¹ See letter of President Eisenhower to Senator Hubert Humphrey, November 17, 1959, US Dept. of State Bulletin, 01 25, 1960 (Vol. 42, No. 1074)Google Scholar.

² For analysis of some of the risks involved in currently advocated strategies of military deterrence, see such penetrating studies as Stephen King-Hall, Defence in the Nuclear Age; Jules Moch, Human Polly; Philip Noel-Baker, The Arms Race; Wohlstetter, Albert, “The Delicate Balance of Terror,” Foreign Affairs, 01 1959Google Scholar; Kennan, George, Russia, the Atom and the West, and also his testimony before the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 02February 4, 1959Google Scholar; and Klaus Knorr (ed.) NATO and American Security (especially chapters by George W. Rathjens, Jr., “NATO Strategy and Total War,” Thomas C. Schelling, “Surprise Attack and Disarmament,” and Klaus Knorr, “NATO Defense in an Uncertain Future”). Note also the policy statement of the Advisory Committee on Science and Technology of the Democratic Advisory Council, reported in The New York Times, 12 27, 1959Google Scholar.

³ See respectively UN Documents DC/SC.I/IO, June 11, 1954, and DC/SC.i/26/Rev.2, May 10, 1955. The Anglo-French plan, revised to meet some Soviet objections, was accepted by all four Western powers on the UN Subcommittee on Disarmament (Documents DC/SC.1/15/Rev.1, March 8, 1955, and DC/SC.-1/25–25, April 18–21, 1955).

⁴ Informal Memorandum submitted by the Chairman of the US Delegation to the Chairman of the USSR Delegation to the UN Disarmament Subcommittee, May 31, 1957.

⁵ See for instance, their proposals of March 19, 1936 (Document DC/SC.1/38) and May 3, 1956 (Document DC/SC.1/44).

⁶ The major US proposals for a first stage disarmament plan were advanced in a working paper of April 3, 1956 (Document DC/SC.1/42), a statement by Ambassador Lodge before the 1st Committee of the nth General Assembly, January 14, 1957 (Document A/C.1/783) and the Informal Memorandum to the Chairman of the USSR Delegation to the UN Disarmament Subcommittee, May 31, 1957, op. cit.

¹ The major Soviet proposals for partial measures during this period were those of: March 27, 1956 (Document DC/SC.1/41), relating primarily to conventional armament; March 18, 1957 (Document DC/-SC.1/49), which formalized a declaration sent by Premier Bulganin to President Eisenhower on November 17, 1956, concerning both conventional and nuclear limitations; and April 30, 1957 (Document DC/SC.-1/55) which also included provisions relating to both types of armament.

⁸ Document DC/SC.1/60, June 14, 1957.

⁹ See US Dept. of State publication No. 6676, Disarmament: The Intensified Effort 1955–1958, p. 41–47. This provides a careful summary from the point of view of American policy of the sequence of negotiations during this entire period.

¹⁰ See note 35 infra; also Four-Power Proposals for Partial Measures of Disarmament, August 29, 1957 (Document DC/SC.1/66), and statements of USSR representative to the UN Disarmament Subcommittee, August 27 and 29, 1957 (Documents DC/SC.1/65/-Rev.1 and DC/SC.1/PV.183).

¹¹ See statements by Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, September 17, 1959 (Document A/PV.798) and Premier Khrushchev, September 18, 1959 (Document A/PV.799); also. Declaration of the USSR, September 18, 1959 (Document A/4219).

¹² Four-Power proposals of August 29, 1957 (Document DC/SC.i/66) and statements of USSR representative to the UN Disarmament Subcommittee, July 8 and August 29, 1957 (Document DC/SC.1/PV.183).

¹³ Document A/4219, September 18, 1959.

¹⁴ The USSR has not yet made clear whether, in reaffirming its May 10, 1955, proposals, it intends to retreat from the more flexible position on bases which it set forth in its April 30, 1957, proposals.

