Hostname: page-component-5c6d5d7d68-wp2c8 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-08-19T01:50:28.031Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Structures of Judicial Decision Making from Legal Formalism to Critical Theory, 2nd ed., by Roy L. Brooks. Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic Press, 2005. Pp. xlix, 325. ISBN 1-59460-123-2. US$50.00

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2019

Marylin J. Raisch*
Affiliation:
John Wolff International & Comparative Law Library, Georgetown Law Center, Washington, D.C. USA

Abstract

Image of the first page of this content. For PDF version, please use the ‘Save PDF’ preceeding this image.'
Type
Book Reviews
Copyright
Copyright © 2006 by the International Association of Law Libraries 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

195 Zimmermann et al., supra, at 596.Google Scholar

196 Zimmermann et al., supra, at 20–21.Google Scholar

197 Reference here is to the broader definition, related to legal philosophy, “the study of the first principles of the law of nature, the civil law, and the law of nations…. 2. More modernly, the study of the general or fundamental elements of a particular legal system, as opposed to its practical and concrete detail.” Black's Law Dictionary 871–872 (8th ed. 2004).Google Scholar

198 For the tensions inherent in opportunity analysis, see generally Robert Hockett, Whose Ownership? Which Society?, 27 Cardozo L. Rev. 1 (2005)Google Scholar

199 See Janny Scott and David Leonhardt, Class in America: Shadowy Lines That Still Divide, N.Y. Times, May 15, 2005, at A1 Sunday Final Edition, CLASS MATTERS: First article in a series).Google Scholar

200 Story, Joseph, Commentaries on equity jurisprudence: as administered in England and America. 2nd ed., rev., corr., and enl. Boston: C.C. Little and J. Brown, 1839.Google Scholar

201 Reference here is more particularly to Justice Scalia's dissent in Roper v. Simmons, 125 S.Ct. 1183 (2005) (juvenile death penalty case); for analysis of this and other similar positions taken by Justice Scalia in other cases and discussions see generally Jeremy Waldron, Foreign Law and the Modern Ius Gentium, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 129 (2005).Google Scholar