¹ See, e.g., Gardner, Richard N., “United Nations Procedures and Power Realities: The International Apportionment Problem,” Proceedings of the American Society of International Law, 59th annual meeting, Washington, 04 22–24, 1965, pp. 232–246Google Scholar;Plimpton, Francis T. P., “The U. N. Needs Family Planning,” The New York Times (section 6, part 1), 09 18, 1966, pp. 54–55, 97–100Google Scholar; Cleveland, Harlan, “The Evolution of Rising Responsibility,” International Organization, Summer 1965 (Vol. 19, No. 3), pp. 828–834CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Yost, Charles W., “The United Nations: Crisis of Confidence and Will,” Foreign Affairs, 10 1966 (Vol. 45, No. 1), pp. 19–35CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Manno, Catherine Senf, “Selective Weighted Voting in the UN General Assembly: Rationale and Methods,” International Organization, Winter 1966 (Vol. 20, No. I), pp. 37–62CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Barrett, Carol and Newcombe, Hanna, “Weighted Voting in International Organization,” Peace Research Reviews, 04 1968 (Vol. 2, No. 2), pp. 1–110Google Scholar.

² The degree of “malapportionment” in 1945 and 1966 is indicated by the following:

³ The most overrepresented states in 1945 were those from Latin America, with 8.4 percent of the population and 39.2 percent of the votes in the General Assembly. The most overrepresented states in 1966 were those from Africa, with II percent of the population and 31.4 percent of the votes (excluding South Africa).

⁴ See, e.g., John G. Stoessinger, with the assistance of McKelvey, Robert G., The United Nations and the Superpowers: United States—Soviet Interaction at the United Nations (New York: Random House, 1965), pp. 23–24, 171Google Scholar; Claude, Inis L. Jr, The Changing United Nations (New York: Random House, 1967) PP. 39, 66Google Scholar; Kulski, W. W., International Politics in a Revolutionary Age (New York: J. B. Lippincott, 1968), pp. 522–527Google Scholar; Morgenthau, Hans J., Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (4th ed.; New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967), pp. 469–471Google Scholar; Ross, Alf, The United Nations: Peace and Progress (Totowa, N.J: Bedminster Press, 1966), p. 48Google Scholar; and Schuman, Frederick L., International Politics (7th ed.; New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969), p. 245Google Scholar.

⁵ Manno, Catherine Senf, “Majority Decisions and Minority Responses in the U. N. General Assembly,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 03 1966 (Vol. 10, No. 1), pp. 1–20CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁶ Ibid., p. 7. Piano, Jack C. and Riggs, Robert E., Forging World Order: The Politics of International Organization (New York: Macmillan, 1967), pp. 156–157Google Scholar, report and presumably accept Manno's study and conclusions. They also state, however, that the United States had something approaching a mechanical majority in the Assembly during the first ten years of the United Nations' history.

⁷ Boyd, Andrew, United Nations: Piety, Myth, and Truth (rev. ed.; Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1964), pp. 74–75Google Scholar; and Alker, Hayward R. Jr, and Russett, Bruce M., World Politics in the General Assembly (New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 1965), pp. 145–190Google Scholar.

⁸ The decision to use roll calls from plenary meetings rather than committees was primarily based upon simple consideration of the time involved in gathering and analyzing the data. In addition, however, since final voting decisions are made in plenary meetings, die roll calls here may be considered of particular importance.

⁹ Under the more recent, mechanical system of voting, so-called “recorded” votes were included as well.

¹⁰ Because of the special nonvoting circumstances the nineteenth session was not included.

¹¹ It was deemed desirable to take into account abstentions both because this was considered a type of stand on an issue (in contrast with most absences) and because so doing meant that the results for each state would be based on the same issues.

¹² If a state did not vote on at least 75 percent of the roll calls in a particular session, it was excluded from consideration during that session.

