¹ Dumberry, P, ‘The Last Citadel! Can a State Claim the Status of Persistent Objector to Prevent the Application of a Rule of Customary International Law in Investor-State Arbitration?’ (2010) 23 Leiden Journal of International Law 2 379–400.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

² Steinfeld, A, ‘Nuclear Objections: The Persistent Objector and the Legality of the Use of Nuclear Weapons’ (1996) 62 Brooklyn LR 4Google Scholar, 1635–1686 (dealing with the question whether a State possessing nuclear weapons can claim the status of persistent objector); Guldahl, CG, ‘The Role of Persistent Objection in International Humanitarian Law’ (2008) 77 Nordic JIL 51–86Google Scholar; E David, ‘L‘objecteur persistant, une règle persistante?’ in P Tavernier and J-M Henckaerts (eds), Droit international humanitaire coutumier: enjeux et défis contemporains (Bruylant, Brussels, 2008) 89–100.

³ L Loschin, ‘The Persistent Objector and Customary Human Rights Law: A Proposed Analytical Framework’ (1996) 2 UC Davis J Int'l L & Policy 148 (discussing, in particular, the position of the United States as persistent objector with respect to a rule preventing the execution of juvenile offenders); Lau, H, ‘Rethinking the Persistent Objector Doctrine in International Human Rights Law’ (2005) 6 Chicago JIL 495–510Google Scholar.

⁴ Such an exercise has been undertaken in recent years by two authors: O Barsalou, ‘La doctrine de l‘objecteur persistant en droit international public’ (2006) 19 Revue québécoise de droit international 1–18; O Elias, ‘Persistent Objector’ in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (online).

⁵ Siderman de Blake v Argentina, US Court of Appeals, 9^th Circuit, 965 F 2d 699, 715 (1992): ‘Customary international law, like international law defined by treaties and other international agreements, rests on the consent of states. A state that persistently objects to a norm of customary international law that other states accept is not bound by that norm, see Restatement 102 Comment d, just as a state that is not party to an international agreement is not bound by the terms of that agreement’.

⁶ See the US Government's letter to the International Committee of the Red Cross, November 3, 2006, fn 38. See discussion, text to (n 94) ff.

⁷ For instance, the position adopted by the US in the 2002 case of Domingues v United States before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, a case further discussed in detail (see text to n 64, below). Another example is the domestic case of In re ‘Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation’, the Vietnam Association for Victims of Agent Orange/Dioxin, et al v Dow Chemical Co, et al, US District Court for the Eastern District of New York, 373 F Supp 2d 7 (2005), where the US Government issued a ‘Statement of Interest’ (12 January 2005) in which it claimed the status of persistent objector: ‘even if the Court determined that a norm of international law prohibiting the use of chemical herbicides existed at the time in question, such a norm would not be binding upon the United States as a matter of international law. It is a well-established principle of international law that a dissenting state, which indicates dissent while a customary international law rule is in the process of development, is not bound by that rule (…). Here, the United States’ persistent and consistent public pronouncements that customary international law did not prohibit the use of chemical herbicides qualify it as a persistent objector under international law, and thus not bound by any rule that might have developed'. (2005) Digest of US Practice Intl L, doc 39, 31–32. The case involved Vietnamese nationals seeking compensation from US companies for exposure to Agent Orange during the Vietnam War. The Court dismissed the case on October 5, 2005. This decision was upheld by the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in New York City (90 US Court of Appeals for The Second Circuit, Docket N 05-1760-cv, In re ‘Agent Orange’ Product Liability Litigation, February 22, 2008).

⁸ US Counter-Memorial, December 22, 2008, Grand River Enterprises Six Nations Ltd et al v United States, UNCITRAL, 129, fn 466. The case is still pending.

⁹ M Akehurst, ‘Custom as a Source of International Law’ [1974–1975] British Ybk Intl L 24–26.

