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Who's There? Selfhood, Self-Regard, and Social Relations

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 March 2020

Diana Tietjens Meyers
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Abstract

J. David Velleman develops a canny, albeit mentalistic, theory of selfhood that furnishes some insights feminist philosophers should heed but that does not adequately heed some of the insights feminist philosophers have developed about the embodiment and relationality of the self. In my view, reflenvity cannot do the whole job of accounting for selfhood, for it rests on an unduly sharp distinction between reflexive loci of understanding and value, on the one hand, and embodiment and relationality, on the other. 1 conclude that what is missing from Velleman's account is an appreciation of the psycho-corporeal attributes and capabilities embedded in the embodied self and the relational self.

Type
Research Article
Information
Hypatia , Volume 20 , Issue 4: Special Issue: Analytic Feminism , Fall 2005 , pp. 200 - 215
Copyright
Copyright © 2005 by Hypatia, Inc.

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