Author's note. The author would like to thank the Center for Research in International Studies of Stanford University and the American Research Center in Egypt for their support of research upon which this article is based, and Clement Henry Moore, for assisting that research.

¹ See, for example, Dekmejian, R. Hrair, Egypt under Nasser: A Study in Political Dynamics (Albany, 1971);Google ScholarIliya, Hank, The Political Mobilization of Peasants: A Study of an Egyptian Community (Bloomington, 1974);Google ScholarJames, Mayfield, Rural Politics in Nasser's Egypt: A Quest for Legitimacy (Austin, 1971);Google ScholarAmos, Perlmutter, Egypt: The Praetorian State (New York, 1974);Google ScholarSadek, S. E. M., The Balance Point between Local Autonomy and National Control (The Hague, 1972);Google Scholar and Ibrahim, Ahmed Kamel, ‘The Impact of Nasser's Regime on Labor Relations in Egypt’, Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan (Ann Arbor, 1972).Google Scholar

² The works cited in n. 1 generally support these observations.

³ Clement, Henry Moore, ‘Authoritarian Politics in Unincorporated Society: The Case of Nasser's Egypt’, Comparative Politics, 6 (01 1974), 193–218;Google Scholar for a discussion of the concept of institutionalization see Samuel, P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, 1968), pp. 2–92.Google Scholar

⁴ See James, A. Bill, ‘Class Analysis and the Dialectics of Modernization in the Middle East’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 4, 3 (10 1972), 426–427;Google ScholarJames, A. Bill and Carl, Leiden, The Middle East: Politics and Power (Boston, 1974), pp. 64–68.Google Scholar

⁵ Shilla is also the term used in Iraq and Saudi Arabia. See ibid., p. 66. See also William, Rugh, ‘Emergence of a New Middle Class in Saudi Arabia’, Middle East Journal 28, 1 (Winter, 1973), 7–20.Google Scholar

⁶ For a discussion of the role of shillas in Egyptian politics see my ‘Patterns of Association in the Egyptian Political Elite’, in George, Lenczowski, ed., Political Elites in the Middle East (Washington, 1975), pp. 83–107.Google Scholar

⁷ President al-Sadat's de-Nasserization policies have spawned a series of revealing articles in Rūz al- Yūsuf, Akhbā al- Yūm, and other publications in which new information on personal conflicts within the Nasserite political elite is found. Some of the more interesting revelations are to be found in Mūsā, Sabrī, ‘Facts about the Struggle and the Power Centers’, Akhbār al-Yūm, 4 10 1975, p. 3;Google Scholariidem, ‘The Struggle of the Power Centers’, ibid., 10 october 1975, p. 1; Ahmad Hamrūsh, ‘The Secrets of the July Revolution’, Rūz al-YUumacr;suf, 21 07 1975, p. 25;Google Scholaridam., ‘Nasser Was in the Hands of the Power Centers’,, 12 December 1975, pp. 32–33.

⁸ For the importance of the Higher Committee of Agrarian Reform and the General Desert Authority to the careers of many Egyptian politicians of cabinet rank, see my ‘The Ties That Bind: Political Association and Policy Making in Egypt’, Ph.D.diss., Stanford University (Stanford, 1974), pp. 244–262.Google Scholar

⁹ Ali Sabrī's commitment to socialism was, of course, negotiable. One account has it that Nāsir postured Sabrī as a leftist in order to secure aid from Moscow.

¹⁰ In a recent round, for example, the influential Sayyid Mar'i was pulled from the foundering ASU and eventually appointed speaker of the Peoples' Assembly, while Muhammad Hāfiż Ghānim, who is not a powerful force in Egyptian politics, was placed in charge of the ASU.

¹¹ For a discussion of the absence of institutionalized political organizations in Egypt, see Perlmutter, , Praetorian State, pp. 4–20 and passim.Google Scholar

¹² For instance, Moore states that ‘contemporary Egypt provides evidence against, and induces modification of, a widely accepted proposition concerning modernization. This proposition suggests that modernization, in the sense of social mobilization, tends to undermine authoritarian government by engendering powerful groups that the system cannot absorb without changing to a pluralist or totalitarian form of rule’ (‘Authoritarian Politics’, p. 193). Samīr Khalaf makes a similar case for Lebanon; he argues that primordial groupings are fully capable of undertaking the tasks of modernization. See his ‘Adaptive Modernization: The Case for Lebanon’, in Charles, Cooper and Sidney, Alexander, Economic Development and Population Growth in the Middle East (New York, 1972). The notion of developmental sequences is associated with the work of the members of the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council.Google Scholar