¹⁰ North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v Denmark/Federal Republic of Germany v Netherlands) [1969] ICJ Rep 38.

¹¹ Schachter, O, ‘International Law in Theory and Practice: General Course in Public International Law’ (1982) 178 Recueil des Cours 38Google Scholar.

¹² G Fitzmaurice, ‘The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice, 1951–54: General Principles and Sources of Law’ (1953) British Yrb Intl L 26.

¹³ Colson, DA, ‘How Persistent Must the Persistent Objector be?’ (1986) 61 Washington LR 965–969Google Scholar; Steinfeld (n 2) 1651–1653.

¹⁴ Practical considerations related to the objection are discussed in Colson, ibid 958–961; Steinfeld (n 2) 1648–1650; Elias (n 4) 15–18.

¹⁵ Weil, P, ‘Le droit international en quête de son identité, Cours général de droit international public’ (1992) 237 Recueil des cours 196–197Google Scholar.

¹⁶ ME Villiger, Customary International Law and Treaties (Kluwer, The Hague, 1985) 36–37.

¹⁷ Charney, J, ‘The Persistent Objector Rule and the Development of Customary International Law’ [1985] British Yrb Intl L 23Google Scholar.

¹⁸ Legality of the Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) 1996 ICJ Rep. In his dissenting opinion Judge Schwebel, 312, stated ‘This nuclear practice is not a practice of a lone and secondary persistent objector. This is not a practice of a pariah Government crying out in the wilderness of otherwise adverse international opinion. This is the practice of five of the world's major Powers, of the permanent members of the Security Council, significantly supported for almost 50 years by their allies and other States sheltering under their nuclear umbrellas. That is to say, it is the practice of States—and a practice supported by a large and weighty number of other States—that together represent the bulk of the world's military and economic and financial and technological power and a very large proportion of its population’. See Steinfeld (n 2).

¹⁹ Kelly, J Patrick, ‘The Twilight of Customary International Law’ (2000) 40 Virginia JIL 513–514Google Scholar.

²⁰ P Weil, ‘Toward Relative Normativity in International Law’ (1983) 77 AJIL 433–434.

²¹ TL Stein, ‘The Approach of the Different Drummer: The Principle of the Persistent Objector in International Law’ (1985) Harvard ILJ 466.

²² American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law Third: the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, vol 1, ch 1, (St Paul, 1987).

²³ Stein (n 21) 469.

²⁴ Restatement (n 22) para 102, 26.

²⁵ Stein (n 21) 470. He examines in detail the work of the Institute.

²⁶ ibid 472.

²⁷ ibid 468.

²⁸ For instance, these writers supported the concept: M Akehurst, (n 9) 23–31; Waldock, H, ‘General Course on Public International Law’ (1962) 106 Recueil des cours 49–52Google Scholar; Fitzmaurice, G, ‘The General Principles of International Law’ (1957) 92 Recueil des cours 101Google Scholar. However, A D'Amato, The Concept of Custom in International Law (Cornell UP, Ithaca, 1971) 21, already opposed the concept.

²⁹ P-M Dupuy, ‘A propos de l'opposabilité de la coutume générale: enquête brève sur l'objecteur persistant’, in Mélanges Michel Virally (Pédone, Paris, 1991) 269; Weil (n 15) 196.

³⁰ Kelly (n 19) 513–514. See also Barsalou (n 4) 4.

³¹ Tomuschat, C, ‘Obligations Arising for States Without or Against Their Will’ (1993) 241 Recueil des cours 285Google Scholar.

³² Stein (n 21) 21; Charney (n 17).

³³ See, for instance: Colson (n 13) 957–971; Dupuy (n 29); Steinfeld (n 2) 1635–1686; Mendelson, MH, ‘The Formation of Customary International Law’ (1998) 272 Recueil des cours 228–233Google Scholar; Tomuschat (n 31).

³⁴ Stein (n 21) 463.

