¹ Standard accounts are: Gottlieb, W.W., Studies in Secret Diplomacy during the First World War (London, 1957);Google ScholarPingaud, Albert, Histoire diplomatique de la France pendant la grand guerre (3 vols., Paris, 1935–1945);Google ScholarSalandra, Antonio, Italy and the Great War (London, 1932);Google ScholarToscano, Mario, II Patto di Londra. Storia diplomatica dell'intervento italiano, 1914–1915 (Bologna, 1934);Google Scholaridem, ‘Rivelazioni e nuovi documenti sul negoziato di Londra per l'ingresso dell'Italia nella prima guerra mondiale’, Nuova Antologia, CDXCIV-CDXCV, fasc. 1976–79 (Aug.–Nov. 1965).

² On Italy in the Triple Alliance see: Salvatorelli, Luigi, La triplice alleanza (Milan, 1939);Google ScholarVolpe, Gioacchino, L'Italia nella triplice alleanza, 1882–1915 (Milan, 1939);Google ScholarFellner, Fritz, Der Dreibund (Munich, 1960);Google ScholarSerra, Enrico, Camille Barrère e I'intesa italo-francese (Milan, 1950);Google ScholarAskew, William C., ‘The Austro-Italian Antagonism, 1896–1914'; Wallace, Lillian P. and Askew, William C. (eds.), Power, Public Opinion and Diplomacy: Essays in Honor of Eber Malcolm Carroll by his former students (Durham, N. C, 1959).Google Scholar

³ Albertini, Luigi, The Origins of the War of 1914 (3 vols., London, 1952–1957), I, 524–6;Google ScholarLaroche, Jules, Quinze Ans à Rome avec Camille Barrère (Paris, 1948), pp. 221,Google Scholar 227.

⁴ Askew, William C., Europe and Italy's Acquisition of Libya (Durham, N. C, 1942), pp. 221–33;Google Scholar 245–7; Albertini, Origins of the War, I, 655–671.

⁵ For a full discussion see Halpern, Paul G., ‘The Mediterranean Naval Situation, 1912–1914’ doctoral dissertation, Harvard University (1965),Google Scholar chap. III.

⁶ Ibid. pp. 573 ff.; Pribram, A.F., The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary, English edition by Archibald Cary Coolidge (2 vols., Cambridge, Mass., 1920–1921), I, 282–305;Google Scholar Ufficio Storico della Marina, R., La Marina italiana nella grande guerra (8 vols., Florence, 1935–1942), I, 158–174;Google ScholarGabriele, Mariano, ‘Origini della convenzione navale italo-austro-germanica del 1913,’ Rassegna Storica del Risorgimento, fasc. III–IV (1965), 325–44, 489–509.Google Scholar

⁷ Corbett, Julian S. and Newbolt, Henry, Naval Operations (5 vols., London, 1920–1931), I, 54–71;Google ScholarMarder, Arthur J., From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow. The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904–1919 (4 vols., London, 1961–), II, 20–41;Google ScholarLorey, Hermann, Der Krieg in den türkischen Gewässern (Berlin, 1928),Google Scholar chaps. I–II; Milne, Admiral Sir A. Berkeley, The Flight of the ‘Goeben’ and the ‘Breslau’ (London, 1921);Google ScholarSouchon, Wilhelm, ‘Der Durchbruch S. M. Schiffe ‘Goeben’ und ‘Breslau’ von Messina nach den Dardanellen’; von Mantey, Eberhard (ed.), Auf See unbesiegt (Munich, 1921), pp. 17–31;Google ScholarLaurens, Adolphe, Le Commandement naval en Méditerranée (Paris, 1931), pp. 28–48.Google Scholar

⁸ Laurens, op. cit. pp. 48–51; Thomazi, A., La Guerre navale dans l'Adriatique (Paris, 1927), pp. 35–6.Google Scholar

⁹ Conrad, Feldmarschall [Franz Graf Conrad von Hötzendorf], Aus meiner Dienstzeit (5 vols., Vienna, 1921–1925), IV,Google Scholar 174 ff.

