¹ Hamid, Algar, “The Oppositional Role of the Ulama in Twentieth-Century Iran”, in: Scholars, Saints, and Sufis, ed. by Nikki, R. Keddie (University of California Press, Los Angeles, 1972), p. 231.Google Scholar

² Hamid, Algar, Religion and State in Iran 1785–1906, The Role of the Ulama in the Qajar Period, (University of California Press, Los Angeles, 1969), p. 259.Google Scholar

³ See e.g., Floor, W. M., “The Office of Kalantar in Qajar Persia”, Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient (JESHO), 14 (1971), 252–68; Abu'l-Fazl Qaemi, Oligarshi ya Khandanha-ye Hukumatgar-e Iran, I. Khandan-e Firuz Farmanfarma'iyan (Tehran, 1351/1972), II, Khandan-e Isfandeyari (Tehran, 1354/1975).Google Scholar

⁴ See e.g., Michael, M. Fischer, Iran, from Religious dispute to Revolution, (Harvard University Press, 1980).Google Scholar

⁵ For an analysis of this conflict in the 19th century see Algar, Religion and State.

⁶ Ibid., p. 28 ff.

⁷ Ibid., p. 108 ff; See also W. M.Floor, “The Political Role of the Lutis in Iran”, in: Modern Iran: The Dialectics of Continuity and Change, ed., M.Bonine and Nikki R. Keddie (SUNY) Press Albany, 1981.

⁸ See Note 3.

⁹ Algar, Religion and State.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Lambton, A. K. S., Landlord and Peasant in Persia (Oxford University Press, London, 1953).Google Scholar

¹² Algar, , Religion and State, p. 14 ff.Google Scholar briefly touches on this matter; the same holds for Nikki, R. Keddie, “The Roots of the Ulama's power in Modern Iran”, in: Scholars, Saints, and Sufis, pp. 211–29.Google Scholar

¹³ Algar, , Religion and State, p. 260.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Algar, , “The Oppositional Role,” p. 246.Google Scholar

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 244.

¹⁷ Bayne, E. A., Persian Kingship in Transition, (New York, 1968), p. 48.Google Scholar

¹⁸ Algar, , “The Oppositional Role,” p. 242, and especially Bagha'i's collection of speeches and letters which were recently published, Doktor Mozaffar Bagha'i K'ermani dar Pishgah-e Tarikh (Kerman, 1358/1979). Notwithstanding the fact that religious leaders like Kashani had good relations with the Shah and General Zahedi in those days, one is surprised by the sympathetic treatment of Kashani in Iran at present. The story, as it is now being officially aired in Iran, is that Dr. Mossadegh's fall was due to the fact that he had opposed the religious leaders and had grown apart from Kashani. Strangely enough, this same treatment has as yet not been accorded to Dr. Bagha'i, who stood by Kashani (or vice versa). This historical turnabout is, amongst other things, based on a letter from Kashani to Mossadegh in which the former offers his services to Mossadegh, and at the same time warns him about an imminent American–engineered coup. This letter is dated one day prior to the date on which Mossadegh was toppled by Zahedi (see Ittela'at, Tir 18, 1359/July 9, 1980), and is undoubtedly a falsification. A few months earlier Ittela'at published a letter by Kashani in which he begged the Shah not to leave the country. Apart from the fact that Kashani had very good relations with the Shah, the involvement of the ulama in the Zahedi coup is also indicated by the fact that prior to the coup Zahedi had found refuge in the house of Ayatollah Bani Sadr. Falsafi, the famous preacher who in 1963 made such critical anti-governmental speeches, was also known for his very cordial relationship with the Court and Zahedi. A picture showing both Falsafi and Zahedi was recently published in the magazine (now suspended) Bamshad, 2, Tir 23–30, 1358/July 14–21, 1979, pp. 48–49. The accompanying article also contains interesting information on Falsafi's role as a loyal servant of the Shah.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Shahrough, Akhavi, Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran, (Albany, 1980), p. 76 ff.Google Scholar

²⁰ Avery, P., Modern Iran (London, 1965), p. 461.Google Scholar

²¹ See e.g., Cottam, R. W., Nationalism in Iran (Pittsburgh, 1965), p. 286.Google Scholar

²² Avery, , Modern Iran, p. 481.Google Scholar

²³ Ayatollah Muhammad Mosavi Behbehani, is the son of 'Abdollah Behbahani, who was one of the leaders of the Constitutional movement.