³⁵ See, for instance, these writers: Fitzmaurice (n 12) 21–26; Henkin, L, ‘International Law: Politics, Values and Function: General Course on Public International Law’ (1989) 216 Recueil des cours 53–58Google Scholar; Weil (n 15) 189–201; Akehurst (n 9) 23–27; Waldock (n 28) 49–50; S Sur, ‘La coutume’ in Jurisclasseur de droit international, Fasc 13, 1989, no 98; HWA Thirlway, International Customary Law and Codification (AW Sijthoff, Leiden, 1972) 78; K Wolfke, Custom in Present International Law (Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1993) 66–67; Cahier, P, ‘Changement et continuité du droit international: Cours général de droit international public’ (1985) 195 Recueil des cours 231–237Google Scholar; Sorensen, M, ‘Principes de droit international public: Cours général’ (1960) 101 Recueil des cours 44Google Scholar; O. Schachter (n 11) 36-39; ME Villiger (n 16) 34–36; GM Danilenko, Law-Making in the International Community (Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1993) 109–113; M Virally, ‘The Sources of International Law’ in M Sorensen (ed) Manual of Public International Law (Macmillan, London, 1968) 137; Colson (n 13) 957; Stein (n 21) 463; Steinfeld (n 2); Loschin (n 3) 148; Mendelson (n 33) 228–233; Elias (n 4); G Pentassuglia, La rilevanza dell'obiezione persitente nel diritto internazionale (Laterza, Bari, 1996); BJ McClane, ‘How Late in the Emergence of a Norm of Customary International Law May a Persistent Objector Object?’ (1989) 13 ILSA JIL, 6.

³⁶ International Law Association (ILA), Statement of Principles Applicable to the Formation of General Customary International Law, Final Report of the Committee, London Conference (2000) 14, ‘principle’ 15, 27 (‘[i]f whilst a practice is developing into a rule of general law, a State persistently and openly dissents from the rule, it will not be bound by it’).

³⁷ See inter alia, Tomuschat (n 31) 284–290; Charney (n 17); Dupuy (n 29); Conforti, B, ‘Cours général de droit international public’ (1988) 212 Recueil des cours 74–77Google Scholar; G Abi-Saab, ‘Cours général de droit international public’ (1987) 207 Recueil des cours 180–182; M Bos, ‘The Identification of Custom in International Law’ (1982) 25 German Yrb Intl L 45–50; L Condorelli, ‘Custom’, in M Bedjaoui, International Law: Achievement and Prospects (Unesco, Paris, 1991) 205; D'Amato (n 28); TS Rama Rao, ‘International Custom’ (1979) Indiana JIL 519–520; Barsalou (n 4) 1–18; Kelly (n 19) 508 ff.; Guldahl (n 2) 84–86; Lau (n 3) 495 ff.; S Toope, ‘Powerful but Unpersuasive? The Role of the United States in the Evolution of Customary International Law’ in M Byers and G Nolte (eds), United States Hegemony and the Foundations of International Law (CUP, Cambridge, 2005) 308–313.

³⁸ Fisheries case (United Kingdom v Norway) [1951] ICJ Rep 116. It should be noted that another ICJ case, Asylum Case (Colombia v Peru) [1950] ICJ Rep 266, often referred to in support of the concept was decided in the different context of the development of a regional custom. See text to n 123 ff. on this question.

³⁹ Pleadings, Documents, vol I, 382–383 (Norway); Pleadings, Documents, vol II, 428–429 (United Kingdom); Pleadings, Documents, vol III, 291–296 (Norway). Stein (n 21) 460, noted, however, that these pleadings only refer to the writing of a few scholars in support of the theory without providing a single example of State practice.

⁴⁰ Fisheries case (n 38) 131.

⁴¹ Charney (n 17) 9.