¹⁵ See Frye, William, “Disarmament in the United Nations, A New Chapter?” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 03 1957 (Vol. 13, No. 3), p. 91CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and International Conciliation, 09 1959 (No. 524), p. 268Google Scholar. For the Soviet position, see Document DC/-SC.1/55, April 30, 1957; also, letter of Premier Bulganin to President Eisenhower, February 1, 1958, and proposals before the General Assembly (13th session), 1st Committee, Documents A/C.1/L.219, November 7, 1958, and A/C.i/L.219/Rev.1, November 18, 1958. For the Western position, see Document DC/SC.1/66, August 29, 1957; letter of President Eisenhower to Premier Bulganin, January 12, 1958; the twenty-power resolution, General Assembly (13th session), Document A/C.1/L.220, November 13, 1958; and General Assembly Resolution 1348 (XIII), December 13, 1958.

¹⁶ See Soviet statement at 11th General Assembly, Document A/3366.

¹⁷ See statement of Ambassador Lodge, nth General Assembly, 1st Committee, January 14, 1957 (Document A/C. 1/783). Also, statement of US representative to the UN Subcommittee on Disarmament, July 3, 1957 (Document DC/SC.1/PV.129).

¹⁸ Document DC/SC.1/59, July 2, 1957.

¹⁹ Document DC/SC.1/38, March 19, 1956. The formula was later rephrased to eliminate the ambiguity in the term “aggression.” The Soviet representative expressed interest in the Western alternatives as presented in June and July of 1957 but did not accept their final formula of August 29. See Chart I, note (b); also, Documents DC/SC.1/59, July 2, 1957, and DC/SC.i/60, July 29, 1957.

²⁰ See USSR statement, August 27, 1957 (Document DC/SC.i/65/Rev.i).

²¹ Document DC/SC.1/43, May 3, 1956.

²² See below, discussion of the timing of inspection for conventional and nuclear disarmament.

²³ Document A/PV.799, September 18, 1959.

⁵⁴ “Acceptability” no longer implies that the system is considered “foolproof” in the sense that it would catch every conceivable violation of the agreement. This rigorous test, so vehemently insisted upon by Mr. Baruch and his colleagues in the days of the American atomic monopoly, is frankly admitted to be unfeasible now, if it ever was otherwise. On the other hand, if the system can provide assurance that violations of a scope capable of giving one nation a major advantage will be detected in time for threatened countries to take effective counter-measures, the present disposition is to accept it as a sufficient guarantor of fulfillment.

²⁵ See especially Soviet proposals to the UN Disarmament Subcommittee of May 10, 1955 (Document DC/SC.i/26/Rev.2), March 27, 1956 (Document DC/SC./1/41). March 18. 1957 (Document DC/SC.-1/49), and April 30, 1957 (Document DC/SC.r/55), and statements of USSR representative, September 4 and 5, 1957 (Documents DC/SC.1/71–73); United States working papers of May 25, 1954 (Document DC/SC.1/5), August 30, 1955 (Document DC/SC.i/-31), and April 3, 1956 (Document DC/SC.1/42); also, the Informal Memorandum of US delegation chairman to USSR delegation chairman. May 31, 1957, op. cit.; Anglo-French syntheses of June 11, 1954 (Document DC/SC.1/10), March 19, 1956 (Document DC/SC.1/38), and May 3, 1956 (Document DC/SC-1/44); French working papers of September 2 and October 6, 1955 (Documents DC/SC.i/32, DC/SC.-1/33, and DC/SC.i/35); United Kingdom working paper of September 13, 1955 (Document DC/SC.1/34); and Pour-Power working paper of August 29, 1957 (Document DC/SC.1/67).

²⁶ The Western states would place factories under control at a somewhat later stage of disarmament than the USSR. The USSR would establish control at airfields at a later stage than the West and only if there were agreement on a broad program of measures of disarmament to follow.

²⁷ Document DC/SC.1/41. March 27, 1956.

²⁸ USSR Declaration, 09 18, 1959Google Scholar (Document A/4219). The USSR has also agreed to aerial surveys of specific zones of inspection and limitation of arms created to guard against surprise attack. See below.

²⁹ Separating the inspection from the enforcement function was a major concession by the US to the Soviet position.

³⁰ The Russia. have distinguished between the day-to-day operations of the control organ and enforcement action against violations. Over the former they have claimed no veto, at least in their control proposals relating to general disarmament (conventional or nuclear). However, in negotiations relating to the cessation of nuclear tests, the Soviet Union has held out for a partial veto over operations, infra.

³¹ General Assembly (1st session, 2d part), 1st Committee, 38th Meeting, December 4, 1946 (Document A/C.i/114).

