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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 February 2009
In defining the tradition of Austria's German policy between 1815 and 1870, Helmut Rumpler wrote recently that it was both consistent and contradictory. On the one hand it was characterized by a struggle against the establishment of Prussian hegemony in Germany while, on the other, it sought co-operation with Berlin based upon the unspoken but clear assumption of a shared or dualistic supremacy within the German Confederation. Far from wanting to weaken Prussia or significantly to diminish the role Berlin would play in either German or European affairs, Vienna was painfully aware of the importance of a strong Prussia for the maintenance of Austria's position as a European power. The problem of Prussia for Austrian policy was therefore the need to find ways to reconcile the necessity of opposing Prussia's ambitions with the equally obvious need to secure her co-operation and support. The dilemma facing Vienna was one of devising policies consistent with the fact that Prussia was at the same time Austria's most dangerous rival and her most important ally.
1 Rumpler, H., ‘Österreich-Ungarn und die Gründung des deutschen Reiches’, in Europa und die Reichsgründung: Preussen-Deutschland in der Sicht der grossen euroäischen Mächte 1860–1880, ed. Kolb, Eberhard, Historische Zeitschrift, Beiheft 6, Neue Folge (Munich, 1980), pp. 144–5Google Scholar.
2 Concerning the importance of Prussia for the struggle against revolution, Schwarzenberg wrote to Prokesch, ‘… if Prussia wants honestly and earnestly to come to terms with us, we will be the strongest and most courageous in Europe and will confront the revolution boldly and successfully’. Schwarzenberg to Prokesch, 17 March 1851, private, Haus–, Hof– und Staatsarchiv, Vienna (hereafter HHStA), Politisches Archiv (PA) XL 320.
3 The literature on this subject is enormous, reflecting the importance historians have attached to it over the years. It has been so important to both the defenders and the opponents of the Bismarckian empire that every generation has had to reinterpret it in its own terms. Perhaps this article could be viewed as an attempt to understand one of the important episodes of German history by a member of the generation that has accepted a multi-state system in Germany as the norm. Be that as it may, it is the product of research into the private papers of the Austrian participants, whose views and aims were neither fully explored nor completely understood by those whose perspectives of the German question were informed by commitments to kleindeutsch, grossdeutsch, gesamtdeutsch, or other varieties of German nationalist thought and were either wholly or partly opposed to the political system in Germany that the Austrians defended. The idea that Austria sought supremacy in Germany appears throughout the literature, including recent, influential works. See, for example, Schoeps, H. J., Von Olmütz nach Dresden, 1850–1851: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Reformen am deutschen Bund, Veröffentlichungen aus den Archiven preussischer Kulturbesitz, VII (Cologne and Berlin, 1972), 46–9Google Scholar, 153–4; and Böhme, H., Deutschlands Weg zur Grossmacht: Studien zum Verhältnis von Wirtschaft und Staat während der Reichsgründungszeit 1848–1881 (Cologne and Berlin, 1966), pp. 8Google Scholar, 14–15. Older works include, Meyer, A. O., Bismarcks Kampf mit Österreich am Bundestag zu Frankfurt 1851 bis 1859 (Berlin and Leipzig, 1927), p. 66Google Scholar and passim; von Srbik, H., Deutsche Einheit: Idee und Wirklichkeit vom Heiligen Reich bis Königgrätz (4 vols., Munich, 1935–1942), II, 123–4Google Scholar, 138—9; id., Metternich, der Staatsmann und der Mensch (2 vols., Munich, 1925), II, 374Google Scholar, 391–2, 416, 536–7; Henderson, W. O., The Zollverein (Cambridge, 1939), pp. 202–7Google Scholar; von Sybel, H., The founding of the German Empire under William I, trans. Perrin, M. L. (New York, 1890), I, 83–6Google Scholar. For a critical analysis of Böhme's reliance on this view, see Pflanze, O., ‘Another crisis among German historians? Helmut Böhme's Deutschlands Weg zur Grossmacht’, Journal of Modern History (JMH), XL (03 1968), 124–5Google Scholar. A reinterpretation of Austria's entire German policy for the years 1848–1864 can be found in Austensen, R. A., ‘Austria and the “Struggle for Supremacy in Germany”, 1848–1864’, JMH, LII (06 1980), 195–225Google Scholar.
