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Negotiating a treaty on environmental modification warfare: the convention on environmental warfare and its impact upon arms control negotiations

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 May 2009

Lawrence Juda
Lawrence Juda
Affiliation:
Assistant Professor in the Master of Marine Affairs Program at the University of Rhode Island
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Abstract

The technology of warfare is in a constant state of flux. In recent years weather modification activities have been employed by military forces and other methods of environmental manipulation have been contemplated for military use. The development of the 1976 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques and the negotiations in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) which culminated in its adoption are focused upon. To date this treaty has generated little in the way of commentary in either the press or in academic journals. The treaty and the politics surrounding its drafting and adoption are considered and shown to be quite instructive on disarmament politics and the operation of the CCD. Further, they reflect the fact that the North-South polarity found in a number of issue areas in world politics is increasingly evident in the field of disarmament and arms control.

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Articles
Information
International Organization , Volume 32 , Issue 4 , Autumn 1978 , pp. 975 - 991
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 1978

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References

1 The text of this convention is found in International Legal Materials.

2 Tse-Tung, Mao, “Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War Against Japan,” and “On Protracted Warfare,” in Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung, Vol. II (Peking: People's Publishing House, 1965) pp. 79–112 and pp. 113–94Google Scholar.

3 For a detailed account of American environmental war efforts and their effects in Indochina see Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Ecological Consequences of the Second Indochina War (Stockholm: SIPRI, 1976)Google Scholar. An unclassified Department of Defense account of weather modification activities in Southeast Asia appears in Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Oceans and International Environment, “Weather Modification,” 93rd Congress, 2nd Session, pp. 87–123Google Scholar. According to a former DOD consultant, Lowell Ponte, weather modification was also attempted against Cuba during 1969 and 1970 so as to cause clouds near Cuba to drop their rain before reaching Cuba thus causing a damaging drought. Pentagon, sources denied such operations. International Herald Tribune, 29 06 1976, p. 2Google Scholar.

4 This is not to claim that environmental warfare is totally new. Ruth Russell points out that warriors have always sought to use or disrupt natural processes to their advantage in military conflicts. She notes, for example, the use by Archimedes of the sun's rays, concentrated off polished shields, to set Roman ships afire and the use of scorched earth tactics by various armies.Russell, , “The Nature of Military Impacts on the Environment,” in Club, Sierra, Air, Water, Earth, Fire (San Francisco: Sierra Club Special Publication, 1974), pp. 1–14Google Scholar. What is new, though, is the availability of increasingly sophisticated knowledge and technology for environmental warfare efforts.

5 See, for example,Hersch, Seymour M., “Rainmaking is Used as a Weapon by U.S.,” The New York Times, 3 07 1972Google Scholar.

6 Senate Resolution 281 (92nd Congress, 2nd session). Prior to the introduction of this resolution Senator Pell called upon the executive branch to take the lead in this matter. Congressional Record, 15 December 1971: 47065.

7 Hersch, op. cit.

8 CongressionalRecord, 11 July 1973: pp. 23303–05. As introduced in the 93rd Congress the resolution was designated SR 71.

9 Letter of Foreign Minister Gromyko to the UN Secretary-General dated 7 August 1974, A/9702.

10 See “Statement on Dangers of Military Use of Environmental Modification, July 3, “ in Department of State Bulletin, 29 July 1974: 185.

11 According to the SIPRI, Yearbook 1975: World Armaments and Disarmament (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1975), p. 435Google Scholar, the United States believed that the matter of geophysical and meteorological warfare had not yet been defined and, therefore, that it was premature to conclude that a convention would be feasible or effective.

12 A/C. 1/PV. 1998. An interesting and informative account of possible weapon systems in the environmental area is contained in MacDonald, Gordon J.F., “How to Wreck the Environment,” in Calder, Nigel, Unless Peace Comes (London: Penguin Press, 1968) pp. 167–83Google Scholar. A more up to date and systematic attempt to identify methods of influencing the environment for military purposes is found in the working paper of Canada, CCD/463. See also SIPRI, Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Environment (London: Taylor & Francis Ltd., 1977)Google Scholar.

13 General Assembly Resolution 3264 (XXIX), 7 January 1975.

14 A/C. 1/L. 675.

15 See, for example, the comments of Ambassador Martin, the U.S. representative to the CCD, CCD/PV. 686.

16 CCD/471, 472.

17 See, for example, the statements of the representatives of the United Kingdom, CCD/PV. 695, p. 24; Iran, CCD/PV. 697, p. 30; and Japan, CCD/PV. 699, p. 7.

18 See the remarks of the representatives of the United Kingdom, CCD/PV. 659, p. 17; the Netherlands, CCD/PV. 681, p. 29; and Romania, CCD/PV. 703, p. 19.

19 See the statements of the representatives of Argentina, CCD/PV. 686 and A/C. 1/PV. 2090, and Kuwait, A/C. 1/31/PV. 26, p. 51.

