¹ For an analysis of the criteria of bloc membership see Ghita Ionescu, The Politics of the European Communist States (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), parts I and IIGoogle Scholar.

² For discussion of the process see Brzezinski, Zbigniew K., The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict (rev. ed; Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1967), passimGoogle Scholar.

³ The data is derived from an analysis of The Current Digest of the Soviet Press from 1950 through March 1969. The graphs do not include all bilateral and multilateral transactions in this period, only “major” transactions. We have determined what is “major” by considering only those transactions which were reproduced in both the text and the index. Obviously, mere is a great disparity in the significance even of material which appeared in both the text and the index. It is, however, inevitably more signifi-cant than that appearing only in the index. We have not distinguished between types of transactions. Such a typology would be helpful in discovering more subtle changes in patterns of intrabloc bargaining.

⁴ For a description of the concerns of a “strong” party-regime see Nagy, Imre, On Communism: In Defense of the New Course (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957)Google Scholar, passim. A good example of an extraparty group's coming to the aid of a party-regime and helping to transform it into a ”strong” regime is the case ofthe Roman Catholic Church in Poland in late 1956.

⁵ The “strength” or “weakness” of a party-regime has been determined on the basis of whether or not actions taken by the regime would be well received by nonparty as well as by party groups. Much of this information has been derived from analyses of individual countries, such as Fischer-Galati, Stephen, The New Rumania: From People's Democracy to Socialist Republic (Cambridge, Mass: M.I.T. Press, 1967)Google Scholar;Aczel, Tamas and Meray, Tibor, The Revolt of the Mind: A Case History of Intellectual Resistance behind the Iron Curtain (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959)Google Scholar; Auty, Phyllis, Yugoslavia (New York: Walker and Co., 1965)Google Scholar; Dziewanowski, M. K., The Communist Party of Poland: An Outline of History (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1959)Google Scholar; Griffith, William E., Albania and the Sino-Soviet Rift (Cambridge, Mass: M.I.T. Press, 1963)Google Scholar; Hiscocks, Richard, Poland: Bridge for the Abyss?: An Interpretation of Developments in Post-War Poland (London: Oxford University Press, 1963)Google Scholar; and others. We are not equating legitimacy with autonomy. Whether a nation-state can preserve its autonomy is only partly determined by the legitimacy of its ruling elite.

⁶ This list was derived by eliminating scheduled multilateral meetings such as those held under the auspices of the Cominform, WTO, CMEA and party congresses.

October I, 1956

March 25, 1968

July 19, 1957

November 22, 1957

December 2, 1960

March 10, 1965

October 18, 1966

April 27, 1967

July 13, 1967

December 23, 1967

March 25, 1968

April 30, 1968

May 9, 1968

June 23, 1968

July 16, 1968

August 3, 1968

August 28, 1968

October 2, 1968

November 22, 1968

March 11, 1969

⁷ “Tacit bilateralism” is based on the fact that the Communist press and media, by virtue of party control, normally represent official views. Communists circulate their views, coordinate policies, and communicate with one another through the press and other media. This system allows the lesser parties and Communists outside die inner ruling elites to look to Moscow for such cues and leads as the CPSU considers “appropriate.” While Stalin was alive, “tacit bilateralism” was supplemented by the widespread use of Soviet representatives stationed in key positions within the other party-regimes to interpret cues and enforce subsequent action in accordance with them.

⁸ See, for example, Dedijer, Vladimir, Tito Speaks: His Self Portrait and Struggle with Stalin (London: Weidenfield and Nicolson, 1953), pp. 330Google Scholar ff, andDjilas, Milovan, Conversations With Stalin, translated by Petrovich, Michael B. (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1962)Google Scholar, chapter 3. Soviet preference for bilateralism in this period was accompanied by Moscow's definition of “people's democracy” as a totally new and unprecedented political phenomenon. Emphasis was laid on the distinctiveness of each of the Eastern European states. This definition was complemented by bilateral organizational arrangements such as the mutual defense treaties and joint stock companies. After the Soviet-Yugoslav schism “people's democracy” was redefined as a form of the dictatorship of the proletariat akin to the Soviet model.

⁹ For a discussion of this phenomenon see Hoffmann, Stanley, Gulliver's Troubles, Or the Setting of American Foreign Policy (The Atlantic Policy Studies Series) (New York: McGraw Hill Book Co. [for the Council on Foreign Relations], 1968), pp. 322ffGoogle Scholar.

