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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 May 2009
Unlike the other countries in what we tend to call “the Soviet bloc,” the Soviet Union benefited financially from the oil crises of the 1970s, for it was a major petroleum and natural gas exporter. The oil crises also benefited the Soviet Union indirectly as a number of radical Third World oil producers acquired money to buy more Soviet arms. Moreover, the windfall increase in petroleum prices was supplemented by a similar windfall increase in the price of the other major Soviet export product, gold. The subsidies that the Soviet Union provided to Eastern Europe did not entail any sacrifice of resources that had been previously committed but required only that it forgo even greater gains. The politics underlying the Soviet decisions were the politics underlying the rapid expansion of export earnings.
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