¹ DDRS77–237E, 11/27/53, “Bermuda Meeting–December 4–8, 1953, Memorandum on Relative US-UK Roles in Middle East”: “The position of the US is not as effective as required due to our unbalanced support of Israel in the past and our tendency to back the French and British in ‘colonial issues’ … The United States should prove that it has a policy of impartial and fair dealings as between the Arab states and Israel and is not directed by minority pressure groups against the interests of the Arab states…”

² These phases are referred to in Heikal, Mohamed, Nasser: The Cairo Documents (London: New England Library, 1972), pp.175–176; and John S. Badeau, recorded interview by Dennis J. O'Brien, 2/25/69, John F. Kennedy Library Oral History Program, p.8.Google Scholar

³ Wilbur, Crane Eveland, Ropes of Sand: Americas Failure in the Middle East (New York, N.Y.: Norton, 1980), pp. 309–310; also Badeau, recorded interview, pp. 20–21, in which the former ambassador contended that “I got the size of CIA somewhat reduced before I went out” and that “we weren't mounting black operations in Egypt at the time.”Google Scholar

⁴ DDRS79–12D, Allen Dulles, “Briefing Notes: Meeting at the White House with Congressional leaders, July 14, 1958–2:30 P.M.,” reveals the initial extremely pessimistic view of the new developments: “If the Iraq coup succeeds it seems almost inevitable that it will set up a chain reaction which will doom the pro-West governments of Lebanon and Jordan and Saudi Arabia, and raise grave problems for Turkey and Iran.”

⁵ Badeau, recorded interview, p. 5: “My most steady contact [in the White House005D; was with … Bob Komer because Komer really appeared to be the person chiefly responsible in the White House staff. He more or less rode herd on the [State Department, on Phil Talbot.]

⁶ Feldman's influence and his badgering is reflected in Komer's memos to McGeorge Bundy on American policy toward Israel. See JFK 119, 1/10/63: “of course [Mike Feldman would] love to carry the word [to Israel on tanks.] Also DDRS R–910H, 1/16/64: “Aside from constantly badgering me on tanks, Feldman called last night to ask why Eshkol invite had been so ‘mishandled’ …I'm getting fed up with this game playing, even if Mike's beef happens to be with State rather than us …” Also see DDRS R–910H, 1/29/64, R. W. Komer, “Memorandum for the President.”

⁷ Badeau, recorded interview, p. 9. Also see DDRS R–453G, 2/20/62, “Second conversation between Ambassadors Bowles and Badeau and President Gamal Abd al-Nasser”: “Ambassador Badeau [said] that Israel continues to be a problem [in UAR-US relations], but the President had stated at the time the American Ambassador presented his credentials that it was the UAR's hope this question could be kept ‘in the ice box’ while mutual interests were developed in other fields.”

⁸ Badeau recorded interview, pp. 9, 19; also see DDRS R–453G, 2/20/62.

⁹ More detail on Nasser's difficult relations with Khrushchev and Kassem can be found in DDRS76—12D, 5/8/64: SC NO. 00618/64A: “Special Report: The Soviet Union and Egypt” (CIA: Office of Current Intelligence). Also see Kerr, Malcolm, The Arab Cold War, 1958–1967: A Study of Ideology in Politics (New York, N.Y.: Oxford Press, 1967);Google ScholarLaqueur, Walter, The Struggle for the Middle East (New York, N.Y.: Macmillan, 1969);Google Scholar and for a more personal dimension, Anthony Nutting, Nasser (London: Constable, 1972).Google Scholar

¹⁰ Halberstam, David, The Best and the Brightest (Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett, 1972), p.120: The 1957 Senate speech on Algeria “was the first major speech of Kennedy on an international issue, and the first time a speech brought him serious criticism. Later he would recall that it was also the only speech which he had made which helped him after he became President; it gave him an identification with independence movements throughout the world.”Google Scholar

¹¹ Badeau, recorded interview, p. 9. Also see Heikal, , Nasser: The Cairo Documents, pp.173–202; Chapter VI: Kennedy and Containment.”Google Scholar

¹² Badeau, recorded interview, pp. 2, 16: “So Reischauer was sent to Japan, Ken Young was sent to Thailand (Ken had been in the government before, but he'd been head of SOCONY-Vacuum in Thailand), John Everton went to Burma, Galbraith went to India, and I went to Egypt.” Regarding the Ambassador's close relationship with Nasser: “in the thirty-six months I was on post, I saw the President officially at his home, for business and other things, forty-three times, which was better than once a month. This was more than all the Western Ambassadors put together.”

