1. For a sophisticated historical reconstruction of economic and political development, see North, Douglass C., Structure and Change in Economic History (New York: Norton, 1981).Google Scholar

2. In this vein Gourevitch, Peter A. in “The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics,” International Organization 32 (Autumn 1978), pp. 881–911CrossRefGoogle Scholar, links international systems and domestic coalition arguments. Several authors have attempted to combine domestic structure and political coalition theories; see, for example, Katzenstein, Peter J., “Conclusion: Domestic Structures and Strategies of Foreign Economic Policy,” in Katzenstein, . ed., Between Power and Plenty (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978)Google Scholar; Castles, Francis G., ed., The Impact of Parties (Beverly Hills: Sage. 1982)Google Scholar; Zysman, John, Government, Markets, and Growth (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983)Google Scholar; and Hall, Peter A., “Patterns of Economic Policy: An Organizational Approach,” in Bornstein, Stephen, Held, David, and Krieger, Joel, eds., The State in Capitalist Europe (London: Allen & Unwin, 1984).Google Scholar

3. Cf., as a good critique, Greenberg, George D., Miller, Jeffrey A., Mohr, Lawrence R., and Vladeck, Bruce C., “Developing Public Policy Theory: Perspectives from Empirical Research,” American Political Science Review 71 (12 1977), pp. 1532–43CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Studies of economic policy making often do not clearly distinguish output variables such as tax policies and welfare expenditures from policy outcome variables such as employment, inflation, and economic growth. The problem can be seen in Schmidt, Manfred, Wohlfahrtsstaatliche Politik unter bürgerlichen und sozialdemokratischen Regierungen (Frankfurt: Campus, 1982), pp. 121–23.Google Scholar

4. In social theory this issue has been critically analyzed by Giddens, Anthony, Central Problems in Social Theory (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), especially pp. 202–4.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

5. Only a few authors have conceptualized a historically changing structure of public policy making. See, for example, Heisler, Martin O. and Peters, B. Guy, “Comparing Social Policy across Levels of Government, Countries, and Time: Belgium and Sweden since 1870,” in Ashford, Douglas, ed., Comparing Public Policies (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1978)Google Scholar; Flora, Peter and Alber, Jens, “Modernization, Democratization, and the Development of Welfare States in Western Europe,” in Flora, and Heidenheimer, Arnold, eds., The Development of Welfare States in Europe and America (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1981)Google Scholar; and Schmidt, Manfred G., “The Role of Parties in Shaping Macro-Economic Policy,”Google Scholar in Castles, , Impact of Parties.Google Scholar

6. For a closer investigation of FBR policies in the context of the overall energy policies of the three countries, see Kitschelt, Herbert, Politik und Energie (Frankfurt: Campus, 1983), chaps. 3–5.Google Scholar

7. See O'Connor, James, The Fiscal Crisis of the State (New York: St. Martin's, 1973)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Offe, Claus, “‘Krisen des Krisenmanagements’: Elemente einer politischen Krisentheorie,” in Jänicke, Martin, ed., Herrschaft und Krise (Opladen: Westdcutscher, 1973).Google Scholar

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10. Compare Nicos Poulantzas, Political Power and Social Classes (London: NLB, 1973)Google Scholar, and Classes in Contemporary Capitalism (London: NLB, 1975).Google Scholar

11. See Esping-Anderson, Gösta, Friedland, Roger, and Wright, Erik Olin, “Modes of Class Struggle and the Capitalist State,” Kapilalistate 4/5 (1976), pp. 186–220.Google Scholar

12. Wilson, James Q., Political Organization (New York: Basic, 1979), chap. 16.Google Scholar

13. Lowi, Theodore, “American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies and Political Theory,” World Politics 16 (07 1964), pp. 677–715CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Lowi, , “Four Systems of Policy Politics and Choice,” Public Administration Review 32 (07–08 1972), pp. 298–310.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

14. See Lowi, Theodore, “The State in Politics: An Inquiry into the Relation between Policy and Administration” (ms., Cornell University, 1982), p. 11Google Scholar. In this more recent formulation. Lowi's approach is no longer far removed from another statist policy theory that uses properties of decision processes to predict the nature of political actors, conflicts, and outcomes: Steiner, Jürg, “Decision Process and Policy Outcome: An Attempt to Conceptualize the Problem at the Cross-National Level,” European Journal of Political Research 11 (09 1983), pp. 309–18.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

