Naval historians traditionally have been preoccupied with operations at sea. Yet sea power hinges on the dockyards without which there would be no navies and no battles to write about. If Britain's greatness in the eighteenth century depended on a navy greater than any other in Europe, it depended no less on land-based facilities sufficient to create and maintain that navy. Two-thirds of the fleet on the eve of the American Revolution had been built in the navy's own dockyards, and virtually all the ships of the fleet were fitted and repaired in them, although in wartime especially upkeep to some extent devolved on the limited facilities of overseas bases. Moreover, decommissioned ships—the ships in Ordinary—which in peacetime were several times more numerous than those in service, were maintained at the royal dockyards. The requirements of an ever-growing fleet—170 ships of twenty guns and upwards in 1739, 271 in 1775, 360 in 1787—made the yards much the largest employer in eighteenth-century Britain. Slightly more than 5,000 workmen of all kinds were employed in 1754; by 1775 the number had risen to more than 7,500 and exceeded 9,500 in 1782 when, due to the demands of war, the number of sixth-rate ships and above was approaching 500.

A hundred years ago there appeared Mill's England and Ireland, long since among the least known of his writings. At the time of publication it caused a furore, and gave its author a kind of notoriety that he had not previously experienced. In his pamphlet of some forty pages Mill issued a condemnation of Britain's conduct, past and present, towards Ireland, which surprised by its violence, in contrast to the judicious if superior tone that people had come to expect from him. This was startling; but the pamphlet's arresting novelty lay in its uncompromising demand for an immediate agrarian revolution in Ireland, as a long overdue act of justice, an inescapable moral obligation, and as the price of Irish loyalty in the future. Mill could not, of course, expect to convince his readers that he was justified in calling for such a sweeping measure without challenging assumptions which seemed built into the social foundations of nineteenth-century Britain. His impatient dismissal of these received notions was another aspect of the pamphlet eliciting a very unfavourable reaction. It is this aspect which is usually mentioned. England and Ireland is seen, when noticed at all, as the compact and forceful expression of ideas which Mill had been trying to inculcate for the best part of a generation.

Louis Napoleon'S assumption of personal power by abrogating the constitution of the Second French Republic is recognized as one of the momentous events of the nineteenth century. His coup d'état of 2 December 1851 and his decision to take the title of emperor the next year were dramatic steps in the rise of the new Bonaparte from exile to arbiter of Europe. Understandably, these acts have attracted the attention of numerous historians. Much less consideration has been given to certain consequences—that is, to the reaction of the great powers to Louis Napoleon—s climb to power and in particular to the search for the means to block any imperialist aspirations he might harbour.

The history of modern or transoceanic American imperialism began midway through the nineteenth century with the achievement of definitive continental boundaries for the United States. At that juncture, the focus of the country's expansionist impulses shifted to Latin America and the Pacific Ocean area, and the quest for territorial possessions and spheres of influence in both regions began. By the turn of the century, thanks to a liberal use of armed force, it had been successfully terminated, completing the first and most robust phase of American empire building abroad.

An expeditionary force of the Indian Army landed in Turkish territory at the head of the Persian Gulf almost immediately upon the declaration of war by Britain against Turkey on 5 November 1914. After winning some minor engagements against Turkish forces, it marched into Basra, the chief town of southern Mesopotamia, on the 23rd. The subsequent course of the campaign in Mesopotamia included a number of setbacks for the British. The principal city, Baghdad, was not captured until after nearly two and a half years of fighting, and the chief northern city, Mosul, not indeed until after an armistice had been signed with Turkey. Even so, by the time hostilities ceased, large areas in the south had been under continuous British occupation for four years and the possibility of further advance was throughout the war present in the minds of British leaders, whether in London, Simla or Mesopotamia itself. Against this background of military conquest and a pre-war diplomacy among the European powers, excluding Russia, in which Mesopotamia had been marked out as the British sphere if Turkey was partitioned, it is unsurprising that the political future of the country should have been much discussed within British official circles. War aims went through several phases whose study contributes to understanding of British aims in the war as a whole.

During the First World War Germany had aimed at the eventual annexation of the Baltic provinces of Russia, later to become the independent Baltic states of Estonia and Latvia. After Germany had been defeated in November 1918, the young German Republic faced the task of building up relations with these small states. A new and difficult situation existed in Eastern Europe. Especially aggravating was the setting up of a large Polish state possessing areas of land which had formerly belonged to Germany. Beyond, Soviet Russia presented a great attraction to Germans who were anxious to exploit the potentially unlimited new markets and at the same time to offset some of the disadvantages created by the Treaty of Versailles. Under such circumstances the German government was anxious to obtain good relations with the Baltic states since, apart from a hostile Poland, they provided a means of indirect access to Russia. In the attempt to obtain the friendly co-operation of the Baltic states the German government was compelled to change its attitude towards the so-called ‘Baltic Germans’ who had been especially important in Latvia. This article attempts to show why such changes were considered necessary and what were the general aims behind the new German policy towards the Baltic Germans.

The 1931 General Election reduced the Parliamentary Labour Party to forty-six. Though a disappointing result, there was substantial evidence for confidence in the eventual revival of the Party; it had received over six and a half million votes and thirty per cent of the total vote cast, only seven percent less than the total vote it had received in 1929 when Labour formed a government. The departure of Ramsay MacDonald, Philip Snowden, and J. H. Thomas to join the National Government freed the Parliamentary Labour Party from the domination of an important section of its older generation. The 1931 election marked the slow transition of power from one generation to another, often an awkward moment for any political party. There was wide agreement in the party that the years after 1931 should be an interregnum period.