²⁴ It was probably with the Behbehani group in mind that Avery, , Modern Iran, p. 481,Google Scholar wrote: “Meanwhile in Tehran the divinea were feasted on festive days… These feasts were paid for by the government. The robed and turbaned figures who sat down to the good victuals did not look like the fomenters of a revolt.” On the Behbehani group see: Algar, , “The Oppositional Role,” p. 224;Google Scholar and Akhavi, , Religion and Politics, p. 103.Google Scholar

²⁵ Bayne, , Persian Kingship, p. 48.Google Scholar

²⁶ Echo Reports, a weekly publication of the ‘Echo of Iran’, Tehran 02 17, 1962, no. 6 (334), p. 4.Google Scholar

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Lambton, A. K. S., The Persian Land Reform 1962–1966 (Oxford, 1969), p. 56 ff.Google Scholar

²⁹ Avery, , Modern Iran, p. 490;Google ScholarIran, Almanac 1963, p. 276 ff. gives data on the disastrous economic situation of Iran.Google Scholar

³⁰ Bagha'i, Dar Pishgah-e Tarikh; Iran, Almanac, 1963, p. 92.Google Scholar

³¹ Ibid., p. 384.

³² Avery, , Modern Iran, p. 493.Google Scholar

³³ Algar, , “The Oppositional Role,” p. 244;Google ScholarAkhavi, , Religion and Politics, p. 100.Google Scholar It was not for want of trying that Ayatollah Hakim did not become Burujerdi's successor. Even during the period of mounting tension and opposition to the State, Ayatollah Hakim sent a telegram to Ayatollah Mar'ashi Najafi inviting all ulama to migrate to the holy place in Iraq (Najaf, Kerbela) in protest to the government's attack on the Feiziyeh theological school (on this event see below). Text of this telegram dated Farvardin, 18, 1342/04 7, 1963, is in my possession.Google Scholar

³⁴ Echo Reports, “Prime Minister Ali Amini and the Clergy,” Tehran, 08 17, 1961, no. 28 (308).Google Scholar

³⁵ Zonis, M., The Political Elite of Iran (Princeton, 1971), pp. 71–72.Google Scholar

³⁶ From a clandestinely printed and circulated pamphlet in my possession.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ See Note 26, p. 5.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Zonis, , Political Elite, pp. 72–73.Google Scholar

⁴¹ These persons were Hasan Taqizadeh (ex-president of the Senate); Dr. Matin-Daftari (former prime minister); Sardar Fakher Hekmat (former Speaker of the Majlis); Abdul Rahman Faramarzi (editor of the Keyhan newspaper); Allahyar Saleh (leader of the National Front); Mohammad Soruri (a prominent lawyer); Sheikh Bana'ol Din Nun (a prominent religious leader).

⁴² See Note 26, pp. 6–7.

⁴³ Iran Almanac, 1963, p. 42.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ A very, Modern Iran, p. 495.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ Iran Almanac, 1963, p. 433;Google ScholarEcho Reports, “Landlords, Tribal Khans and Clergymen versus the Government,” Tehran, 11 24, 1962, no. 360, p. 4;Google Scholar according to another Iranian source, Jazani, B., An Introduction to the Contemporary History of Iran (London, n.d.) p. 117,Google Scholar “the clergy, almost without exception, opposed the whole land reform project.” Jazani, like Akhavi, , Religion and Politics, p. 92, both rightly reject a simple economic explanation of the ulama's opposition to land reform. For Akhavi “it was simply the first issue over which their general dissatisfaction over the course of events was publicly expressed,” while Jazani stressed the fact that the reform mea sures were “detrimental to the position of the clergy in society” and that they therefore, “despite inner contradictions, had to stand against the reforms. From the very start of land reform, the farm lands distributed were declared by the clergy to be Qabsi (usurped); but, faced with the choice of land and religious decrees, the peasant went for the former. This was the first blow to the position of the clergy,” p. 117.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ See on this issue, Akhavi, , Religion and Politics, p. 95;Google ScholarJazani, remarks: “when the regime put forward the secondary aspects of the reform, the enfranchisement of women provided the clergy with the necessary excuse to rouse the masses to move and oppose the regime,” Introduction, pp. 117- 18.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ Iran Almanac, 1963, p. 433;Google Scholar for a detailed analysis of this whole issue as seen through the eyes of a member of the religious opposition see: Ali Davvani, Nahdat-i do maheh-yi rowhaniyan-i Iran, (Qum, 1341/1962). From the copious material presented by Davvani (most of the telegrams exchanged between the ulama and the government as well as the pamphlets and fatwas issued by the ulama on this issue) it is clear that the religious leaders opposed the Bill on three grounds: i. the absence of a qualification for an elector or a candidate for election to be a Muslim, ii. the absence of the obligation to take oath on the Quran, iii. women's franchise.