¹⁰ Ibid. 205–6. See also the memorandum by Haus, Marinekommandant Admiral Anton, ‘Promemoria über die Kriegslage in der Adria’, 24 10 1914,Google Scholar reproduced ibid. v, 304–5. Haus told his representative in Vienna that as long as the possibility existed that Italy would declare against them, he considered his first obligation to be maintaining the fleet as much intact as possible for the decisive battle against this their most dangerous enemy (Haus to Kailer, 6 Sept. 1914, Austria, Kriegsarchiv, Vienna, Nachlass Kailer, B/242).

¹¹ Although the French Navy had undergone more than its share of troubles in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, it was well on the road to recovery in 1914. Lapeyrere could count on 2 dreadnoughts (with another pair to arrive shortly); 6 semi–dreadnought ‘Dantons’; 5 older ‘Patries’; and 9–10 old battleships. To oppose this the Austrians had only 3 dreadnoughts (with a fourth under construction); 3 semi-dreadnought ‘Radetzkys’; and 6 old battleships. Aside from fast light cruisers, the French enjoyed a sizable preponderance in most classes of warships.

¹² Thomazi, Guerre navale dans I'Adriatique, p. 38.

¹³ Ibid., passim; Sokol, Hans Hugo, Österreich-Ungarns Seekrieg, 1914–1918 (2 vols., Zurich, Leipzig, Vienna, 1933), I, 90–6.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Thomazi, op. cit. pp. 67–8, 72. On 20 December the Curie was sunk trying to enter Pola. See also Laurens, Commandement naval, pp. 56–7, 64–5.

¹⁵ Report by Captain Boyle, William H.D. [later Admiral of the Fleet, the Earl of Cork and Orrery], 31 03 1915,Google Scholar Great Britain, Public Record Office, London [hereafter referred to as P.R.O.], Admiralty MSS, Adm 137, vol. 1088, 116–18. Boyle suggested four French ‘Patries’ under a rear-admiral.

¹⁶ Minute by Churchill, 14 Apr. 1915, ibid.

¹⁷ Memorandum by Churchill, 14 Apr. 1915, ibid. p. 252.

¹⁸ Ibid. Churchill thought that if the French gave up control in the Adriatic they would have to have local command at the Dardanelles after the naval role there ceased to be the primary one. He would agree provided they sent 6–8 of their best dreadnoughts north to Brest. Churchill to Kitchener, 14 Apr. 1915, P.R.O., Kitchener MSS, P.R.O. 30/57/72. Churchill also had to fend off attempts to defer the Dardanelles attack until after Italy decided to throw in her lot with the allies lest a reverse influence her decision. Hankey, Lord, The Supreme Command, 1914–1918 (2 vols., London, 1961), I, 301;Google ScholarMarder, Arthur J. (ed.), Portrait of an Admiral: The Life and Papers of Sir Herbert Richmond (London, 1952), pp. 150–1.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Joffre to Min. of War, 6 April 1915, France, Archives centrales de la Marine francaise, Paris Paris [hereafter referred to as A.M.F.], Carton Es–9.

²⁰ Ibid. Assistance to Holland would have to be by sea since the German occupation of Belgium effectively cut off the Dutch from land contact with the allies.

²¹ Ministère de la Guerre, 3e Bureau, Etat-Major, Secret, ‘Résumé de la note relative à l'intervention de l'ltalie’, 11 Apr. 1915, ibid.

²² Ibid. The French General Staff thought there was every interest in combining the Italian offensive with a Serb offensive in the south of Hungary and a Rumanian push in Transylvania.

²³ C.-in-C, Ière Armée navale to Min. of Marine, 16 Apr. 1915, cable no. 1925, ibid.

²⁴ Idem, suite à télégramme 1925, 16 Apr. 1915, ibid.