¹³ Donald, M. Reid has published articles that are highly informative sources for the history and development of professional syndicates: ‘The Rise of Professions and Professional Organization in Modern Egypt’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 6 (01 1974), 24–57,Google Scholar and ‘The National Bar Association and Egyptian Politics, 1912–1952’, International Journal of African Historical Studies, 7, 4 (1974), 608–646.Google Scholar An excellent analysis of professional syndicates in contemporary Egypt is provided by Clement, Henry Moore, ‘Professional Syndicates in Contemporary Egypt: The “Containment” of the New Middle Class’, paper presented to the Middle East Studies Association conference, 11 1973.Google Scholar

¹⁴ For a history of the bar association see Farhat, J. Ziadeh, Lawyers: The Rule of Law, and Liberalism in Modern Egypt (Stanford, 1968).Google Scholar See also Reid, , ‘National Bar Association’, pp. 24–57.Google Scholar

¹⁵ al-Ahrām, 29 12 1958, 4 04 1971.Google Scholar

¹⁶ 'Uthman, M., general secretary of the Syndicate of Teachers, interview, 21 06 1972Google Scholar The figure of 140,000 is given by Luīal-Khūlī, , ‘Intellectual and Political Work’, al-Tali'a, 05 1967.Google Scholar

¹⁷ This is an estimate based on Khuli's figures (in ibid.) for 1967 and projected growth rates for all syndicates estimated from data available for the agricultural engineers', teachers', doctors', and engineers' syndicates. Khūlī's figures for 1967 are as follows: doctors' syndicate, 14,000; veterinarians', 1,625; dentists', 1,654; pharmacists', 4,042; lawyers', 7,000; accountants', I,500; teachers', 140,000; agricultural engineers', 20,000 engineers', 22,000; scientists', not available; journalists', I,200; musicians', I,060; stage actors', 914; cinema actors', 430.

¹⁸ Between 1924 and 1952, promotion from the presidency of the bar association into the cabinet was a significant although not major channel of political recruitment. Six presidents of the bar later took up cabinet posts. See Reid, , ‘National Bar Association’, pp. 641–642.Google Scholar

¹⁹ The constitutions ratified in 1956, 1964, and 1971 all included clauses respecting the legal existence of syndicates and their bylaws.

²⁰ From interviews in 1971–1972 with past and present members of the board of directors of the agricultural engineers' syndicate.

²¹ Apathy among the membership of the engineers' syndicate is suggested by Moore, , ‘Authoritarian Politics’, p. 211.Google Scholar

²² There have been attempts to expand the geographical base of syndicate activities. See below pp. 287–288.

²³ Clement, Henry Moore, ‘Authoritarian Politics in Unincorporated Society: The Case of Nasser's Egypt’, paper presented to the American Political Science Association convention, Washington, 1972, p. 16.Google Scholar

²⁴ Ziadeh, , Lawyers, pp. 155–158;Google ScholarReid, , ‘National Bar Association’, p. 640.Google Scholar See also Mālik, Za'lūk, ‘The Egyptian National Bar Association’, unpublished paper, Department of Economics and Political Science, American University in Cairo, 05 1971, pp. 43–45.Google Scholar

²⁵ The press law of March 1955 was, according to official sources, ‘to reorganize the profession on a democratic basis’. It was based on three principles: ‘(1) Separating owners of newspapers and press associations from reporters, and limiting membership in the syndicate to the latter; (2) limiting the practice of the profession to the membership of the syndicate only; (3) establishing a period of training for anyone who intends to become a professional journalist’ (al-Ahrām, 14 03 1955).Google Scholar

²⁶ According to the press report, ‘the new law is supposed to include a rule making all ties between doctors and a company or organization take place through the syndicate. The syndicate is to distribute such work in companies or other nongovernmental organizations among doctors in the interest of fairness’ (ibid., 14 Macrch 1955).According to Moore, this law was never fully implemented. Private correspondence, 6 Dec. 1975.

²⁷ After 1958, all candidates for board positions had by law to be members of the National Union. Occasionally, when it appeared as if a critic of the regime would be elected, the government forced the syndicate to postpone elections.

²⁸ From interviews in 1971–1972 with past and present members of the board of the syndicate of agricultural engineers.

