¹ This article will draw almost exclusively on the experience of the European Communities in specifying the limits of current research efforts and in discussing the kinds of problems that remain to be tackled. Nevertheless, the underlying argument for research on die consequences of integration should be relevant to other regions.

² See, for example, one of the standard works: Balassa, Bela, The Theory of Economic Integration (Homewood, 111: Richard D. Irwin, 1961), chapter 1Google Scholar.

³ This was probably first explored by Scitovsky, Tibor, Economic Theory and Western European Integration (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1958)Google Scholar.

⁴ An obvious exception is Krause's, Lawrence B. excellent empirical study, European Economic Integration and the United States (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1968)Google Scholar. Krause's book is certainly a big step in the direction favored in this article and will be discussed below. Ingo Walter has also collected a good deal of data in The European Common Market: Growth and Patterns of Trade (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967)Google Scholar.

⁵ The recent outbreak of hostilities between two members of the relatively stable Central American Common Market (CACM) is a case in point—particularly since the conflict seems to have been due at least in part to the absence of regional policies on the free movement of labor.

⁶ Again, my reference is primarily to political scientists who have been doing empirical studies of integration.

⁷ The argument here is admittedly simplified with a great many other contributory factors excluded. For a more systematic consideration which places the communities within the general postwar context in Europe see Lindberg, Leon N. and Scheingold, Stuart A., Europe's Would-Be Polity: Patterns of Change in the European Community (Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice-Hall, 1970), chapter 1Google Scholar. See also Stanley Hoffmann's analysis, “Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe,” reprinted in Joseph S. Nye, Jr. (ed.), International Regionalism: Readings(Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1968), in particular, pp. 185–198.

⁸ It is interesting to note that where other parties were in power and/or the effects of the war did not seem so crushing, the integration option was not so appealing—in particular, in die United Kingdom and Scandinavia.

⁹ Haas, Ernst B., “Technocracy, Pluralism and the New Europe,” in Graubard, Stephen R. (cd.), A New Europe? (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1964), p. 68Google Scholar.

¹⁰ See Maddison, Angus, Economic Growth in the West: Comparative Experience in Europe and North America (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1964), p. 37Google Scholar.

¹¹ Scitovsky, pp. 31–32.

¹² Ibid., pp. 27ff.

¹³ See Balassa, chapters 5–8.

¹⁴ One of the most persistent skeptics has been Lamfalussy, Alexandre. See his The United Kingdom and the Six (London: Macmillan & Co., 1963)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁵ For a rejoinder see Mayne, Richard, “Economic Integration in the New Europe,” in Graubard, , pp. 174–199Google Scholar.

¹⁸ Krause, p. 73.

¹⁷ Ibid., see particularly pp. 35—45. The book ranges well beyond a consideration of these income effects for the member states. Indeed, the basic concern is, as the tide suggests, with the impact on the United States. Incidentally, the above conclusions on income are based on manufactured products. Agriculture is treated separately since it has been subjected to a program which has tended to promote selfsufficiency rather than the most efficient allocation of resources. See chapter 3.

¹⁸ Krause, p. 44.

¹⁹ This rough estimate would presumably have to be adjusted for the exclusion of agricultural products from Krause's calculation of annual income increments attributable to integration, but this adjustment would not seem likely to change the total picture appreciably.

²⁰ Krause, p. 44.

²¹ Servan-Schreiber, J. J., The American Challenge, trans, by Steel, Ronald (New York: Atheneum, 1968)Google Scholar.

²² Ibid., p. 3.

²³ Krause, p. 146.

²⁴ Ibid., pp. 144–145. See also Layton, Christopher, Trans-Atlantic Investment (The Atlantic Papers) (Boulogne-sur-Seine: Atlantic Institute, 1966)Google Scholar.

²⁵ David Mitrany, “The Prospect of Integration: Federal or Functional?” as reprinted in Nye, pp. 43–74.

²⁶ “The more fields of activity it actively enters, e.g., agriculture, the more acquisitive it tends to become; and in the degree to which it is rounded out it also hardens into a segregated entity.” Mitrany, in Nye, p. 69. Of course, Mitrany's concern is not with the EFTA/EEC split, per se, which he sees as symptomatic of the federalist approach to integration. The confusion of terminology among students of integration is suggested by this characterization of the community. Servan-Schreiber, of course, stigmatizes the community for its failure to adopt a federalist approach. One way out of this confusion is to distinguish between the neo-functional approach of the European Communities and Mitrany's functional ideas—both separable from federal schemes. For details see Lindberg and Scheingold. chapter 1. Chapter 7 of the same study analyzes the problem of British entry.

²⁷ Krause, concludes, somewhat surprisingly, that “the loss inflicted on the EEC by EFTA is almost twice as great as the reverse loss.” Krause, , p. 72Google Scholar.

²⁸ Aron, Raymond, Peace and War (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), pp. 462–463Google Scholar.