15. In a sense Lowi has thus confirmed the criticism made by discussants of his earlier work that–contrary to the statement “policy determines politics–the “policy type is rather an explanandum than an explanans of public policy.” See Greenberg, et al. , “Developing Public Policy Theory,” p. 1542.Google Scholar

16. Lowi, , “The State in Politics,” p. 11.Google Scholar

17. This subjectivist turn has been advocated by Steinberger, Peter, “Typologies of Public Policy: Meaning Construction and the Policy Process,” Social Science Quarterly 61 (09 1980), pp. 185–97.Google Scholar

18. This argument is developed in Ashford, Douglas E., “The Structural Analysis of Policy or Institutions Really Do Matter,”Google Scholar in Ashford, , Comparing Public Policies.Google Scholar

19. The analysis of national policy styles is attempted in Richardson, Jeremy, ed., Policy Styles in Western Europe (London: Allen & Unwin, 1982).Google Scholar

20. The definition of domestic structures and international regime structures rests on similar methodological and conceptual choices. For a definition of international regimes along lines similar to the definition of domestic structures see Krasner, Stephen D., “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables,” International Organization 36 (Spring 1982), pp. 185–205.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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22. See for instance Krasner, Stephen, Defending the National Interest (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), chap. 3Google Scholar. A combination of interest intermediation and state capacities is attempted in Katzenstein, , “Conclusion: Domestic Structures.”Google Scholar

23. Criticisms of this perspective have been advanced from other public policy theories. For issue-based approaches see Steiner, , “Decision Process and Policy Outcome,” pp. 310–11Google Scholar, and Zysman, . Governments, Markets and Growth, p. 297Google Scholar. From the perspective of international systems and political coalition theories, see Gourevitch, , “Second Image Reversed,” p. 301Google Scholar, and Zysman, , Governments, Markets and Growth, pp. 347–49.Google Scholar

24. Coalition theories are developed in Gourevitch, Peter A., “International Trade, Domestic Coalitions, and Liberty: Comparative Responses to the Great Depression of 1873–1896,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 8 (08 1977), pp. 281–313CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Gourevitch, , “Breaking with Orthodoxy: The Politics of Economic Policy Responses to the Depression of the 1930s,” International Organization 38 (Winter 1984), pp. 95–129CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Esping-Anderson, Gösta and Friedland, Roger, “Class Coalitions in the Making of West European Economies,” Political Power and Social Theory 3 (1982), pp. 1–50.Google Scholar

25. In this vein coalition theories have often blended a Marxist, economy-based conception of politics with a pluralist, group-based vision of the political process. Recent reformulations of pluralism by Dahl and Lindblom have come rather close to a similar conceptualization of politics in capitalist democracies. For a critique see Manley, John F., “Neo-Pluralism: A Class Analysis of Pluralism I and Pluralism II,” American Political Science Review 77 (06 1983), pp. 368–83.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

26. See, for example, Castles, Francis G., The Social Democratic Image of Society (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978)Google Scholar; Cameron, David R., “The Expansion of the Public Economy: A Comparative Analysis,” American Political Science Review 72 (12 1978), pp. 1243–62CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Hibbs, Douglas A., “Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy,” American Political Science Review 71 (12 1977), pp. 1467–87.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

27. See Waltz, Kenneth, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979)Google Scholar, and, critically, Keohane, Robert O., “Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond,” in Finifter, Ada, ed., Political Science: The State of the Discipline (Washington, D.C.: APSA, 1983).Google Scholar

28. In the limitational case that a subset of actors constitutes a “privileged group,” whose benefits from supplying the collective good are higher than its goods, this privileged group will supply the entire collective good. See Hardin, Russell, Collective Action (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982).Google Scholar

29. In this sense the openness of economies to world markets has been suggested as a constraint on domestic policy making. For example, see Cameron, , “Expansion of the Public Economy.”Google Scholar

30. See Kurth, James R., “Industrial Change and Political Change: A European Perspective,” in Collier, David, ed., The New Authoritarianism in Latin America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979).Google Scholar

31. See Gilpin, Robert, U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation (New York: Basic, 1975).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

32. For debate on this point see Krasner, , Defending the National Interest, pp. 35–43Google Scholar, and, critically, Keohane, , “Theory of World Politics,” p. 521.Google Scholar

33. For a historical critique of Waltz's theory see Ruggie, John Gerard, “Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis,” World Politics 35 (01 1983), pp. 261–85.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