20 CCD/PV. 724, p. 8.

21 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., press release of 22 November 1976.

22 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Paul Warnke, Director, U.S. ACDA and Cyrus Vance, Secretary, U.S. Department of State, 17 May 1977, Stipulation, signed on 7 October 1977. The agreement states in part that: “No party to this Stipulation is, by entering into the Stipulation, taking or modifying any position concerning the applicability or non-applicability of NEPA to the actions of the ACDA or the Department connected with the Convention.” A copy of this Stipulation was provided the author by the NRDC.

23 CCD/PV. 689, p. 25 and CCD/PV. 691. pp. 12–13.

24 This type of thinking was also in evidence in 1968 as discussions occurred within the government on the subject of forbidding the placing of nuclear weapons in the seabed. At that time General Earle Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, maintained that in the future some advantages to seabed deployment might be found and, consequently, the United States should not cut off any options by arms limitations.Wenk, Edward Jr, The Politics of the Ocean (Seattle: The University of Washington Press, 1972) p. 290Google Scholar. In regard to the ENMOD convention see the comments of Senator Pell in Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Oceans and International Environment, “Weather Modification,” 93rd Congress, 2nd session, pp. 2, 17–19, and 65–66. The DOD was the agency responsible for leading the U.S. delegation in its fight at the Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment to weaken the wording of recommendation 70 of the Action Plan on the Human Environment which treated activities having an effect on climate. The Action Plan is found in A/Conf. 48/14/Rev. 1.

25 It is interesting to note that in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in January 1976, Thomas Davies, assistant director of the ACDA, interpreted “long-lasting” as perhaps a week. This is quite different from what emerged as the official U.S. interpretation. Subcommittee on Oceans and the Environment, “Prohibiting Hostile Use of Environmental Techniques,” 94th Congress, 2nd session, p. 13.

26 Letter of Senator Pell to Fred Ikle, director of the ACDA, dated 23 January 1976 reproduced in ibid., p. 16.

27 CCD/PV. 698, pp. 14–15.

28 CCD/PV. 703, pp. 8–10. On the United States policy regarding the use of herbicides see the statement of President Ford on the occasion of the U.S. ratification of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the Biological Weapons Convention and Executive Order 11850 in Department of State Bulletin, 5 May 1975, pp. 576–77. The United States renounced the “First use of herbicides in war except use, under rules applicable to their domestic use, for control of vegetation within U.S. bases and installations or around their immediate defense perimeters.”

29 For the text of the CCD “understandings” of articles I, II, III, and VIII see the 1976 report of the CCD to the General Assembly, CCD/520, Annex A, pp. 6–7. “Widespread” is to be interpreted as “encompassing an area of the scale of several hundred square kilometers,” “long-lasting” as “lasting for a period of months, or approximately a season,” and “severe” as involving serious or significant disruption or harm to human life, natural and economic resources, or other assets.”

30 A/C. 1/31/L..4. See the remarks of the Mexican representative as he introduced the draft resolution on behalf of Argentina, Cyprus, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Grenada, Haiti, Mauritius, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela. A/C. 1/31/PV. 26, pp. 62–71. According to the Mexican representative “…partial prohibitions in matters of disarmament have, in fact, become an incentive to increase research and development and the sophistication of new methods of destruction below the threshold that has been prohibited. To prove this suffice it to recall that the number of nuclear weapons tests after the signing of the Moscow treaty [test ban] in 1963 grew dramatically.”

31 A/C. 1/31/L. 4/Rev. 1.

32 A/C. 1/31/L. 5/Rev. 3 and A/C. 1/31/PV. 51. For the roll call vote on this see p. 21 of the latter document.

33 A/31/382, pp. 7–8.

34 See the statements of the representatives of the Netherlands, CCD/PV. 692, p. 32; Sweden, CCD/PV. 697, p. 26; Japan, CCD/PV. 699, p. 9; Italy, CCD/PV. 701, p. 12; and Yugoslavia, CCD/PV. 701, p. 19.

35 U.S. view, CCD/PV. 688, p. 26; Soviet view, CCD/PV. 698, p. 18.

36 The text of the remarks of Secretary of State Vance at the signing ceremony in Geneva are found in Department of State Bulletin, 13 June 1977: 633–634.

37 Myrdal, Alva, The Game of Disarmament: How the United States and Russia Run the Arms Race (New York: Pantheon Books, 1976), pp. 173–175Google Scholar.

38 See, for example, the views expressed by the representatives of Japan, CCD/PV. 699, p. 10; Italy, CCD/PV. 701, p. 11; and Romania, CCD/PV. 703, p. 19.

39 CCD/PV. 697, pp. 12–13 (Federal Republic of Germany).

40 CCD/PV. 697, p. 25 (Sweden). See also Myrdal, , op. cit., pp. 274–275Google Scholar on the belief that reliance on the Security Council as an instrument of control machinery in arms control agreements is discriminatory.