²⁹ On the basis of a very unsystematic sampling it is reasonable to conclude that the policymakers share this view. See, for example, Acheson, Dean, “Europe: Decision or Drift,” Foreign Affairs, 01 1966 (Vol. 44, No. 2), pp. 198–205CrossRefGoogle Scholar, or an earlier piece in the same journal: Brentano, Heinrich von, “Goals and Means of the Western Alliance,” Foreign Affairs, 04 1961 (Vol. 39, No. 3), pp. 416–429CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³⁰ New York Times, March 7, 1970, p. 3.

³¹ Hoffmann, Stanley, Gulliver's Troubles, or the Setting of American Foreign Policy (Atlantic Policy Studies) (New York1: McGraw-Hill, 1968), chapter 11Google Scholar.

³² Haas, in Graubard, p. 78.

³³ See Lindberg and Scheingold, chapter 2; also Ronald Inglehart in this volume.

³⁴ Donald Puchala in this volume, p. 744.

³⁵ Ibid., Table 2, part 3, p. 746.

³⁶ Weissberg, Robert, “Nationalism, Integration, and French and German Elites,” in International Organization, Spring 1969 (Vol. 23, No. 2), p. 347CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The data considered by Weissberg is that collected by Karl Deutsch, and others. See Deutsch, Karl, and others, France, Germany and the Western Alliance: A Study of Elite Attitudes on European Integration and World Politics (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967)Google Scholar.

³⁷ Given the rather small number in the sample and the uneven distribution, the German and French figures have been combined. Consideration of each country individually would not, however, alter the above conclusion.

³⁸ Agenor, 10 1969 (No. 12), p. 34Google Scholar.

³⁹ Ernst B. Haas in this volume, p. 641.

⁴⁰ Etzioni, Amitai, The Active Society: A Theory of Societal and Political Processes (New York: Free Press, 1968)Google Scholar. Regional integration is, it should be pointed out, at most tangential to the concerns of this elaborate and imposing tome.

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 6 The precise role of regional communities is that of “a ‘middle’ tier in an evolving worldcommunity consensus-formation structure.” Not all regional schemes are suitable, but integrative projects along the lines of the European Communities have significant potential. They serve “central” rather than “marginal” societal functions; they are not directed at “countervailing” other regional bodies as are the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact; and finally they are “welfare” communities rather than defensive trading blocs like die European Free Trade Association. See p. 596.

⁴² Ibid. p. 514.

⁴³ Shonfield, Andrew, Modern Capitalism: The Changing Balance of Public and Private Power (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 408Google Scholar. For a discussion of the participatory implications of technocracy within the European community see Lindberg and Scheingold, pp. 266–269.

⁴⁴ Zaring, J. L., Decision for Europe: The Necessity of Britain's Engagement (Baltimore, Md: Johns Hopkins Press, 1969), p. 70Google Scholar. Zaring's discussion extends well beyond the parliament and devotes considerable attention to the problem of representation. For a consideration of the community's rather limited and uneven contribution to mobilization see Lindberg and Scheingold, pp. 75–80.

⁴⁵ Lindberg and Scheingold, p. 273.

⁴⁶ Gorz, André, Strategy for Labor: A Radical Proposal (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967), p. 162Google Scholar.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 149. These coalitions are not, it should be pointed out, perceived to be the normal and necessary consequence of integration, per se, but rather part of a scenario which stems directly from Gorz's mistrust of the communities' essentially market approach to integration. Thus the coalitions will form in periods of recession, brought on by the overproduction which Gorz does perceive as a necessary consequence of integration. As such recessions become the salient political issue, the above groups would tend to crystallize around distinctive solutions: The Adantic coalition would choose an Atlantic free-trade response; the Nationalist coalition would opt for dismanding the European Communities; and the European coalition would put their faith in planning, intervention, and stabilization at the supranational level.

⁴⁸ Frey-Wouters, Ellen, “The Progress of European Integration,” World Politics, 04 1965 (Vol. 17, No. 3), pp. 472–476CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴⁹ See, for example, Mazrui, Ali A., “The Common Market and Non-Member Countries: African Attitudes to the European Economic Community,” in Krause, Lawrence B. (ed.), The Common Market: Progress and Controversy (Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice-Hall, 1964)Google Scholar, and Dell, Sidney, Trade Blocs and Common Markets (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963), pp. 186–193Google Scholar.

⁵⁰ Frey-Wouters, , World Politics, Vol. 17, No. 3, p. 476Google Scholar.

⁵¹ Without research we can only speculate about the costing process. It seems safe to say, however, that it is a good deal more complex now than it was when Europe lay in ruins at the close of World War II and when there were fundamental doubts about the economic potential and political viability of the European state system. Bargains which have to take into account the kinds of expectations voiced in the new politics will surely be more intricate and perhaps more delicately balanced than those of the 1950's in which peace and affluence were the controlling values.

⁵² In addition to Krause, see on this point Bernard Heidelberger, “La ventilation dés depenses communautaire,” unpublished manuscript.

⁵³ Gorz, pp. 144–153.

⁵⁴ That portion of Leon Lindberg's article in this volume which is concerned with outputs and feedback opens the same kinds of opportunities.

⁵⁵ Joseph S. Nye in this volume.

⁵⁶ Haas in this volume, p. 641.