²⁵ Etat-major général de la marine [hereafter referred to as E.M.G.], Ière section,‘Note pour le Ministre au sujet de l'intervention de l'Italie dans la guerre actuelle’, 19 Apr. 1915, ibid. The notes bear the signature of Vice-Admiral Aubert, Chef de l'E.M.G.

²⁶ 4e section, E.M.G., ‘Considérations sur les conséquences de la cooperation italienne dans les Opérations maritimes en Méditerranée', n.d. [13 Apr. 1915], ibid.

²⁷ These would be in addition to the cruisers, destroyers, and submarines co-operating in the Adriatic (ibid.).

²⁸ Ibid. A number of auxiliary cruisers would also be made available to reinforce the patrols at the entrance to the Channel. A rough draft of one of the studies made by the E.M.G. indicates the old battleships then with the allied force off the Dardanelles would be retained there. (Unsigned note, ‘Eventualité d'une entrée en guerre de l'Italie alliée à la Triple Entente’, n.d., ibid.)

²⁹ Lapeyrère to Min. of Marine, 23 Apr. 1915, ibid.

³⁰ Ibid. Lapeyrère planned for two Italian scout cruisers to support the French in the south, no doubt because the French navy lacked this type of ship.

³¹ Ibid. Agreements were to be reached on the areas to be mined while surveillance of t he Straits of Otranto might be accomplished by old cruisers or auxiliary cruisers whose presence on t h e Provencal coast would now b e rendered superfluous.

³² 4e section, E.M.G., ‘Eventualité d'une entrée en guerre de l'ltalie alliée à la Triple Entente', n. d., idid.

³³ ‘Les flottes de la France et de la Grande-Bretagne donneront leur concours actif et permanent a l'ltalie jusqu'à la destruction de la flotte austro-hongroise ou jusqu'à la conclusion de la paix.’ ‘Agreement between the Three Powers and Italy’, 26 April 1915, P.R.O., Cabinet Papers, Cab. 37/128.

³⁴ See for example Manfroni, Camillo, I nostri alleati navali (Milan, 1927), p. 15;Google ScholarPo, Guido, Il Grande Ammiraglio Paolo Thaon di Revel (Turin, 1936), p. 78.Google Scholar

³⁵ Ufficto Storico, Marina italiana nella grande guerra, 1, 312–14;Google Scholar Vice-Admiral P. Thaon di Revel, ‘Relazione sintetica sull'operasvolta dal 1 Aprile 1913 al 1 Ottobre, 1915’, pp. 10–11. Ufficio storico della Marina Militare, Rome [hereafter referred to as U.S.M.], Cartella 1451/ 740. Similar views were expressed in 1909; see Vice-Admiral Bettolo,‘Studio di preparazione militare marittima per un conflitto armato contro l'Empero Austro-Ungarico’, n.d. [1909], pp. 4–9; ibid., Cartella 296.

³⁶ Asquith to King George V, 24 Mar. 1915, P.R.O., CAB 41/36/12; Grey to Rodd, 25 Mar. 1915, ibid., CAB 37/126; Rodd to Grey, 6 Apr. 1915, ibid., F.O. 371, vol. 2507, 449. The Italians had occupied Valona in Dec. 1914. Paradoxically the Austrians could argue just the opposite, that Pola was a ‘mouse trap’ and Cattaro dominated by Montenegrin-held Mount LovCen. Admiral Rudolph Graf Montecuccoli, ‘Militarisch-Maritimen Vorsorgen Oesterreich-Ungarns und Italians in der Adria’, 13 Mar. 1912, Kriegsarchiv, Operationskanzlei des Kriegsministerium/Marinesektion, OK/MS-VI-1/3 ex 1912. Captain Boyle also considered the Italian argument overdone: see his memorandum ‘The Naval Situation in the Adriatic’, enclosed in Boyle to Rodd, 23 Apr. 1915. Adm 137, vol. 1088, 163.

³⁷ Revel to Min. of Marine, 7 Nov. 1914, U.S.M., Cartella 331/3.

