¹ Amery, L. S., My political life (London, 1955), ii, 144.Google Scholar

² Those in the Union who endorsed the use of sanctions against an aggressive power were sensitive to the charge that they were ‘bloodthirsty’ or ‘warmongers’. Typical of this jibe was the statement of Austen Chamberlain: ‘Oh, these peace lovers. They are far worse than the men of war’ (A. Chamberlain to his sister Hilda, 23 May 1932, A. Chamberlain papers, 5/1/582, University of Birmingham Library).

³ Gilbert Murray, ‘an ordinary orthodox Leaguer’, explained the difference between the two groups as: ‘Supposing all measures of conciliation and arbitration fail, supposing collective non co-operation breaks down and the war-maker finds his course free before him. They, I presume, will say: “Let him work his will. Submission is at least better than war.” The true Leaguer will still have two resources left: first, to try even yet to deter the aggressor by showing that he will be confronted by so strong an alliance that conference and arbitration will pay him much better than war; and at last, at the very last, rather than acquiesce in die unopposed triumph of evil, to accept his challenge and fight for the law.’ Letter to The Times, 17 May 1937, reproduced in Headway, June 1937, p. 113.Google Scholar

⁴ Based on die argument that 14 October 1933, the date when Germany withdrew from the disarmament conference and the League, marks the end of the Locarno period.

⁵ Martin, Kingsley, Father figures (Chicago, 1970), p. 97.Google Scholar

⁶ Middlemas, Keith (ed.), Whitehall diary (London, 1969), i, 148.Google Scholar A statement reputedly made by Austen Chamberlain at an informal conference of cabinet ministers on 13 April 1921.

⁷ Edgar Algernon Robert Cecil, born 1864, third son of third marquess of Salisbury. Became Viscount Cecil of Chelwood in 1923. Cecil was chairman of the Union's executive committee, 1919–23, and joint president or president, 1923–45. For biographical information see Rose, Kenneth, The later Cecils (London, 1975),Google Scholar and Cecil, Lord David, The Cecils of Hatfield House (Boston, 1973).Google Scholar Perceptive comments on Cecil are found in Salvador de Madariaga's essay, ‘Gilbert Murray and die League’, in Smith, Jean and Toynbee, Arnold (eds.), Gilbert Murray: an unfinished autobiography (London, 1940),Google Scholar and Salter, Lord, Memoirs of a public servant (London, 1961).Google Scholar One of Cecil's early French tutors referred to him as an ‘esprit positif’ and Cecil's mother said he had the jaw of a wild beast (Viscountess Cecil to Gilbert Murray, 8 Dec. 1932, Gilbert Murray papers, Bodleian Library, Oxford).

⁸ See, for example, Thorne, C. G., ‘Viscount Cecil, the government and the Far Eastern crisis of 1931', Historical Journal, XIV (1971),Google Scholar and Thome's book, The limits of foreign policy: the West, the League and the Far Eastern crisis of 1931–1933 (London, 1972).Google Scholar

⁹ This represented individuals 16 years of age and upwards who had joined the Union and never been reported as dead or resigned. More telling figures were of paid-up subscriptions, which were 406, 868 in 1931, 388, 255 in 1932 and 373,912 in 1933. In June 1932 Gilbert Murray complained that the membership was not increasing as rapidly as before, with smaller increases in 1931 than 1930 and smaller in 1932 than 1931 (Headway, June 1933, p. 123, and Feb. 1935, p. 23).Google Scholar

¹⁰ Murray to Cecil, 17 Nov. 1936, Gilbert Murray papers.

¹¹ Carr, E. H., Britain: a study of foreign policy (London, 1939), pp. 100–1, 108–9.Google Scholar ‘The vast mass of those who sympathized with the ideals of the League of Nations did not read the Covenant, or failed to grasp its implications. They relied on their leaders; and their leaders did not enlighten them.’ Public opinion did not consider the onerous obligations. ‘The League was an organisation for peace; and it seemed paradoxical to argue that its Covenant imposed on Britain military commitments more far-reaching than any she had hitherto undertaken. The ordinary Englishman does not read legal documents.’

