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⁴⁰ eg Congreso del Partido (n 12).

⁴¹ Trendtex (n 10) 558.

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⁴⁸ The investor's consent is akin to a party's entry into an agreement to arbitrate—or compromis—after the dispute has arisen.

⁴⁹ This is ‘generally speaking’ only because some investment treaties allow counter-claims by the respondent State after an investor has made a claim under the treaty although in all cases it is the investor who triggers the use of the system.

⁵⁰ Such as in the case of the International Criminal Court whose jurisdiction is limited (but for cases referred to the court by the UN Security Council) to acts of individuals that were committed either within the territory of a State Party or by a national of a State Party: Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 07 1998, 37 ILM 999 (entered into force 1 08 2002) Art 12(2).Google Scholar

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⁵³ Reproduced in ibid 46, n 67.

⁵⁴ ibid 28–33.

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⁶⁶ Texaco (n 59) paras 54–7.

⁶⁷ Such as the principle that one elected government may not bind another, so as to maintain the ability of the sovereign ‘to change its policies in order to reflect the will of the people (particularly after a change of government) or to reflect new circumstances (such as evidence of a new risk to public health)’: Davies, ACL, ‘Ultra Vires Problems in Government Contracts’ (2006) 122 LQR 98, 105.Google Scholar

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⁷⁶ Although the tribunal also reserved the possibility that a contractual breach by the State could violate the umbrella clause in exceptional circumstances, such as where the State impeded the ability of an investor to prosecute its claims before an international arbitration tribunal, having previously agreed to such arbitration in a contract with the investor: ibid para 172.

⁷⁷ ibid para 119.

⁷⁸ ibid para 168. The tribunal also found that a broad reading would make superfluous the other substantive obligations of the States Parties, that the language of the umbrella clause did not expressly refer to ‘contractual’ commitments, and that the location of the umbrella clause in the treaty text indicated that it was not meant to be a substantive obligation: paras 168–9.

⁷⁹ SGS v Philippines (n 74) para 126.

⁸⁰ ibid para 22.

⁸¹ See UNCTAD (n 65) 27–31.

⁸² As suggested in SGS v Pakistan (n 74).

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⁸⁴ UNCTAD (n 65) 35, n 15.

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