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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 May 2009
For almost a decade commentators on international organization have nurtured the myth that the UN Charter was originally ‘oversold’ to the American public by enthusiastic supporters, who represented the organization as a panacea for the ills of twentieth-century world politics. So unrealistic were the expectations created by this publicity barrage, so the story runs, that subsequent disillusionment with die UN was inevitable. Although propagated with many variations, the myth finds a classic formulation in the words of Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., uttered before the House Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements, July 8, 1953: ‘The United Nations,’ said Ambassador Lodge, ‘was oversold. It was advertised entirely as an automatic peace producer. All we had to do was sign on die dotted line—so it was said—and all our troubles would be over’. A recent volume on international relations, currently in use as a college text, restated the myth in a some what less extreme form: ‘Considered a towering edifice of strength in 1945, the United Nations was often shrugged off in the early 1950's with the damning phrase, ‘debating society.’ Because expectations had been so extravagant, the achievements of the United Nations seemed ridiculously trivial to many who had expected a Utopian revolution in international relations that the United Nations could not hope to provide.” Other variations on the theme are no doubt familiar to students of international organization. Use of the expression ‘myth’ implies no denial that ‘a veritable wave of propaganda and influence was generated on behalf of American membership’ in the UN. The country was flooded with information, from bodi government and private sources, designed to win over the public to the desirability of postwar international organization. It is also true that those engaged in selling the UN to the public tried to give their arguments an optimistic, hopeful tone. Recalling the League's fate, they emphasized the differences between the League and the proposed new organization rather than their patent similarities. Often they were guilty of oversimplifying the facts of world politics upon which the future of the UN would necessarily depend. The growing split between Russia and the Western allies, so ominous for the new organization, was not usually highlighted in speeches urging the establishment of the UN. A vigorous selling campaign was unquestionably conducted.
1 International Organizations and Movements, Hearings, Subcommittee of House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 83rd Cong., 1st sess., 1953, p. 93.
2 Hartmann, Frederick H., The Relations of Nations, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1957, p. 174Google Scholar. See also Organski, A. F. K., World Politics, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1958, p. 426Google Scholar.
3 Snyder, Richard C. and Fumiss, Edgar S. Jr, American Foreign Policy, New York, Rinehart & Company, Inc., 1954, p. 793Google Scholar.
4 Department of State Bulletin (hereafter cited as DSB), 10 8, 1944 (Vol. II), p. 366Google Scholar.
5 Ibid., October 22, 1944 (Vol. II), p. 448–449.
6 An article by Dorothy Fosdick, then assistant in the Division of International Organization Affairs, is particularly pointed in this matter: ‘With the collapse of the common foe we will be thrown back again on the more enduring and less dramatic ties of friendship and trust. If we are not prepared to do everything we can to cultivate these ties, we will run the risk of the major Allies’ going in different directions. ‘Such a development would be truly disastrous. The Organization proposed at Dumbarton Oaks can be successful only if the principal powers fully and wholeheartedly cooperate to make it effective. If the major powers develop fundamentally divergent policies and if they persist in pursuing these policies at the expense of the cooperative effort to preserve international peace and security, no arrangements can finally preserve the peace whether they are bilateral, regional, or universal.’ Ibid., February 25, 1945 (Vol. 12), p. 297.
7 Ibid., December 17, 1944 (Vol. 11), p. 747.
8 Ibid., March 18, 1945 (Vol. II), p. 433. For other Grew statements see ibid. (Vol. 12), January 21, 1945, p. 90; February 18, 1945, p. 223–224; April 29, 1945, P. 835. Similar caution may be noted in remarks of other high level officials, e.g., ibid. (Vol. 12), December 10, 1944, p. 706; December 17, 1944, p. 751; February 11, 1945, p. 181; March 25, 1945, p. 505.
9 A handy compendium of official statements regarding the UN is found in the document, Principal Statemenu Regarding the UN by President! and Secretaries of State of the United States, 1942–1949, Research Project No. 161, June 1950, Division of Historical Policy Research, Office of Public Affairs, Department of State, unclassified. A number of the statements excerpted do give the impression of overselling. Almost invariably, however, when the excerpts are checked with the full context, the impression is substantially modified in the direction of caution and realism.
