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INTELSAT: Technology, politics and the transformation of a regime

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 May 2009

Steven A. Levy
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Abstract

The question arises whether “technological imperatives” or political considerations will guide the activity and determine the structure of regimes that support the use of technology on an international scale. In the case of communications satellites, the establishment of such a regime involves the search for structures that could satisfy technology and still remain responsive to political forces that desired to affect the decision-making process. The regime which has emerged resulted from the interplay of technology and politics. Initially it consisted of a single global agency, INTELSAT, but as the full potential of the technology became known, a single agency could not provide an adequate forum for the political interests that were associated with each new application that was discovered. Thus, the regime came to consist of a number of related organizations each dedicated to particular uses of the technology.

Type
Research Article
Information
International Organization , Volume 29 , Issue 3 , Summer 1975 , pp. 655 - 680
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 1975

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References

1 INTELSAT is the abbreviated name for the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization.

2 The technology of satellite telecommunications makes possible the destruction of spheres of influence which are maintained by conventional media, by introducing direct point-to-point communication. As President Johnson said in the 1967 policy message on telecommunications: “A telephone call from Rangoon to Djakarta must still go through Tokyo. A call from Dakar, Senegal, to Lagos, Nigeria, is routed through Paris and London. … Such an archaic system of international communications is no longer necessary.” (Johnson, Lyndon B., “Global Communications Systems,” Message to Congress, 08 14, 1967)Google Scholar. But the major European powers and Japan have considerable interest in maintaining such special ties. Thus, proposals for European-wide satellite systems have all called for the inclusion of former colonial dependencies. An early French proposal, Francophone, sought to establish direct satellite links between France and French-speaking Africa; the current French-German project, Symphonie, may be extended to include Africa as well.

At the siime time, it must not be thought that the United States argued for an “open” system on grounds of altruism. One American sentiment was expressed during hearings on the Communications Satellite Act of 1962: “Suppose we go ahead with a medium altitude system which directly serves the ‘have’ nations. Then let the Soviets follow with a stationary multiple access sysiem which ties all the ‘have nots’ nations to the USSR. Who will have won this vital race for men's minds?” (“Commercial Communications Satellites,” Hearings before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Science and Astronautics, 87th Congress, 2d Session, 1962, p. 7Google Scholar). The other American “sentiment” was, of course, commercial.

3 See footnote 2.

4 Agreement Establishing Interim Arrangements for a Global Commercial Communications Satellite System, US Department of State, Treaties and International Acts Series, No. 5646, Article I(a).

5 Ibid., Article V, sec. c (ii); INTELSAT has general authority to establish standards for approval of earth stations for access to the space segment.

6 US Department of State Bulletin, 08 4, 1961, p. 273Google Scholar.

7 P.L 87–624, Communications Satellite Act.

8 Ibid., Title III.

9 Cited in Galloway, Jonathan, The Politics and Technology of Satellite Communications, Lexington Books, Lexington, Mass., 1972, p. 96Google Scholar.

10 A full comparison of the interim arrangements and the cable consortia is provided by Colino, Richard, “INTELSAT: Doing Business in Outer Space,” Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, vol 6, no. 1, Spring 1967, pp. 17–60Google Scholar.

11 Agreement Establishing Interim Arrangements …, Article II.

12 Ibid., Article III.

13 Ibid., Preamble.

14 Agreement Establishing Interim Arrangements, Article VIII.

15 The ICSC consisted of the representatives of the nationally designated communications entities; there was no structural device for representatives of central governmental authority. In addition, the ICSC was not wholly representative since membership was limited to those whose ownership was at least 1.5 percent. It was possible, however, for members to pool their holdings to secure a seat on the Committee.

16 “Signing of Communications Satellite Agreements Hailed by President: Statement by President Johnson,” US Department of State Bulletin, 09 7, 1964, p. 348Google Scholar.

17 Agreement Establishing Interim Arrangements, Article X.

18 Special Agreement, US Department of State, Treaties and International Acts Series, No. 5646, Article 10.

19 Non-US participation in procurement for the INTELSAT-IV satellite series amounted to 28 percent of a total contract value of $106 million. For further elaboration on the uniting of US and foreign R&D programs through INTELSAT, see Metzger, sidney, “R&D Trends for communications Satellites: Comparison of US and Other Programs,” in Telecommunications Research in the United States and Selected Foreign Countries, Report to the National Science Foundation, 06 1973Google Scholar; and “Europeans Determining Space Priorities,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, March 19,1973, p. 45 for summary of European space programs.