²⁹ al-Ahrām, 17 01 1969.Google Scholar Both sides honored the compromise agreement. Dr. Muhammad al-Nabawī al-Muhandis, appointed minister of Health in the government formed on 19 October, 1961, voluntarily resigned his position on the syndicate board of directors. That this principle was established was a considerable victory for syndicate activists, for an incumbent minister invariably acts as a government spokesman to the syndicate rather than as a representative of the syndicate's interests in the cabinet (ibid. 30 october 1968).

³⁰ In Oct. 1958, there were approximately 8,000 doctors in Egypt, with some 3,250 practicing in Cairo. A voting turnout of 30 per cent is high by syndicate standards (ibid., 1 October 1958).

³¹ Dr. Kāmil, grandson of the famous nationalist Rif'at al-Tāhtawī, joined the army in 1938, the same year Nāsir graduated from military college.

³² See 'Ādil, Sami Nasr Allah, ‘Professional Syndicates between Labor and Business Organizations’, al-Kātib, 6 (09 1966), 90–101;Google Scholar 'Adib Dīmitrī, ‘Professionals and Syndical Organization’, ibid., pp. 102–110.

³³ Anouar, Abdel Malek, Egypt: Military Society (New York, 1968), p. 184.Google Scholar

³⁴ ibid., pp. 180–183.

³⁵ ibid., p. 341.

³⁶ al-Ahrām, 22 03 1962.Google Scholar

³⁷ They were Drs. Ibrahim Rif'at al-Ghamrawāwī, Butrus Ghālib Jibra'il and 'Alī Husayn Sha'bah (ibid., 20 April 1962).

³⁸ al-Ahrām, 26 06 1963.Google Scholar A health insurance pilot project was also established in Alexandria, but doctors' participation in it was voluntary. See Moore, , ‘Professional Syndicates’, p. 15.Google Scholar

³⁹ They were Sharīf Fām, Hāfiz Mahmūd, 'Abd al-'Azīz 'Abd Allah, and Ibrāhīm al-Ba'thi (ibid., 18 May 1963).

⁴⁰ ibid., 26 June 1963.

⁴¹ That cabinet members provide umbrellas to shield syndicates under their jurisdiction from ill winds and/or to nurture their growth is a phenomenon that dates back to the early days of parliamentary government. Sa'd Zaghlūl provided the necessary patronage for the syndicate of lawyers in its crucial early years, while Dr. 'Alī Ibrāhīm, promoted to minister for Health in 1940, presided over the birth of the doctors', veterinarians', dentists', and pharmacists' syndicates. See Reid, , ‘Rise of Professions’, pp. 43, 48.Google Scholar

⁴² On the significance of Khrushchev's visit for Egyptian-Soviet relations, see Mohamed, Heikal, Nasser: The Cairo Documents (London, 1972), pp. 146–150.Google Scholar See also Jaan, Pennar, The U.S.S.R. and the Arabs (London, 1973), pp. 70–71.Google Scholar

⁴³ ‘Nasser's Discussions with the Members of the Executive Committee and the General Secretariat about the Plan of Work for the Political Organization’, al-Tali'a, 03 1965.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ Nāsr, Allah, ‘Professional Syndicates’, p. 97.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ ibid.

⁴⁶ This change of heart may well have been due to the fact that syndicates were placed under the authority of the ASU, thereby providing ASU activists with an excellent opportunity, which they seized, to build networks of clients within the leadership ranks of syndicates.

⁴⁷ Dīmitri, , ‘Professionals and Syndical Organization’, pp. 102–110.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ ibid., p. 804.

⁴⁹ al-Ahrām, 16 05 1966.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ Nāsir's speech to the governorate executive officers of the ASU, cited in ‘The Method of Work in the ASU’, al-Tali'a, 02 1966.Google Scholar

⁵¹ Nāsr, Allah, ‘Professional Syndicates’, p. 94.Google Scholar

⁵² Only the engineers' syndicate has been successful in resisting outside efforts to amend its bylaws. As Moore suggests, this is an indication of the relative strength of that syndicate. See Moore, , ‘Authoritarian Politics’, APSA paper, pp. 25–26.Google Scholar

⁵³ Previously officers of provincial branches of the syndicate were appointed from Cairo (al-Ahrām, 16 04 1966, 16 05 1966, and 21 06 1966).Google Scholar

⁵⁴ Nasr, Allah, ‘Professional Syndicates’, p. 95.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ Until the present time, however, the syndicate has continued to discriminate against public sector lawyers, who are forced to form ad hoc committees to lobby the government for salary increases and the like (Za'lūk, , ‘Egyptian National Bar’, p. 47).Google Scholar

⁵⁶ A majority of the members of the profession teach in primary schools, but the syndicate board is dominated by secondary school teachers and administrators employed by the Ministry of Education.