¹³ Ibid., pp. 18–19.

¹⁴ Copeland, Miles, The Game of Nations (New York, N.Y.: College Notes, 1969), p. 268;Google Scholar but, as noted in Polk, William, The Arab World (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980), p. 337, the United States derived something more than a bit of political good will: “PL480 offered the basic instrumentality of American foreign policy. It disposed of a surplus American commodity, primarily wheat, employed American citizens to process and ship it, enriched American shipowners who transported it, gave the United States government some apparent ‘leverage’ in foreign policy dealings and, at the recipients' end, was used to generate local currencies which could be committed at the option of the donor. Since the expenditure of monies tied up local currencies, the law had the effect of locking the recipient economy and government into development projects.”Google Scholar

¹⁵ Badeau, recorded interview, p. 9, n which the former ambassador remembers Kennedy saying with regard to the drafting of a letter to Nasser: “You know, we have to remember this guy has got his problems too. He's got a public opinion. I understand there're some things he can't do.”

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 13; the largest number of landowners in Egypt were Turkish and Lebanese.

¹⁷ See the summaries of the meetings with Nasser by both Bowles and Badeau, in DDRS R–453D, E, F, G, and 454A, which took place on 2/14/62 and 2/17/62, for a fascinating interchange on a diverse number of subjects. The significance of Bowles' visit should not be overstated, however, for it occurred only three months after he “was removed from the job of Under Secretary [of State] and given a meaningless title as the President's Special Representative and Adviser on African, Asian and Latin Amerian Affairs to make room for George Ball.…” (Hilsman, Roger, To Move A Nation [New York, N.Y.: Delta, 1967] p. 50).Google Scholar On the other hand, the fact that the Middle East was a peripheral concern of the Administration, and that Kennedy likely felt an obligation to compensate him in some way for the insult suffered by his demotion, suggest that Bowles might have exercised real influence even at this time. Substantiating this supposition is the evidence that Kennedy heeded Bowles' advice on Third World matters not related to crises. With regard to Egypt, his proposal that aid be increased, if not his suggestion that Nasser be invited to the United States, was followed. More information on Chester Bowles' place in the Administration is found in Halberstam, , The Best and the Brightest, pp. 18–34, 87–90.Google Scholar

¹⁸ DDRS R–764B, 3/22/62, Edward Mason, “Summary: Report on Mission to the United Arab Republic.”

¹⁹ Author's discussion with Mordechai Gazit, Israeli Deputy Ambassador to the United States during the early 1960's, 12/5/80.

²⁰ JFK119, 1/14/63, Robert Komer, “Memorandum for Record [of lunch date with an Israeli official (Shimon Peres?)].”

²¹ JFK 118; see the correspondence of mid-August 1962, regarding Feldman's visit to Israel. Gazit, in his discussion with the author, claimed that there had earlier been a misunderstanding in which Ben Gurion believed that Eisenhower had approved the sale of the Hawks in talks between the two leaders.

²² Badeau, recorded interview, p. 12.

²³ Philip M. Klutznick, recorded interview by Dennis J. O'Brien, 7/12/70, John F. Kennedy Library Oral History Program, p. 53.

²⁴ JFK 119; see, for instance, the transcript of Secretary of State Rusk's meeting with the British Minister in Washington, Lord Hood, 8/27/62, in which Rusk averred that the “key question was not whether the UAR had a ground-to-air missile system, but rather whether Israel required such a system to offset a significant change in the relative balance of power because of Soviet equipment deliveries. The Soviets were making deliveries of supersonic aircraft, bombers and fighters…”

²⁵ Author's discussion with Mordechai Gazit.

²⁶ DDRS78–82A, 7/26/66. “Informal Visit of President Zalman Shazar of Israel. Background Paper: U.S. Arms Sales to Israel.”

²⁷ DDRS78–240C, 2/25/65: Prime Minister Eshkol used this argument in talks with W. Averell Harriman and Robert Komer, when the two Americans went to Jerusalem to notify him of expected sales of American tanks to Jordan, and of an American policy decision to sell Israel military equipment directly. It should be noted that many of these arguments were repeated in the bargaining before each sale, just as the argument that King Hussein would turn to the Soviets for military equipment if the U.S. did not provide it has been utilized for the past twenty-five years.

