^1/ The land in question involves 433 land grants from Spain and Mexico to the ancestors of plaintiffs and consists of approximately 12 million acres of land lying principally between the Rio Grande and the Nuces River in South Texas.

^2/ United States citizens also had claims of expropriation or wrongful taking of property against Mexico and its citizens, in large part as a result of the Mexican Revolution.

^3/ In 1934 the General Claims Commission was replaced by two special claims appraisers using a revised appraisal process.

^4/ Mexico also raises the statute of limitations as a defense, however, the Court does not reach that issue due to the lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the defendant.

^5/ 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1330(b) provides that:

Personal jurisdiction over a foreign state shall exist as to every claim for relief over which the district courts have [subject matter] jurisdiction under subsection (a) where service has been made under section 1608 of this title A joint motion and stipulation agreeing that service was proper was filed on December 4, 1981 and accepted by the Court on December 15, 1981. Therefore, all that remains to be decided is whether there is (a) subject matter jurisdiction, id., and (b) a justiciable claim under the FSIA. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1330(c).See In the Matter of the Arbitration Between Maritime International Nominees Establishment v. Republic of Guinea, 693 F.2d 1094,1099-1100 (D.C. Cir. 1982).

^6/ Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, at 4 n.5 (April 5, 1982). The Court notes that the greater weight of authority suggests that Sec. 1330 is the exclusive means for exercising jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign. It was enacted as part of the FSIA “to provide when and how parties can maintain a lawsuit against a foreign state … “ and to ensure parties have a federal forum without needing to invoke diversity jurisdiction. H. Rep. No. 94-1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 61, 13 (1976). See Maritime Int'l Nominees v. Republic of Guinea, supra, 693 F.2d at 1099; Ruggiero v. Compania Puruana de Vapores, S.A., 639 F.2d 872, 875 (2d Cir. 1981).

^7/ The Congress became dissatisfied with the State Department practice of making formal suggestions of sovereign immunity in suit against foreign sovereigns. They often resulted in inconsistent decisions due to unequal abilities on the part of foreign sovereign to bring diplomatic influences to bear on the State Department — influences which could deny litigants due process and may not have been relevant to the decision. H. Rep. No. 94-1487, supra,at 7.

^8/ There is no allegation by plaintiffs that they or their ancestors sought to retain or quiet title within the applicable statute of limitations after the alleged wrongful takings occurred. Moreover, Mexico has no power over title to land,within the United States under the 1941 treaty.

^9/ Compare Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964) (sovereign held immune prior to enactment of FSIA in connection with a commercial loan obtained for general governmental purpose), cert, denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965).

^10/ The Court notes that there is a question whether Mexico's“internal obligation” can fall within any of the exceptions to section 1605. In a section-by-section analysis prepared by the Departments of State and Justice in 1973, the view was expressed that:

Public debts do not fall within the scope of 1605.The immunity of foreign states in this respect should be maintained by the United States, in its role as one of the principal capital markets of the world ….

Immunities of Foreign States: Hearings on H.R. 3493, Before the Subcomm. on Claims and Government Relations of the H. Comm. On the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 42(1973)(herinafter “1973 Hearings“). The Court is mindful of Congress' instructions not to consult the 1973 section by section analysis in construing the FSIA and that no inferences should be drawn by differencesbetween the 1973 analysis and the FSIA. H. Rep. No. 94-1487,supra, at 12. For this reason, the Court is not relying on any “differences,” but instead notes the following contemporaneous constructions of the bill.

When the FSIA was first proposed it contained proposed Section 1606 which provided that all debts of sovereigns would remain beyond the jurisdiction of the U.S. courts. See H.R.11315, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 11315, 94th Cong., 1^st Sess. (1975); 1973 Hearings, supra, at 42. Ultimately, the provision was deleted from H.R. 11315. The Committee found it unecessary because U.S. lenders “invariably include an express waiver of immunity in the debt instrument.” H. Rep. No. 94-1487, supra, at 10; S. Rep. No. 1310, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1976). Proposed section 1606 was ambiguous in that it applied to all debts, not just general governmental obligations. The State Department considered amending it but then decided that 10 provision was better than a more precise provision which identified only non-commercial debts for general government obligations as eligible for per se sovereign immunity.Jurisdiction of the U.S. Courts in Suits Against Foreign States: Searings on H.R. 11315 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Government Relations of the H. Coram, on the Judiciary,94th Cong., 2d Sess. 69, 75 (1976).

The 1976 House Report specifically discusses the deletion of proposed section 1606 to which the above quoted passage referred. The Committee appears to have ignored the fact that a public debt could exist in other than the commercial lending context. It merely suggests that only public debts “which are of a commercial nature and should be treated like other commercial transactions” are excepted from sovereign immunity. Id. The non-commercial debt obligation is thus arguably immune by implication and may place the “internal obligations” in dispute in this case outside the scope of the Section 1605 exceptions.

This is in accordance with the historical meaning of a “public debt,” which was considered a per se public act and a sufficient basis for sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor, U.S. Dept. of State, to the Attorney General (May 19, 1952), reprinted in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S.682, 711-15 (1976).

^11/ See La. Civ. Code Ann. Arts. 462-470, 575 (West 1980); Mexican Civ. Code Arts. 750, 980 (Ediciones Andrade 1976).

^12/ See discussion, infra, at pages 22-27.

^13/ A few of the claims were processed by the General Claims Commission before 1941, and Mexico agreed to honor those decisions. See Presidential Decree, 129 D.O. sec. 5, supra at pages 5-6. Those findings, however, only went to the validity of the claims and their valuation. Even if honoring those findings is ministerial, funding them is certainly not.

^14/ An additional basis for declining jurisdiction, on which the Court does not rely, is that assuming Mexico converted plaintiffs' claims and committed a tort, the tort occurred in Mexico and did not affect property in the United States. See Perez v. The Bahamas, 652 F.2d 186, 189 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 326 (1981). As noted above, the alleged tort involves the conversion of claims against Mexico, not property in the United States.

^15/ cf. Fountain v. Metro. Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority, 678 F.2d 1038, 1041 (11th Cir. 1982) (“federal courts should be scrupulous in confining their use of judicial power to the precise limits set by the Constitution and Congress.”).

^16/ The court went on to hold that the FSIA could not and does not supersede the act of state doctrine. .Id. at 1359-60.

^17/ The affidavit of Oscar Flores, Attorney General of Mexico, attached to Defendant's motion as Exhibit A, merely confirms the allegations in plaintiffs' Complaint and is unnecessary for the Court to reach its holding.

^18/ See discussion, supra, at pages 4-5.

^19/ Id.

^20/ In Maltina, the former owners of a brewery, expropriated and dissolved by Cuba, were successful in defeating a claim that their corporate dissolution was an act of state and that their corporate authority must be honored in the United States insofar as it involved trademarks located in the United States. Id.at 1027.

^21/ A recent example of this possibility is the negative impact on United States relations with China as a result of Jackson v. Peoples Republic of China, 550 F. Supp. 869 (N.D.Ala. 1982). In Jackson, China chose not to appear and defend against a suit for payment on $41.3 million of 1911 Huguang railroad government obligations. The Court entered a default judgment and subsequently the Executive Branch has been requested by Chinese officials to intervene in the decision and deny its effect. Wren, Separation of Powers? You Must Be Kidding Says China, N.Y. Times, March 20, 1983, The Week In Review Section. Unlike this case, had the foreign sovereign entered an appearance, the Court might have been presented with a record on which to consider the act of state doctrine.