4 Fellner, F. and Schmid, G. E., ‘Ende oder Epoche der deutschen Geschichte? Bemerkungen zum Abschlussband des Gebhardtschen Handbuches’, Zeitgeschichte, V, no. 4 (1978), 158–71Google Scholar; Rumpler, , ‘Österreich-Ungarn und die Gründung des deutschen Reiches’, p. 142Google Scholar.
5 The collections on which this essay is based include the Metternich family archives in Prague, Státní ústředí archiv v Praze (SUA), Rodinný archiv Metternišski (RAM), Acta Clementina (AC), Correspondance Politique Autriche (CPA) and Correspondance du Prince Clément (CPC); the papers of Friedrich Thun-Hohenstein in the Státní oblastní archiv Litoměřice, pobočka Děčín (SALD), Rodinný archiv Thun-Hohenstein (RAT), pozustalost Friedrich Thun-Hohenstein (FTH), in Děčín, Czechoslovakia; and the papers of Carl von Buol-Schauenstein, Johann von Rechberg, and Anton von Prokesch-Osten in the HHStA, Vienna.
6 Srbik, , Metternich, II, 359–60Google Scholar, 460–1. Metternich's view of Schwarzenberg was probably not as harsh as one might conclude from the diary of his wife, Princess Melanie, on which Srbik based his view. Metternich credited Schwarzenberg with learning a good deal during his brief but hectic tenure in office. An exchange between Metternich and Hübner shortly after Schwarzenberg's death suggests that Metternich genuinely valued his achievements even though he criticized what he considered his many shortcomings. Metternich to Hübner, May 1852 (copy), SUA, RAM/AC, CPC 13/38 B; Hübner to Metternich, 30 May 1852, ibid., CPA 3/27 A.
7 Rechberg to Metternich, 30 May 1850, ibid., CPA 5/57 A. Friedrich Thun also complained that Werner was responsible for problems with Austria's German policy. Thun to Prokesch, 16 Sept. 1850, private, HHStA, Gesandtschaftsarchiv (GA) Berlin 133. It is not clear what the difficulty with Werner might have been. He had served under Metternich for many years and others thought highly of him. See von Arneth, Alfred, Aus meinem Leben (2 vols., Vienna, 1891–1892), II, 5–7Google Scholar.
8 Hübner to Metternich, 20 Feb. 1850, and 7 Dec. 1850 (secret), SUA, RAM/AC, CPA 3/27A. On Schwarzenberg's subalterns in the Ballhausplatz, see Rumpler, H., Die deutsche Politik des Freiherm von Beust 1848–1850: Zur Problematik mittelstaatlicher Reformpolitik im Zeitalter der Paulskirche, Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für neuere Geschichte Österreichs, LVII (Vienna, 1972), p. 199Google Scholar. Count Joachim Münch-Bellinghausen, who served for many years at Frankfurt under Metternich, also thought that Schwarzenberg's choices for the Frankfurt ‘Interim’ Commission were weak. He would have preferred Rechberg to Kübeck since the latter's experience was limited to domestic affairs. Munch to Metternich, 31 Mar. 1850, SUA, RAM/AC, CPA 5/52A.
9 Handel to Thun, 29 June 1850, private, HHStA, Frankfurt Correspondenz 67.
10 Kübeck to Prokesch, 9 Apr. 1850, private, ibid., GA Berlin 133.
11 Hübner to Metternich, 24 Oct. 1850, SUA, RAM/AC, CPA 3/27A. In thanking Prokesch for a letter, Hübner remarked, ‘… the Staatskanzlei has become more silent than ever. It drives one to despair. This apathy at such a time.’ Hübner to Prokesch, 5 Sept. 1849, private, HHStA, GA Berlin 132.
