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III. Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v Nigeria:: Equatorial Guinea Intervening), Merits, Judgment of 10 October 20021

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 January 2008

Extract

On 10 October 2002 the International Court of Justice gave its decision on the merits in the case brought by the Republic of Cameroon against the Federal Republic of Nigeria over their land and maritime boundary. The judgment, which addresses a number of issues of general international law concerning maritime boundaries and territorial sovereignty, as well as providing a detailed treatment of the particular facts, concludes a case that began in 1994 and has had an unusual history. As this background had a significant bearing on the eventual outcome, a brief recapitulation may be useful.

Type
Decisions of International Tribunals International Court of Justice
Copyright
Copyright © British Institute of International and Comparative Law 2003

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References

2 See the Court's Order of 15 Mar 1996, ICJ Rep 1996, 13 and the author's case note in (1997) 46 ICLQ 676.

3 See the Court's Judgment of 11 June 1998, ICJ Rep 1998, 275 and the author's case note in (1999) 48 ICLQ 651.

4 See the Court's Judgment of 25 Mar 1999, ICJ Rep 1999, 31 and the above case note at 657–8.

5 See the Court's Order of 30 June 1999, ICJ Rep 1999, 24 and the author's case note in (2000) 49 ICLQ 720 at 723.

6 See the Court's Order of 21 Oct 1999, ICJ Rep 1999, and the author's case note n 5 above.

7 See paras 41–55 of the judgment.

8 See paras 56–61 of the judgment.

9 On the legal relationship between effectivites and titles the Court here recalled its observation in the Burkina Faso/Mali Frontier Dispute case that ‘Where the act does not correspond to the law, where the territory which is the subject of the dispute is effectively administered by a State other than the one possessing legal title, preference should be given to the holder of the title’, ICJ Rep 1986, 587, para 63.

10 See paras 62 to 70 of the judgment.

11 See paras 87–91 of the judgment, dealing with the Limani area.

12 See paras 125–9 of the judgment, dealing with the Tsikakiri River.

13 See paras 161–68 of the judgment, dealing with the Hambere Range area.

14 See paras 135–9 of the judgment, dealing with the Maio Senche area.

15 See paras 130–4 of the judgment, dealing with the boundary between Beacon 6 and Wamni Budungo.

16 Here the Court quoted the view of the arbitrator in the Island of Palmas case that in this second type of case ‘suzerainty over the native States becomes the basis of territorial sovereignty towards other members of the community of nations’ (RIAA Vol II, 858–9), and also its own observation in the Western Sahara case that agreements with local rulers may provide ‘derivative roots of title’, ICJ Rep 1975, 39, para 80.

17 As with its ruling with regard to the Lake Chad area, the Court again relied here on its observations in the Frontier Dispute case, see n 9 above.

18 See ICJ Rep 1998, 275, para 117, and Merrills, op cit n 3 at 654–5.

19 See paras 237 to 238 of the judgment.

20 See ICJ Rep 1998, 275 paras 107–111.

21 See paras 239–245 of the judgment.

22 See paras 247–268 of the judgment.

23 On a related point the Court also rejected Nigeria's argument that the Maroua Declaration was invalid because it was never ratified, holding that the Declaration was the type of treaty that entered into force upon signature.

24 See, eg, the Libya/Malta case, ICJ Rep 1985, 13 and the Jan Mayen case, ICJ Rep 1993, 38.

25 Cameroon had argued that the whole of the coastline of the Gulf of Guinea should be taken into account, but that most of the coastline of Bioko Island, belonging to Equatorial Guinea, should be ignored. The Court, however, rejected both arguments.

26 See paras 269–307 of the judgment. However, as point G, which had already been designated, lay to the east of the equidistance line, it was jointed to the latter by a linking line.

27 See paras 308–24 of the judgment.

28 See further n 29 below.

29 In the Jan Mayen case in 1993 Judge Oda argued that Denmark's unilateral application to the Court should likewise be dismissed, although both Denmark and Norway had accepted the Court's jurisdiction under the optional clause. For a review of Judge Oda's thinking on this and related issues see Dyke, JM Van, ‘Judge Shigeru Oda and Maritime Boundary Delimitation’, in Ando, N, McWhinney, E, and Wolfram, R, Liber Amicorum Judge Shigeru Oda (The Hague: Kluwer, 2002), vol 2, 1197.Google Scholar

30 ICJ Rep 1982, 18.

31 ICJ Rep 1985, 13.

32 See Sinclair, I, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 2nd edn (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984), at 169–71.Google Scholar

33 It is interesting to note that Cameroon claimed that Nigeria's international responsibility was based inter alia on its failure to comply with the order indicating provisional measures of protection which the Court made in 1996. Following the Court's recent ruling in the LaGrand case, ICJ Rep 2001, it appears that failure to comply with such an order could entitle a State in the position of Cameroon to compensation.

34 See the Arbitral Award case, ICJ Rep 1960, 192 and, more recently, the Territorial Dispute case, ICJ Rep 1994, 6 involving Honduras/Nicaragua and Libya/Chad, respectively. On the implementation of these decisions and the role of external assistance, see Merrills, JG, ‘The International Court of Justice and the Adjudication of Territorial and Boundary Disputes’, (2000) 13 LJIL 873, at 898901.CrossRefGoogle Scholar