¹ See, e.g., Clark, John F., O'Leary, Michael K., and Wittkopf, Eugene R., “National Attributes Associated with Dimensions of Support for the United Nations,” International Organization, Winter 1971 (Vol. 25, No. 1), pp. 1–25;CrossRefGoogle ScholarAlker, Hayward R. Jr., “Supranationalism in the United Nations.” Peace Research Society (International) Papers, 1965 (Vol. 3), Chicago Conference, pp. 197–212;Google ScholarKeohane, Robert “Who Cares about the General Assembly?” International Organization, Winter 1969 Vol. 23, No.1), pp. 141–149;CrossRefGoogle ScholarVincent, Jack E., “National Attributes as Predictors of Delegate Attitudes at the United Nations,” American Political Science Review, 09 1968 (Vol.62, No.3), pp.916–931;CrossRefGoogle Scholar Jack E. Vincent, “Testing Some Hypotheses about Delegate Attitudes at the United Nations and Some Implications for Theory Building,” Research Report No. 52, The Dimensionaliy of Nations Project, Department of Political Science, University of Hawaii, April 1971. There is also a large number of works dealing with support by individual countries and groups of countries, and support for particular typer of UN activities.

² Clark, , O'Leary, , and Wittkopf, , International Organization, Vol. 25, No. 1, pp.22–23.Google Scholar

³ Padelford, Norman J., “Financial Crisis and the Future of the United Nations,” World Politics, 07 1963 (Vol. 25, No. 4), p. 534.Google Scholar

⁴ Much of the increase in the contributions of the Soviet Union in the 1951–55 period can be explained in terms of changes in the scale of assessments. At that time, over strong Soviet opposition, the Soviet Union's share of assessed expenses was sharply increased.

⁵ Classifications by size were based upon 1969 figures for total gross national product and population. “Large” states were those which ranked among UN members in the upper one-third in both population and GNP; “small” states were those in the lower one-third in both; all other states were considered of “medium” size. Classifications by levels of development followed the methods used by Cox, Robert and Jacobson, Harold K., “Decision-Making in International Organizations: An Interim Report,” paper delivered at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York City, 09 2–6, 1969 (mimeographed).Google Scholar Based upon GNP at 1965 prices: “underdeveloped” states are those falling below $199 per capita; “growing” states are those in the $200 to $599 range; “developed“ those in the $600 to $999 range; and “highly developed” those above $1,000 per capita. Classification by regime type are also based partly upon the Cox and Jacobson paper, combined with the classifications provided by Haas, Ernst B., Human Rights and International Action (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970), pp. 141–159.Google Scholar My classification follows Haas' work quite closely, except that his various types of authoritarian, oligarchic and autocratic regimes are grouped in the single “authoritarian” category. Also, communist bloc countries are separated from other “mobilization” regimes. For my purposes here, the justification for this division rests simply with the sharply distinct pattern of financial participation by the communist states.

⁶ Clark, , O'Leary, , and Wittkopf, , International Organization, Vol. 25, No. 1, pp. 6–7.Google Scholar

⁷ A description of the methods used in computing the scale is contained in UN Document A/8011, the Report of the Committee on Contributions, General Assembly Official Records, Twenty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 11.

⁸ Population estimates used to compute adjusted GNP figures were taken from the United Nations Demographic Yearbook. Although several different sources had to be consulted for some countries, most GNP estimates were obtained from the United Nations Statistical Yearbook and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, World Bank Atlas.

⁹ One argument normally advanced for limiting United States contributions suggests that larger contributions might involve an unacceptable level of United States dominance. It is argued that the United States indicates its support and strengthens the UN system by restricting funds and thus preventing so much dependence on a single member. It is difficult to know how seriously these contentions should be taken, but there are many reasons for considering them rather artificial and self-serving. Certainly the United States does not appear to have attempted to limit its political role in the UN in other ways, nor is there evidence to suggest that decisions on UN financing in the United States Congress and Department of State have actually been influenced by attempts to protect the UN from United States domination. Moreover, the United States already contributes a sufficiently large proportion of the total funds to create a considerable degree of financial dependence. It is doubtful if the political leverage provided by existing dependence would be significantly increased by larger contributions. If the United States contributed, say, 45 percent rather than 36 percent of all funds, would the UN be significantly more vulnerable to United States control? A number of other countries, including the Soviet Union, do not appear to be fearful of this result and have argued for some time that United States assessments are unfairly low.

¹⁰ See footnote 5.

¹¹ Estimates used here for military expenditures were based upon figures in the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures, 1969. Since the yearly estimates of the ACDA went back only to 1964, the 1962 figures had to be estimated on the basis of later years and of figures in the United Nations Statistical Yearbook.

¹² Admittedly, this interpretation of defense expenditures would not be true of all countries. Moreover, cross-national comparisons are obviously of limited validity. Not only are figures only rough estimates, but some countries may rely on allies for expenditures they would otherwise make on their own military forces.