41 CCD/PV. 692, pp. 33–35 and CCD/PV. 697, p. 25.

42 CCD/PV. 698, pp. 18–20.

43 CCD/PV. 705, pp. 17–18 and CCD/PV. 726, pp. 9–10.

44 A/C. 1/PV. 2007. According to the PRC “…the Soviet arms expansion is a reality while its talk on disarmament is a fraud.”

45 See, for example, the views expressed by the representatives of the Netherlands, CCD/PV. 692; Nigeria, CCD/PV. 693; Argentina, CCD/PV. 695; Canada, CCD/PV. 699; Egypt, CCD/PV. 701; and Romania, CCD PV. 703.

46 See the statements of the representatives of Iran, A/C. 1/PV. 2082; USSR, CCD/PV. 688; and the United States, CCD/PV. 691.

47 CCD/PV. 660 (Hungary).

48 See, for example, A/C. 1/31/PV. 32, pp. 46–52 and A/C. 1/31/PV. 39, pp. 43–45. It is often noted that the rate of increase in arms expenditures by the developing world is growing at a faster rate than that of the developed states. The LDCs, accordingly, are said to be hypocritical for their attacks on the United States and the USSR. LDC armament imports, though, are highly concentrated in a few states such as Iran and Saudi Arabia. While, indeed, there may be some element of hypocrisy present it is also true that there is considerable sales pressure upon the LDCs to buy and competition among the developed states to sell arms. Arms sales to the LDCs are useful to the developed countries for a variety of purposes including: reducing the unit cost of weapons, dumping an older generation of weapons, improving the balance of payments, and possibly gaining political influence. In the author's opinion the awareness of the exploitative aspects of the arms trade is growing among the LDCs. See, for example, the statements made to the First Committee of the UN General Assembly by the representatives of Trinidad and Tobago, A/C. 1/31/PV. 35, pp. 22–40; Colombia, A/C. 1/31/PV. 38, pp. 3–16; and Singapore, A/C. 1/31/PV. 47, pp. 17–22. See also the recent report of the UN Secretary-General, “Economic and Social Consequences of the Armaments Race and its Extremely Harmful Effects on World Peace and Security.” A/32/88. On the international trade in arms see SIPRI, Yearbook 1976, pp. 136–144Google Scholar and U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1966–1975 (12 1976)Google Scholar.

49 A/C. 1/31/PV. 21, pp. 36–57, A/C. 1/31/PV. 25, pp. 57–58, and A/C. 1/31/PV./34, p. 31 respectively. For an assessment of the CCD and its work by an academic observer see Sullivan, Michael J., III, ”Conference at the Crossroads: Future Prospects of the Committee on Disarmament,” International Organization 29 (Spring 1975): 393–413CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

50 A/C. 1/31/PV. 41, pp. 7–12.

51 A/C. 1/31/PV. 28, p. 26.

52 CCD/PV. 693, p. 13–20. See also the comments of the representative of Sweden, CCD/PV. 689, p. 11 and the remarks of Ambassador Clark of Nigeria to the UN General Assembly's First Committee, A/C. 1/31/PV. 31, pp. 56–62. For a provoking and thoughtful analysis of the politics of disarmament see Alva Myrdal, supra note 37. On the basis of her twelve years of participation in disarmament negotiations she says of the superpowers: “More and more a regular pattern has become visible: that although seemingly they struggle against each other they are in a kind of conspiracy, dividing between them the responsibility of saying nyet and no. They apparently want to continue their arms race, to make mutual concessions, minor as they are, within bilateral negotiations, undisturbed by the majority of nations.” p. xiii.

53 CCD/PV. 686, p. 18.

54 CCD/PV. 695, p. 7. This concern is reflected in the General Assembly resolution approving the ENMOD convention. It stated in part that: “…draft agreements on disarmament and arms control measures submitted to the General Assembly by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should be the result of a process of effective negotiations and that such instruments duly take into account the views and interests of all States so that they can be joined by the widest possible number of countries “ A/31/382.

55 CCD/PV. 708, pp. 21–22.

56 See UN General Assembly Resolution 31/68 approved on 10 December 1976 and entitled “Effective Measures to Implement the Purposes and Objectives of the Disarmament Decade.” In part it “deplores the meagre achievements of the Disarmament Decade in terms of truly effective disarmament and arms limitation agreements, and the detrimental effects on world peace and economy of the continuing unproductive and wasteful arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race.…” See also Resolution 31/189 entitled “General and Complete Disarmament.” Resolution A, in part, expressed regret at the absence of progress in Soviet-American bilateral negotiations on the limitations of strategic nuclear weapons systems and criticizes the two superpowers for the “very high” ceilings of nuclear arms they have set and the absence of qualitative limitations of such arms. Resolution A was approved by a vote of 107–10 with 11 abstentions. Both the USSR and the United States voted in the negative.

57 A/31/189 B.