Hostname: page-component-84b7d79bbc-g5fl4 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-31T09:45:36.230Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

The Soviet View of the United Nations

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 May 2009

Alexander Dallin
Get access

Extract

The United Nations has patendy not fulfilled the high hopes which some of its sponsors had for it. A major share of responsibility for this failure has commonly been assigned to the Soviet Union, and not widiout reason. Yet the Soviet view and Soviet conduct have not been products of perversity or malice. They follow logically, first, from the world view held by the communist leadership, which sees the United Nations as another arena in the struggle between the two “world systems” of our age, and, second, from the Soviet experience as a minority power seeking to frustrate the efforts of the hostile majority “in control” of the UN.

Type
Articles
Information
International Organization , Volume 16 , Issue 1 , Winter 1962 , pp. 20 - 36
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 1962

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 For instance, Morozov, Grigorii, Organizatsiia Ob'edinennykh Natsii (Moscow, 1960), p. 9ff.Google Scholar; New Times (Moscow, 1961), no. 3, p. 3Google Scholar; Kraminov, D., “Ubeditel'nyi pereves sil mira,” Kommunist (Moscow, 1960), no. 18, p. 87Google Scholar.

2 Editorial, “Za mir, za razoruzhenie, za svobodu narodov,” Kommunist, 1960, no. 14, p. 5Google Scholar.

3 de Groot, Paul wrote in the MoscowKommunist (1957, no. 2, p. 63)Google Scholar: “For a state over which America rules at present, neutrality guaranteed by both world camps would constitute a step forward, toward national independence. For a socialist state neutrality constitutes a step backward, toward the subjugation to American imperialism and its sphere of influence.” Similarly Hungarian Foreign MinisterHorvath, Imre declared (06 2, 1957)Google Scholar: “We approve of the neutrality of certain capitalist countries since it signifies that they do not join the imperialist military blocs … [But] neutrality for a socialist country represents an underhanded attack on peace and socialism and their betrayal.” For a systematic exposition of the Soviet view, see Korovin, E. A., “Neitralitet v. proshlom i nastoiashchem,” in his Osnovnye problemy sovremennykh mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii (Moscow, 1959)Google Scholar, and Ganiushkin, Boris, Sovremennyi neitralitet (Moscow, 1958)Google Scholar. See also Ginsburgs, George, “Neutrality and Neutralism and the Tactics of Soviet Diplomacy,” American Slavic and East European Review (New York, 12 1960)Google Scholar.

4 Inozemtsev, N., “Razvitie mirovogo sotsializma i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia,” Kommunist, 1961, no. 9, p. 101Google Scholar.

5 The first time the UN plan was raised by President Roosevelt (Bohlen Minutes of November 29, 1943; meeting at Tehran), Stalin's, immediate question was “whether this body would have the right to make decisions binding the nations of the world.” (Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran 1943, Washington, D. C., 1961, p. 570.)Google Scholar On the containment of conflicts within the communist orbit, see Modelski, George, The Communist International System (Princeton University: Center of International Studies, 1960), p. 66–68Google Scholar.

6 In the course of defending the Khrushchev record against what may be assumed to be charges of naiveté and failure at the UN, A. I. Adzhubei made a revealing comment about Soviet performance at the 1960 session: Soviet behavior there, far from amounting to collaboration with the class enemy (as some comrades alleged), furthered the class struggle, for the Soviet delegation “organized obstructions when mendacious, provocative speeches were made from the UN rostrum,” in order to show up “the attitude of the gentlemen who engage in the deceit of the peoples.” Soviet fistbanging and shoe-wavíng, Adzhubei continued, were intended to “curb the pharisees and liars.” These are no junkets, he argued: “Comrades, behind personal contacts and visits, there is hard work, work until you are covered with sweat, often not leaving you time for sleep or rest, work which demands constant concentration and resourcefulness, and the ability to use all the forces of argument.” (Speech of October 26, 1961.)

7 Airapetian, M. and Kabanov, P., Leninskie printsipy vneshnei politiki sovetskpgo gosudarstva (Moscow, 1957), p. 65Google Scholar. See also Khrushchev's, interview with the editor of the Tokyo Asahi Shimbun on 06 18, 1957Google Scholar.

8 See, e.g., Bloomfield, Lincoln P., The United Nations and U.S. Foreign Policy (Boston: Little, Brown, 1960), p. 5Google Scholar.

