^{page no 960 note 1} Hoffmann, Stanley, “The European Process at Atlantic Crosspurposes,” Journal of Common Market Studies, February 1965 (Vol. 3, No. 2), pp. 85-101Google Scholar; Nye, Joseph S. Jr., “Patterns and Catalysts in Regional Integration,” in Nye, Joseph S. Jr. (ed.), International Regionalism (Boston: Little, Brown, 1968), pp. 347–349Google Scholar; Kaiser, Karl, “The Interaction of Regional Subsystems: Some Preliminary Notes on Recurrent Patterns and the Role of Superpowers,” World Politics, October 1968 (Vol. 21, No. 1), pp. 84-107CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Ernst B. Haas, lecture, Western European seminar, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., December 8, 1967.

^{page no 960 note 2} EFTA communiques state, for instance, that the EFTA Council met “with the Finnish Foreign Minister participating in a personal capacity.”

Finland participated in the current negotiations, but for the purposes of this article it will be ignored. There are four reasons for this, the first being the most important. 1) I am interested in the configuration Denmark-Norway-Sweden and believe that their relations and the foreign policy difficulties they encounter (detailed in this note) would be the same without Finland. 2) Obviously the factor of a permissive attitude by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is crucial for Finland. Soviet and Finnish Communist newspapers have attacked the Nordic plan as a hidden conduit to the European Economic Community (EEC). See Hoist, Johan J., “A Norwegian Look into the Early ‘Seventies,” International Journal (Toronto), Spring 1969 (Vol. 24, No. 2), pp. 356–366Google Scholar. The Finns have previously managed to negotiate permission for FINEFTA in exchange for most-favored-nation treatment to the Soviet Union, which in effect eliminated Finnish tariffs for the Soviets also. They have been hoping to present the Nordic plan in the same light to the Soviet Union. Finnish leaders have treated the matter as if the Soviet Union’s motive were to insure the retention of its share of Finnish trade and have been openly reassuring about this. (Arbeiderbladet [Oslo], February 12, 1969, for example.) 3) If they can negotiate successfully with the Soviet Union, I am assuming that they view a strong Scandinavian link as some kind of counterweight to that special relationship eastward and that mat fact will outweigh almost any short-term economic difficulties. 4) The other countries will do all they can to help Finland ease these difficulties, for the same reason.

^{page no 961 note 3} Nils Montan, “Nordic Cooperation in the Field of International Trade Policy,” Nordisfc udrednings-serie, 1968 (No. 9), pp. 44. (Montan, a Swede, was the chief negotiator for the four countries in the Kennedy Round.) Also interviews, Direktjør Knut Getz-Wold, Norges Bank, Oslo, June 21, 1967; Minister of Trade (at that time) Tyge Dahlgaard, Copenhagen, May 22, 1967.

^{page no 961 note 4} Barclay, G. St. J., “Background to EFTA: An Episode in Anglo-Scandinavian Relations,” The Australian Journal of Politics and History, August 1965 (Vol. 11, No. 2), pp. 185–197CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

^{page no 963 note 5} “UD-informasjon” [Oslo], April 24, 1968 (No. 10).

^{page no 963 note 6} The January report is in Nordisk udredningsserie, 1969 (No. 1); the July report will undoubtedly be published in the same series.

A rough sketch of some of those parts of the July report on which there was reported to be agreement: 1) a ten-year treaty to begin in 1971, including a customs union to go into effect in 1972; 2) a special “revision clause” permitting a country to notify the others that it is negotiating with the EEC and permitting withdrawal within a year; 3) an investment fund to which each country contributes one-fourth of the base capital of $200 million, and three (less restrictive) joint funds for agriculture, fishing, and industry, to which the countries contribute in proportion to the ratio of their gross national products, to a total of $440 million (Sweden requires that the funds be limited to five years and that by that time all tariff suspensions be eliminated as a condition of its contribution of 46 percent); 4) the funds and bank are to be governed, as is the organization otherwise, by a unanimity rule in the council of ministers. (Sources: Dagens Nyheter and Svens\a Dagbladet, July 18, 1969, and Dagens Nyheter, July 24, 1969, hereafter cited as DN and SD.)

There Was disagreement on the agricultural arrangements of the Swedish offer and on whether this offer would be tied to the achievement of a complete—without reservations—customs union within five years as Sweden now insisted. Whether the Swedish position, interpreted by the other two as a stiffening, was meant as a warning to the restless Danes who had recently been speaking of the priority of the EEC or was designed to give Sweden room for concessions later is being speculated about. (Per Monsen, Arbeiderbladet [Oslo], July 18, 1969.)

