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The European Court of Human Rights Grand Chamber: Scoppola v. Italy (No. 3)
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 20 January 2017
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In Scoppola v. Italy (No. 3), the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights clarified its position on prisoner disenfranchisement under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The Grand Chamber upheld, by sixteen votes to one, the challenged Italian legislation as within the margin of appreciation granted to member states in determining the conditions under which the Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 right to vote is exercised. Following its precedent in Hirst v. United Kingdom (No. 2), the Grand Chamber ruled that the Italian law pursued the legitimate aim of preventing crime and enhancing civic responsibility and respect for the rule of law, and that the relevant measure was proportionate because it did not affect a group of people generally, automatically, and indiscriminately. Notably, the Grand Chamber differentiated Scopppola (No. 3) from Hirst (No. 2), stressing that the U.K. legislation challenged in the latter deprived all prisoners, regardless of the length of their sentences or the nature of their crimes, of their right to vote. Unlike Hirst (No. 2), the Grand Chamber noted, the Italian legislation adapted voting restrictions to the particular circumstances of each case.
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References
* This text was reproduced and reformatted from the text available at the European Court of Human Rights Web site (visited March 4, 2013) http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-111044.
1 Scoppola v. Italy (No. 3), App. No. 126/05, Grand Chamber Judgment (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 22, 2012), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-111044 [hereinafter Scoppola (No. 3) Grand Chamber Judgment].
2 Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights art. 1, Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 262 [hereinafter ECHR Protocol No. 1].
3 Hirst v. United Kingdom (No. 2), 42 Eur. Ct. H.R. 41 (2005). Hirst is the Court’s first decision on general and automatic disenfranchisement of convicted prisoners.
4 Although Hirst (No. 2) became final in 2005, the U.K. government has failed to amend its legislation to implement the Court’s judgment.
5 It was reported that U.K. Prime Minister David Cameron has said that ‘‘he feels ‘physically sick’ at the thought of any prisoner being able to vote.’’ UK Mulls Ruling Over Prisoner Voting Rights, Deutsche Welle (Jan. 24, 2013), available at http://www.dw.de/uk-mulls-ruling-over-prisoner-votingrights/a-16547503.
6 In its 2010 decision, Green & M.T. v. United Kingdom, the European Court ordered the U.K. government to adopt legislation amending the law on prisoner disenfranchisement six months after that judgment became final (the judgment became final in April 2011, when the Grand Chamber refused the government’s request for a referral). The U.K. government requested that the timetable set out in Green & M.T. be deferred to expire six months from the Grand Chamber Scoppola (No. 3) judgment. That deadline expired in November 2012.
7 In November 2012, the U.K. government published a draft legislation, which provides, inter alia, voting rights to prisoners serving shorter sentences. See Voting Eligibility (Prisoners) Draft Bill (Nov. 12, 2012), available at http://www. justice.gov.uk/downloads/legislation/bills-acts/voting-eligibility-prisoners/voting-eligibility-prisoners-command-paper.pdf.
8 See, e.g., Gladkov v. Russia, App. No. 15162/05 (Eur. Ct. H.R.) (communicated in Oct. 2009); see also Ivanovich Kuchmara v. Russia, App. No. 4664/10 (Eur. Ct. H.R.) (communicated in Jan. 2012).
9 ECHR Protocol No. 1, supra note 2, art. 3.
10 The U.K. government argued that the measure was proportionate as it ‘‘only affected some 48,000 prisoners (not the 70,000 stated in the Chamber judgment which omitted to take into account that prisoners on remand were no longer under any ban.’’ It also stressed that ‘‘the ban was in fact restricted in its application as it affected only those convicted of crimes serious enough to warrant a custodial sentence and did not apply to those detained on remand, for contempt of court or for default in payment of fines.’’ See Hirst (No. 2), supra note 3, ¶ 77.
11 Id. ¶ 82.
12 Scoppola v. Italy (No. 3), ¶ 48, App. No. 126/05, Section Chamber Judgment (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 18, 2011).
13 Scoppola (No. 3) Grand Chamber Judgment, supra note 1, ¶ 84.
14 Id.
15 Id. ¶ 110.
16 Id. ¶ 95.
17 Id. ¶¶ 45-48.
18 Id. ¶ 47. Italy’s legislation falls within the latter category.
19 Under the pilot judgment procedure, the Court identifies structural problems underlying repetitive cases and requires states to address those problems. See Information Note Issued by the Registrar, Pilot Judgment Procedure, available at http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/DF4E8456-77B3-4E67-8944-B908143A7E2C/0/Information_Note_on_the_PJP_for_Website.pdf.
20 The Court also decided not to review any similar cases pending new legislation. After the U.K. failed to meet the new deadline to amend its voting law—six months after the May 2012 Scoppola (No. 3) Grand Chamber decision—the Council of Europe gave the U.K. government an additional nine months to come in compliance with the Convention. See Terri, Judd, UK Would Breach Human Rights Commitments By Ignoring Strasbourg on Prisoner Voting , Independent (Dec. 11, 2012)Google Scholar, available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/homenews/uk-would-breach-human-rights-commitments-by-ignoringstrasbourg-on-prisoners-voting-8405729.html; see also Communication on the Activities of the Committee of Ministers, Report by the Chair of the Committee of Ministers to the Parliamentary Assembly (Oct. 2012 – Jan. 2013), CM/AS(2013)1 (Jan. 2013), available at https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=2021705&Site=CM.