³⁸ Revel, ‘Relazione sintetica', p. 4.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Revel to Grassi, 26 Apr. 1915, reproduced in Mariano Gabriele, ‘La convenzione navale italo-franco-britannica del 10 maggio 1915’, Nuova Antologia, CDXCH–CDXCIV, fasc. 1972–3 (Apr.–May 1965), CDXCIII, 489. Professor Gabriele's article includes extensive extracts from the archives of the Ufficio Storico and is indispensable for the Italian side of the negotiations.

⁴¹ Ibid. pp. 489–90. In a subsequent note Revel ordered Grassi to establish that the Italian C.-in-C. could bring to the upper Adriatic—in addition to the 12 destroyers permanently attached to his command—any of the other allied ships (ibid. p. 491, n. 16).

⁴² Grassi's report, reproduced, ibid. pp. 491–2. The writer found no record of this preliminary meeting in the British or French files.

⁴³ ‘Diary of the Conference’, 2 May 1915, Adm 137, vol. 1088, 219. Although unsigned, the diary appears to be the work of Capt. H. Richmond.

⁴⁴ Ibid. p. 220. Capo d'Istria is mentioned as a possible secondary base in the French record of the conference, which is far more detailed. ‘Procès Verbal Sommaire de la Séance du 2 mai 1915 à 9^h 30 du Matin’, A.M.F., Carton Es–9. In the Italian plan for operations in the Adriatic, dated 18 April 1915, these operations were considered by themselves a morale booster which might induce the Austrians to sortie from Pola. Ufficio Storico, Marina italiana nella grande guerra, 1, 340.Google Scholar See also Cadorna, Luigi, La guerra alia fronte italiana (2 vols., Milan, 1921), 1, 92–4,Google Scholar 106.

⁴⁵ Procès Verbal Sommaire, 2 mai 1915. The Italian Army believed that the maritime preliminaries to such a landing would involve too much delay. Cadorna, , Guerra alia fronte italiana, 1, 95.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ Procès Verbal Sommaire, 2 mai 1915. Not surprisingly the Italians considered Augagneur curt (cassant): Poincaré, Raymond, Au service de la France (10 vols., Paris, 1926–1933), VI, 190–1.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ Diary of the Conference, 2 May 1915, 219–21; Jackson to Churchill, 2 May 1915, (ibid.), p. 232; Proces Verbal Sommaire, 2 mai 1915.

⁴⁸ Diary of the Conference, 2 May 1915, p. 221. A representative of the Russian Navy was also present but naturally played a very minor role.

⁴⁹ Procès Verbal Sommaire de la Séance du 2 mai 1915 à 15^h 30 du soir, A.M.F., Carton Es–9. The Italians were particularly worried over raids destroying the petrol deposits at Brindisi.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Jackson to Churchill, 2 May 1915, Adm 137, vol. 1088, 233. Grassi's final report of the negotiations is reproduced in Storico, Ufficio, Marina italiana nella grande guerra, I, 424–34.Google Scholar

⁵² The military representatives met separately. See Toscano, Mariano, ‘Le convenzioni militari concluse fra 1'ltalia e l'intesa all vigilia dell'intervento’, Pagine di storia diplomatica contemporanea (2 vols., Milan, 1963), I, 65–74.Google Scholar

⁵³ Jackson to Churchill, 2 May 1915, 233–4.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Jackson to Churchill, 3 May 1915, ibid. 236–7.

⁵⁶ ‘Observations by Naval Delegates on Naval Operations in the Adriatic’, 3 May 1915, ibid..

⁵⁷ Ibid. The number of small craft for minesweeping and submarine-hunting also had to be increased.

