1. Four such conditions have been identified by Haas and Schmitter: size-power homogeneity of the states working for integration; the rate of transactions among them; the extent to which each state exhibits a pluralistic sociopolitical structure; and the degree of complementarity of elite values existing within the proposed union. See Haas, Ernst B. and Schmitter, Philippe C., “Economic and Differential Patterns of Political Integration: Projections about Unity in Latin America,” in International Political Communities: An Anthology (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1966), pp. 268–69Google Scholar. Barrera and Haas later added a fifth condition, perception of external dependence, in consideration of the concept of “passive” and “active” external factors introduced by Nye. See Barrera, Mario and Haas, , “The Operationalization of Some Variables Related to Regional Integration: A Research Note,” International Organization 23 (Winter 1969), p. 152CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Nye, Joseph S. Jr., “Central American Regional Integration,” International Conciliation no. 562 (03 1967), pp. 50–57Google Scholar; and Nye, , “Patterns and Catalysts in Regional Integration,” International Organization 19 (Autumn 1965), pp. 370–84.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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10. This paragraph relies on an offical publication, ECOWAS, Lagos International Trade Fair, 27th November to 11th December 1977 (Lagos, 1977).Google Scholar

11. Singer, Marshall R., “The Foreign Policies of Small Developing States,” in Rosenau, James N., Thompson, Kenneth W., and Boyd, Gavin, eds., World Politics: An Introduction (New York: Free Press, 1976), p. 270.Google Scholar

12. Calculated from Agency for International Development, Africa: Economic Growth Trends (Washington, D.C., 03 1976), p. 10.Google Scholar

13. Haas, , “Turbulent Fields,” p. 186Google Scholar. Nye and Barrera and Haas have contended that perception of external dependence is an important factor that may strengthen a process of regional integration and enhance integrative potential. See Nye, , “Central American Regional Integration,” pp. 50–57Google Scholar, his “Patterns and Catalysts,” and Barrera, and Haas, , “Operationalization.”Google ScholarSchmitter, Philippe C. has endeavored to improve on Barrera and Haas's work in “Further Notes on Operationalizing Some Variables Related to Regional Integration,” International Organization 23 (Spring 1969), pp. 327–31.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

14. Only Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde, which were still under colonial rule, were excluded.

15. John, Louis B., ed., Basic Documents of African Regional Organization, vol. 3 (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana, 1972), pp. 987–89Google Scholar. The Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Togo, and Niger decided not to participate.

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17. For a detailed analysis of the origins of ECOWAS, see Ojo, , “Nigeria and the Formation,” pp. 571–604.Google Scholar

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19. Ibid., 21 July 1972, p. 961.

20. Cape Verde became the 16th member in 1978.

21. ECOWAS, Development of the Community, 1977–1981, p. 11.Google Scholar

22. Treaty of Economic Community of West African States, art. 2 (hereinafter ECOWAS Treaty). Summaries of the treaty are to be found in Legum, Colin, ed., Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents, 1976–1977 (London: Rex Collins, 1977), pp. C196–99Google Scholar, and West Africa, 16 June 1975, p. 679Google Scholar, and 23 June 1975, p. 720.

23. Barrera, and Haas, , “Operationalization,” p. 155Google Scholar. Russett has, however, argued that the existence of strong “core areas” which provide a force for promoting unity is a more compelling argument than size-power equality. See Russett, Bruce M., International Regions and International Systems: A Study in Political Ecology (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1976)Google Scholar. Schmitter has argued that economic size is not the only measure of size-power, and in their study of the Andean Common Market Avery and Cochrane suggested that a more sensitive measure would include growth rate, size of labor force, rate of inflation, etc. See Schmitter, , “Further Notes,” pp. 327–31Google Scholar, and Avery, William P. and Cochrane, James D., “Innovation in Latin American Regionalism: The Andean Common Market,” International Organization 27 (Spring 1973), esp. pp. 207–9.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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25. For detailed studies of LAFTA see, for instance, Gale, Edward G., Latin American Free Trade Association: Progress, Problems, Prospects (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, Office of External Research, 1969)Google Scholar; Wionczek, Miguel S., ed., Latin American Economic Integration (New York: Praeger, 1966)Google Scholar; and Wionczek, , “The Rise and Decline of Latin American Economic Integration,” Journal of Common Market Studies 9 (09 1970), pp. 49–66CrossRefGoogle Scholar. On CARIFTA and CARICOM see Axline, W. Andrew, “Integration and Development in the Commonwealth Caribbean: The Politics of Regional Negotiations,” International Organization 32 (Autumn 1978), pp. 953–73.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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28. Nye, on the other hand, argues that rate of transaction is not a particularly important background variable for integration among LDCs and that singling it out “is to overemphasize a static analysis of existing trade patterns rather than potential trade in new (usually industrial) products which is a basic motivation for such schemes.” Nye, , “Comparing Common Markets,” p. 812.Google Scholar