10 Stettinius, Edward R. Jr,. DSB, 10 8, 1944 (Vol. 11), p. 374Google Scholar.
11 Ibid., November 19, 1944 (Vol. 11), p. 566, 568; For other statements see ibid, (Vol. 11), p. 592–595; November 26, 1944, p. 631–635; December 10, 1944, p. 707—710; (Vol. 12), January 28, 1945, p. 115–119, 136–141; February 18, 1945, p. 253–255; April 8, 1945, p. 605–607, 650–656; and (Vol. 13), August 19, 1945, p. 263–269. One outstanding exception, in the person of Assistant Secretary Archibald MacLeish, might fairly be charged with overselling the product. During the course of a March 3, 1945, broadcast panel discussion involving MacLeish, Alger Hiss, and Joseph C. Grew, MacLeish repeatedly summarized the comments of others in terms more roseate (and imprecise) than they were originally presented. He insisted that the new organization was being given ‘teeth,’ that we were ‘not merely policing the old world’ but ‘creating a new world,’ and that war could be eliminated ‘if we root out its economic, social, and psychological causes, and set up a world organization to solve disputes peacefully and nip aggression in the bud.’ Fortunately, Under-Secretary Grew provided the note of caution—ibid., March 4, 1945 (Vol. 12), p. 354–361. By August 1945, however, MacLeish had grown considerably less sanguine in his public appraisal of the organization: see ibid., August 5, 1945 (Vol. 13), p. 181–188.
12 Ibid., August 27, 1944 (Vol. II), p. 198–199.
13 Ibid., March 4, 1945 (Vol. 12), p. 324–326. What appeared to be overselling becomes in context a hopeful but restrained affirmation of support. Consider also the May 28 conference progress report of Secretary Stettinius over a nationwide broadcasting network. He described the organization then taking shape as ‘strong in the power to prevent aggression and to develop the economic and social conditions which will reduce the causes of war.’ But he subsequently pointed out that aggression by any of the great powers would mean a third world war and the end of the organization. While he believed the final Charter would ‘offer great hope of lasting peace,’ he expressed frank uncertainty as to whether it would in fact work. This depended on the nations’ will to peace and their support of the Charter. ‘We can do no more at San Francisco,’ he concluded, ‘than to establish the constitutional basis upon which the world can live without war—if it will.’ Ibid., June 3, 1945 (Vol. 12), p. 1007–1013.
14 The four outlines are reproduced in ibid., April I, 1945 (Vol. 12), p. 555–573.
15 At this point the reader is asked to speculate 1) whether the Security Council could enforce its decisions in cases where small nations might be involved, 2) whether the Security Council would be able to prevent a major power from going to war (the obvious answer being ‘no’), and 3) whether cooperation in an international organization and the force of world opinion would help to preserve peace among the major powers. An enlightening commentary on the second of these three speculative propositions is the statement of Stettinius before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations: ‘The question is asked: What would happen if one of the five permanent members used the unanimity rule to veto enforcement action against itself? The answer is plain. If one of these nations ever embarked upon a course of aggression, a major war would result, no matter what the membership and voting provisions of the Security Council might be.’ Hearings on The Charter of the United Nations, 79th Cong., 1st sess., July 9–14, 1945, p. 215.
16 The outline dealing with ‘Prosperity—How Can We Promote It?” even includes in an introductory section the clear caveat: ‘The plans made thus far do not purport to provide complete answers to all the perplexing international economic questions.’ DSB, April 1, 1945 (Vol. 12), p. 562.
17 Ibid., April 29, 1945 (Vol. 12), p. 793.
18 Ibid., July 15, 1945 (Vol. 13), p. 77.
19 ‘The General Assembly,’ Foreign Affairs, 10 1945 (Vol. 24), p. 2Google Scholar.
20 ‘Already,’ he wrote, ‘the United States Delegation saw that it was unlikely that the United Nations could be a means of ‘enforcing peace’ by using the military and economic might of the great powers to impose policies upon which they agreed. We saw that the only kind of power that could be counted on at this stage of world development was moral power and the power of world opinion.’ War or Peace?, New York, Macmillan Company, 1950, p. 38Google Scholar.