⁵⁸ Ibid. The suggested dispositions were: in the north, a squadron for offensive operations in the Adriatic under the command of the Italian C.-in-C. consisting of 4 Italian armoured cruisers (‘San Marcos’), 3 Italian light cruisers (‘Marsalas’), 2 (eventually 4) British light cruisers; all Italian torpedo-craft and submarines, and the remaining old Italian battleships; and French submarines and French destroyers. In the south would be the Allied battle fleet under the French C.-in-C. composed of the French and modern Italian battleships and armoured cruisers, plus requisite flotillas. The total was 17 battleships and II armoured cruisers, to be joined by 4 British battleships once Dardanelles operations were concluded. To this the Austrians could only oppose 9 battleships (3 very weak) and 2 armoured cruisers.

⁵⁹ Diary of the Conference, 3 May 1915, Adm 137, vol. 1088, 222.

⁶⁰ Richmond to Jackson, n.d. [4 May 1915], ibid. 200.

⁶¹ Richmond, ‘A suggestion to meet the difficulty of the Command’, ibid. 201–8.

⁶² Richmond to Jackson, n.d. [4 May 1915], ibid. 200.

⁶³ Diary of the Conference, 4 May 1915, ibid. 223–4. A copy of this paper (dated 4 May) is in ibid. 209–15.

⁶⁴ Procès Verbal Sommaire de la Séance tenue le 4 mai 1915 à 3 heures de l'après-midi, A.M.F., Carton Es-9.

⁶⁵ Diary of the Conference, 4 May 1915, Adm 137, vol. 1088, 224.

⁶⁶ Ibid. 225.

⁶⁷ Jackson to Churchill, 4 May 1915, ibid. 243–4.

⁶⁸ Procès Verbal Sommaire, 4 Mai 1915.

⁶⁹ Jackson to Churchill, 4 May 1915, 244–5.

⁷⁰ Gabriele, ‘Convenzione navale’, pp. 493–4.

⁷¹ Storico, Ufficio, Marina italiana nella grande guerra, I, 428.Google Scholar

⁷² Gabriele, ‘Convenzioni navale’, p. 498.

⁷³ Thaon di Revel, ‘Promemoria circa trattative in corso per una convenzione militare navale con la marina inglesae la marina francese’, 5 May 1915, reproduced ibid. pp. 499–590.

⁷⁴ Ibid. pp. 501–2.

⁷⁵ Sonnino to Tittoni, Imperiali and Carlotti, 6 May 1915, reproduced in Toscano,‘Rivelazione e nuovi documenti’ (pt. 3), pp. 163–4.

⁷⁶ Ibid. (pt. 4), pp. 295–6.

⁷⁷ Gabriele, ‘Convenzione navale’, pp. 69–71.

⁷⁸ Rodd to Grey, 7 May 1915, F.O. 371, vol. 2508, Italy, 383–4. A copy of this dispatch was sent to the Admiralty.

⁷⁹ Rodd to Grey, 8 May 1915, ibid. 386. Captain Boyle correctly interpreted Italy's intention not to wage an energetic campaign unless adequately supported in order to preserve her fleet as a power factor after the war. Boyle to Rodd, 7 May 1915, Adm 137, vol. 1088, 300. Boyle's recommendations were explained in detail in an attached study,‘Naval Operations in the Adriatic’, ibid.

⁸⁰ Lennox, Lady Algernon Gordon (ed.), The Diary of Lord Bertie of Thame (2 vols., New York, 1925), I, 159.Google Scholar

⁸¹ Procès Verbal Sommaire de la réunion tenue sous la présidence du Chef d'Etat-Major Général P. I. de la Marine, le jeudi 6 Mai à 3 heures de l'après-midi, A.M.F., Carton Es-9; Diary of the Conference, 6 May 1915, Adm 137, vol. 1088, 226. Churchill was not present at the technical meeting.

