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The Deferential Wife Revisited: Agency and Moral Responsibility

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 March 2020

Anita Superson
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Abstract

This paper rejects two main arguments for absolving the deferential wife and victims of deprived circumstances from responsibility or blame for their servility: for Susan Wolf, circumstances can determine their reasons and acts, and for Sarah Buss, circumstances can give them excusing reasons for their acts. The paper argues that circumstances can give them justifying reasons to act in ways defending their intrinsic worth when their acts can be legitimately interpreted as a protest against an attempt to degrade their intrinsic value.

Type
Original Articles
Information
Hypatia , Volume 25 , Issue 2 , Spring 2010 , pp. 253 - 275
Copyright
Copyright © 2010 by Hypatia, Inc.

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