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On the Influence of the Secretary-General: Can We Know What It Is?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 May 2009

Jonathan Knight
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Extract

Examination of the literature on the influence of the secretary-general forcefully suggests two conclusions about that literature: It is large and growing rapidly, yet tihere is little in the way of systematic explanation of the behavior of the secretary-general. The scholarly literature is filled with statements that tell us the kindls of things we should be studying (for example, superpower rivalries and the “special right” of the secretary-general), but what they represent are alternative research concerns. They do not constitute conceptual tools for empirical analysis that would help us devise and evaluate propositions setting Ifortti relationships about human action in tihe context of international organizations. No doubt these studies have added to our descriptive knowledge of the secretary-general, and this knowledge possibly alerts us to complex processes at work in and out of the United Nations. Yet two qualifications must be noted. First, the identification of complexity should be the beginning and not the end of empirical inquiry. Second, the actual value of descriptive knowledge remains problematical when it is presented without clarifying the generalizations used as criteria to select facts. Without explicitness we have no way of validating the reliability of criteria used for sorting out “important” information. We are placed in the position of not being certain that the particular study contains all relevant information and not knowing whether the information presented is relevant.

Type
Review Article
Information
International Organization , Volume 24 , Issue 3 , Summer 1970 , pp. 594 - 600
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 1970

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References

1 The logic of argument to this point draws on Runciman, W. G., Social Science and Political Theory (2nd ed; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969)Google Scholar, and Homans, George C., The Nature of Social Science (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1967)Google Scholar.

2 See the reviews of Gordenker's work in the Journal of Politics, 08 1968 (Vol. 30, No. 3), pp. 847–848Google Scholar; Midwest Journal of Political Science, 02 1969 (Vol. 13, No. 1), pp. 157–158CrossRefGoogle Scholar; American Political Science Review, 09 1969 (Vol. 63, No. 3), pp. 979–980Google Scholar.

3 The criticism of Gordenker that follows is rooted in a concern for clear concept formation, and by concept is meant

nothing more than descriptive words, as opposed to, say, logical words. We must distinguish these descriptive words from the things they describe. It is obviously the words, not the things, that we define. A definition of a concept is a verbal statement of the criteria of applicability of a word or its ‘meaning’ in the sense of reference.

Fleron, Frederick J. Jr, “Soviet Area Studies and the Social Sciences: Some Methodological Problems in Communist Studies,” in Fleron, Frederick J. Jr, (ed.),Communist Studies and the Social Sciences (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969), pp. 11–12 (his italics)Google Scholar. For further discussion on concept formation see Hempel, Carl, Fundamentals oj Concept Formation in Empirical Science (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952)Google Scholar; Kaplan, Abraham, The Conduct of Inquiry(San Francisco, Calif: Chandler, 1964)Google Scholar; Rudner, Richard, Philosophy of Social Science (Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice-Hall, 1966)Google Scholar.

4 Gordenker, Leon, The UN Secretary-General and the Maintenance of Peace (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), p. xiiiGoogle Scholar.

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid., p. x.

7 Ibid.

8 Neustadt, Richard E., Presidential Power (New York: New American Library, 1964), especially chapter 3Google Scholar. See also Dahl, Robert A., “The Concept of Power,” Behavioral Science, 06 1957 (Vol. 2, No. 3), pp. 201–215CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

9 Ibid., p. 203.

10 On methods of influence Dahl notes with regard to the president that “means would include the promise of patronage, the threatof veto, the holdingof a conference, the threat of appeal to the electorate, the exercise of charm and charisma, etc.” (Ibid., his italics.)

11 The assumption has been subjected to considerable empirical refinement in recent years, especially in leadership studies and role theory literature. Among many, see the following: Guetzkow, Harold (ed.), Groups, Leadership and Men (New York: Carnegie Press, 1951)Google Scholar; Hemphill, John K., Situationd Factors in Leadership (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1949)Google Scholar; Bass, Bernard M., Leadership, Psychology and Organizational Behavior (New York: Harper & Row, 1960)Google Scholar; Verba, Sidney, Small Groups and Political Behavior: A Study of Leadership(Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1961)Google Scholar; Kahn, Robert L., and others, Organizational Stress: Studies in Role Conflict and Ambiguity (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1964)Google Scholar; Gross, Neal, Mason, Ward, and McEachern, Alexander, Explorations in Role Analysis (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1958)Google Scholar.

The definition of influence is drawn from Cartwright, Dorwin, “Influence, Leadership, Control,” in March, James G. (ed.), Handbook of Organizations (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), pp. 1–47Google Scholar. The symbols O and P follow Cartwright's usage.

12 Ibid., p. 27.

13 Domain of influence refers to the set of actors over whom O exercises influence. Range of influence refers to the set of states of P subjected to influence by O. See ibid., pp. 22–23.

14 French, John R. P. Jr, and Raven, Bertram, “The Bases of Social Power,” in Cartwright, Dorwin (ed.), Studies in Social Power (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1959), pp. 150—167Google Scholar. For present purposes, influence and power are used interchangeably. An important effort in applying French and Raven to an ongoing political system is Manley, John F., “Wilbur D. Mills: A Study in Congressional Influence,” American Political Science Review 06 1969 (Vol. 63, No. 2), pp. 442–464CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

15 French and Raven, in Cartwright, p. 161.

16 Ibid., pp. 162–163, 165.

17 Cartwright, Dorwin and Zander, Alvin (ed.), Group Dynamics: Research and Theory (3rd ed; New York: Harper & Row, 1968), p. 216Google Scholar.

18 Ibid.

19 This follows the language and argument of Dahl, Robert, “Power,” in Sills, David L. (ed.), International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (New York: Macmillan, 1969), Vol. 12, pp. 412–413Google Scholar.