The case presented by Davvani and the religious leaders appears to be open to criticism, however. Art. 7 (section III) of the Electoral Law (1909) states that candidates for election should be Muslims. ‘unless they represent the Christian, Zoroastrian, or Jewish communities, in which case they must be sound in their respective beliefs.” Religion as a qualification was not mentioned at all (art. 4). The Fundamental Law of 1906 (art. 11) requires that members of the Majlis take oath on the Quran, but this did not apply of course to non-Muslim members of the Majlis. Although the election laws (of 1906 and 1909) excluded women from voting and from being elected, it is not stated anywhere that the election laws, which were explicitly only applicable for the election of the Majlis and the Senate, had to be applied to the Provincial and Local Councils as well. The fact that women were allowed to vote in the Islamic Republic of Iran raises doubts about the anti-Islamic nature of the government's proposal for women's franchise.

⁴⁸ Echo Reports, 11 18, 1964, no. 457, “The case of Mr. Khomeini,” p. 2.Google Scholar Khomeini himself also contributed to the credibility of these rumours. He made it publicly known, for example, that 18-year-old girls had been taken by force to the barracks, which in his eyes were but whorehouses. See Sayyid, Hamid Rowhani, “Barrasi va tahlili az nahdat-i Imam Khomeini,” (Qum, 1358/1979) 4th ed., pp. 316, 319–24.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ Ibid., November 24, 1962, no. 360, “Landlords, Tribal Khans and Clergymen versus the government,” p. 6.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 7; the abridged translation of Khomeini's cable is from the text published in Davvani, Nahdat.

⁵¹ Iran Almanac, 1963, pp. 48, 410;Google Scholar According to Ahmad, Ashraf, Iran: Imperialism, Class and Modernization from Above, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, New School for Social Research (New York, 1971) the following written protest messages were sent to the Shah in November, 1962: telegrams from the Ayatollahs Shari'atmadari and Gulpaygani; a declaration of 132 ulama; a declaration of 26 ulama of Tehran; a declaration of religious associations of Mashad and a letter of Ayatollah Milani; and a declaration of 10 ulama of Qum. For a more detailed view of the activities by the religious circles see Davvani, Nahdat.Google Scholar

⁵² Iran Almanac, 1963, p. 388 ff.Google Scholar In this connection I wish to draw attention to the fact that I convey the impression by the use of the term ‘ulama’ that there were no differences amongst them. Akhavi, , Religion and Politics, p. 93,Google Scholar for example, warns that “the clergy did not react as a monolithic force.” Although I agree with this statement I want to point out at the same time that it is very difficult to distinguish factions among the ulama. Akhavi, p. 100 ff. makes a few suggestions (he identifies four different groupings) but these differ completely with a similar analytical exercise made by Ashraf, , Iran: Imperialism, pp. 220–26Google Scholar who suggested the existence of two groupings: one speaking as concerned landowners, the other speaking for the bazaaris. In the first faction Ashraf lists Ayatollahs Burujirdi, Behbehani, Khunsan, Tunekabunin, and Amuli. In the second, more progressive group, he lists the Ayatollahs Khomeini, Milani, and Shari'atmadari. The latter two were classed by Akhavi as conservatives! On February 2, 1963, Milani wrote to Alam that land reform would be detrimental to petty land owners; see Michael, Fischer, Iran, p. 179;Google Scholar A third classification of the ulama was given by Dr. Bagha'i in one of his pamphlets. He in fact distinguishes three groups. The first group is apolitical and sticks only to religious matters – by far this is the largest group. The second group is the smallest, for it is composed of the real political leaders among the ulama, who fight both in the interest of Islam and the people. Bagha'i states that very few fall into this category and in recent times he only knew two religious leaders who qualified: Kashani and Khomeini. The third group is also small and consists of religious leaders who use religion for their own parochial ends. Bagha'i, without naming them, mentions that there were 3 in this category during the period which interests us here, Dar Pishgah-i Tarikh, pp. 397–98.Google Scholar So far the only Ayatollahs known to me who did not oppose land reform explicitly were Shari'atmadari and Rowhani (see Cottam, , Nationalism, p. 308,Google Scholar Note 13) and Taliqani (see Akhavi, p. 93). The position of Khomeini is less clear. I have not come across any statement or speech in which he declared himself against land reform, although he did oppose the Shah's reform policy. This probably is the reason why Doroshenko, E. A., Shi'itskoje Dukhovenstvo v sovrennom Irane (Moscow, 1975), p. 109,Google Scholar states that Khomeini was against land reform. One of his biographers, Rowhani, , Barrasi, (p. 170, Note 1) states that he does not know of any religious leader who opposed land reform. He mentions the fact that Arsanjani sent a telegram to Shari'atmadari, Gulpaygani and Najafi in Esfand 1340/December 1961 to congratulate them with ‵id-i fitr and to thank them for their support of land reform. In view of the conflicting evidence this point needs more research.Google Scholar