²⁸ Author's discussion with Mordechai Gazit; also see Silverberg, Robert, If I Forge, Thee O Jerusalem: American Jews and the State of Israel (New York, N.Y.: William Morrow, 1970), p. 552. Kennedy received 82% of the Jewish vote in the 1960 election.Google Scholar

²⁹ The two most vocal spokesmen for Israel's interests were the Senators from New York, Jacob Javits and Kenneth Keating, but they were joined by many others in the public and on Capitol Hill whose influence could not be discounted. In Bowles' discussions with Nasser in 1962, the Ambassador mentioned “that responsible Jewish leaders in the United States, and the Israeli Ambassador, had expressed satisfaction that he was coming to visit President Nasser,” DDRS R–453 0, 2/21/62; and in his policy recommendations to Kennedy he stated: “I am convinced that key Jewish leaders in the US may be persuaded to see the advantages for Israel should a visit result in genuine relaxation of tensions in the area,” DDRS R–454A, 2/21/62.

At time, the Administration even asked the Israeli Government to intercede with the American Jewish community to explain the advantage to Israel in a warm Arab-American relationship. In his talks with Eshkol and Golda Meir in February 1965, Governor Harriman (or perhaps Robert Komer; sanitization of the document makes it unclear) stated that: “Sometimes the Jewish Community in the U.S. tended to run away with the bit in its teeth. We knew the GOI could not control all elements of the Community, but it was most important to the President that the Prime Minister put these matters into proper perspective for the key leaders of the Community. This was an essential part of our relationship.” DDRS78–204C, 2/25/62.

The principal advocate of the Zionist influence theory among American participants was Ambassador Badeau. In explaining the sale of the Hawks to Israel, he stated that: “On one hand, this had a military justification; that is the Pentagon said that Israel is vulnerable because of its lack of certain defensive measures and that the sale of Hawk missiles would not increase its offensive capacity and therefore, you could justify it militarily. But I don't think this is why it was done. It was done because the Congress was facing the first election to Congress after Kennedy had been elected and individuals, who were contributors to the campaign funds of various candidates, withheld their contributions in that summer along into August and said, ‘You don't get this until we know what you are going to do for Israel.’ And finally, the President said, ‘Well, I've got military justifications, I'm going to sell Hawk missiles to Israel’ and then he got the funds. This is private individual pressures.” Badeau, recorded interview, p. 23.

³⁰ Klutznick, recorded interview, p. 50; Goldberg was the Scretary of Labor before his appointment to the Supreme Court; Ribicoff was the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare before his successful race for the Senate in Connecticut; Klutznick was an Ambassador to the United Nations under Adlai Stevenson and a leader of the American Jewish community; another individual who occasionally was called in on related issues was Abe Feinberg, a wealthy American Jew active in Democratic Party politics.

³¹ DDRS R–5D, 1/30/63, David Bell, “Memorandum for the President,” although it should be noted that the grant portion of the aid was discontinued. Israel continued to be, as it is today, the greatest recipient of American aid per capita, at about $28.

³² Klutznick, recorded interview, p. 23.

³³ Ibid., p. 24; also Eban, Abba, An Autobiography (New York, N.Y.: Random House, 1977), p. 297.Google Scholar

³⁴ On Israel's relationship with Germany, see Deutschkron, Inge, Bonn and Jerusalem: The Strange Coalition (New York, N.Y.: Chilton, 1970),Google Scholar especially Chapter 15: “The Secret Deal.” On Israel's relationship with France, see Crosbie, Sylvia, A Tacit Alliance: France and Israel from Suez to the Six Day War (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974).Google ScholarHeikal, , Nasser: The Cairo Documents, p. 178, contends that “in 1961, when Adenaur paid an official visit to the United States, Kennedy put pressure on him to sell arms to Israel.” I have not, however, found anything to substantiate this claim.Google Scholar

³⁵ JFKI 18, 8/18/62, telegram from Rusk to Feldman.

³⁶ JFKI 18, 5/23/62, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense William Bundy, “Memorandum for Mr. Phillips Talbot (cc. McGeorge Bundy), re Conversation with Israeli Deputy Defense Minister Shimon Peres.” Peres continued, however, to dispute this thesis, “arguing that the French had maintained a better standing in the Arab world than the British notwithstanding or perhaps even because of their support for Israel, and that some Britishers were now thinking that possibly a policy of ‘more and more’ support for Israel might be a better gambit on the Arab problem or at least provide the opportunity to meet rebuffs by unpleasant action.”

