , ‘Protocolli’, Rastegna di Politico Internaxionale, IV (1937), 936–7Google Scholar. F.O. 45/648, Salisbury to Dufferin, Tel. no. 56, 12 November 1800; F.O. 170/426, Dufferin to Salisbury, Tel. no. 52, 13 November; F.O. 78/4313, Baring to Salisbury, Tel. no. 119, 14 November; F.O. 170/432, Salisbury to Dufferin, no. 242A, 17 November. Hornik, , op. cit. 65–6Google Scholar, citing Bruck to Kalnoky, 18 November 1890.

50 Salisbury to Dufferin, 7 January 1891 ( Cecil, , op. cit. IV, 377–8Google Scholar). F.O. 45/647, Dufferin to Salisbury, no. 222, 22 December 1890; F.O. 45/664, Salisbury to Dufferin, no. 4,2 January 1891. S.P. Italy 1890-2, Dufferin to Salisbury, 8 January 1891.

51 Dufferin believed that Crispi was ‘by no means in favour of a forward policy’ and had no intention of advancing to Kassala. He attributed the ‘miscarriage at Naples’ to the intransigence of dal Verme rather than of Crispi (S.P. Italy 1890-2, Dufferin to Salisbury, I October, 13 November 1890. F.O. 45/647, loc. cit.).

52 F.O. 84/2038, Dufferin to Salisbury, no. 15 Africa, 22 December 1800; F.O. 170/426, same to same, no. 221, 22 December; F.O. 170/439, Dufferin to Crispi, 24 December. S.P. Italy 1890-2, Dufferin to Salisbury, 25 December 1890; same to same, 7 January, 21 January 1891. F.O. 84/2131, minute, Currie to Anderson, 31 January 1891.

53 Cecil, , op. cit. IV, 334Google Scholar. F.O. 45/667, Salisbury to Dufferin, Tel. no. a, 4 February 1891; same to same, Tel. no. 3, 8 February.

54 F.0. 45/667, Dufferin to Salisbury, Tels. no. 9 and 10, 14 February 1891; same to same, Tel. no. 15,23 February. G.P. VIII, no. 1982, Solma-Sonnenwalde to Caprivi, 3 March 1891; and footnote reporting a further statement by di Rudinl to Solms on 22 March. C. Zaghi, ‘La Conquista di Casala’ (hereafter cited as: Zaghi, , ‘Conquista’), Nuova Antologia (10 1934). 603–4Google Scholar.

55 S.P. Italy 1890-2, Dufferin to Salisbury, 20 February 1891; F.O. 45/667, Dufferin to Salisbury, Tel. no. 15, 23 February.

56 F.O. 84/2131, F.O. to Dufferin, Tel. no. 13 Africa, 13 March 1891; Dufferin to F.O., Tel. no. i Africa, 24 March, and minute by Anderson. Text of the Protocol printed in E. Hertslet, The Map of Africa by Treaty, 3rd Edn. (1909), III, no. 288.

57 S.P. Italy 1890-2, Dufferin to Salisbury 30 March 1891. F.O. 45/667, Dufferin to Salisbury, Tel. no. 24, 15 April 1891. Text of Protocol printed, Hettslet, op. cit. HI, no. 289.

58 One of di Rudini's first acts had been to send the Borgnini-Martini commission to investigate the situation and prospects in East Africa. The Commission's report (published Gaxxetta Ufficialc, 2 October 1891) was remarkably sanguine, and laid particular emphasis on the retention of Agordat as a starting-point for ‘parallel action’ in the Sudan. Cf. F.O. 84/2131, Dering (Rome) to Salisbury, no. 7 Africa, 5 October 1891; Homik, , op. cit 54Google Scholar;Bourgin, , op. cit. 142Google Scholar.

59 S.P. loc. cit. F.O. 45/665, Dufferin to Salisbury, no. 65, 15 April 1891, enclosing text of the ‘Protocole Separe’; F.O. 45/664., Salisbury to Dufferin, no. 93, 7 May 1891. The test of the Secret Protocol is printed as an Appendix to this paper.