9 The latter reference is to the Clark and Sohn proposals. (Morozov, p. 145.)

10 This has permitted Moscow to assume a pose of unselfishness: “In reaffirming its proposals for reorganization of the United Nations structure, the Soviet government is primarily concerned for the interests of independent Asian, African and Latin American countries. The Soviet Union is, of course, in a position to defend itself against any aggression, but what would be the fate of weak ex-colonial nations if the imperialists, having tried out their strength in the Congo, launch an all-out offensive against the Afro-Asian movement for national liberation?” (Editorial, New Times, 1961, no. 10, p. 2.)Google Scholar

11 See Welch, William, “Soviet Commitments to Collective Action,” in Wolfers, Arnold, ed., Alliance Policy in the Cold War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1959), p. 294—300Google Scholar.

12 In New York Khrushchev commented that “the question of Germany is outside the limits of the United Nations.” (Pravda, October 11, 1960.) Indeed, during the tensest phase of the Berlin crisis in the summer of 1961, the Soviet Union made no move to involve the UN in its “resolution.” To Senator Hubert Humphrey Khrushchev intimated that “the United States should be discussing questions of outer space directly with the Soviet Union instead of raising them in the UN. ‘So now,’ Khrushchev said, ‘the United States discusses outer space with Guatemala—but Guatemala does not seem to be too advanced in outer-space science.’” (Humphrey, Hubert H., “My Marathon Talk with Russia's Boss,” Life, 01 12, 1959.)Google Scholar

13 Kuusinen, Otto et al. , Fundamentals of Marxism Leninism (Moscow, 1960)Google Scholar.

14 Editorial, ”‘Reshit’ problemu reorganizatsii OON,” Kommunist, 1961, no. 4, p. 14Google Scholar.

15 Armstrong, Hamilton Fish, “UN on Trial,” Foreign Affairs, 04 1961 (Vol. 39, No. 3), p. 388CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

16 See, for instance, Kennan, George F., Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin (Boston: Little, Brown, 1961)Google Scholar, and Roberts, Henry L., Russia and America (New York: Harper, 1956)Google Scholar.

17 Nicholas, Herbert G., The United Nations as a Political Institution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 145Google Scholar.

18 Bourquin, Maurice, L'état souverain et l'organisation Internationale (New York: Manhattan, 1959). P. 17Google Scholar.

19 Eden, Anthony, Full Circle (London: Deutsch, 1960), p. 7Google Scholar.

20 Not long ago a leading Soviet scholar wrote plainly: “It is entirely self-evident that the inclusion of this or that country within one of the types characteristic for the period of the disintegration of the colonial system is not immutable and given for all time.” (Guber, A. A., cited in Kulski, Wladyslaw W., Peaceful Coexistence, Chicago, Regnery, 1959, p. 209Google Scholar.)

21 Bol'shaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia, 2d ed. (Moscow, 1952), XV, p. 475–76Google Scholar.

22 Adlai Stevenson, address at the Princeton Club, Washington, D. C, May 17, 1961.

23 Editorial, Kommunist, 1961, no. 4, p. 15Google Scholar. Italics mine.

24 The New York Times, October 8, 1960.

25 Morozov, p. 12.

26 The New York. Times, October 4 and 8, 1960. He added that the socialist states would “not recognize [inimical] decisions and will rely on their own strength to defend the interests of their state”; and “if anyone tries to interfere in our affairs, if you will excuse the rather indelicate phrase, we will just give him a punch in the nose.”

27 Khrushchev, speech of July 11, 1961 (USSR Mission to the UN, Press Release 44/61).

28 See Claude, Inis L., Swords into Plowshares (New York: Random House, 1959), p. 128–29Google Scholar.

29 See Padelford, Norman J., “Politics and Change in the Security Council,” International Organization, Summer 1960 (Vol. 14, No. 3), p. 381—401CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

30 See Aspaturian, Vernon, “The Metamorphosis of the United Nations,” Yale Review, Summer 1957Google Scholar.

31 Hammarskjöld, Dag, “The Development of a Constitutional Framework for International Cooperation,” 04 29, 1960 (UN Press Release SG/910)Google Scholar. See also Schwebel, Stephen M., The Secretary-General of the United Nations (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1952), and Nicholas, Chapter VIIGoogle Scholar.

32 UN Press Release SG/1035 (May 29, 1961).

33 New York. Herald-Tribune, April 17, 1961.

34 Mangone, Gerard J., A Short History of International Organization (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1954). P. 14Google Scholar.

35 Matveev, V. and Mikhailov, M., “Bor'ba za mir, za svobodu narodov i Organizatsiia Ob'edinennykh Natsii,” Kommunist 1960, no. 15, p. 102Google Scholar.

36 “Introduction to the Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization 16 June 1960—15 June 1961,” General Assembly Official Records (16th session), Supplement No. 1A.

37 Claude, p. 15.

38 Kennan, George F., Russia, the Atom and the West (New York: Harper, 1958), p. 27Google Scholar.