21 DSB, 02 27, 1949 (Vol. 20), p. 243–244.Google Scholar Dr. Jessup recalled, ‘When the Charter of the United Nations was signed at San Francisco on June 26, 1945, the general comment of the delegates from the 51 countries who took part in this great task of drafting a constitution for a world organization, was a realistic comment. What was being said then was that we must not set our hopes too high … They did not expect the United Nations to accomplish miracles and they knew that only a miracle could eliminate war overnight. The general comment in the United States was along the same lines.’
22 Vandenberg, Arthur H. Jr,. ed., The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg, Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1952, p. 218–219, 235–236Google Scholar.
23 DSB, 07 1. 1945 (Vol. 13). p. 3Google Scholar
24 Reproduced in the U. S. Senate, Subcommittee of Committee on Foreign Relations. Review of the United Nations Charter, A Collection of Documents, Sen. Doc. No. 87, 83rd Cong., 2nd sess., p. 68.
25 Cong. Rec, 1st Cong., 1st sess., p. 7953, 6981.
26 DSB, 01 30, 1949 (Vol. 20), p. 147Google Scholar.
27 War or Peace?, p. 38; DSB, 03 16, 1953 (Vol. 28), p. 402–403Google Scholar.
28 From an editorial by Clark Eichelberger, M.in the Association's monthly publication, Changing Times, 03 1945, p. 2Google Scholar.
29 Ibid., September 1944, p. 5.
30 Ibid., March 1945, p. 5, reproduced from a speech by Raymond B. Fosdick, former Under-Secretary-General of the League of Nations, delivered at New York dinner of the AAUN, February 1, 1945.
31 Ibid., April 1945, p. 2.
32 Ibid., June 1945, p. 2. The reader may query whether other statements published in the name of the AAUN were more glowing and less cautious in their appraisal. The answer is in the affirmative; but never was the proposed organization treated as an ‘automatic peace producer.’ The important point is that AAUN spokesmen ordinarily attempted to make their audience aware that the UN could be vulnerable to the same debilitating influences that beset the League.
33 Time, November 27, 1944, p. 21; Christian Century, May 2, 1945, p. 540. The conference, attended by 118 Roman Catholic bishops and archbishops, made numerous suggestions for change in the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals.
34 Time, January 29, 1945, p. 22. See also The Christian Leader, February 17, 1943, p. 77; and Information Service, Dept. of Research and Education, Federal Council of Churches, June 23, 1945 (Vol. 24), p. 4. A formal statement approved by the Federal Council for issuance upon the conclusion of the San Francisco Conference is in the same vein. The statement, a strong affirmation of support for the Charter, concludes, with the assertion:‘The road to a better order is long. The journey is arduous. Only God can assure its achievement. As we move forward we humbly seek his help.’ The New York Times, June 27, 1945, p. 14.
35 Hearings, The Charter of the United Nations, op. cit., p. 563–564.
36 This estimate of the church leaders’ attitude is supported by contemporary opinion. Time, referring to the vigorous support of world organization by Jewish, Catholic, and Protestant groups, noted approvingly the ‘unaccustomed realism’ with which they had been studying the problems of peace. Their views, according to Time, were epitomized in the words of John Foster Dulles, a leading spokesman for the Protestant Crusaders: ‘This time it is of the utmost importance that we be realistic. We must see the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals for what they are—a good start … San Francisco must be looked to not as a stopping point but as a starting point.’ Time, April 9, 1945, p. 56. The editors of Christian Century, in reference to the activities of the churches as well as other groups, noted existing ‘general agreement’ that those who had been working the hardest to create support for world organizations had also been the most insistent upon the need for changes in the proposed league. ‘Hopes for San Francisco,’ April 18, 1945, p. 485.
37 American Federationist, November 1944, p. 16; April 1945, p. 8.
38 See ibid., November 1944, p. 16; March 1945, p. 22; April 1945, p. 8, 22; May 1945, p. 23; June 1945, p. 6–7; and esp., July 1945, p. 3–4.