⁴² Conforti (n 37) 75; Bos (n 37) 65; Weil (n 15) 192; Tomuschat (n 31) 287. However, see MH Mendelson (n 33) 230, and Elias (n 4) 13, both stating that the obiter argument is not relevant since international law does not recognize the doctrine of binding precedent. D'Amato (n 28) 252–254, 261, argues that this passage of the Court is actually referring to a regional custom, and not to a ‘general’ custom. Most writers reject his position.

⁴³ For instance, Asylum Case (n 38), dissenting opinion of Judge Azevedo (336–337); South West Africa Case (Second Phase) (Ethiopia v South Africa, Liberia v South Africa) [1966] ICJ Rep, separate opinion of Judge Van Wyk (169–170); North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (n 10), separate opinion of Judge Ammoun (130-131), dissenting opinions of Judge Lachs (238) and Judge Sorensen (247–248); Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v France) [1974] ICJ Rep, separate opinion of Judge Gros (286–289).

⁴⁴ Fisheries Jurisdiction case (United Kingdom v Iceland) [1974] ICJ Rep 175.

⁴⁵ See Charney (n 17) 10–11.

⁴⁶ Fisheries Jurisdiction (n 44), separate opinions of Judge Waldock (120) and Judge De Castro (91-92).

⁴⁷ Charney (n 17) 10–11; Tomuschat (n 31) 287–288.

⁴⁸ See Mendelson (n 33) 232; Elias (n 4) 14.

⁴⁹ Fischbach and Friedricy Cases (Germany-Venezuela Mixed Claims Commission) (1903) 10 RIAA 388 ff.

⁵⁰ ibid 395–396.

⁵¹ ibid 397 (emphasis added).

⁵² ibid 398 (emphasis in the original).

⁵³ ibid 397: ‘when Venezuela admits, without qualification, her liability for wrongful seizures of or injuries to property growing out of insurrectionary events during the civil war, she must be held to admit her liability for all wrongful seizures of persons and property during that period and under those conditions’, including wrongful acts committed by the rebels.

⁵⁴ Mendelson (n 33) 232–233; Elias (n 4) 14.

⁵⁵ Roach & Pinkerton v United States, Res No 3/87, Case 9647 (United States), Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 1986-1987 (OEA/Ser.L/V/II.71, Doc 9 rev 1, 22 September 1987), para 53 (also in (1987) 8 Human Rights LJ 345). This case is discussed in: Loschin (n 3); D Weissbrodt, ‘Execution of Juvenile Offenders by the United States Violates International Human Rights Law’ (1988) 3 Am UJ Int'l L & Policy, 346–352.

⁵⁶ Roach & Pinkerton, para 51 (quoting the ICJ Fisheries case (n 38).

⁵⁷ ibid para 53. The Commission noted that the United States ‘abstained from participating in the debate and vote on the draft International Covenant, and submitted it to the US Senate with reservations’ (art 6(5) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976, 999 UNTS 171, prohibits the imposition of the death penalty on persons under 18 years of age. The United States ratified the Covenant in 1992 with a number of reservations, understandings and declarations). The Commission also stated that the United States was opposed to art 4(5) of the American Convention on Human Rights (also including the same prohibition), adding that ‘when President Carter signed the American Convention he proposed the Senate advice and consent to ratification of the treaty be accompanied by a reservation stating that “United States adherence to Article 4 is subject to the Constitution and other law of the United States”.’ (The United States has signed but not ratified the Convention and the Commission acknowledged that it was therefore not bound by art 4(5)).

⁵⁸ ibid.

⁵⁹ ibid 55–56.

⁶⁰ ibid 59.

⁶¹ ibid 60.

⁶² ibid 62. The Commission also stated that ‘[t]he deprivation by the State of an offender's life should not be made subject to the fortuitous element of where the crime took place’ (ibid 61).

⁶³ ibid 62.

⁶⁴ Michael Domingues v United States, Report N° 62/02, Merits, Case 12.285, October 22, 2002.