⁸² Ibid. 226–7 Procès Verbal sommaire, 6 mai 1915; Neither the French nor British minutes of the proceedings support the version of the conference given by Churchill in which he speaks of spending ‘two days in intricate discussions’ with the French and Italians over naval bases the Italians were to receive on the Dalmatian coast after a victorious war, the most important of which was the Canal of Sabioncello Churchill, Winston S., The World Crisis, 1915 (New York, 1923), pp. 344–5.Google Scholar Actually these questions were settled prior to signature of the Treaty of London with the Sabioncello peninsula to be neutralized and the nearby island of Curzola going to Italy. Churchill may have been thinking of an earlier discussion in April when the Prime Minister asked the Admiralty's opinion of the Italian claim to Curzola as ‘the strategical key to the Adriatic’, Asquith to Churchill, 5 Apr. 1915, F.O. 371, vol. 2508, file 41174. Churchill replied that there was no reason Italy should regard possession of Curzola as vital, but no reason Britain should object to Italian possession of Curzola or ‘not acquiesce in the Adriatic becoming strategically an Italian lake’ as the advantages of preventing Austria from having a navy were ‘overwhelming’ and Corfu was ‘the true key to the Adriatic’, Churchill to Asquith, 7 April 1915, ibid. In a separate study Admiral Jackson claimed Curzola was the best of a similar group of islands (Jackson, H.B., ‘Note on the Strategical Value of Curzola Island’, 6 04 1915,Google Scholaribid.).

⁸³ Procès Verbal Sommaire, 6 mai 1915. Augagneur also promised to place a few small ships at Italy's disposal, but insisted the Italians provide artillery and crews for them.

⁸⁴ Note by Churchill, 10 May 1915, Adm 137, vol. 1088, 181. The Italians were to arm and man the ships. The French minutes also show the French and British promising to provide minesweeping gear to serve as models for the Italians. Procè Verbal Sommaire, 6 mai 1915.

⁸⁵ Churchill, , The World Crisis, 1915, p. 345.Google Scholar

⁸⁶ Diary of the Conference, 8 May 1915, 228.

⁸⁷ Gabriele, ‘Convenzione navale’ (pt. 2), pp. 71–2; Storico, Ufficio, Marina italiana nella grande guerra, I, 432–3;Google ScholarCorbett, , Naval Operations, II, 396.Google Scholar

⁸⁸ Diary of the Conference, 8 May 1915, 229–30. Vice-Admiral de Jonquieres, acting head of the E.M.G., signed for France. As the Italian delegate was still waiting for authority to sign the convention, Jackson returned to England, leaving Vice-Admiral Douglas Gamble in Paris in case of difficulties (minute by Jackson, 10 May 1915, ibid.). As the Italians did not sign until 10 May, this was the date given the treaty (Salaun to Richmond, 11 May ibid. 218).

⁸⁹ For the full text of the convention see Thomazi, Guerre navale dans I'Adriatique, pp. 82–5; Storico, Ufficio, Marina italiana nella grande guerra, I, 435–9.Google Scholar

⁹⁰ ‘Cette Seconde Flotte Alliée accompagnée des ses bâtiments de flotille et placée sous le commandement du Commandant en Chef de l'Armée Navale française sera prête à répondre à l'appel du Commandant en Chef de la Flotte italienne.’

⁹¹ All bases on the Italian coast were placed at the disposal of the allies. The 1st Allied Fleet would use Brindisi; the 2nd Allied Fleet preferably Taranto, Malta and Bizerte. If the 1st Allied Fleet moved to the north, taking Venice as a base, Brindisi as well as Taranto would be at the disposal of the 2nd Allied Fleet.

⁹² ‘Tant qu'il y aura des forces navales ennemies dans PAdriatique, les Alliées s'engagent à assurer leur concours à l'Armée navale italienne, de façon à maintenir autant que possible la puissance navale alliée nettement supérieure à celle de l'ennemi.'

⁹³ Even before formal signature of the naval convention the Admiralty gave the Italian naval attache in London the signal and r/t (radio) code common to the British, French and Russian navies so that it could be translated into Italian: Gabriele, ‘Convenzione navale’, o. 70, n. 34.

⁹⁴ Orders to this effect were cabled the same day: 4e Section, E.M.G. to Lapeyrère, o May 1915, A.M.F., Carton Es-9.

⁹⁵ Vice-Admiral Gamble signed the codicil for Great Britain.