⁵⁷ al-Ahrām, 30 05 1969, 10 06 1969. Interviews with members of the board of the teachers' syndicate.Google Scholar

⁵⁸ Nāsr, Allah, ‘Professional Syndicates’, pp. 98–100.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ ibid.

⁶⁰ ‘The Minutes of the General Secretariat of the ASU Central Committee's Meeting with the ASU's Work Committee, 13 March 1972’, al-Talī'a, 05 1972, pp. 20–49.Google Scholar

⁶¹ Criticism of ASU interference had been voiced in the press as early as 1966, when Jamāl ‘Utayfī, journalist, legal advisor to al-Ahrām, member of the National Assembly and political maverick observed that ‘the ASU in practice, in several elections in syndicate organizations, has played the role of a party in choosing candidates’ (‘The Alliance and the Party’, al-Talī'a, 11 1966, pp. 31–35).Google Scholar

⁶² Za'lāk, , ‘Egyptian National Bar’, p. 57.Google Scholar

⁶³ al-Ahrām, 4 11 1964, 8 11 1964.Google Scholar

⁶⁴ ibid., 8 Nov. 1964.

⁶⁵ ibid., 3 April 1965.

⁶⁶ al-Ahrām, 1 06 1966;Google Scholaral-A khbār, 16 03 1967.Google Scholar

⁶⁷ al-Ahrām, 12 08 1967.Google Scholar

⁶⁸ ibid., 28 Jan. 1967. Elections had always been held at this time.

⁶⁹ al-Ahrām al-Iqtisādī, supp. 8, 1 07 1968.Google Scholar

⁷⁰ For a discussion of the development of power centers under Nāsir, see John, Waterbury, ‘The Opening, Part III: De-Nasserization?’, American Universities Field Staff Report, Northeast Africa Series, 20, 4 (06 1975), 3–4.Google Scholar

⁷¹ al-Ahrām, 5 06 1969, 1, 1970.Google Scholar

⁷² Za'lūk, ‘Egyptian National Bar’, pp. 55–56.Google Scholar

⁷³ ‘Press and Law Syndicate Elections’, al-Nahar Arab Report, 5 07 1972.Google Scholar

⁷⁴ Za'lūk, , ‘Egyptian National Bar’, p. 57.Google Scholar

⁷⁵ al-Ahrām, 28 09 1968, 25 10 1968.Google Scholar

⁷⁶ ibid., 16 Jan. 1969.

⁷⁷ In this election, the ASU also rammed down the syndicate's throat Fu'ad 'Alī, a leftist military officer and close friend of ASU First Secretary 'Abd al-Muhsin Abū al-Nāsr. 'Alī was elected first vice-president.

⁷⁸ This was the case especially with respect to land reclamation in the desert, a favorite scheme of the military and many ASU stalwarts.

⁷⁹ By 1969, those in the inner core of the elite were making plans for a future without Nair. 'Alī Sabrī, in fact, may have jumped the gun, thinking that Nāsir's heart attack in September 1969 would be fatal. Nāsir, however, rallied and Sabrī's takeover bid, if indeed it was one, was thwarted. For evidence of the attempted coup d'état, see al Jarīda, 17 09 1969.Google Scholar

⁸⁰ Syndicates enjoyed a brief resurgence after May 1971 as al-Sādādot;t sought to legitimate his rule by promising a more open government. In 1971, syndicates held elections in order to purge ASU supporters, a task which the government could accomplish by simply permitting relatively free elections. Subsequent efforts by syndicates to win autonomy have foundered on the government's reluctance to liberalize the regime. While syndicates currently enjoy more freedom than they did under Nāsir, their journals continue to be censored and their elections are not without government interference. Since the ASU has been defanged, however, it is more difficult for al-Sādāt to control syndicates and their spokesman. The government's difficulty in dealing with syndicates was revealed most explicitly in the discussions between Sayyid Mar'ī, who was representing the ASU, and syndicate presidents, on 22 April 1972. The criticisms of the syndicate presidents of the Egyptian political system were so trenchant that plans to publish a transcript of the meeting in al-Tali'a were abandoned. Private copies were, however, circulated in Cairo.