⁶⁵ Response of the United States Government, dated 18 October 2001, 9–10, in (2001) Digest of US Practice Intl L, 303, 310. See also Reply of the United States Government (dated 19 December 2001) to the Report of the Inter-American Commission made on October 15, 2001.

⁶⁶ Michael Domingues (n 64) 42.

⁶⁷ ibid 48.

⁶⁸ ibid 84.

⁶⁹ ibid 85: ‘it may be said that the United States itself, rather than persistently objecting to the standard, has in several significant respects recognized the propriety of this norm by, for example, prescribing the age of 18 as the federal standard for the application of capital punishment and by ratifying the Fourth Geneva Convention without reservation to this standard’.

⁷⁰ ibid 84. The Commission also noted: ‘The overwhelming evidence of global state practice as set out above displays a consistency and generality amongst world states indicating that the world community considers the execution of offenders aged below 18 years at the time of their offence to be inconsistent with prevailing standards of decency’.

⁷¹ ibid 85.

⁷² ibid 49.

⁷³ ibid 85.

⁷⁴ This position is criticized by Lau (n 3) 501–502.

⁷⁵ Michael Domingues case (n 64) 86.

⁷⁶ DT Fox, ‘Inter-American Commission on the Human Rights Finds United States in Violation’ (1988) 82 AJIL 602.

⁷⁷ Weil (n 15) 192 (referring to a skeleton State practice); Stein (n 21) 459–460 (‘it is far easier to find instances in which a State has failed to invoked the principle (…) than it is to find cases of the principle's actual application’).

⁷⁸ Dupuy (n 29) 264; Barsalou (n 4) 15.

⁷⁹ Weil (n 15) 191; Dupuy (n 29) 264; Mendelson (n 33) 234–235. For Stein (n 21) 468, the principle of the persistent objector is a fallback argument to be used in conjunction with the claim denying that a rule is part of customary international law.

⁸⁰ Charney (n 17) 11–13, 22.

⁸¹ ibid 13–14.

⁸² ibid 15; Tomuschat (n 31) 289; Stein (n 21) 463.

⁸³ The persistent objector argument was advanced by South Africa in South West Africa ICJ Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents, vol X, 1960, 9–11.

⁸⁴ The relevance of this example is, however, limited since the principle prohibiting apartheid must certainly be regarded as a norm of jus cogens, from which no dissent whatsoever is possible (this is further discussed, see text to n 143 ff.).

⁸⁵ Charney (n 17) 14–15.

⁸⁶ The ‘Hull formula’ was first articulated by the US Secretary of State, Mr Cordell Hull, in a letter to its Mexican counterpart in response to Mexico's nationalisation of US companies in 1936. Mr Hull argues that international law required ‘prompt, adequate and effective’ compensation for the expropriation of foreign investments (in GH Hackworth, Digest of International Law, vol 3, 1942, para 228).

⁸⁷ UNGA Res 3281 (XXIX) (12 December 1974). See also UNGA Res 1803 (XVII) (14 December 1962).

⁸⁸ UNCTAD, Bilateral Investment Treaties 1995–2006: Trends in Investment Rulemaking (2007) 52.

⁸⁹ UNCTAD, South-South Cooperation in International Investment Arrangements (UNCTAD Series on International Investment Policies for Development, 2005) 45. This is discussed in: Dumberry (n 1).

⁹⁰ CME Czech Republic BV v Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Final Award, 14 March 2003, para 497.

⁹¹ Elias (n 4) 4.

⁹² ‘Rule 45’ in JM Henckaerts & L Doswald-Beck (eds), Customary International Humanitarian Law Volumel 1 (CUP, Cambridge, 2005) 201–206 (of the French version).

⁹³ ibid xxxix.

⁹⁴ Letter of the US Government to the International Committee of the Red Cross, November 3, 2006, providing its ‘initial reactions’ to the Study, see at fn 38, in (2006) Digest of US Practice Intl L No 103. The letter also indicates that the US was not simply a persistent objector since the Study's Rule 45 had not crystallized and become a customary rule.