⁹⁶ Revel to Marescotti, 8 May 1915, Marescotti, L. Aldovandi, Nuovi ricordi e frammenti di diario (Milan, 1938), p. 222.Google Scholar

⁹⁷ Toscano, ‘Rivelazioni e nuovi documenti’ (pt. 4), pp. 300–4.

⁹⁸ Storico, Ufficio, Marina italiana nella grande guerra, I, 434.Google Scholar

⁹⁹ Poincaré, , Au service de la France, VI, 199.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁰ Memorandum by Jackson, 11 May 1915, Adm. 137, vol. 1088, p. 256. Apparently Lord Nelson, Agamemnon, Swiftsure and Triumph were promised if possible. Triumph was sunk by a German submarine 25 May.

¹⁰¹ Note by Admiral H. F. Oliver, ibid.

¹⁰² Minute by Churchill, 11 May 1915 ibid. 257. Churchill proposed sending after the Dardanelles operations were concluded Lord Nelson, Agamemnon, Cornwallis and London.

¹⁰³ Churchill to Min. of Marine, Rome, 14 May 1915, ibid. 286; Admiralty [Churchill] to Vice-Admiral de Robeck, 15 May 1915, ibid. 290. The relieving French cruisers and battleships were either already at the Dardanelles or shortly to arrive, ibid. Actually, Italy declared war 23 May.

¹⁰⁴ ‘Principal Defects in H.M. Ships forming Squadron attached to Italian Fleet‘, 5 June 1915, ibid. 539. The French placed the Borée and eight torpedo-boats from Toulon at the disposal of the Italian C.-in-C. and also arranged to send minesweeping gear. De Jonquiéres to Préfet Maritime, Toulon, 12 May, 1915; Min. of Marine to Préfet Maritime, Toulon, 22 May 1915, A.M.F., Carton Es-9.

¹⁰⁵ Vice-Admiral Gamble, ‘Letter of Proceedings’, Jun. 1915, Adm 137, vol. 1088, 518.

¹⁰⁶ Ufficio Storico, Marina italiana nella grande guerra, 11, 22–32; Hans Hugo Sokol, Osterreich-Ungarns Seekrieg 1914–1918, I, 193–203; Amm. di Squadra (a) Vittorio Prato, ‘La nostra entrata in guerra nel 1915 e le prime operazioni in Adriatico', Rivista Marittima, xcvin, no. 5 (May 1965), 33–47. For an interesting account of Admiral Richmond's growing disillusionment see Marder, Portrait of an Admiral, ch, iv. Richmond was liaison officer with the Italian fleet in 1915.

¹⁰⁷ Corbett, Naval Operations, II, 395.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid. p. 397.

¹⁰⁹ Thomazi, Guerre navale dans l'Adriatique, p. 87; Salaun, Vice-Amiral, La Marine francaise (Paris, 1934), p. 199;Google Scholar R. de Belot and Reussner, Andre, La Puissance navale dans l'histoire, vol. III, De 1914 à 1919 (Paris, 1960), p. 54.Google Scholar

¹¹⁰ Ibid. p. 198. According to Sonnino's secretary Revel asked the Foreign Minister by means of an intermediary what to do if German submarines were encountered in the Adriatic. Sonnino's reply was ‘shoot’ (sparare): Aldrovandi, Nuovi ricordi, p. 234.

¹¹¹ Marder, Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, II, 336–7.

¹¹² Marder, Portrait of an Admiral, pp. 162–3. Among other critics see Salaun, Marine francaise, pp. 198–9; Wilson, H.W., Les Flottes de guerre au combat (2 vols., Paris, 1929), II, 372–3;Google Scholar Belot and Reussner, Puissance navale dans Vhistoire, in, 52–4; Castex, Amiral, Théories stratégiques (5 vols., Paris, 1929–1935), III, 359 ff.Google Scholar

¹¹³ Corbett, Naval Operations, n, 385; Thomazi, Guerre navale dans l'Adriatique, p. 79.