39 E.g., ‘If this United Nations program is demanded by our people, demanded of our elected representatives in Congress, demanded of the President and his Cabinet, we shall have the peace we want.’ (New York, Duell, Sloan and Pearce, Inc., 1945, p. 12.)Google Scholar
40 A few citations from the Senate committee hearings, op. cit., may illustrate the point. Anna Lord Strauss presented an official statement adopted by the League of Women Voters, which read in part: ‘ … is the present organization strong enough to prevent wars? Obviously no machinery alone can prevent war. The proposed machinery is adequate to achieve conditions conducive to peace and to settle disputes peacefully if the nations, large or small, stand together and make use of it, supported by strong public opinion’ (p. 425). Ray Krimm, Executive Director of the United Nations Council at Philadelphia: ‘… unless you do have unanimity among the five big powers you are not going to have world peace anyhow’ (p. 432–433). Helen Dwight Reid, American Association of University Women: ‘Its future usefulness depends on the quality of our participation’ (p. 446). William Green of the American Federation of Labor, while strongly supporting the Charter, recognized certain ‘imperfections’ and declared that its success depended ‘upon the supporting spirit of the people throughout the world‘ (p. 578). Edward O'Neal, President of the American Farm Bureau Federation, likewise gave a firm endorsement despite acknowledged ‘imperfections’ in the Charter (p. 591–592). Norman Thomas, Socialist, favored ratification ‘not because I believe it an adequate basis for lasting peace, but because I believe that the United States will be in a better position to lead in the establishment of such a basis …’ (p. 584).
41 April 20, 1945, p. 55. Significantly, editions of Newsweek published in April, May, and June were replete with stories of rifts among the great powers. Its July 2, 1943, number, issued after the Charter was completed, again emphasized that big-three unity was the key to peace (p. 50).
42 Life, April 30, 1945, p. 28. Cf. Time, April 30, 1945, p. 26–27. A post-San Francisco note of congratulation concluded with the observation, ‘And so the United Nations Organization, which may or may not keep the peace, will at least be a free forum.’ Life, July 9, 1945, p. 24.
43 E.g., April 13, 1945, p. 11–12.
44 September 4, 1944, p. 264.
45 See, e.g., October 23, 1944, p. 511; March 12, 1945. P. 35O–551: April 30, 1945, p. 603–622.
46 June 30, 1945, p. 709. One aspect of the Nation's evaluation is particularly significant for the thesis of this study: ‘Certainly,’ the editors said, ‘the new world organization will not be hampered in its operations by the shining illusions that bedevilled the League of Nations from the beginning. Rather the danger is that it will be impeded by cynicism and political differences’ (ibid.). Editors of the Nation, apparently, were not convinced that the Charter had been oversold.
47 ‘United States News, conducting its own private survey of editorial opinion, offered this conclusion: ‘The United Nations Charter drafted at San Francisco, the opinion of commenting editors, is an improvement over both the League of Nations Covenant and the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals. It is generally conceded, however, that its effectiveness in keeping peace depends on continued cooperation among the big powers toward the goals it sets forth.’ July 6, 1945, p. 38.
48 These excerpts and others from press comment on the United Nations Charter are collected in Senate Hearings on The Charter of the United Nations, op. cit., p. 656–663. Another valuable but less generally available collection of press comment is found in the San Francisco Chronicle Conference Digest, a type written page of current news excerpts reproduced in four languages and circulated five days a week to conference delegates. The Digest includes expressions from foreign as well as domestic organs. The tenor and range of American press opinion are much the same as represented in the Senate collection. A few, like the St. Louis Globe—Democrat, thought the Charter was likely to be ‘a historic innovation by no means perfect but far more potent and reliable than was the League of Nations or any other covenant designed to perpetuate peace.’ At the other extreme the Chicago Tribune used terms like ‘Punch and Judy show’ and ‘a satirical document’ to describe the conference and the emerging Charter—Conference Digest, June 18, 1945 (Vol. 1, No. 38). between.
40 Said the Tribune: ‘The San Francisco Charter, although a fraud, is probably for the most part an innocuous one … Americans after reading the Charter inevitably ask themselves whether it will prevent wars. That is what it is supposed to do, but it won't … If we have peace for a time, it will not be because of the operation of the clumsy and self-defeating international mechanism outlined in the Charter but rather because none of the great nations chooses to start a war.’ Ibid., p. 662.
50 New York, Meridian Books, 1957, p. 83.
52 Reproduced in Scott, William A. and Withey, Stephen B., The United Nations: the Public View, 1945–1955, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, New York, Manhattan Publishing Co., 1958, p. 56, 273Google Scholar.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
55 DSB, 02 27, 1949 (Vol. 20), p. 243–244Google Scholar.