⁹⁵ Weil (n 15) 191.

⁹⁶ J Charney, ‘Universal International Law’ (1993) 87 AJIL 539.

⁹⁷ ibid.

⁹⁸ Charney (n 17) 21.

⁹⁹ Colson (n 13) 967.

¹⁰⁰ For Charney (n 17) 22, ‘no case is cited for a circumstance in which the objector effectively maintained its status after the rule became well accepted in international law’. Cahier (n 35) 236; Akehurst (n 9) 27; Weil (n 15) 191, 197, all supporters of the concept, acknowledge this phenomenon. See also Steinfeld (n 2) 1671, 1675–1676, 1685, 1679–1680.

¹⁰¹ Wolfke (n 35) 66–67 (for whom, the fact that objections are rarely upheld by States ‘does not undermine the principle of persistent objector. On the contrary, it confirms the consensual basis of customary international law. It shows merely that for extra-legal reasons, the so-called “societal context”, it is in practice difficult, if not impossible, for individual State to abstain à la longue from the general evolution of international law’); Danilenko (n 35) 112 (‘the possibility of effective preservation of the persistent objector status should not be confused with the legally recognized right not to agree with new customary rules’). See also Mendelson (n 33) 237.

¹⁰² Guldahl (n 2) 58 (the author nevertheless adds that ‘although it is understandable that the question may arise as to the need for a doctrine which is not extensively applied and which is only effective in the short run, if at all’). See also Elias (n 4) 4.

¹⁰³ ILA Statement (n 36) 27–28.

¹⁰⁴ Charney (n 17) 15.

¹⁰⁵ Dupuy (n 29) 259, asking the question whether the concept is just ‘un mythe positivist, créé puis entretenu par une doctrine aux aguets devant les assauts victorieux des majorités nouvelles?’ and concluding that ‘l'efficacité de l'objection persistante constitue bien un mythe puisqu'elle peut très difficilement s'autoriser d'une effectivité démontrable’ (266).

¹⁰⁶ Steinfeld (n 2) 1655, who nevertheless argues that the concept is necessary and ‘may soon become a tool for the lawmakers as well’ (1658).

¹⁰⁷ Stein (n 21) 470, see also 458–459, 470.

¹⁰⁸ Weil (n 20) 433–434.

¹⁰⁹ Lotus Case (France v Turkey) PCIJ Rep Series A No 10, at 18 (‘The rules of law binding upon states … emanate from their own free will as expressed in conventions or by usages generally accepted as expressing principles of law.’).

¹¹⁰ Tunkin, G, ‘Co-existence and International Law’ (1958) 95 Recueil des cours 13Google Scholar; R. Erickson, ‘The Soviet Theory of the Legal Nature of Customary International Law’ (1975) 7 Case Western Reserve JIL 148–168.

¹¹¹ Cahier (n 35) 232–233; GJH Van Hoof, Rethinking the Sources of International Law (Kluwer, Antwerp, 1983) 76–77.

¹¹² Barsalou (n 4) 12.

¹¹³ For instance, see Henkin (n 35) 57, for whom, custom is ‘not a product of the will of States but a “systemic creation”, reflecting the “consent” of the international system, not the consent of individual States’.

¹¹⁴ Condorelli (n 37) 203; C De Visscher, Théories et réalités en droit international public (Pedone, Paris, 1953) 182.

¹¹⁵ Charney (n 17) 16, 18.

¹¹⁶ These different theories are discussed in Guzman, AT, ‘Saving Customary International Law’ (2005) 27 Michigan JIL 142 ff.Google Scholar

¹¹⁷ D'Amato (n 28) 44.

¹¹⁸ Tomuschat (n 31) 209.

¹¹⁹ DP O'Connell, International Law (Stevens & Sons, London, 1970) 16.