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32. Haas, and Schmitter, , “Economic and Differential Patterns,” p. 267.Google Scholar

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34. Nye, , “Comparing Common Markets,” p. 817.Google Scholar

35. Ibid., p. 802. See also Nye, , “Patterns and Catalysts,” pp. 370–84Google Scholar, and Nye, , “Central American Regional Integration,” pp. 50–57Google Scholar; and Barrera, and Haas, , “Operationalization,” p. 152.Google Scholar

36. Ravenhill, , “Regional Integration,” p. 231Google Scholar. In his study of drug firms and dependency in Mexico, Gereffi concludes that there is a need for Third World countries to develop strong states capable of dealing effectively with multinational corporations if they are to establish their own development priorities successfully. See Gereffi, Gary, “Drug Firms and Dependency in Mexico: The Case of the Steroid Hormone Industry,” International Organization 32 (Winter 1978), pp. 237–86.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

37. Ravenhill, , “Regional Integration,” p. 231Google Scholar. Mytelka has shown that such arrangements with developing states and multinational corporations produce a “technological dependence syndrome,” since the developing state constantly misses the opportunity to learn by doing. See Mytelka, Lynn K., “Technological Dependence in the Andean Group,” International Organization 32 (Winter 1978), pp. 101–39.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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48. Senghor had stated that the problem was very difficult because of the different nature of the regimes of Senegal and Guinea and their different political and economic philosophies. See West Africa, 4 July 1972, p. 887.Google Scholar

49. See Dia, Mamadou, The African Nations and World Solidarity (New York: Praeger, 1961), especially pp. 15–17.Google Scholar

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54. In the Andean Pact the junta is composed of three members who may be citizens of any Latin American country and are selected by and responsible to the commission, which appears to combine some of the functions of the ECOWAS council and secretariat. The junta makes technical decisions relating to integration and formulates sectoral development programs and other economic harmonization measures. The ECOWAS secretariat is headed by an executive secretary, who is assisted by two deputy executive secretaries and a financial controller. It performs the main administrative and executive functions of the community and services all the other institutions. It also initiates and proposes policy measures and programs to the technical commissions. The executive secretary is appointed jointly by the authority and council for a term of four years and can be reappointed for only one more term of four years. He can be removed from office by the authority upon the recommendation of the council. The appointment of his two deputies as well as the determination of their terms and conditions of service and those of other officers of the executive secretariat are under the control of the Council of Ministers. See ECOWAS Treaty, art. 8.

55. Ibid., art. 8, sec. 9.

56. Andean Subregional Integration Agreement (Cartagena, 1969), art. 14.Google Scholar

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58. During the Lagos summit (1978) the authority designated Sierra Leone to nominate the external auditors; at the Dakar summit (1979) the appointment of R. A. Dillisworth & Co. as external auditors was ratified. ECOWAS Documents ECW/HSG/I/21, Rev I, and ECW/HSG.II, 7 Rev. I.

59. ECOWAS, Development of the Community, 1977–1981, pp. 12 and 15.Google Scholar

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62. ECOWAS Treaty, art. 52.

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69. In 1973 the Gambia reportedly had more than 50% of total government revenue originating from customs duties, Benin 49%, Upper Volta 47%, Sierra Leone 37%, and the Ivory Coast 35%. West Africa, 24 May 1982, p. 1371.Google Scholar

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72. ECOWAS Treaty, art. 27.

73. ECOWAS Document ECW/HSG/I/21/Rev. I.

74. Full text of the protocol is published in Official Journal of ECOWAS, English ed., 1 (June 1979), pp. 3–5.Google Scholar

75. ECOWAS Document ECW/HSG/II.7 Rev. I. The first phase, the right to move freely, is now in force and is expected to last five years (i.e. until 1984). If the opposition against free movement in several states continues at its present rate, it is very doubtful whether the next two phases–resident and establishment–will be inaugurated soon.

76. Official Joumal of ECOWAS, English ed., 4 (June 1982), p. 56.Google Scholar

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78. ECOWAS Treaty, art. 32.