³⁷ Eban, , An Autobiography, p. 299.Google Scholar

³⁸ JFKI 18, 8/18/62, telegram from Rusk to Feldman.

³⁹ JFKI 18, 5/23/62, William Bundy memorandum for Talbot re Conversation with Shimon Peres.

⁴⁰ DDRS79–193D, 5/22/64, “Prime Minister Eshkol of Israel Official Visit, June 1–3, 1964, Background Paper: Instances in which U.S. was obliged to oppose Israel.”

⁴¹ Eveland, , Ropes of Sand, pp. 310, 323.Google Scholar

⁴² DDRS79–193D, 5/25/64, “Prime Minister Eshkol of Israel Official Visit, June 1–3, 1964, Background Paper: What the United States has done and is doing to support Israel.”

⁴³ See the extensive American-Israeli correspondence on the Johnson Mission in JFK118–119. Fora brief review see Ellis, Harry, “The Arab-Israeli Conflict Today” in Stevens, Georgiana, ed., The United States and the Middle East (New York, N.Y.: The American Assembly, 1964), p. 142. The Palestine Conciliation Commission (a UN body composed of the US, France and Turkey) had appointed Dr. Joseph E. Johnson, president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, in 1961, to make a fresh study of the refugee problem.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ The desire for face-to-face talks with the Arabs and a comprehensive approach to peace proposals was constantly repeated by Israelis in their talks with Americans. See, for example, DDRS79–193A; also JFKI 19, 9/14/62, informal proposal for seeking a “package deal” with Egypt; and JFKI 19, 1/22/63, Ambassador Barbour's assessment: “Israelis are not really convinced that refugee problem was in fact susceptible of solution by itself now and to a considerable degree they are motivated to attempt work in that direction simply by recognition of importance US attaches thereto.”

⁴⁵ See JFKI 19, 12/6/62, Deptels 1414, 1425; also 12/4/62 Feldman, Harman, et al., meeting on President's Package Proposal on Arab Refugees; and the formal confirmation of the American agreement in a letter from Rusk to Ben Gurion, JFK 119, 1/29/63: “We are in agreement that the Johnson Plan cannot be implemented, and, as was indicated to Mrs. Meir, we have no intention of trying to push it further with relevant partie.”

⁴⁶ DDRS79–I93D, 522/64, “Background Paper for Eshkol Visit of June 1964: Instances in which U.S. was obliged to oppose Israel.”

⁴⁷ DDRS79–193A, 12/27/62, 10 A.M., “Conversation with Israel Foreign Minister Meir”; also present were Ambassador Harman of Israel, Myer Feldman, Phillips Talbot and Robert Komer.

⁴⁸ DDRS79–193D, 5/25/64, “Background Paper for Eshkol Visit of June 1964: What the United States has done and is doing to support Israel.”

⁴⁹ This point was made by Badeau, John, The American Approach to the Arab World (New York, N.Y.: Council on Foreign Relations, Harper & Row, 1968), p. 13.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 6, Badeau notes that “many Arabs, especially the military leadership in Egypt, were convinced that, given the opportunity, Israel would ‘try it again’.” As Bowles noted to Kennedy in his report on his talks with Nasser, DDRS R–454A, 2/21/62, “the Egyptians are convinced that the British and the French have not given up their determination to destroy Nasser which led to the Suez attack in 1956. Their intelligence service is firmly convinced that the British are now actively involved with the Israelis in some activity in the Sinai-Negev area. They genuinely believe the British and the Jordanians were deeply involved in Lebanon (and offered to provide proof of this). They are persuaded that the French mission members, now on trial in Cairo, were plotting the murder of Nasser. We may dismiss all this as emotional and irrational, as a demonstration of paranoia or whatever. Yet it furnishes the basis of what is in effect an Egyptian ‘National Intelligence Estimate’ and in dealing with Egypt we must take it into account.”

⁵¹ Copeland, Miles, The Game of Nations, pp. 264–265, 268,Google Scholar has offered a variation of this thesis. He contended that Nasser, with whom he had a personal relationship, was continually baffled by the American approach to Egypt under Kennedy and Johnson: “From the opening days of the Kennedy Administration down to the present [1969], Nasser has been puzzled at the way our moves seemed both immoral (as opposed to amoral) and irrelevant to the objective of making gains, yet were almost always favorably responsive to his own game-play moves to gain advantages for Egypt. Our government allowed him to ‘win’ his game yet had no discernible game of its own. Nasser insists that a political analyst visiting Earth from Mars, and examining American and Egyptian moves solely according to criteria of self-interest, would be similarly puzzled.”