20 Booz, , Allen, and Hamilton, , INTELSAT Management Review, INTELSAT, ICSC 48–14, 07 1970, p. 42Google Scholar.

21 INTELSAT, ICSC 7–6, April, 1965.

22 INTELSAT, ICSC 21–3.

23 “Report of the Advisory Subcommittee on Contracting Procedures to the ICSC,” ICSC 26–8, 04 22, 1967Google Scholar.

24 Summary Record of the Twenty-Eighth Meeting of the ICSC, ICSC 28–3, September, 1967.

25 Booz, Allen and Hamilton, p. 48.

26 Special Agreement, Article 10 (f).

27 “Report of the Advisory Subcommittee on Contracting Procedures t o the ICSC,” ICSC 27–8, 07 1967, p. 12, ¶ 21Google Scholar.

28 Ibid., p. 13.

29 See supra at 19.

30 Communications Satellite Corporation, Comsat: The First Ten Years, Report to the President and Congress, 1973; a half-circuit is the link from the ground station to the satellite.

31 INTELSAT Plenipotentiary Conference, Annex to Doc. 125, Statement by Israel.

32 These nations include Algeria, Cameroon, the Ivory Coast, Morocco, Senegal, and Tunisia.

33 INTELSAT Plenipotentiary Conference, Statement by France, Com. 1/36.

34 Ibid., Statement by France, Com. 1/96

35 Ibid., Statement b y Algeria, Com. IV/SR/3, March 20,1969.

36 US Department of State, Treaties and International Acts Series #7532, International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT), Agreement between the United States of America and Other Governments and Operating Agreement, 08 20, 1971Google Scholar.

37 Ibid., Agreement, Article IX (a) (iii).

38 President's Task Force on Communications Policy, Final Report, 12 7, 1968, Chapter III, p. 15Google Scholar.

39 INTELSAT Plenipotentiary Conference, US Draft Agreement, Doc. 10, Article VIII (f).

40 INTELSAT Plenipotentiary Conference, SR/50.

41 This draft became Article XIV (d). The group sponsoring this draft was composed of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, West Germany, Italy, Japan, Norway, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and Canada, among the industrialized states, and Algeria, India, Mexico, and the UAR among the less developed countries.

43 Agreement, Preamble.

43 INTELSAT Plenipotentiary Conference, Com. 1/36.

44 Ibid., Com. 1/16.

45 INTELSAT Plenipotentiary Conference, Statement of the Chairman of the Working group on Inventions and Technical Information, Com. B/SR/11, May 7,1971, emphasis supplied.

46 Agreement, Article III (a).

47 Ibid., Article III (b) (i).

48 “Space Segment Facilities for Maritime Services,” ICSC 62–16, 10 20, 1972Google Scholar.

49 INTELSAT Plenipotentiary Conference, IWG/Doc. 8.

50 Ibid., IWG (III) /TD/7.

51 Ibid., IWG (III) /SR/117.

52 Ibid., Com. A/4.

53 Ibid., Com. A/23.

54 Ibid., Doc. 171, Attachment 1.

55 Ibid.

56 ICSC 62–16.

57 IMCO, Panel of Experts on Maritime Satellites, Doc. 33.

58 Agreement, Article III (f).

59 MAROTS refers to the Maritime Operations Technology Satellite. Other participants in the MAROTS Program include Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, and Sweden. Including the United Kingdom, the MAROTS partners account for 35 percent of the world's shipping tonnage. The prime contractor for the MAROTS spacecraft is Hawker Siddeley Dynamics, Ltd. The prime contractor for the satellite payload is Marconi Space and Defense Systems, Ltd. These firms are each headquartered in Great Britain.

60 The Panel of Experts adjourned its fifth and final meeting in September, 1974.

61 Cited in the Report of the United States Delegation to the Third Meeting of the Panel of Experts on Maritime Satellites, September 10–14, 1973.

62 Panel of Experts on Maritime Satellites, MARSAT V/6, “Report to the Maritime Safety Committee,” 09 16, 1974, p. 2Google Scholar.