¹²⁰ A D'Amato, ‘The Concept of Special Custom in International Law’ (1969) 63 AJIL 211; G Cohen-Jonathan, ‘La coutume locale’ (1961) 7 AFDI 119–140.

¹²¹ Waldock (n 28) 50; Schachter (n 11) 36.

¹²² Conforti (n 37) 76; D'Amato (n 28) 233–234, 248–249, 252–254, 261; Abi-Saab (n 37) 181.

¹²³ Asylum Case (n 38) 276. In this case, Columbia was relying on the existence of a so-called Latin-American regional custom giving the right to a unilateral and definitive qualification of the status of an individual by a State when granting diplomatic asylum, and maintaining that such special rule was binding on Peru. The Court rejected Colombia's contention of the existence of a regional custom and added in an obiter dictum that ‘even if it could be supposed that such a custom existed between certain Latin-American States only, it could not be invoked against Peru which, far from having by its attitude adhered to it, has, on the contrary, repudiated it (…)’ (ibid 277–278).

¹²⁴ Charney (n 17) 18; Barsalou (n 4) 12.

¹²⁵ Charney ibid 5, 16 (‘it is difficult to see how the acceptance of [the persistent objector] rule does not reflect an acceptance of the consent theory of international law’). See also D'Amato (n 28) 261.

¹²⁶ Akehurst (n 9) 23–24.

¹²⁷ Stein (n 21) 476.

¹²⁸ ibid 477–478 (also indicating, at 466, that ‘American disenchantment with the United Nations over the last decade in part reflects the realisation that the multilateral process cannot be controlled by the United States’). See also Akehurst (n 9) 26; Waldock (n 28) 50; Mendelson (n 33) 239–240; Weil (n 20) 435; Cahier (n 35) 236; Elias (n 4) 2–3.

¹²⁹ Stein (n 21) 476.

¹³⁰ ibid 476. See also Danilenko (n 35) 111.

¹³¹ Barsalou (n 4) 6.

¹³² Akehurst (n 9) 28.

¹³³ Waldock (n 28) 52.

¹³⁴ Henkin (n 35) 57; Danilenko (n 35) 115.

¹³⁵ Schachter (n 11) 34.

¹³⁶ The United Kingdom in the Fisheries Case (n 38), Pleadings, vol. II, (Reply submitted by the Government of the United Kingdom) took the view that ‘there is universal agreement that a new state has no option but to adhere to generally accepted customary law’ (428).

¹³⁷ Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v Mali) [1986] ICJ Rep 565. The Chamber decided that customary law (in this case the principle of uti possidetis) would apply to new States ‘immediately and from that moment onwards’ (568). On this case, see Danilenko (n 35) 116–118.

¹³⁸ H Thierry, J Combacau, S Sur, C Vallee, Droit international public, (Montchrestien, Paris, 1985) 119; Villiger (n 16) 36; Sur (n 35) 100; Van Hoof (n 111) 77–78; Danilenko (n 35) 113–118.

¹³⁹ Guzman (n 116) 173.

¹⁴⁰ North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (n 10) 10, Judge Ammoun for whom a rule of customary law ‘does not require the consent of all States, (…) but at least the consent of those who were aware of this general practice and, being in a position to oppose it, have not done so. (…) Thus the right of countries becoming independent, which have not participated in the formation of rules which they consider incompatible with the new state of affairs, is preserved’ (130).

¹⁴¹ Kelly (n 19) 513.

¹⁴² For instance, Guzman (n 116) 172–173, who supports the concept of persistent objector, nevertheless admits that ‘the logic here is simple: if a persistent objector rule is desirable from a systemic perspective, it is because giving states the ability to object offers benefits that outweigh the costs’, therefore ‘[i]f allowing objection is desirable in general, it is also desirable for new states.’

¹⁴³ Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, art 53 defines jus cogens as ‘a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character’.

¹⁴⁴ Stein (n 21) 480. See also the theory elaborated by Henkin (n 35) 51–55.