Heikal, in an article with which Nasser largely agreed, wrote that Egyptian foreign policy which was indifferent or contrary to American interests was a “sound investment because it brings practical as well as political benefits to Egypt–economic aid from the United States and military aid from the Soviet Union.”

⁵² See the reports of the American ambassadors to Arab countries on the Arab reaction to the sale, in JFKI 19, /21/62–10/6/62, and the FBIS (Foreign Broadcast Information Service) report as well, 10/1/62. The reaction was a bit more muted than expected because of the simultaneous outbreak of the Yemen conflict, although there is no evidence that the sale was disclosed at that time for that reason.

⁵³ JFK1 19, 10/1/62, report from Rupert Prohme, American Consul in Alexandria, re Local Reaction to Hawk sales. Also see Badeau, recorded interview, p. 12. However, the Egyptian Ambassador in Washington warned that the United States “should not be deceived by the mildness of comments of UAR officials re missiles for Israel. … The US could expect delayed but severe reaction. Problem is not with Nasser and the Egyptian government but with the Egyptian army. The army has never been completely convinced of the merits of a policy of cooperation with US and missile deal taken as confirmation of its worst fears. He suggested US do something urgently, ‘even secretly, even symbolically’ to put modern US equipment in Army hands;” in JFKI 19, 9/29/62.

⁵⁴ JFK 119, 9/29/62, Badeau report on meeting with Heikal. In another meeting two days earlier, JFK 119, 9/27/62, Heikal had claimed that the leak could not have come from the Egyptian side, since the only ones who knew of the American-Egyptian consultations besides Nasser and himself were Ali Sabry and Marshal Amer.

⁵⁵ JFK 119, 10/16/62, Badeau report on Egyptian reaction. Also see the FBIS summary of Arab reactions, 10/1/62.

⁵⁶ JFK 119, 10/16/62, Badeau report on Egyptian reaction.

⁵⁷ Badeau, , The American Approach to the Arab World, pp. 133–134, discusses the nature of the threats to the Saudi and Jordanian regimes.Google Scholar

⁵⁸ Dawisha, A.I., “Intervention in the Yemen: An Analysis of Egyptian Perceptions and Policies,” Middle East Journal, 29 (Winter, 1975), p. 51.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ Copeland, The Game of Nations, p. 266. Dawisha, “Intervention,” p. 51, notes the dividends of American recognition: “The following day fifty states including Canada and Australia followed the American lead, and the UN General Assembly voted in favor of seating the Republican delegation.”Google Scholar

⁶⁰ Badeau, , The American Approach to the Arab World, pp. 137–138.Google Scholar

⁶¹ JFK 169. 6/27/63, Badeau meetings with Ali Sabry and Hafez Ismail on the use of lethal gas in Yemen.

⁶² JFKI 19, 10/5/62, Barbour reports on the Israeli reaction to the Egyptian launching of missiles on 7/21/62. Concerning the American belief that the missiles did not constitute a threat, see JFKII9, 1/10/63, Komer memo to Bundy; and DDRS79–193D, 5/22/64, memo from Acting Secretary George Ball to President Johnson.

⁶³ JFK169, mid-6/63, correspondence on McCIoy's planned visit; also DDRS78–272C, 6/28/63, McCIoy's report on his talk with Nasser (which is heavily sanitized).

⁶⁴ JFK 169, 7/4/63; and DDRS78–272C, in which McCloy offered American assistance in space experiments, to which Nasser did not respond.

⁶⁵ Deutschkron, Bonn and Jerusalem: The Strange Coalition, Chapter 13: “Two States in a Fix.”Google Scholar

⁶⁶ Badeau, , recorded interview, p. 14.Google Scholar

⁶⁷ WiIliam, B. Macomber, recorded interview by Dennis, J. O'Brien, 2/14/69. JFK Library Oral History Program, p. 29.Google Scholar

⁶⁸ Badeau, recorded interview, p. 14: “almost inevitably an Ambassador has to have a certain understanding of the country to which he's sent. Now you do your best to keep your objectivity, but if you're Ambassador to Lebanon, and Egypt nationalized a lot of Lebanese property, you tend to be anti-Egyptian. If you're stationed down at Riyadh and you see the impact of Egypt's Yemen program in Saudi Arabia, as Pete Hart did, you tend to be somewhat anti-Egyptian.” The odd man out, in a sense, was Walworth Barbour, the American Ambassador to Israel. He was regarded very favorably by his Israeli hosts. See Eban, , An Autobiography, p. 297; author's interview with M. Gazit; also see, for instance, his analysis of the refugee problem, in JFK119, 1/22/63.Google Scholar

⁶⁹ Badeau, recorded interview, p. 16.