12 The decrees on organization are dated 19 Feb. 1849, 22 June 1849, and 1 Dec. 1850. HHStA, Administrative Registratur, F4, Generalia P-T.
13 Schwarzenberg to Metternich, 16 Feb. 1849, and 24 July 1850, SUA, RAM/AC, CPC 13/75A. An excerpt of the letter of 16 Feb. 1849 is in Aus Metternichs Nachgelassenen Papieren (NP), ed. Metternich-Winneburg, Prince Richard and von Klinkowström, Alfons (8 vols., Vienna, 1880–1884), VIII, 475–6Google Scholar.
14 Most of this correspondence is in the HHStA, GA Berlin 132–3.
15 Thus, Hübner replied to Prokesch's letter of 30 May 1849, ‘Your letter anticipated mine. It is necessary for us to have a mutual exchange of information since the Staatskanzlei does not do it at all. Has it fallen asleep again, this unbelievable chancellery? That Prince Schwarzenberg cannot serve as his own Referent is obvious.’ Hübner to Prokesch, 6 June 1849, private, HHStA, GA Berlin 132. The Austrian minister in Hamburg, Langermann, later wrote, ‘… I cannot tell you how important it is for me here to know the true state of things and not to have to wander around in the dark’. Langermann to Prokesch, 13 Nov. 1850, private, ibid., GA Berlin 133.
16 See, for example, Hübner to Prokesch, 8 July 1849, 17 July 1849, and 11 Oct. 1849 (all private), HHStA, GA Berlin 132. Rechberg did the same while he was in Frankfurt with Archduke John. Ibid., GA Berlin 132.
17 Hoffmann, J., ‘Russland und die Olmützer Punktation vom 29. November 1850’, Forschungen zur osteuropäische Geschichte, VII (1959), 59–71Google Scholar.
18 Metternich, to Hübner, , 5 Dec. 1849, in de Grunwald, C. (trans.), Mémoires du Prince de Metternich, IV: Lettres inédites du Prince de Metternich au Baron Hübner, 1849–1859 (Paris, 1959), 82Google Scholar.
19 On Metternich's activities in the months after his fall, see Obermann, K., ‘Unveröffentlichte Materialien über die Tätigkeit Metternichs in der Revolution von 1848–1849’, Mitteilungen des österreichischen Staatsarchivs, XXI (1968), 214–37Google Scholar.
20 In January 1850 he boasted to Hübner that he was well informed on German affairs. Metternich, to Hübner, , 28 01 1850, in Grunwald, (trans.), Lettres inédiles, 112–13Google Scholar. Metternich relied upon Prokesch for much of his news from Germany and also used him to make his views known in Vienna. See Metternich, to Prokesch, , 21 10 1849, in von Prokesch, Anton, Aus dem Nachlasse des Grafen Prokesch-Osten: Briefwechsel mit Herrn von Gentz und Fürsten Metternich (2 vols., Vienna, 1881), II, 328–34Google Scholar.
21 According to Obermann, the tone of Metternich's letters to Schwarzenberg suggests that he considered himself a political confidant of the Austrian government. ‘Unveröffentlichte Materialien über die Tätigkeit Metternichs’, 241.
22 Metternich was not very subtle about it. ‘If you find that certain of my opinions may be useful in high places …’, Metternich, to Hübner, , 18 12 1849, in Grunwald, (trans.), Lettres inédites, 86–7Google Scholar.
23 Hübner to Metternich, 31 Aug. 1849, SUA, RAM/AC, CPA 3/27A.
24 Hübner to Schwarzenberg, 9 Ma y 1849, private, ibid., CPC 13/38A.
25 The best work on Prokesch during his years in Berlin is the dissertation by Hoffmann, J., ‘Die Berliner Mission des Grafen Prokesch-Osten, 1849–1852’ (D.Phil, thesis, Free University of Berlin, 1959Google Scholar). Also useful is Engel-Janosi, F., ‘Ein Kampf um Österreich in Berlin und Frankfurt 1849–1855’, in Geschichte auf dem Ballhausplatz: Essays zur österreichischen Ausstnpolitik 1830–1945 (Graz, Vienna, and Cologne, 1963), pp. 65—101Google Scholar.