34. Efforts to test the relative explanatory power of “realist” and “complex interdependence” views of international politics can be found in Keohane, Robert O. and Nye, Joseph S., Power and Interdependence (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977).Google Scholar

35. This limitation applies to most of the literature referred to in fn. 2. It is also highlighted by Alford's, Robert seminal “Paradigms of State and Civil Society Relations,”Google Scholar in Lindberg, Leon N., Alford, Robert R., Crouch, Cohn, and Offe, Claus, Stress and Contradiction in Modern Capitalism (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1975)Google Scholar. First, Alford's recommendation to use class, elite, and pluralist arguments in a layered analysis of policy making omits “institutionalist” approaches (regime theory), while the methodological similarity of elite and pluralist analysis may warrant treating them both as variations of coalition theory. Second, his essay sheds little light on the conceptualization of policy itself. For a sophisticated empirical application of Alford's framework see Whitt, J. Allen, “Toward A Class-Dialectical Model of Power. An Empirical Assessment of Three Competing Models of Political Power,” American Sociological Review 44 (02 1979), pp. 81–99CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Given that Whitt studies referenda decisions about public transportation projects in just one setting, California, structural-institutional impacts on policy making cannot be analyzed well. Moreover, the analysis tends to focus on groups and decisional outcomes while neglecting an explanation for the shaping of the policy arenas or the choice of policy instruments. This is unfortunate, because the conditions that lead to the choice of the policy instruments, e.g., the financing schemes for public rail systems, could be a serious contender to his own preferred explanation of referenda outcomes, the mobilization of class (factions)– unless he were prepared to argue that these choices merely reflected class interests.

36. The market failure argument for government intervention in FBR policy has been challenged by Keck, Otto, Policy-Making in a Nuclear Program: The Case of the West German Fast Breeder Reactor (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1981), chap. 1Google Scholar. Keck points to large private investment efforts, for example in the computer industry, but he overlooks the fact that the breeder reactor is only one part of an extremely complex nuclear fuel cycle. Moreover, the institutional uncertainties of breeder development, due to its military sensitivity as well as its extraordinary hazard potential, are unmatched in the history of industrial innovation.

37. For budget data see Chow, Brian, The Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor: An Economic Analysis (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1975), p. 13Google Scholar. In the 1960s the LMFBR budget grew mostly at the expense of other advanced reactor technologies. Only between 1970 and 1976 did annual budget allocations for the LMFBR skyrocket, from about $100 million to about $650 million.

38. The spreading of West German development funds over several reactor lines is documented by Keck, , Policy-Making in a Nuclear Program, p. 73.Google Scholar

39. For the controversy about the end of the French gas-cooled reactor see Colon, Jean-Marie, Le nucléaire sans les français. Qui décide? Qui prfite? (Paris: Maspero, 1977)Google Scholar, and Bupp, Irwin C. and Derian, Jean-Claude, Light Water: How the Nuclear Dream Dissolved (New York: Basic, 1978), p. 62.Google Scholar

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45. For the U.S. breeder program in the 1960s see Stiefel, Michael D., “Government Commercialization of Large Scale Technology: The U.S. Breeder Reactor Program, 1964–1976” (Ph.D. diss., MIT, 06 1981).Google Scholar

46. A good account of the controversy about leadership in the German FBR program is Keck, , Policy-Making in a Nuclear Program, pp. 67ff., 80ff.Google Scholar

47. The conflict about the choice of FBR technologies in West Germany is discussed in numerous contributions to Atomwirtschaft-Atomtechnik 14 (April 1969).

48. For the conflict between scientists and engineers-administrators in the early development of the French CEA, see Scheinman, Lawrence, Atomic Energy Policy in France under the Fourth Republic (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1965)Google Scholar, and Weart, Spencer R.. Scientists in Power (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979).Google Scholar

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50. Cf. Arndt, Hans-Joachim, West Germany: Politics of Non-Planning (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1966).Google Scholar

51. See Pavitt, Keith, “Government Support for Industrial Research and Development in France: Theory and Practice,” Minerva 14 (Autumn 1976), pp. 330–54Google Scholar, and Zysman, John, “The French State in the International Economy,”Google Scholar in Katzenstein, , Between Power and Plenty.Google Scholar

52. Krasner, , Defending the National Interest, chap. 3.Google Scholar

53. Documents of the “project definition” phase in the LMFBR program are published in the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, LMFBR Demonstration Plant Program: Proceedings of the Senior Utility Steering Committee and of the Senior Utility Technical Advisory Committee (Washington, D.C., 1972).Google Scholar

54. Changes in the FBR project management were discussed by the Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress, Fast Breeder Reactor Program (Washington, D.C., 1975), pp. 2273ff.Google Scholar: see also U.S. General Accounting Office, The LMFBR Program: Past, Present, and Future (Washington, D.C., 04 1975).Google Scholar

55. Keck, , Policy-Making in a Nuclear Program, pp. 148–50Google Scholar, praises the economizing spirit of the utilities. But these savings might have been erased by project delays due to the lengthy negotiations.