³² Document DC/SC.1/PV.69, p. 10, quoted in US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Disarmament, Staff Study No. 3, p. 179. Or, as expressed by Ambassador Lodge to the General Assembly's First Committee, 9progressive establishment of an effective inspection system concurrent with such reductions.” Document A/C.1/783, January 14, 1957.

³³ See par. II (7), Soviet memorandum to the UN Disarmament Subcommittee, Document DC/SC.1/41, March 27, 1956.

³⁴ United Nations Review, 10 1959 (Vol. 6, No. 4), p. 46Google Scholar. The point was also made in the formal declaration submitted by the USSR in conjunction with Mr. Khrushchev's address: “The scope of control and inspection shall correspond to the extent of the phased disarmament of states.“ Document A/4219.

³⁵ International Conciliation, 09 1958 (No. 519), p. 10Google Scholar.

³⁶ See International Conciliation, 09 1959 (No. 524), p. 9–12Google Scholar, for a succinct summary of the negotiations. The report of the conference is contained in Document A/4078, January 5, 1959. See also the statement of William C. Foster, Chairman and Senior US Expert at the conference, Subcommittee on Disarmament, US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 86th Cong., 1st sess., January 30, 1959.

³⁷ Statement before the General Assembly (14th session), 1st Committee, October 22, 1959. See also, for a similar estimate of the urgency of the problem of control, Matteson, Robert, “Th e Disarmament Dilemma,“ Orbis, Fall 1958Google Scholar. (Matteson was Chief of Staff to the President's Special Advisor on Disarmament and intimately involved in the negotiations.) A penetrating study of the current problems and possibilities of preventing surprise attack is Thomas C. Schelling, “Surprise Attack and Disarmament,” in Klaus Knorr (ed.), NATO and American Security.

³⁸ Noel-Baker, Philip, who was British Minister of State during most of this period and privy to the negotiations, provides a searching analysis in The Arms Race (New York: Oceana, 1958)Google Scholar. See also the perceptive appraisal by Claude, Inis L. Jr, in Swords into Plowshares (New York: Random House, 1956), p. 309–532Google Scholar.

³⁹ See statement of US representative to the UN Subcommittee on Disarmament, March 20, 1957 (Document DC/SC.1/PV.89, p. 6). A Soviet admission t o the same effect was contained in the proposals of May 10, 1955 (Document DC/SC.i/26/Rev.2). The US did hold out some hope that control of stockpiles might ultimately become sufficiently feasible to permit their gradual transfer to international control for peaceful use. If effective control of nuclear production were installed, it might be possible to establish within reasonable accuracy the amount of fissionable material previously produced. See statements of Ambassador Lodge, General Assembly (12th session), January 14, 1957 (Document A/C.i/783), and of US representative at the UN Subcommittee on Disarmament, March 19, 1957 (Document DC/SC.1/PV.88).

⁴⁰ The system being designed specifically for the control of nuclear testing does not fully conform to the principles here outlined for more comprehensive nuclear control. See discussion below.

⁴¹ See letter of September 3, 1947, from the USSR representative on the UN Atomic Energy Commission Third Report of the Commission to the Security Council, Annex 3(c). See also Document DC/SC.1/26/-Rev.2.

⁴² See Third Report of the Atomic Energy Commission to the Security Council, Annex 3(c), p. 23ff.

⁴³ General Assembly (5th session), 1st Committee, October 23, 1950.

⁴⁴ See Majority Plan of Control, USSR proposal of June 11, 1947 (especially pars. 6 and 7), and related documents as presented in the first, second, and third reports of the UN Atomic Energy Commission to the Security Council.

⁴⁵ Compare Majority Plan with USSR proposals of June 11, 1947, Third Report of UN Atomic Energy Commission to the Security Council.

⁴⁶ See the analysis of the IAEA system by John Stoessinger, in Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, Eleventh Report, Organizing Peace in the Nuclear Age (New York: New York University Press, 1959)Google Scholar. Also, Cory, Robert H. Jr, “International Inspection: From Proposals to Realization,” International Organization, Autumn 1959 (Vol. 13, No. 4), p. 495–504CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Rubinstein, Alvin Z., “The U.S., the Soviet Union and Atoms-for-Peace,“ World Affairs, 04 1959 (Vol. 30, No. 1)Google Scholar.