¹² Murray to Cecil, 22 Aug. 1939, Cecil papers, 51133. In 1920 Murray, an Oxford professor who was chairman 1923–38, wrote a small book for the Union, The guarantees of the League, in which he said coercive power was failure. A League always in arms coercing would-be war-makers was a League in the last stage of collapse. A successful League was one that secured international justice by removing oppression and fears of oppression and spread the habit of general confidence and security (p. 22).

¹³ Cecil to Murray, 30 July 1936, Cecil papers, 51132, British Library. Cecil told the house of commons in 1919 that there would be no attempt to rely upon force to carry out a decision of the Council or the Assembly of the League. The great weapon would be public opinion and ‘if we are wrong about it then the whole thing is wrong’ (House of commons, Debates, 21 July 1919, 5th series, cxviii, col. 990).Google Scholar

¹⁴ Cecil to D. D. Davies, 9 May 1923, Cecil papers, 51138.

¹⁵ Murray to Cecil, 31 Jan. 1930, Gilbert Murray papers.

¹⁶ Murray to Cecil, 21 Feb. 1930, Gilbert Murray papers. Smuts argued that conference, not coercion, was the League's technique; he made a volte-face in 1935 over Abyssinia. See Hancock, W. K., Smuts: the fields of force (Cambridge, 1968), p. 273.Google Scholar Kerr agreed with Smuts: war was prevented through conference, reason, good-will, but he did not go as far as the pacifists in thinking it was immoral and wrong to take action against a power starting a war (Kerr to Graham Bower, 17 June 1930, Lothian papers, GD40/17/246, Scottish Record Office, Edinburgh).

¹⁷ Murray to Cecil, 16 May 1930, Gilbert Murray papers.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ In an article entitled ‘Responsibilities and confusions’, Headway, Feb. 1931, p. 27.Google Scholar Similar views were expressed in an editorial, ‘An ordered world’, in the same issue.

²⁰ Murray to Cecil, 26 Jan. 1931, Gilbert Murray papers.

²¹ See de Madariaga's essay, ‘Gilbert Murray and the League’ in Smith, and Toynbee, (eds.), Gilbert Murray.Google Scholar

²² Cecil, Lord Robert, The moral basis of the League of Nations (London, 1923), p. 28.Google Scholar

²³ On these assumptions and the root philosophy of the League, see Cecil, , The moral basis of the League; Spender, J. A., Between two wars (London, 1943);Google ScholarHancock, W. K., Four studies of war and peace in this century (Cambridge, 1961);Google Scholar and Fisher, H. A. L. et al. , The background and issues of the War (Oxford, 1940).Google Scholar

²⁴ See, for example, Richards, Leyton, Realistic pacifism: the ethics of war and the politics of peace (New York, 1972),Google Scholar which combines two books published by Richards, a prominent Christian pacifist, in England in 1929 and 1935. Pacifist thinkers were far less sanguine in the 1930s about developing a ‘new mentality’ or about the intention of existing governments. And as sanctions became less remote, they were eager to eliminate. all coercive elements in the Covenant. See, for example, Joad, C. E. M., Under the fifth rib (New York, 1933);Google ScholarMatthews, Charles H. S., Dick Sheppard: man of peace (London, 1948);Google Scholar and Huxley, Aldous, Ends and means (New York, 1937).Google Scholar

²⁵ The phrase of F. H. Hinsley, who has developed the argument in Power and the pursuit of peace (Cambridge, 1967).Google Scholar See also Barros, James, The Corfu incident of 1925 (Princeton, 1965),Google Scholar and the conclusions of Thorne, Limits of foreign policy.

²⁶ The judgement of Hancock, , Smuts: the fields of force, pp. 229–30.Google Scholar

²⁷ See the preface Murray wrote for Hope Costley White's Willoughby Hyett Dickinson 1859–1943 (Gloucester, 1956).Google Scholar

²⁸ Cecil, , All the way, p. 158.Google Scholar This judgement overlooks the Scandinavian countries.

²⁹ The Times, 5 Oct. 1918, 7:1. See also Toynbee, Arnold, Survey of international affairs 1929 (London, 1930), p. 1.Google Scholar

³⁰ This is the likely judgement of future historians, says Wolfers, Arnold, Britain and France between two wars (New York, 1940), pp. 335–36.Google Scholar

³¹ Cited in Thorne, , Limits of foreign policy, p. 382.Google Scholar This is a memorandum on League policy dated 26 May 1936, Cecil papers 51083.