26 In the spring of 1849 Prokesch viewed Prussia as virtually the last hope against revolution in Germany. As he wrote to Thun in Munich, ‘… Austria cannot send a single man to Germany; the German governments are either already lost to the revolution or can only be rescued by Prussia’. Prokesch to Thun, 14 May 1849, private, SALD, RAT/FTH, D 76–10. Two years later he again commented on Prussia's strength to Thun. ‘Toward a well-administered state that has twenty-one million Thaler in its pocket and consistently pursues conservative progress, words will not suffice. Above all, it would be a childish mistake to expect that I can convince people here that it is not in their interest to aspire to ascendancy in Germany.’ Prokesch to Thun, 12 Nov. 1851, private, HHStA, GA Berlin 134.
27 Prokesch to Schwarzenberg, 30 Mar. 1849, 22 Oct. 1849, and 21 Nov. 1849 (all private), in von Osten, Anton Prokesch, Aus den Briefen des Grafen Prokesch von Osten, 1840–1855 (Vienna, 1896), pp. 21Google Scholar, 96, and 102. Hoffmann, , ‘Die Berliner Mission des Grafen Prokesch-Osten’, pp. 74–75Google Scholar, 81, and passim.
28 After describing the situation in the summer of 1850 as hopeless, Prokesch concluded a letter to Metternich, ‘I have many sad reflections on this, too many for the space of a letter …’ Prokesch to Metternich, 6 July 1850, SUA, RAM/AC, CPA 5/56A. Prokesch's diary also suggests that his moods varied from excited enthusiasm to deep melancholy. HHStA, Nachlass Prokesch, TagebüCher, vols. 8 and 9, passim.
29 Concerning the risks he took, Prokesch once remarked that they were the kind ‘that in military life, if they succeed, earn the Maria Theresa Cross’. Quoted in Hoffmann, , ‘Die Berliner Mission des Grafen Prokesch-Osten’, p. 62Google Scholar. Schwarzenberg appears to have given his envoys much more freedom than Metternich had before 1848 or that Buol would after 1852. Freiherr Maximilian von Handel, who was in Stuttgart for many years, maintained that Schwarzenberg relied more on his diplomats abroad and thereby gave them increased status with the governments to which they were accredited. Handel to Rechberg, 20 May 1859, private, HHStA, PA I 527.
30 Hübner to Metternich, 21 Feb. 1851, SUA, RAM/AC, CPA 3/27A; Metternich, to Hübner, , 24 02 1851, in Grunwald, , trans., Lettres inédites, 133Google Scholar.
31 Metternich to Hübner, 3 Sept. 1849, SUA, RAM/AC, CPC 13/38B. This letter is in Grunwald, , trans., Lettres inédites, 36–40Google Scholar.
32 Metternich to Schwarzenberg, 3 Sept. 1849, SUA, RAM/AC, CPC 13/75B/I; Metternich to Schwarzenberg, 6 July 1850, and 22 Aug. 1850, ibid., CPC 13/75B/II. Metternich's letter of 22 Aug. 1850 is in Beer, Adolf (ed.), Kübeck und Metternich: Denkschriften und Briefe, Denkschriften der kaiserlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften in Wien, Philosophische-Historische Classe, XLV (Vienna, 1897), 125–9Google Scholar. Hübner had little use for the middle-sized states and warned Prokesch not to trust Ludwig von der Pfordten, the Bavarian Minister-President. Hübner to Prokesch, 17 July 1849, private, HHStA, GA Berlin 132.
33 Metternich, to Hübner, , 22 12 1849, in Grunwald, (trans.), Lettres inédites, 93Google Scholar; Metternich to Koller, 25 Jan. 1850, and 6 June 1850 in NP, VIII, 294, 304–5.
