Hostname: page-component-77c89778f8-n9wrp Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-17T05:05:16.754Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

A Question of Evidence

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 March 2020

Abstract

I outline a pragmatic account of evidence, arguing that it allows us to underwrite two implications of feminist scholarship: that knowledge is socially constructed and constrained by evidence, and that social relations, including gender, race, and class, are epistemologically significant. What makes the account promising is that it abandons any pretense of a view from nowhere, the view of evidence as something only individuals gather or have, and the view that individual theories face experience in isolation.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © 1993 by Hypatia, Inc.

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Addelson, Kathryn Pyne. 1992. Knower/doers and their moral problems. In Feminist epistemologies. See Alcoff and Potter 1992.Google Scholar
Alcoff, Linda and Potter, Elizabeth, eds. 1992. Feminist epistemologies. New York and London: Routledge.Google Scholar
Al‐Hibri, Azizah Y. and Simons, Margaret A., eds. 1990. Hypatia reborn: Essays in feminist philosophy. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.Google Scholar
Bleier, Ruth. 1984. Science and gender. New York: Pergamon Press.Google Scholar
Bordo, Susan. 1990. Feminism, postmodernism, and gender‐scepticism. In Feminism/postmodernism. See Nicholson 1990.Google Scholar
Boydston, Jo Ann, ed. 1970. Guide to the works of John Dewey. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.Google Scholar
Code, Lorraine. 1991. What can she know? Feminist theory and the construction of knowledge. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
Davidson, Donald. 1974. On the very idea of a conceptual scheme. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 47:520.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dewey, John [1910] 1970. The influence of Darwin on philosophy. Reprinted in Darwin: A Norton critical edition, ed. Philip Appleman. New York and London: W. W. Norton.Google Scholar
Di Stefano, Christine. 1990. Dilemmas of difference. In Feminism/postmodernism. See Nicholson 1990.Google Scholar
Duran, Jane. 1991. Toward a feminist epistemology. Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield.Google Scholar
Gould, Stephen J. 1989. Wonderful life: The Burgess shale and the nature of history. New York and London: W. W. Norton.Google Scholar
Harding, Sandra. 1986. The science question in feminism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
Harding, Sandra. 1990. Feminism, science, and the anti‐Enlightenment critiques. In Feminism/postmodernism. See Nicholson 1990.Google Scholar
Harding, Sandra. 1991. Whose science? Whose knowledge? Thinking from women's lives. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
Jaggar, Alison M. 1983. Feminist politics and human nature. Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Allenheld.Google Scholar
Kennedy, Gail. 1970. Dewey's logic and theory of knowledge. In Guide to the works of John Dewey. See Boydston 1970.Google Scholar
Lederman, Leon. 1989. An interview with Leon Lederman. Omni (Oct): 4652.Google Scholar
Longino, Helen. 1990. Science as social knowledge: Values and objectivity in scientific inquiry. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Nelson, Lynn Hankinson. 1990. Who knows: From Quine to a feminist empiricism. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.Google Scholar
Nelson, Lynn Hankinson. 1992. Epistemological communities. In Feminist epistemologies. See Alcoff and Potter 1992.Google Scholar
Nicholson, Linda J., ed. 1990. Feminism/postmodernism. New York and London: Routledge.Google Scholar
Potter, Elizabeth. 1992. Gender and epistemic negotiations. In Feminist epistemologies. See Alcoff and Potter 1992.Google Scholar
Quine, W. V. 1960. Word and object. Cambridge: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Quine, W. V. 1966a. On mental entities. In The ways of paradox and other essays. New York: Random House.Google Scholar
Quine, W. V. 1966b. Posits and reality. In The ways of paradox and other essays. New York: Random House.Google Scholar
Quine, W. V. 1969. Epistemology naturalized. In Ontological relativity and other essays. New York: Columbia University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Quine, W. V. 1981a. On the very idea of a third dogma. In Theories and things. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Quine, W. V. 1981b. Things and their place in theories. In Theories and things. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Quine, W. V. 1987. Quiddities: An intermittently philosophical dictionary. Cambridge, MA and London: Belknap Press.Google Scholar
Rorty, Richard. 1982. Consequences of pragmatism. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.Google Scholar
Seigfried, Charlene Haddock [1985] 1990. Second sex: Second thoughts. In Hypatia reborn: Essays in feminist philosophy. See Al‐Hibri and Simons 1990.Google Scholar
Tarski, Alfred. 1956. Logic, semantics, metamathematics. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
Tuana, Nancy, ed. 1989. Feminism and science. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.Google Scholar
Tuana, Nancy. 1992. The radical future of feminist empiricism. Hypatia 7(1): 100–14.CrossRefGoogle Scholar