¹³ Since colonial issues formed such a large portion of the total issues both before and after 1955, it was possible that these issues alone might have determined the patterns of American successes and losses. However, when win-loss scores were calculated and ranked with all colonial issues excluded, the rankings of United States scores were not fundamentally changed for either the earlier or later sessions as a whole. There were, of course, variations in some individual sessions but not of such a character as to change the overall pattern over time or the overall ranking of the United States in the four periods examined. Thus, both with and without colonial issues the United States ranked in the first quartile in 1945–1950; in the third quartile in 1951–1955; in the first quartile in 1956–1960; and in the third quartile in 1961–1966.

¹⁴ The method used in constructing the win-loss scores gave the same positive weight to all “wins” whether they were obtained with a blocking (1/3+) vote, a simple majority, or a 2/3 majority. Thus, it was possible that the relatively greater success of the United States from 1956 through 1962 than from 1951 through 1955 was largely the result of a shift from unsuccessful attempts to build 2/3 majorities in the earlier period to successful attempts to form blocking minorities in the later period. This very interesting hypothesis and methods for investigating it were suggested to this author by Professor Robert Keohane. The hypothesis would not only fit in with the patterns already indicated but would accommodate that portion of other writings which have emphasized the declining strength of the United States' position. In an attempt to investigate this two things were done: Win-loss scores were determined and ranked for all issues except those which failed because of a blocking minority vote; and a “majority support” score was determined. The latter involved the same method as the win-loss score except that a +I score was given for voting with the positive majority and a-I score for voting with the blocking minority on those proposals which failed because they did not obtain the required 2/3 of the votes. Thus, this majority support score, when compared with the earlier results, would indicate the extent to which those results were dependent upon a shift in United States strategy. The hypothesis of such a change occurring around 1955, however, was not supported by the rankings of either majority support scores or of win-loss scores with blocked proposals removed. On the contrary, in each session when these particular issues had a significant impact on the rank of United States scores, they consistently worked to the advantage of the United States. Thus, win-loss scores without these issues and majority support scores produced significantly lower rankings for the United States in the fourth through the eighth sessions, in the tenth session, and in the fourteenth through the seventeenth sessions. In short, in both the earlier and later years the United States derived relatively greater benefits in terms of obtaining wins and avoiding losses from the 2/3 majority rule than did the other UN Members. At the same time, whatever method is used to look at the data, the United States was considerably more successful from 1956 through 1960 than from 1951 through 1955. One particularly interesting result of the ranking of United States majority support scores, however, was the fact that while the United States was among the top 25 percent in 1957 and 1958, it dropped to the second quartile in 1959 and 1960, to the third quartile in 1961, and to the lowest 25 percent from 1962 on. This would indicate that between 1959 and 1962 the ability to block proposals supported by the majority was a major factor in the relatively high degree of success attained by the United States during those years. After 1962 the United States was unable even to accomplish this with sufficient frequency to be particularly successful.

¹⁵ The average margin by which the United States has been successful on cold-war issues has declined in recent years. For each cold-war issue a “margin of support” score was determined by subtracting the percentage of those voting which opposed the United States' position from the percentage voting which supported the United States position. (Abstentions were considered intermediate between opposition and support and therefore were included only in determining the total number voting on each issue.) The sums of these United States scores for each of four session groupings were then divided by the total number of cold-war issues during those sessions, giving average “margin of support” scores for the four groupings. The results were as follows: sessions 1–5, +.55; sessions 6–10, +.64; sessions 11–15, +.37; and sessions 16–21, +.28. While even the last figure represents a considerable margin, it is certainly much smaller than during earlier sessions; and the overall pattern would clearly imply increased difficulties for the United States in obtaining its cold-war “wins.”

¹⁶ Keohane, Robert O., “The Study of Political Influence in the General Assembly,” International Organization, Spring 1967 (Vol. 21, No. 2), pp. 221–237CrossRefGoogle Scholar.