34 Schwarzenberg to Metternich, 24 July 1850, private, SUA, RAM/AC, CPC 13/75A.
35 Rumpler, , Die deutsche Politik des Freiherrn von Beust, pp. 198–201Google Scholar; Hoffmann, , ‘Der Berliner Mission des Grafen Prokesch-Osten’, pp. 20–1Google Scholar. F. Engel-Janosi questions whether Schwarzenberg was really willing to make such concessions, although he thinks that Rechberg, Prokesch, and Hübner were sincere in advocating them. Engel-Janosi, , Graf Rechberg: Vier Kapitel zu Seiner und Österreichs Geschichte (Munich and Berlin, 1927) pp. 12–13Google Scholar.
36 Prokesch to Thun, 14 May 1849, private, SALD, RAT/FTH, D 76–10.
37 According to Rumpler, , ‘Prussia was not satisfied to exclude Austria from a German Bundesstaat. She did not want to tolerate any power next to her.’ Die deutsche Politik des Freiherrn von Beust, p. 245Google Scholar.
38 Prokesch to Archduke John, 21 May 1849, private, HHStA, GA Berlin 132.
39 Hoffmann, , ‘Die Berliner Mission des Grafen Prokesch-Osten’, pp. 29–38Google Scholar.
40 Rumpler, H., ‘Felix Schwarzenberg und das “Dritte Deutschland”: Überlegungen zu Heinrich von Srbiks Interpretation der deutschen Politik Österreichs’, in Beiträge zur neueren Geschichte Österreichs, ed. Fichtenau, Heinrich and Zöllner, Erich (Vienna, 1974), pp. 378–9Google Scholar.
41 Metternich to Schwarzenberg, 31 May 1849, quoted in Obermann, , ‘Unveröffentlichte Materialien über die Tätigkeit Metternichs’, 243Google Scholar.
42 Metternich to Schwarzenberg, 3 Sept. 1849, SUA, RAM/AC, CPC 13/75B/I. For the complete text of this memorandum, see Austensen, R. A., ‘Einheit oder Einigkeit? Another look at Metternich's view of the German dilemma’, German Studies Review, VI (02 1983), 41–57CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Metternich províded Prokesch with similar observations on German affairs. See, for example, the series of letters from 15 to 23 Nov. 1849, in Prokesch, , Aus dem Nachlasse, II, 334–45Google Scholar.
43 Metternich, to Hübner, , 22 12 1849, and 5 Jan. 1850, in Grunwald, (trans.), Lettres inédites, 93Google Scholar, 100; Metternich to Koller, 25 Jan. 1850, in NP, VIII, 294.
44 Schwarzenberg to Metternich, 16 Feb. 1849, private, SUA, RAM/AC, CPC 13/75A (NP, VIII, 475).
45 Rechberg to Metternich, 30 May 1850, ibid., CPA 5/57A.
46 Metternich sent Schwarzenberg a letter and a memorandum on German affairs dated 20 June 1850. They are not in Metternich's papers, but one can infer from Schwarzenberg's reply what he recommended. Schwarzenberg contended that a definitive reconstruction of Germany along the lines Metternich wanted was not yet possible. Despite much effort, he had not been able to win over Prussia; and, although the situation in the rest of Germany had improved lately, he did not believe the time was ripe to push hard for a complete restoration of the Bund. ‘In Germany even the simplest and most obvious things can be achieved only after a long time and with unbearable effort’. Schwarzenberg to Metternich, 24 July 1850, private, SUA, RAM/AC, CPC 13/75A.
47 Prokesch made this quite clear in a letter to Metternich at the end of August. ‘I would consider it a mistake if one did not offer a hand if they are inclined to grasp it on the Prussian side.’ Rather than to stand firm on legality, Prokesch thought that it would be wiser to continue to seek an accommodation with Prussia because ‘further concessions do not seem too high a price if a reasonable reorganization of the confederate organs could thereby be achieved; and if, at the same time, a confidential understanding between Vienna and Berlin over the bases of this reorganization furnished a guarantee of the sincerity of the Berlin Cabinet’. Prokesch to Metternich, 26 Aug. 1850, SUA, RAM/AC, CPA 5/56A. Concerning Schwarzenberg's intentions in Frankfurt, Thun had written earlier to Prokesch that he was supposed to do nothing there that would make an agreement with Prussia more difficult. Thun to Prokesch, 5 May 1850, private, HHStA, GA Berlin 133.