⁵³ Zonis, , The Political Elite, p. 73 ff.;Google ScholarCottam, , Nationalism, pp. 305–06.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ From a clandestinely printed and circulated pamphlet.

⁵⁵ Iran Almanac 1963, pp. 394–95, 433.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 433; Echo Reports, Tehran, 06 8, 1963, no. 386, “Religious Demonstrations and Clashes,” p. 4.

⁵⁷ Iran Almanac, 1963, pp. 433–4.Google Scholar

⁵⁸ Based on clandestinely printed and circulated pamphlets in my possession. Quite naturally the religious opposition accused the National Front of non-cooperation and even of opposition against the religious leaders, see Rowhani, Barrasi.

⁵⁹ Echo Reports, Tehran, 08 26, 1963, no. 397, “Tehran Riot Trials,” pp. 1–2.Google Scholar

⁶⁰ Anonymous, Zendiginameh-yi Imam Khomeini, (Qum, n.d.) 2nd vol., pp. 38–43. (This book contains many of Khomeini's speeches and was published by the Faidiya theological school.)

⁶¹ See Note 59; Algar, , “Oppositional Role,” pp. 247–49; Zendiginameh-yi Imam Khoemeini, pp. 50–80, 90.Google Scholar

⁶² See Note 48; at that time Khomeini was described in this source as follows: “He is now considered one of the most famous and influential of Shi'a ulemas of Qum, judging by the large number of aspirants learning theology from him and the amount of donations he receives from his followers. It is reported that his followers in Iran and Pakistan contribute about one million rials a month to him to spend for religious purposes as he sees fit. Most of the contributions go towards the upkeep of his religious school. Each theological student receives a loaf of bread for himself and each member of his family plus a monthly cash allowance.”

Another interesting detail in Khomeini's life concerns his early period about which his biographers only provide general information. In 1316/1937 Khomeini worked in the idara-yi ma'arif va awqaf-i Qum va Mahallat (the education and waqf office of Qum and Mahallat) which was part of the Ministry of Education. One of Khomeini's duties in this office was to be a member of the examination commission that passed candidates for religious studies. A certificate issued and signed by this commission gave the holder exemption from military service. Religious students and scholars also needed a permit to wear “clerical” clothes (i.e. turban, aba, etc.) during Reza Shah's period.

⁶³ Both bills had already been presented to the Majlis at the end of 1963, but the discussion on the U.S. personnel diplomatic status had been postponed until the very end and then was only discussed in a closed session of the Majlis and the Senate. For a detailed discussion of this issue see Dr. Bagha'i's pamphlet “Hast ya fist?” Aban 1, 1343/October 23, 1964, which was republished in “Kapitulasiyun, gunahi ke Hovoida be an i'teraf kard,” Kerman, 1358/1979. It is of interest to observe that Bagha'i's pamphlet, which was published three days prior to Khomeini's speech, did not provoke either a reaction from the public in general or from the government in particular. (See also Note 64.)

⁶⁴ See Note 48; Zonis, , Political Elite, pp. 45–46;Google Scholar for a translation of this important speech see Appendix. Algar wrongly assumed that this speech had been given in 1963, Algar, , Oppositional Role, pp. 246–47; for the Persian version of this speech see, e.g., Rowhani, Barrasi.Google Scholar