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Independent Revenue for the United Nations
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 May 2009
Extract
Several categories of suggestions have been put forth in recent years aimed at the relief of the financial problems of the United Nations. Major attention in the United Nations itself and in many writings has focused on modification of budgetary procedures, assessment criteria, and collection administration designed to induce adequate support from Members. Paralleling this, some Members and the Secretary-General as well have called for strict economy, a stabilized level of UN conferences and activities, and even some retrenchment. The principal alternatives proposed seek new sources of UN financing analogous to those open to governmental fiscal policy, including direct or indirect UN levies on the citizens of Member States and further development of UN deficit financing. Others call for intensified exploitation of potential sources of direct “independent” income to the Organization. Aside from the encouragement of gifts from private and public sources and the admittedly limited potential profit from tourism, rentals, and sales at the UN site, proposals for an independent UN income have concentrated on UN exploitation of the “new sources of wealth which are being opened by advances in science and technology, preferably outside the jurisdiction of national states …” in outer space, the poles, and the seas. This study seeks primarily to evaluate this last alternative.
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References
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18 In determining ability to pay, the UN Committee on Contributions uses total national income and per capita income, as well as other criteria. The former is a better index of national power.
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22 Of course voting weights are officially unequal in the International Bank and the International Monetary Fund and are weighted in favor of heavy contributors. “Voting weights” in an integrated free international market would also be weighted according to the initial distribution of achieved wealth and income.
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