48 Rumpler, , ‘Felix Schwarzenberg und das “Dritte Deutschland”’, pp. 380–2Google Scholar.
49 Metternich to Schwarzenberg, 6 July 1850, SUA, RAM/AC, CPC 13/75B/II.
50 ‘Nichts für sich’ should be Austria's motto in Germany, Metternich wrote to Hübner. 4 Dec. 1850, ibid., CPC 13/75C/II.
51 See Hoffmann, , ‘Russland und die Olmützer Punktation vom 29. November 1850’, 59–71Google Scholar; id., ‘Die Berliner Mission des Grafen Prokesch-Osten’, pp. 65–7, 120–3; Rumpler, , ‘Felix Schwarzenberg und das “Dritte Deutschland”’, pp. 371–4Google Scholar.
52 Hoffmann, , ‘Die Berliner Mission des Grafen Prokesch-Osten’, pp. 60–67Google Scholar. Prokesch wrote to Metternich two days after Olmütz, ‘I think we are over the mountain. What Prussia can and does view as concessions are for us just as many guarantees of a conservative course that she gives us. That seems to me … sensible and worthy on our side.’ Prokesch to Metternich, 1 Dec. 1850, SUA, RAM/AC, CPA 5/56A. For his part, Metternich was opposed to a war with Prussia and approved of the Olmütz agreement. Metternich to Hübner, 1 Dec. 1850, and 4 Dec. 1850, ibid., CPC 13/75C/II; Metternich to Hübner, 14 Dec. 1850, ibid., CPC 13/38B.
53 Austensen, , ‘Austria and the “Struggle for Supremacy in Germany”’, pp. 213–14Google Scholar. Schwarzenberg's private letters to Metternich and Prokesch in the weeks before Olmütz indicate clearly that it was the understanding with Prussia that he wanted. Schwarzenberg to Metternich, 6 Nov. 1850, and 17 Nov. 1850, private, SUA, RAM/AC, CPC 13/75A; Schwarzenberg to Prokesch, 16 Nov. 1850, private, HHStA, PA XL 320. After he saw the text of the convention, Hübner, wrote to Metternich, , ‘The question is simply this: have we arranged it so that a necessary consequence of this convention must be a total and basic change of system in Berlin? Everything depends on it. Prussia has committed herself to act as policeman in the Duchies and in Hesse. This is certainly a break with the revolution.’ 5 12 1850Google Scholar, SUA, RAM/AC, CPA 3/27A. The contention of Schoeps that Prussia had to bend without a reciprocal compromise before Schwarzenberg's Politik der Macht und Stärke merely perpetuates a reichsdeutsch myth. Schoeps, , Von Olmütz nach Dresden, p. 34Google Scholar.
54 For a recent bibliography of works on the Dresden Conference, see Austensen, R. A., ‘Felix Schwarzenberg, “Realpolitiker” or Metternichian? The Evidence of the Dresden Conference’, Mitteilungen des österreichischen Staatsarchivs, XXX (1977), 98Google Scholar.
55 Even though Prokesch tried to explain the Olmütz agreement to Thun with great care, Thun thought that he had been compromised with the other delegates at Frankfurt by such a precipitous agreement with Prussia. Prokesch to Thun, 7 Dec. 1850, and 12 Dec. 1850, private, HHStA, Frankfurt Correspondenz 66; Thun to Prokesch, 9 Dec. 1850, ibid., GA Berlin 133.
