Hostname: page-component-7479d7b7d-8zxtt Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-15T13:32:25.749Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

The logic of deterrence in theory and practice

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 May 2009

Leon V. Sigal
Leon V. Sigal
Affiliation:
Associate Professor of Political Science, Wesleyan University.
Get access

Abstract

An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content.
Image of the first page of this content. For PDF version, please use the ‘Save PDF’ preceeding this image.'
Type
Review essays
Information
International Organization , Volume 33 , Issue 4 , Autumn 1979 , pp. 567 - 579
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 1979

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 Quoted in Bell, Coral, Conventions of Crisis (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 2Google Scholar.

2 Kahn, Herman, On Thermonuclear War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 24Google Scholar.

3 I am indebted to Alexander George for clarifying this point.

4 George, Alexander L., Hall, David K., and Simons, William E., The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), pp. 228–44Google Scholar.

5 The authors elaborate a number of game structures which they distinguish according to payoff orderings. In the following matrix,

6 Quoted in Jenkins, Brian, The Unchangeable War (Santa Monica: RAND, 1973)Google Scholar.