⁴⁷ In this respect, its position has changed markedly since the negotiations over the Baruch Plan. It originally objected that continuous inspection would be tantamount to management and proposed instead that inspection be periodic with advance notice, except for “special investigations” which could be authorized when specific violations were suspected.

⁴⁸ At that time the Russians contemplated that continuing inspection would apply both to reduction of conventional arms and to prohibiting production of atomic weapons. Though their position on the character of inspection has not* changed, their proposals of March 1956, as indicated above, by-passed the question of nuclear control and therefore did not cover atomic inspection. The elaboration of the Soviet package in 1957, however, clearly demonstrated that, were agreement to be reached to control nuclear production and weapons, they would accept without question a system of continuing inspection.

⁴⁹ See Baker, op. cil., Chapter 2. Acceptance of this approach represented a 180-degree reversal for the Russians, who had determinedly called for a complete ons as an unconditional prerequisite to control.

⁵⁰ See note 39.

⁵¹ Report of the Conference of Experts to Study the Methods of Detecting Violations of a Possible Agreement on the Suspension of Nuclear Tests (Document EXP/NUC/28, August 20, 1958). The report is reprinted as Appendix to Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Disarmament, Hearings on Disarmament and Foreign Policy, Part 1, 86th Cong., 1st sess. The preceding spring, a US scientific team under the chairmanship of Killian, James had reported the feasibility of control—US Dept. of State Bulletin, 04 28, 1958 (Vol. 38, No. 983), p. 683Google Scholar.

⁵² In August 1959, the US announced new developments in the technique of detecting atmospheric nuclear explosions and also missile launchings, whereby more than 95 percent of such events could be instantaneously spotted anywhere in the world from a single monitoring station. See report on Project Tepee, The New York Times, August 8, 1959.

⁵³ International Conciliation, 09 1959 (No. 524), p. 21Google Scholar.

⁵⁴ Report on Hardtack Project by Presidential Science Advisory Board, US Dept. of State Bulletin, 01 6. 1959 (Vol. 40, No. 1022)Google Scholar.

⁵⁵ Annex II to the report of the conference (Document GEN/DNT/TWG, February 9, 1960) as quoted in The New York Times, December 24, 1959. These views were elaborated in an article in Pravda, signed by the Soviet experts headed by Dr. Yevgeni I. Fedorov —see The New York Times, February 9, 1960.

⁵⁵ US Dept. of State Bulletin, 01 18, 1960 (Vol. 43, No. 1073)Google Scholar. See also Document GEN/-DNT/PV.150, December 19, 1959, for the full statement of Dr. James B. Fisk, head of the American group, in refutation of the Soviet report. Other American scientists, reviewing the data in the light of the Russian criticisms, have since conceded that some serious errors were made in the initial analyses (for instance, underestimating the magnitude of the experimental explosions from which the data were derived) and that the problems of detection are, therefore, not so serious as set forth by the US representatives at the conference.

⁵⁷ Report of Panel on Seismic Improvements, Berkner, Lloyd V., Chairman, US Dept. of State Bulletin, 07 6, 1959 (Vol. 41, No. 1045), p. 17–18Google Scholar. A group representing the Federation of American Scientists similarly has concluded that it is highly probable detection techniques could be greatly improved, with consequent reduction of the risks of evasion by the time the control system is established—see The New York Times, January 27, 1960, p. 12.

⁵⁸ See testimony of James J. Wadsworth, US representative on Disarmament, before the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Disarmament, 86th Cong., 1st sess., March 25, 1959. See also the Subcommittee's hearings on “Disarmament and Foreign Policy,” Parts 1 and 2, 86th Cong., 1st sess., January and February 1959. A fine summary of the negotiations is presented in International Conciliation, 09 1959 (No. 524), p. 12–23Google Scholar.

⁶⁸ They also wanted the veto to apply to any changes in the basic treaty provisions, all matters relating to treaty violations, and the actual positioning of the control posts. On these questions, however, the US representative did not consider a veto unreasonable, involving as they did the fundamental terms of the agreement. See testimony of James J. Wadsworth, op. cit.

⁶⁰ See The New York Times, December 15, 1959.

⁶¹ Ibid., February 17, 1960.

⁶² See text of White House statement as reproduced in The New York Times, February 12, 1960.

⁶³ ibid.

⁶⁴ Ibid., January 21, 1960.

⁶⁵ Ibid., December 15, 1959.