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2. Gordon, Andrew, The Evolution of Labor Relations in Japan: Heavy Industry, 1853–1955 (Cambridge, 1985), 329CrossRefGoogle Scholar, argues that the prewar and wartime expectations had a postwar “reconstitution” in the labor-management balance that emerged by the 1950s.

3. Large, Stephen S., Organized Workers and Socialist Politics in Interwar Japan (Cambridge, 1981), 230Google Scholar, argues that new aspects of industrial paternalism were developed during the war, and the government-sponsored Sanpō movement (discussed below) provided valuable organizational experience. Garon, Sheldon, The State and Labor in Modern Japan (Berkeley, 1987) 229–37.Google ScholarNotar, Ernest J., “Japan's Wartime Labor Policy: A Search for Method,” Journal of Asian Studies, 44 (02 1985), 326CrossRefGoogle Scholar, makes the strongest case for looking at the legacy of wartime labor issues, whose “imprint on Japan today is unmistakable.” Johnson, Chalmers, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925–1975 (Stanford, 1982)Google Scholar traces the history of the economic bureaucracy in Japan, showing its continuity from the late 1920s to 1970s.

4. Large, , Organized Workers, 2–4.Google Scholar His book focuses principally on the Ninon Rōdō Sōdōmei (Japan General Federation of Labor), the only labor organization to span the entire interwar period.

5. Garon, , State and Labor, 212–14.Google Scholar Iwao had been chief labor manager at Japan Electric, and he became a protege of Yoshida Shigeru in the early 1930s. At Yoshida's request, he joined the Social Bureau in 1935 where his ideas of harmony led to the Sanpō movement (see below).

6. Taira, Koji, Economic Development and the Labor Market in Japan (New York, 1970), 145Google Scholar, table 16, shows a wide range of unionization by industry.

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9. Gordon, , Evolution of Labor, 258.Google Scholar

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11. Gordon, , Evolution of Labor, 264.Google Scholar

12. Cohen, Jerome B., Japan's Economy in War and Reconstruction (Minneapolis, 1949), 334–35; 337–40.Google Scholar This now classic study is still the most complete economic history of the war in Japan. Chapter Five, “Mobilizing Manpower,” deals with the work force. See also Gordon, , Evolution of Labor, 272.Google Scholar

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15. Hitachi Seisakushōshi, 2: 30–31.Google Scholar This official company history has no single author.

16. Tsūshō sangyōshō jūkōgyō kyokuhen, Nihon no kikai kogyo—sono seichō to kōzō (Tokyo, 1960), 55.Google Scholar

17. Cohen, , Japan's Economy, 272.Google Scholar

18. Ibid., 281.

19. Tsūshō sangyōshōhen, Sangyō tōsei (Tokyo, 1964), 592Google Scholar; Bōeichō bōeikenshūjō senshishitsu, Rikugun gunju dōin (Tokyo, 1970), 2: 830–3.Google Scholar A translation of the Munitions Ministry legislation is in Saburo, Hayashi and Coox, Alvin D., Kogun: The Japanese Army in the Pacific War (Quantico, 1959), chap. 10, note 1.Google Scholar Surprisingly, until November 1943, the army and navy each produced aircraft independently and competed for scarce materials and workers.

20. Tsūshō, Sangyō tōsei, 545; 594–97.Google Scholar For example, oil stocks declined from 7,677,000 barrels in late 1942 to 3,512,000 in 1943, and only 490,000 were available in late 1944. Access to oil in Indonesia was one of the reasons for the attack on Pearl Harbor.

21. Cohen, , Japan's Economy, 274.Google Scholar

22. Gordon, , Evolution of Labor, 262.Google Scholar

23. Cohen, , Japan's Economy, 282.Google Scholar Until the setback at Guadalcanal, the Japanese did not take mobilization as seriously as did Britain and the United States, but neither did Germany attempt full mobilization until the defeat at Stalingrad.

24. Lockwood, William, The Economic Development of Japan (Princeton, 1968), 184, note 54.Google Scholar

25. Taira, , Economic Development, 145.Google Scholar

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29. Gordon, , Evolution of Labor, 333.Google Scholar

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31. Ibid., 211.

32. Ibid., 209.

33. Ibid., 211–12.

34. Ibid., 217.

35. Gordon, , Evolution of Labor, 261–62.Google Scholar

36. Ibid., 263; Notar, , “Japan's Wartime Labor,” 312Google Scholar, and Large, , Organized Workers, 30Google Scholar, also support this argument.

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38. Notar, , “Japan's Wartime Labor,” 312.Google Scholar He weakens his own argument by admitting that the Sanpō's positive aspects were soon victims of ideology and the need for economic controls. Ayusawa, , History of Labor, 230–31Google Scholar, recognized early on the progressive aspects of wartime labor law.

39. Ibid., 314. Ironically, as noted above, during the Pacific War the army refused Welfare Ministry inspectors access to its own munitions plants.

40. Ibid., 317, 319. For another view of the reluctance of businessmen to give up their prerogatives, even in wartime, see Rice, Richard, “Economic Mobilization in Wartime Japan: Business, Bureaucracy, and Military in Conflict,” Journal of Asian Studies, 38 (08, 1979), 689–706.CrossRefGoogle Scholar As Large, , Organized Workers, 212Google Scholar, notes, neither business nor organized labor could openly oppose Sanpō because of their political weakness and their professed patriotism supporting mobilization after the outbreak of war in China.

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42. Ibid., 323–25.

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44. Ibid., 203–5. In an article on the postwar survival of the “social bureaucrats” and their policies, Garon sees 1938 as an important turning point: “the strengthened social bureaucrats no longer concerned themselves with protecting the rights of organized labor; they concentrated instead on strike prevention, wage controls, labor allocation, and other measures related to military-industrial mobilization.” Garon, Sheldon, “The Imperial Bureaucracy and Labor Policy in Postwar Japan,” Journal of Asian Studies, 43 (05 1984): 442.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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49. Ibid., 320–26. In extreme cases, according to Ōkōchi, , Kurai tanima, 219Google Scholar, absenteeism reached 40 and even 50 percent.

50. Adapted from Table 25, Ibid., 322. I do not include the “near disputes” reported by the police in 1943 and 1944: 412 and 200, respectively.

51. Garon, , State and Labor, 225.Google Scholar

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53. Havens, Thomas R., Valley of Darkness: The Japanese People and World War Two (New York, 1978), 93Google Scholar; Cohen, , Japan's Economy, 97.Google Scholar Only China faced greater inflation.

54. Tsūshō, , Sangyō tōsei, 590.Google Scholar American figures are based on consumer prices; English and German figures are cost of living. 1944 figure is in the average from January to November.

55. Hitachi seisakushōshi, 2: 44–45.Google Scholar

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57. Havens, , Valley of Darkness, 94.Google Scholar

58. Ibid., 95.

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60. Havens, , Valley of Darkness, 104–6Google Scholar; Cohen, , Japan's Economy, 324–26.Google Scholar

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62. Ibid., 918.

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