60 Langer, W. L., The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 2nd edn. (New York, 1951), 112Google Scholar.

61 Cf. Zaghi, , ‘Conferenza’, 669Google Scholar; ‘Conquista’, 607; ‘Protocolli’, 938-9; ‘Problema’, 430. In all these places Zaghi states that immediately before Crispi's fall Salisbury withdrew his reserves concerning Kaasala. No evidence is cited in support of this remarkable assertion, which is in no way corroborated by the F.O. papers.

62 Homik is near the mark, so Car as Crispi is concerned, when he says that ‘Um die italieniache Afrikapolitik zu verstehen, muss man daran festhalten, dan ihr wichtigstes Objekt der Nil war’ (op. cit 61).

63 Billot at Rome ww at pains to point this out to the Quai d/Onay (D.D.F. l, VIII, no. 339, Billot to Ribot, 17 April 1891). But Ribot addrened no observations either to Rome or to London. This rather surprising silence may be die source of die widespread belief among French publicists that the Protocol had been kept secret. It was in fact laid as a Blue Book on 5 May 1891 (Italy No. I (1891) [C.6316].

64 Shibeika, M., British Policy in tks Sudan, 1889-1903 (1952), 328–30Google Scholar, citing correspondence between Cramer and Rosebery, February-April 1894, from F.O. 78/4986. One of Crispins motives in advancing to Kassala was to force die hand of the British, and he was very irritated when London made no move (GJs. VIII, no. 1996, Billow to A. A., 21 July 1894). Cf. die German Emperor's comment- Nun sollte England gegen Chartum losgehens (ibid, no. 1097, minute).

65 In March 1893 di Rudinl's indifference to East Africa seemed so marked that it inspired fears in Paris lest the French should be left ‘seub europeens, en face de Menelik, dont lea bonnes dispositkms a notre egard tiennent…au besoin qu/il a de se menager un appui centre ritalie’ (D.D.F. i, IIC, no. 253, minute by Ribot on Billot's despatch of 2 April 1892).

66 S.P. Italy 1890-2, Dufferin to Salisbury, 30 March 1891.

67 Langer, , The Frattco-Rusnan Alliance, 117Google Scholar. D.D.F. I, VIII, no. 176, Billot to Ribot, 2 October 1890; no. 210, Herbette (Berlin) to Ribot, 21 November; no. 217, Billot to Ribot, 5 December. Cf. ibid. no. 335, Herbette to Ribot, 12 April 1891. Default on the January 1891 coupon of the Italian State Bonds had been avoided only through action taken by the German banker Bleichroeder at the personal request of the Emperor.

68 D.D.F. I, VIII, nos. 176, 181. Billot to Ribot, 2 and 10 October 1890; no. 183, Ribot to Billot, 12 October; no. 185, Billot to Ribot, 14 October.

69 Langer, , op. cit. 139Google Scholar. Albertini, , op. cit. 70- Rudinl ‘was regarded as a Francophile, capable of abandoning the Triplices. For die German dismay at Crispi's fall, cf. D.D.F. i, VIII, no. 246, Barrere (Munich) to Ribot, 3 February 1891; no. 247, Herbette to Ribot, 3 FebruaryGoogle Scholar.

70 Langer, , op. cit. 151 II. D.D.F. i, VIII. no. 253, Ribot, note of conversation with Menabrea, II February 1891; no. 256, Billot to Ribot, 13 February; nos. 258, 259, same to same, 14 February; no. 261, Ribot, note of conversation with Ressmann, 15 February; no. 262, Billot to Ribot, 15 February; no. 264, Ribot, memorandum on a communication by Baron Alphonse de Rothschild, 17 February; no. 272, Billot to Ribot, 21 February; no. 290, Ribot to Billot, 28 February.Google Scholar

71 D.D.F., I, VIII, nos. 259,290; cf. not. 253, 261. When on n Februtiy Menabrea had told Ribot that ‘la Triple Alliance eat dana I/interet de la France elle-meme’, ‘“Si cela eat vrai”, ai-je repliqul, “pourquoi ne publiez-vous paa ce traite? Vous feriez tomber bien dea defiances’”.