¹⁰ For a description of Soviet-Yugoslav relations during this period see Brzezinski, pp. 182ff, and Mansbach, R. W., “The Soviet-Yugoslav Rapprochement of 1955–58: Its Ideological and Political Implications” (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Oxford, 1967), passimGoogle Scholar.

¹¹ One should not assume that the Soviet Union would always avoid sharing the rewards of “victory” with a third party or inevitably seek a minimal winning coalition. The Soviet Union might desire the support of another “strong” party-regime in a dispute with a “weak” party in order to: i) “invest” for the future, 2) prevent a similar dispute from occurring between it and the other “strong” party (parties), and 3) avoid creating a situation in which the other “strong” party (parties) could become a potential attraction for die audience—though it would entail costs. For a discussion of die costs involved in coalition formation see Charles Adrian, R. and Press, Charles, “Decision Costs in Coalition Formation,” American Political Science Review, 06 1968 (Vol. 52, No. 2), pp. 556–563CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹² It might be argued that “weaker” parties could balk die “stronger” by suggesting that, if not granted concessions, they might collapse. There are several reasons why this is unlikely in the situations which have been described: i) die leaders of the “weak” regimes highly value dicir recently acquired status and privileges; 2) diey have required either explicit or implicit Soviet assistance in attaining and retaining their status and “owe” a great deal to die CPSU; 3) they are not associated with an indigenous nationalist movement and are easily replaceable; and 4) the CPSU would not hesitate to deal with a new regime comprising individuals with similar characteristics. The argument may be applicable if the bargaining process involves a second “strong” regime and if association with indigenous nationalism would make it difficult for it to adopt policies which would be perceived as nonnationalist. To force it to adopt policies which would be less would make it vulnerable to being overdirown by odier nationalists who might be less favorably inclined to deal with the Great Power. If this occurred, the Great Power must either accept the new situation or have recourse to intervention.

¹³ See Royal Institute of International Affair's The Soviet Yugoslav Dispute (London: R.I.I.A., 1948)Google Scholar andKatona, P., The Cominform: A Study in Propaganda (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of London, 1958)Google Scholar.

¹⁴ See, for example, Griffith, William E., The Sino-Soviet Rift (Cambridge, Mass: M.I.T. Press, 1964), pp. 207–230Google Scholar, andGriffith, William E., Sino-Soviet Relations, 1964–1965 (Cambridge, Mass: M.I.T. Press, 1967), pp. 11–13, 25-41 and 132ffGoogle Scholar.

¹⁵ Bulajić, Krsto, “La declaration des douze partis,” Questions actuelles du socialisme, 01–03 1959 (No. 52), pp. 201–224Google Scholar.

¹⁶ In order to avoid being associated with policies widi which it was not in agreement Russia did not attend multilateral conferences in April and July 1967 dealing with European security and the Arab-Israeli conflict. Nor did it attend bloc meetings in July and August 1968 concerning the reform movement in Czechoslovakia.

¹⁷ See The New York. Times, July 10, 1968, and July 13, 1968.

¹⁸ Analyses of shifts in bargaining relationships in other areas have been made widi some success. See, for example, Kissinger, Henry A., The Troubled Partnership (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965)Google Scholar, passim, and InisClaude, L. Jr., International Conciliation: The OAS, The UN, and the United States, 03 1964 (No. 547)Google Scholar.

¹⁹ It may be argued that the shift in intrabloc bargaining is due to the death of Stalin and the assumption of leadership by less dictatorial personalities. The fact that Stalin's successors were all “Stalinists” at one time or another and mat Soviet leaders have continued to show a preference for bilateral bar-gaining in which they could “dictate” policy suggests that an explanation based on different leadership “styles” is inadequate. Our premise is that shifts in bargaining relationships have occurred in spite of CPSU preferences. While new bargaining relationships have resulted in agreements as well as disagreements, it is nonetheless the case that negotiation must now occur where formerly it did not.

²⁰ For a discussion of data problems see Shoup, Paul, “Comparing Communist Nations: Prospects for an Empirical Approach,” American Political Science Review, 03 1968 (Vol. 62, No. 1), pp. 185–204CrossRefGoogle Scholar.