56. The Phénix project is described in Vendryés, G. et al. , “Situation et perspectives de la filière de réacteurs à neutrons rapides en France,”Google Scholar in United Nations and International Energy Authority, Fourth International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, vol. 5 (Geneva, 1971).Google Scholar

57. U.S. Energy Research and Development Agency, Energy Policies in the European Community (Washington, D.C., 1975), p. 132Google Scholar, estimates the price of the Phénix reactor at about $530 million.

58. Although some authors have claimed a continuing concern with energy security in French policy since the 1920s, public documents show that such worries had subsided in the 1960s and early 1970s and that a further rise in oil imports was no longer considered undesirable. See Commissariat Générale du Plan, Plan et prospectives: l'énergie (Paris: Colin, 1972).Google Scholar

59. Cooperation in the French and West German FBR programs soon gave way to intense competition; cf. Nau, Henry, National Policy and International Technology (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), chap. 8.Google Scholar

60. Note, for instance, the loss of three to four years in the West German and U.S. FBR demonstration projects relative to the French effort. These delays were due entirely to institutional difficulties of the development program.

61. For a broader discussion of these movements see Kitschelt, Herbert, “Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest: Anti-Nuclear Movements in Four Countries,” British Journal of Political Science 16 (Winter 1986)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and “New Social Movements in the United States and West Germany,” Political Power and Social Theory 5 (1985).Google Scholar

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63. See Lovins, Amory B., Soft Energy Paths (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1977)Google Scholar, and Jungk, Robert, Der Aromstaat (Munich: Kindler, 1978).Google Scholar

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67. In West Germany agreements in April 1983 increased the utilities' and the reactor manufacturers' shares of the FBR demonstration reactor's cost to DM 1.42 billion, or 22% of the project costs (Nuclear Engineering International, 28 June 1983, p. 3Google Scholar). Similar arrangements were aired during 1983 in the United States, but Congress terminated funding before they could bear fruit.

68. Cf. Bundesregierung, , Deutschland, Bundesrepublik, I. Fortschreibung des Energieprogramms (Bonn: Bundestags-Drucksache VII/2713, 1974)Google Scholar; U.S. Energy Research and Development Agency, A National Plan for Energy Research, Development, and Demonstration (Washington, D.C., 1975)Google Scholar; Commissariat Générale du Plan, Rapport de la commission de l'énergie sur les orientations de la politique énergetique (Paris: Ministère de l'Industrie, 1975).Google Scholar

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73. The difficulties of integrating the nuclear issue into the established cleavage structures of political parties are described in Nelkin, Dorothy and Pollack, Michael, “The Political Parties and the Nuclear Energy Debate in France and Germany,” Comparative Politics 12 (01 1980), pp. 127–41.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

74. See Bundestag, Deutscher, Enquete-Kommission, “Zukünftige Kernenergiepolitik,” Zwischenbericht (Bonn: Bundestags-Drucksache VIII/4341, 1980).Google Scholar

75. Cf. the foreword by Mitterrand, François to Bauer, Etienne et al. , Pour une autre politique nucléaire: rapport du comité nucléaire environment et société du parti socialist (Paris: Flammarion, 1978).Google Scholar

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77. For France see Suleiman, Ezra, Politics, Power, and Bureaucracy in France (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974)Google Scholar; for Germany, West, Mayntz, Renate and Scharpf, Fritz, Policy-Making in the German Federal Bureaucracy (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1975).Google Scholar

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86. The official French perspective is explained in Barré, B., “The Proliferation Aspects of Breeder Development,” in Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation (London: Francis & Taylor, 1979).Google Scholar

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91. Estimates of natural resources are problematic and subject to political bias. Sec, for example, Wildavsky, Aaron and Tenenbaum, Ellen, The Politics of Mistrust (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1981)Google Scholar. To interpret the figures presented here in a meaningful way, we have only to assume that the bias in the estimates is the same for all three countries.

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