72 G.P. VII, no. 1401, Brack (Rome) to Kalnoky, 16 February 1891; no. 1402, Manchall, memorandum of conversation with de Launay (Italian ambassador), 7 March 1891. Langer, working from the German papers, accepted thia impreaaion aa accurate (op. cit. 152-4).

73 G.P. VII, no. 1402. Cf. Langer, , op. cit. 153Google Scholar.

74 C.P. VII, no. 1402; no. 1403, Marachall to Hatzfeldt, 9 March 1891; no. 1404, Solms- Sonnenwalde to A.A., 9 March, and minute by the Emperor; no. 1406, minute by Caprivi on Reuas (Vienna) to Caprivi, 19 March. The Germans were alao disturbed by the weakness of di Rudinl's parliamentary position and the possibility of his supersession by a Minister less favourable to themselves.,

75 G.P. VII, no. 1407, Manchall, memorandum of conversation with de Launay, 19 March 1891.

76 D.D.F. I VIII, no. 316, Billot to Ribot, 23 March 1891; no. 340, Ribot, note of a con-venation with Alphonae de Rothachild, 18 April; no. 342, Ribot, note of a conversation with Lelin Say, 27 April. Towarda the end of March Ribot began to believe, for the first time, that o change in Italian policy was possible. But he discouraged Billot from pressing di Rudinl too strongly, and urged that time should be allowed to do its work (D.D.R I, VIII, no. 324, Ribot to Billot, 28 March 1891). It is a complete distortion, derived once again from the account which di Rudinl gave to the Germans, to suggest that since ‘diplomatic pressure had failed completely… as a last resort die French foreign office turned to the use of financial pressure’ ( Langer, , op. cit. 156Google Scholar). It was the Italians who took the initiative throughout.

77 Cf. D.D.F. I, VIII, no. 255, Billot to Ribot, 12 February 1891.

78 G. J. VII, no. 1408, Solms-Sonnenwalde to Caprivi, 23 March 1891; no. 1418, Engel-brecht (military attachs, Rome) to the Emperor. The ‘dirty Jew’ (di Rudinl/a epithet, according to Engelbrecht) waa Signer Padoa, the Rothschilds' Italian agent.

79 G.P. VII, nos. 1402,1403.

80 S.P. Italy 1890-2, Dufierin to Salisbury, 30 March 1891.

81 G.P. VIII, no. 1707, Solros-Sonnenwalde to Caprivi, 12 April 1891; cf. ibid. no. 1706, Hatzfeldt to A.A., 26 March.

82 G.P. VIII, no. 1708, Manchall to Hatzfeldt, 18 April 1891; G.J.S. VII, nos. 1403, 1403.

83 G. P. VII, no. 1412, Memorandum by Caprivi, 23 April 1891; G.P. VIII, no. 1862, Memorandum by Caprivi, 15 May 1890.

84 G. P. VII, no. 1412; no. 1414, Memorandum by Marachall, 24 April 1891; no. 1419, Memorandum by Caprivi, 28 April; no. 1420, de Launay to Manchall, 30 April. G.P. VIII, no. 1862.

85 Langer, , op. cit. 158, 166Google Scholar. Salisbury to the Queen, 17 April 1891 ( Cecil, , op. cit. IV, 379Google Scholar). Cf. Rich, N. and Fisher, M. H., The Holsths Papint III (Cambridge, 1961), 377–8Google Scholar, Hatzfeldt to Holrtein, 14 April 1891. A.

86 G.P. VIII, nos. 1710, 1713, Hatzfeldt to A.A., 18 and 23 May 1891. Hatzfeldt had cor-recdy predicted this result in April. cf. Rich, and Fisher, , op. cit. III, 378–9, Hatzfeldt to Hobtein, 15 April 1891Google Scholar.