^{page no 964 note 7} In the negotiations for a Nordic free trade area in me 1950’s Sweden was willing to pay 40 percent of the base capital for a Nordic investment bank for joint investments basically according to business criteria. In 1958 it raised the offer to the total base capital ($300 million) by accepting the repayment of postwar loans as the contribution of the others. (Interview, Departementsråd Åke Englund, June 2, 1967, Stockholm.) In me current negotiations Sweden has thus far offered to pay 25 percent of a joint bank ($50 million) plus 46 percent of the three funds (about $290 million) in exchange for a partial external tariff (not covering EFTA countries); since internal tariffs have already been eliminated, there will be no gains from that. (SD, July 18, 1969.)

^{page no 964 note 8} SD, January 16, 1969, December 31, 1968; DN, January 19, 1969. SD has also editorialized (April 24, 1969) mat after the “unfortunate form” of Sweden’s last application to the EEC a Nordic organiza tion could undeniably “mean much for keeping Sweden in the same category as Norway and Denmark.”

CF: SD, October 30, 1954, and October 31, 1954. Also, Statement from The Federation of Industries to the Minister of Trade, February 6, 1958 (6 mimeographed pages), pp. 4-5. In the latter it was argued that the bank suggestion included in the 1957 plan would be used to support uneconomic investments, that the division of costs was “somewhat one-sided,” etc.

^{page no 965 note 9} “UD-informasjon” [Oslo], January 18, 1969, reprinted from the Swedish television statement of January 15, 1969; SD, July 18, 1969; DN (editorial), July 18, 1969.

^{page no 965 note 10} I am excluding a possible “security policy” factor independent of the EEC factor although it is one of the two conditions mentioned in the April communique. A few voices have been raised on this, e.g., Norwegian former Foreign Minister Lange (“Udenrigsministeriets nyhedsoversigt,” Copenhagen, February 24, 1969) while others, even some opposing the pact, deny its relevance to security (e.g., Norwegian industrialists interviewed by Dagbladet [Oslo], January 30, 1969). In this writer’s view the only way in which security policy might be affected is that should a Nordic economic union be established and successful, it might provide a pole of attraction for those neutralist voices always latent in Norway and Denmark and sometimes manifest depending on the degree of tension and the irritations of the international political scene.

^{page no 966 note 11} Geoffrey, Smith, “A Nordic Customs Union Possible,” The Times [London], November 5, 1968, p. 11Google Scholar.

^{page no 967 note 12} See, for example, Thor Storeøs articles in Dagbladet [Oslo], particularly December II, 1967, and December 25, 1967, for the points on purpose and on the future of the EEC. Støre is the head of the Norwegian Liberal Party’s committee on market relations and one of the most persistent advocates of a Nordic economic grouping. On the judgment that the extent of possible cooperation depends on Swe den’s interpretation of neutrality see Knut Frydenlund in Internasjonal Politic, 1968 (No. 1).

^{page no 967 note 13} This is a combination of the arguments of Labor Party chairman Trygve Bratteli and Liberal Party chairman Gunnar Garbo, in Storting melding, February 25, 1969. “Balkanization” is Bratteli’s term. (“UD-informasjon,” February 25, 1969.) It should be noted that in i960 Sweden provided 11 percent of Norway’s imports and took 12 percent of its exports whereas in 1967 the comparable figures in both cases were 17 percent, ahead of both England and the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany).

^{page no 967 note 14} Arne Geijer to Foreningen Norden, late June 1969, cited in “Svensk pressoversikt for utrikesforvaltnongen,” July 1969 (No. 36). Also see Dagens Nyheter’s view that just as all countries will help Finland, so it will be to no one’s advantage to force Sweden to change its security policy, thus irritating the Soviet Union. (DN [editorial], May 5, 1969.) On what Sweden might bring to Europe see Jan Prawitz who notes that Sweden has uranium deposits “about ten times larger than those now within Euratom territory and sufficiendy large to be the basis for a super-power-sized nuclear arsenal.” (Jan Prawitz, “A Nuclear Doctrine for Sweden,” Cooperation and Conflict, 1968 [No. 3], pp. 191-192.)

^{page no 968 note 15} Prime Minister Per Borten (Norway) to Storting melding, May 7, 1969. (“UD-informasjon.”)

^{page no 968 note 16} Precise evidence, apart from the quality of debate at the time, is difficult to obtain. In 1967 both countries had coalition governments. In Norway the government report on membership in 1967 was delicately balanced. It called the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (Rome Treaty) “an economic agreement” which will have “political effects,” said that Norway would not be assuming “political obligations,” but noted that EEC members view their cooperation as having “a political goal.” (Storting melding, 1966—1967 [No. 86], pp. 99-100.) In this writer’s view this reflects not perceptions but considerations of coalition maintenance and audience appeal. The report was characterized by an independent-Conservative paper as “a compromise.” (Ājtenposten [Oslo], June 17, 1967.)

Supporting evidence is to be found in a survey of attitudes of Scandinavian members of parliament in the spring of 1967. See G. Matthew Bonham, “Scandinavian Parliamentarians: Attitudes toward Political Integration,” forthcoming in Cooperation and Conflict.