³² Address given 12 Oct. 1937 (see Headway, , Nov. 1937, p. 212).Google Scholar Such convictions, and their articulation, became clearer and firmer as the decade progressed. See, for example, Cecil's, Peace and pacifism (Oxford, 1938).Google Scholar In an editorial in die January 1932 issue of Headway, ‘Manchuria: the moral’, Murray claimed that the failure of the League had been one of public opinion – support for the Covenant was not clear and unmistakable. But this editorial, and succeeding ones, were undecided on die proper response to Japanese aggression. In November 1932 Headway thought the forming of a right judgement was more important than any economic or military means which might give effect to the Lytton report.

³³ See, for example, Attlee's, C. R.An international police force (London, 1934).Google Scholar This was a New Commonwealth Publication. The Commonwealth, founded in 1932 by Lord Davies, advocated the creation of an international tribunal, empowered to adjudicate upon all disputes arising between nations, and an international police force to prevent aggression and to act as the ultimate sanction of the tribunal.

³⁴ Cecil to General Smuts, 6 Oct. 1922, Cecil papers, 51076.

³⁵ Minutes of the executive committee of the League of Nations Union, Book 11, pp. 264, 294–6, London School of Economics.

³⁶ A. Chamberlain to sister Ida, 1 Apr. 1933, A. Chamberlain papers, 5/1/613; Cecil to A. Chamberlain, 10 Apr. 1933, A. Chamberlain papers, 40/5/27; Chamberlain to Murray, 15 Apr. 1933, A. Chamberlain papers 40/5/29; Chamberlain to Murray, 2 May 1933, A. Chamberlain papers, 40/5/34.

³⁷ The executive committee adopted the report 16 to 10. But Chamberlain maintained two Conservatives were absent, which meant a real division of 16 to 12, or 4 to 3 (Chamberlain to Cecil, 12 Apr. 1933, A. Chamberlain papers, 40/5/28).

³⁸ Cecil to Chamberlain, 10 Apr. 1933, A. Chamberlain papers, 40/5/27; Chamberlain to Murray, 19 Nov. 1934, A. Chamberlain papers, 40/6/55. Chamberlain thought everyone should be free to express his own view: Chamberlain to sister Ida, 1 Apr. 1933, A. Chamberlain papers, 5/1/613.

³⁹ Chatfield, Charles, For peace and justice (Knoxville, Tenn., 1971), p. 265.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ Chamberlain to Lord Cranborne, 12 May 1932, A. Chamberlain papers, 39/5/34.

⁴¹ For pacifist objections see t h e above letter as well as one to John Simon, 30 May 1932, A. Chamberlain papers, 39/5/36. See also the minutes of the executive committee, 26 May 1932, Book 11, pp. 294–6.

⁴² Chamberlain to Gilbert Murray, 8 Feb. 1932, A. Chamberlain papers, 39/5/17.

⁴³ See Cecil's memorandum on disarmament dated 27 Nov. 1933, A. Chamberlain papers, 40/5/134s, and the ‘Six point disarmament programme’ in the September 1933 issue of Headway.

⁴⁴ Monthly issues of The London Bulletin from January 1928 to 1936 are found in the British Library. 1931 and 1932 issues were largely devoted to disarmament, with the January 1932 issue headlined: ‘Help to make 1932 a disarmament year.’

⁴⁵ The London Bulletin, September 1935.

⁴⁶ Cecil to Noel Baker, 16 Nov. 1932, Cecil papers, 51107.

⁴⁷ Col. P. Docker to Cecil, 12 Feb. 1934; Cecil to P. Docker, 13 Apr. 1934; Cecil to Lord Gage, 6 Dec. 1934, Cecil papers, 51168.

⁴⁸ Cecil to Lord Gage, 6 Dec. 1934, Cecil papers, 51168.

⁴⁹ Headway, Aug. 1934, p. 156.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ So claimed a correspondent in Headway, May 1937, p. 97.Google Scholar

⁵¹ House of lords Debates, 2 Mar. 1937, 5th series, civ, 418 and 421.Google Scholar Cecil developed these arguments fully and cogently in the Romanes lecture delivered 17 May 1938. It was published as Peace and pacifism (Oxford, 1938).Google Scholar

⁵² Cecil to Halifax, 1 Feb. 1940, Cecil papers, 51109.