⁷⁰ See the transcript of the relevant portion of the news conference, in Magnus, Ralph, ed., Documents on the Middle East (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1969), p. 104.Google Scholar

⁷¹ Badeau, recorded interview, p. 25, makes this point; as does W. W. Rostow, in DDRS77–324D, 10/7/

⁷² DDRS78–273A, 2/ 12/64, Memorandum for McGeorge Bundy regarding United States Influence on the Arab Summit Conference.

⁷³ DDRS R–893E, 3/25/64, Carl Rowan, Director, U.S.I.A., Memorandum for the President, anticipates a severe Arab reaction, including “a new and emotional anti-American campaign” in the media; an Egyptian-led political propaganda effort “both overt and covert–to undermine the Governments of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, and Libya and perhaps others”; and an Arab media demand on their governments “to ask the Soviet Union, and perhaps Red China, for armaments superior in both quality and quantity to those supplied Israel.”

⁷⁴ Deutschkron, Bonn and Jerusalem: The Strange Coalition, p. 274; also see DDRS79–278B, 5/19/66: “How We Have Helped Israel.”Google Scholar

⁷⁵ DDRS76–57B, 2/17/64, telegram from MacArthur to Undersecretary of State Harriman: “In light success Israelis have had with Congolese we strongly believe we should be much more active in trying to stimulate and support a substantially increased Israeli training program designed to produce soonest two additional commando battalions. Israelis have great training capabilities: have an ‘in’ with Mobutu who might well accept Israeli encadrement of two commando battalions: as well as not being adversely affected by psychological difficulties Belgians suffer from as former Congo colonialists. We should not in our judgment be squeamish about negative Arab reaction in light seriousness Congo situation and fact Congo so vital to whole African picture. In this general connection we welcome indication in deptel 1064 that we are thinking of taking more positive position with Israelis.”

⁷⁶ DDRS79–183D, 5/25/64, “Background Paper for Eshkol Visit of June 1964: What the United States has done and is doing to support Israel.” The Johnston Plan stemmed from 1953–1955, when Eisenhower's emissary, Eric Johnston, succeeded in persuading Israel and her neighbors to agree on a water-sharing plan which, however, ended in failure because of the refusal of the Arab states to conclude any agreement which might be interpreted as acknowledging recognition of the Jewish State. The Israelis and Americans eventually agreed that Israel would be entitled to take the share allocated to her in the plan.

⁷⁷ DDRS77–65G, 3/25/64, record of Talbot's meeting with Ambassadors Meyer (Lebanon), Knight (Syria), Hart (Saudi Arabia), Barnes (Jordan), and Barbour (Israel). Also see The New York Times, 1/21/64:9, and for the Arab reactions 1/23/64:8, 1/24/64:4, 1/25/64:3, and 2/15/64:22. Alexis Johnson's statement is found in Department of State Bulletin, 2/64.

⁷⁸ DDRS77–65G, 3/25/64, Ibid.

⁷⁹ DDRS76–12A, 2/9/64: “Nasir's Reaction to President Johnson's Speech at the Weizman Institute”; DDRS76–12B, 3/3//64: “Nasir's comments on his meeting with Assistant Secretary Talbot”; and the chapter in Heikal, Nasser: The Cairo Documents, pp. 205–224,. on Nasser's “instinctive dislike for LBJ.”

⁸⁰ DDRS77–65G, 3/25/64, record of Talbot's meeting with Ambassadors Meyer, Knight, Hart, Barnes, and Barbour.