87 Salisbury to the Queen, 10 February 1887 ( Cecil, , op. cit. IV, 39Google Scholar). Cf. Salisbury to Malet, 23 February 1887; Salisbury to Wolff, 23 February (ibid. 40-2). Salisbury to White, 2 November 1887-‘I think…we are merely rescuing Bismarck's somewhat endangered chestnuts. If he can establish a South-Eastem [sic] raw, the Russian bear must perforce forget the Western raw on his huge carcase’ (ibid. 70-1). Cf. Kinsley, F. H., ‘Salisbury and the Mediterranean Agreements of 1887’, The Historical Journal, I, I (1958), 76–81CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

88 ‘If ever France should be on friendly terms with [her two eastern neighbours], the army and navy estimates would rise very rapidly’ (Salisbury to the Queen, 25 August 1888 ( Cecil, , op. cit. IV, 106Google Scholar)).

89 Marder, , op. cit. 150–1Google Scholar. Cf. Salisbury to Dufferin, 7 January 1891 ( Cecil, , op. cit. IV, 377–8Google Scholar).

90 G.P. VIII, nos. 1714, 1715, Solms-Sonnenwalde to Caprivi, 25 and 27 May 1891; no. 1716, Manchall to Hatzfeldt, 30 May; no. 1717, Hatzfeldt to A. A., I June. The first Italian draft amounted to a formal Quadruple Alliance in the Mediterranean.

91 Linger, , op. cit. 166–7Google Scholar. The Figaro article consisted of the reproduction of a letter from the Boulangist deputy Millevoye to Labouchere: Millevoye's informant was Prince Jérôme Napoléon, to whom King Humbert was supposed to have made the statement. It is not known whether di Rudinl had any part in prompting this publication.

92 G.P. VIII, no. 1720, Hatzfeldt to A.A., 6 June 1891; no. 1722, Hatzfeldt to Caprivi, 8 June.

93 G.P. VIII, no. 1723, Reuss to Caprivi, 10 June 1891; no. 1724, memorandum by Manchall, 6 July. Cf. the reply by Sir James Fergusson to Labouchere's question of 4 June ( Cecil, , op. cit. IV, 380–1Google Scholar).

94 Salisbury to Lytton, 16 June 1891 ( Cecil, , op. cit. IV, 381Google Scholar).

95 D.D.F. I, VIII, no. 386, Ribot to Waddington, 23 June 1891; no. 390, Waddington to Ribot, 25 June (Waddington cited in English die phrase quoted); no. 431, report of d'Estournelles, enclosed in Waddington to Ribot, 14 July.

96 The Letters of Queen Victoria, III, ii (1931). 64–5Google Scholar. Salisbury to die Queen, aa August 1891.

97 D.D.F. I, VIII, no. 431, Waddington to Ribot, 21 July 1891. Salisbury also undertook with success the delicate operation of keeping Prince Henry of Prussia out of sight during the visit.

98 Ibid. no. 430, Laboulaye (St Petersburg) to Ribot, 20 July 1891.

99 Meyendorff, A., Correspondence Diplomatique de M. de Stool (Paris, 1929), II, 137–8Google Scholar, 140-1: Gien to Staal, 29 May 1891; Staal to Giera, 16 June, i July, 14 July 1891. D.D.F. I, VIII, no. 415, Vauvineux to Ribot, 9 July 1891; ibid. no. 430. Cf. Langer, , op. cit. 182–4Google Scholar.

100 D.D.F. I, VIII, no. 430.

101 Cf. Shuvalov's comment on the published bases of the Anglo-German Agreement of 1890: ‘On compte…, a Londres, barrer le chemin de notre politique traditionelle en Orient’ (ibid. no. 83, Herbette to Ribot, 17 June 1890).

102 Ibid. no. 434, Projet de Note pour le Gouvemement ruaae,23 July 1891. It seems evident from the context that Italy is the ‘Power’ alluded to.

103 Staal to Giers, I July 1890 ( Meyendorff, , op. cit. II, 88–9Google Scholar). D.D.F. I, VIII, no. 83, Herbette to Ribot, 17 June 1800; no. 140, same to same, 5 August 1890. Both Staal and Herbette speculate on the possibility of secret clauses to the Agreement

104 While at the same time retaining Italian confidence by refusing any concession to France on the question of the Tunisian customs duties. [I am most grateful to the Marquess of Salisbury for permission to make use of the Salisbury Papers.]