¹⁴⁵ In the Fisheries Case (n 38), Pleadings, Oral argument, Documents, Volume II, 428–429, the United Kingdom took the position that a State has no right to claim the status of persistent objector to avoid ‘fundamental principles of law’. The Court did not examine this argument in its decision.

¹⁴⁶ South West Africa Case (n 43) 470, Judge Nervo arguing that ‘there is no principle of general international law which could be validly invoked to contradict, or destroy, the essential purpose and the fundamental sources of the legal obligation rooted in the very existence of the Covenant, the mandates system and the Charter’.

¹⁴⁷ Michael Domingues v United States (n 64) 85. See also, Roach & Pinkerton v United States (n 55) 53: ‘for a norm of customary international law to be binding on a State which has protested the norm, it must have acquired the status of jus cogens’.

¹⁴⁸ Charney (n 17) 19.

¹⁴⁹ Charney (n 96) 541.

¹⁵⁰ Elias (n 4) 18.

¹⁵¹ Dupuy (n 29) 261; Charney (n 17) 19–20 (‘if the persistent objector rule is good law, the rule could apply to the development of all new rules of international law, including rules of jus cogens’).

¹⁵² Charney (n 17) 19.

¹⁵³ Weil (n 15) 193. He also states (at 197) that ‘la théorie du persistent objector sauvegarde la primauté objective de la règle de droit tout en constituant un réduit inexpugnable pour le volontarisme. Bref, une conciliation des contradiction plutôt que le sacrifice de l'une des exigences au profit de l'autre’.

¹⁵⁴ ILA Statement (n 36) 28.

¹⁵⁵ Dupuy (n 29) 271.

¹⁵⁶ Henkin (n 35) 57 (emphasis added).

¹⁵⁷ Stein (n 21) 466 (emphasis added).

¹⁵⁸ Schachter (n 11) 38; Kelly (n 19) 536.

¹⁵⁹ Conforti (n 37) 76.

¹⁶⁰ Charney (n 17) 21.

¹⁶¹ ibid 22; Cahier (n 35) 227.

¹⁶² Weil (n 15) 197–198; Dupuy (n 29) 271; Mendelson (n 33) 240; Barsalou (n 4) 9.

¹⁶³ Charney (n 17) 24; G. Abi-Saab (n 37) 181.

¹⁶⁴ Barsalou (n 4) 6–7.

¹⁶⁵ Barsalou (n 4) 9; Lau (n 3) 499.

¹⁶⁶ M Byers, Custom, Power and the Power of Rules: International Relations and Customary International Law (CUP, Cambridge, 1999) 183.

¹⁶⁷ Mendelson (n 33) 239.

¹⁶⁸ ibid 240. See also I Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (5^th edn, OUP, Oxford, 1998) 10.

¹⁶⁹ The two above-mentioned Reports of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (n 55 and 64) are merely theoretical recognition of the concept of persistent objector. In both cases, however, the Commission ultimately did not apply the concept. In one case, it held that no customary rule existed in the first place and in the other that the rule had become jus cogens (to which no dissention is allowed).

¹⁷⁰ Barsalou (n 4) 18. However, see Guzman (n 116) 166–172, concluding based on a rational choice theory of custom that the concept reduces the ‘costs’ to the international legal system caused by States which would not comply with a customary rule. See also V Fon and F Parisi, ‘Stability and Change in International Customary Law’ George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No 03–21, 3.

¹⁷¹ Schachter (n 11) 37–38: ‘It would be germane to consider a variety of factors including the circumstances of adoption of the new principles, the reasons for its importance to the generality of States, the grounds for dissent, and the relevant position of the dissenting States. The degree to which new customary rules many be imposed on recalcitrant States will depend, and should depend, on the whole set of relevant circumstances’.

¹⁷² Dumberry (n 1) 379.

¹⁷³ Guldahl (n 2) 84, 86.

¹⁷⁴ Lau (n 3) 500–501, 506; Loschin (n 3).