56 Metternich to Hübner, 5 Nov. 1850, SUA, RAM/AC, CPC 13/38B.
57 Metternich, to Hübner, , 26 01 1850, in Grunwald, , trans., Lettres inédites, 105–6Google Scholar.
58 Böhme, , Deutschlands Weg Zur Grossmacht, pp. 14–15Google Scholar; Schoeps, , Von Olmütz nach Dresden, pp. 46–9Google Scholar; Mosse, W. E., The European powers and the German question, 1848–1871 (Cambridge, 1958), pp. 40–1Google Scholar; Matis, H., Österreichs Wirtschaft 1848–1913: Konjunkturelle Dynamik und gesellschaftlicher Wandel im Zeitalter Franz Josephs I (Berlin, 1972), p. 33Google Scholar; Droz, J., L'Europe centrale: Évolution historique de l'idée de ‘Mitteleuropa’ (Paris, 1960), p. 93Google Scholar. Cf. Schroeder, P. W., Austria, Great Britain, and the Crimean War: the destruction of the European Concert (Ithaca, New York, 1972), pp. 2–3Google Scholar; Rumpler, , Die deutsche Politik des Freiherrn von Beust, pp. 390–1Google Scholar; Austensen, , ‘Felix Schwarzenberg: “Real-politiker” or Metternichian?’, pp. 114–16Google Scholar.
59 Austensen, , ‘Felix Schwarzenberg: “Realpolitiker” or Mctternichian?’, pp. 105–7Google Scholar. Algerneine, Geheime Instructionen für die k.k. Bevollmächtigten zur Dresdner Ministerial Conferenz, 20 Dec. 1850, HHStA, PA II 92.
60 Buol to Schwarzenberg, Dresden, 26 Mar. 1851, no. 24, ibid., PA II 90.
61 This was the message that Prokesch now sent to his colleagues. Prokesch to Thun, 12 Nov. 1851, and 2 Dec. 1851, private, HHStA, GA Berlin 134; Prokesch to Buol, 28 Feb. 1852, ibid., GA Berlin 135; Prokesch to Metternich, 3 May 1851, SUA, RAM/AC, CPA 5/56A.
62 Buol outlined Austria's policy in these terms in a private letter to Manteuffel shortly after Schwarzenberg's death. Buol to Manteuffel, undated draft (June 1852), HHStA, PA XL 277m, fos. 82–92. See Gaertner, A., Der Kampf um den Zollverein zwischen Österreich und Preussen von 1849 bis 1853, Strassburger Beiträge zur neueren Geschichte, IV (Strassburg, 1911), pp. 41–3Google Scholar, 168, and passim.
63 Buol later wrote to Metternich that, as far as Austria's policy toward Prussia was concerned, ‘nothing remains for us but to wait for better times while persevering peacefully on the basis of legality’. Buol to Metternich, private, 13 Aug. 1856, SUA, RAM/AC, CPA 2/7A.
64 Meinecke, F., Radowitz und die deutsche Revolution (Berlin, 1913), pp. 274–8Google Scholar.
65 Rumpler, , Die deutsche Politik des Freiherm von Beust, p. 317Google Scholar.
66 Prokesch was in close contact with Rechberg, who was with the confederate army in Hesse. Rechberg did everything possible to avoid any hostilities between the Frankfurt forces and the Prussians. Rechberg to Prokesch, 9 Nov. 1850, 19 Nov. 1850, and 27 Nov. 1850 (all private), HHStA, GA Berlin 133.
67 Buol to Prokesch, 9 Apr. 1851, private, ibid., GA Berlin 134.
68 In 1867 Bishop W. E. von Kettler of Mainz used the term Borussianismus to refer to the idea of Prussia's special mission in Germany; Metternich called it Prussoteutonismus. See Hardtwig, W., ‘Von Preussens Aufgabe in Deutschland zu Deutschlands Aufgabe in der Welt. Liberalismus und borussianisches Geschichtsbild zwischen Revolution und Imperialismus’, Historische Zeitschrift, CCXXXI (10 1980), 265–324Google Scholar. Prokesch and Metternich both complained that many Prussians believed it was Prussia's destiny to rule Germany. Prokesch to Buol, 21 June 1850, HHStA, PA XL/277m; Metternich, to Prokesch, , 4 03 1850, in Prokesch, , Aus dem Nachlasse, II, 354–8Google Scholar.