⁸¹ Heikal, , Nasser: The Cairo Documents, pp. 205–224.Google Scholar LBJ's association with the opposition to the sanctions was certainly an indication to the Israelis of where he stood. Note the emphasis on that action by Meir, Golda in My Life (New York, N.Y.: Dell, 1975), pp.301–302.Google Scholar

⁸² See DDRS77–88D, 8/28/4, SC. NO. 00634/64A Special Report: “Nasir's Arab Policy–The Latest Phase” (CIA–Office of Current Intelligence), which concludes that Nasir “has transformed the Israeli problem from a divisive force among the Arab countries to a relatively solid rallying point with Egypt in the lead,” and “is also intensifying his drive to remove the remaining vestiges of colonialism in the Arab world, both as a means of further reducing the Israeli threat and as a necessary prelude to further ‘liberation’ of the political and social structures within the Arab world.” Also see Kerr, M., The Arab Cold War, and Laqueur, W., The Struggle for the Middle East.Google Scholar

⁸³ Heikal, , Nasser: The Cairo Documents, p. 208; and see the analysis by Hedrick Smith: “Nasser Poses Dilemma for U.S.” in the The New York Times, l/3/65:IV:4.Google Scholar

⁸⁴ DDRS77–225C, 5/25/64: Badeau's report on Nasser's May Day speech noted that “at one point, in midst of harangue about those who support Israel, he started to say ‘Britain and US’ but choked it off before ‘US’ uttered and ended up saying lamely ‘Britain and England’…” The text of the speech is in Magnus, Documents on the Middle East, pp. 104–106. Also see DDRS77–88E, 12/24/64 OCI No. 2854/64, CIA Analysis of Nasir's Port Said Speech, which concludes: “This was Nasir's bitterest attack on the US since 1956. Some of its extravagances suggest that he had thrown away his text and was speaking extemporaneously, perhaps influenced by Shelepin's presence. He may have believed Shelepin was carrying an open checkbook or he may have been trying to test US intentions. In any case, the speech reflects both Nasir's recognition of Egypt's economic problems and his determination nonetheless to back ‘national liberation’ ovements at whatever cost.”Google Scholar

⁸⁵ Copeland, , The Game of Nations, pp.268–272.Google Scholar

⁸⁶ DDRS77–324D, 10/7/65, record of conversation between W. W. Rostow; Dr. A. M. Kaissouni, Deputy Prime Minister for Economy and Finance, UAR; Dr. Mostafa Kamel, Ambassador of UAR; Dr. Nazih Dief, Minister of Treasury; and Dr. El-Sayeh, Under Secretary of Economy, UAR.

⁸⁷ Badeau, recorded interview, p. 25.

⁸⁸ Dawisha, , “Intervention in the Yemen,” Middle East Journal, 29 (Winter, 1975), pp.55–57;Google Scholar also see Nutting, , Nasser, pp. 338–357, “Nasser's Vietnam.”Google Scholar

⁸⁹ DDRS78–143A, 10/15/62: President's Intelligence Checklist: “King Saud, in extremely poor health and in a psychopathic state of suspicion and. worry over the Yemenis, may not last much longer.”

⁹⁰ DDRS77–324D, 10/7/65, record of conversation between W. W. Rostow and Kaissouni, Kamel, Dief, and EI-Sayeh.

⁹¹ See, for instance, Hedrick Smith, “U.S. and Cairo Friendlier, Sort of…,” The New York Times, l/9/66:IV:6; also 11/26/65:26 and 12/1/65:11.

⁹² DDRS77–324D, 10/7/65, record of conversaion between W. W. Rostow and Kaissouni, Kamel, Dief, and El-Sayeh. When Rostow “asked bluntly: ‘Is your government really prepared for the sustained stability in relations with the West which that kind of assistance demands, if it is to be successful?’ Kaissouni, without hesitation.said. ‘It is.’”

⁹³ The New York Times, 1/9/66:IV:6.

⁹⁴ Dawisha, “Intervention in the Yemen,” pp. 57–59.

⁹⁵ Hedrick Sith, “Nasser Criticizes U.S.,” The New York Times, 5/10/66:12.

⁹⁶ DDRS78–82A, 7/26/66: “Informal Visit of President Zalman Shazar of Israel: Background Paper: U.S. Arms Sales to Israel.”

⁹⁷ Ibid. The United States also expressed the hope “that we are now at the end of a cycle of arms acquisitions in the Near East.”

⁹⁸ Copeland, The Game of Nations, p. 269, quotes Egyptian Ambassador Kamel's observation that “the Pentagon is under the influence of the British, the CIA believes that Nasser is a Soviet agent, and the State Department's Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs is manned by a lot of tired Arabists who have long ago lost whatever influence they ever had.”Google Scholar