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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 May 2009
The arms control and disarmament issues on which there is no agreement are numerous and important. The purpose of this article is not to go over what is by now too familiar ground, but rather to examine the little considered question of the relationship contemplated between the United Nations and agencies that may be created to administer arms control or disarmament arrangements.
1 For official United States descriptions of the differences between Soviet and US positions, see United States Disarmament Administration, Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests: History and Analysis of Negotiations, Dept. of State Publication 7258, Disarmament Series 4, 10 1961Google Scholar; and United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Disarmament: Two Approaches—A Comparison: US and USSR Disarmament Proposals, USACDA Publication 1, General Series i, 11 1961Google Scholar.
2 Except, of course, for early Soviet plans which contemplated no inspection or control agencies.
3 This phrase is taken from paragraph 6 of the McCloy-Zorin agreement (UN Document A/4879). The most recent US proposals refer to “an International Disarmament Organization.” The Soviet proposals speak of “a control organization.”
4 The control functions with respect to international cooperation in peaceful uses of atomic energy are, of course, performed by the International Atomic Energy Agency. An exception to the general rule was the decision taken during the sixteenth General Assembly to give the UN Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space certain functions in this field and to authorize the Secretary-General to maintain a registry of space vehicle launchings.
5 What follows does not purport to be a comprehensive history of postwar discussion of the topics considered. Only selected evidence is given, in order to define the major issues, hopefully without distorting them in the process.
6 General Assembly Resolution 1660 (XVI), November 28, 1961.
7 A/C.1/PV.1218.
8 Ibid.
9 Bechhoefer, Bernhard G., Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control (Brookings: Washington, 1961), p. 567Google Scholar.
10 However, it is interesting to observe that resolution of the sixteenth session urging immediate cessation of nuclear tests was opposed by both the Soviet Union and the United States.
11 Italics added.
12 UN Document A/4772, June 3, 1961.
13 “USA: Working Paper Setting Forth Proposals for Progressive and Continuing Disclosure and Verification of Armed Forces and Armaments,” April 5, 1952, UN Document DC/C.2/1, reproduced in US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Disarmament and Security: A Collection of Documents: 1919–1955, p. 322Google Scholar.
14 US Senate, Disarmament and Security, op. cit., p. 192–193Google Scholar.
15 On this point, see Bechhoefer, , op. cit., p. 56 ff.Google Scholar
16 US Senate, Disarmament and Security, op. cit., p. 204Google Scholar.
17 Ibid., p. 281.
18 Para. 1(b), McCloy-Zorin agreement.
19 Department of State Bulletin, 03 7, 1960 (Vol. 42, No. 1080), p. 354Google ScholarPubMed.
20 See, for example, “The Development of a Constitutional Framework for International Cooperation,” an address at the dedication ceremony for the new buildings of the University of Chicago Law School, May 1, 1960, UN Press Release SG/910, April 29, 1960; the Secretary-General's Press Conference of April 8, 1960, UN Note to Correspondents No. 2148; and the Secretary-General's Press Conference of May 5, 1960, UN Note to Correspondents No. 2166.
21 E.g., Statement of Foreign Minister Yi, Ch'en, The New York Times, 01 22, 1960Google Scholar.
22 Bloomfield, L. P., The Politics of Arms Control: Troika, Veto and International Institutions, Institute for Defense Analysis: Special Study Group, Study Memorandum Number 3, Washington, D. C., 10 6, 1961, p. 18Google Scholar.
23 Bloomfield, , op. cit., p. 12–13Google Scholar.
24 On this point, see Bowie, Robert R., “Basic Requirements of Arms Control,” in Brennan, Donald G., ed., Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security (New York: Braziller, 1961), p. 43 ff.Google Scholar
25 Iklé, Fred Charles, “After Detection—What?” Foreign Affairs, 01 1961 (Vol. 39, No. 2), p. 214–216CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
26 Iklé's thoughtful article cites other reasons why governments may be reluctant to make effective responses to violations.
27 The question whether international judicial organs can usefully be employed to determine whether violations of arms control agreements have taken place is an interesting and intricate one. Another possible role might be to interpret the basic agreements.
28 Conference of Experts for the Study of Possible Measures Which Might be Helpful in Preventing Surprise Attack and for the Preparation of a Report Thereon for Governments Report. UN Document A/4678, January 5, 1959, Annex II, p. 49.