79. Davies, , “Cost-Benefit Analysis,” p. 174Google Scholar. See also Robson, P., The Economics of International Integration (London: Allen & Unwin, 1980), p. 116.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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82. The industrially less developed states, besides the concession allowed in relation to contributions of member-states to the ECOWAS budget and under the trade liberalization program, share 20% of contributions due to more developed countries as compensation for loss of revenue over a period of five years and they are paid special attention in the allocation of industries.

83. ECOWAS, Development of the Community, 1977–1981, p. 26.Google Scholar

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85. The Malian representative at the meeting felt that a defense pact would be a step toward the “colonial reconquest” of Africa and would encourage a split of the continent into blocs dominated by outside powers. West Africa, 9 June 1980, p. 1038.Google Scholar

86. Ibid., p. 1038.

87. Commenting on the Defence Pact, Radio Nigeria stated: “The significance of a defence protocol cannot be overemphasized, particularly at a time when almost every African country is becoming more and more vulnerable to external aggression. It is a fact that there cannot be any meaningful development without peace and adequate security. In fact both are necessary conditions for the welfare and prosperity of the citizens of any state, country, or sub-region. And to the extent that this is the case for member countries of ECOWAS union, such a defence pact will be indispensable.” Africa Research Bulletin (Political, Social, and Cultural Ser.), 15 July 1981, p. 6072.Google Scholar

88. Document A/SP3/5/81, “Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence,” in Official Journal of ECOWAS 3 (June 1981), pp. 9–13.Google Scholar

89. Ibid., arts. 6 and 16; Africa Research Bulletin, 15 July 1981, p. 6072.Google Scholar

90. “Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence,” art. 17.

91. Ibid., art. 19.

92. Document A/SP2/5/81, “Additional Protocol Amending Article 4 of the Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States relating to the Institutions of the Community,” in Official Journal of ECOWAS 3 (June 1981), pp. 7–8.Google Scholar

93. France has existing defense or military cooperation agreements with the ECOWAS states of Benin, the Ivory Coast, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Togo, and Upper Volta. See The Military Balance, 1980–1981 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1980), p. 51Google Scholar. For a more detailed assessment of the Defence Pact, see Okolo, Julius Emeka, “Securing West Africa: The ECOWAS Defence Pact,” World Today 39 (05 1983), pp. 177–84.Google Scholar

94. National Concord (Lagos), 6 June 1984.

95. “All Change in Paris,” West Africa, 30 November 1981, p. 2838.Google Scholar

96. In the same year Nigeria's share of nonfrancophone West Africa's trade with France was 95% for imports and 90% for exports. Calculated from “Nigeria Oil Dominates Trade,” table in West Africa, 30 November 1981, p. 2844.Google Scholar

97. Ibid., pp. 2847–49.

98. “French Policy to Africa,” West Africa, 21 August 1981, p. 1920.Google Scholar

99. A new era in Franco-Nigerian relations has actually been demonstrated, many observers feel, by France's warmness toward the Nigeria-led OAU peacekeeping force in the Republic of Chad.

100. In addition, ECOWAS as the largest integration grouping in the world can be too unwieldy, particularly because of the decision-making process. There is also a language problem. The authority has established a Bilingual Institute of Management and Public Administration, but training in management functions and public administration for the community's personnel does not remove the language barrier at the grass roots. See ECOWAS, Development of the Community, 1977–1981, pp. 17–19 and 38.Google Scholar

101. An ECOWAS telecommunications project was scheduled for completion in 1985 and was estimated to cost $35 million. ECOWAS embarked on a search for funds to help finance it. By the end of a donor's conference in Freetown, Sierra Leone, in May 1981 and Executive Secretary Diaby-Quattara's completion of talks with several international banks in Brussels and the European Commission in October 1981, about $69 million (almost double the estimate) had been committed, and tenders were issued for the project in January 1982. See West Africa, 1 June 1981, p. 1207Google Scholar, and 2 November 1981, p. 2595; and African Business no. 41 (January 1982), p. 75.Google Scholar

102. Significantly, the West African Chambers of Commerce, Industry, and Agriculture has been accorded observer status in ECOWAS. West Africa, 24 05 1982, pp. 1369 and 1371.Google Scholar

103. Ibid., p. 1377. See also West Africa, 7 June 1982, p. 1494.Google Scholar

104. “ECOWAS Poised to Advance,” West Africa, 1 June 1982, p. 1492.Google Scholar

105. National Concord, 4 June 1984.