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The International Seabed Resources Agency negotiations and the New International Economic Order

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 May 2009

Robert L. Friedheim  and
William J. Durch
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Abstract

The negotiations concerning the establishment of an International Seabed Resources Agency (ISRA) raise three research questions: 1) what is the current state of the ISRA negotiations, and how have they evolved; 2) what effect do New International Economic Order (NIEO) considerations have on national behavior in these negotiations; and 3) can the ISRA negotiations “succeed” (reach a positive-sum-type outcome) and produce a comprehensive Law of the Sea treaty? A methodology based on thematic content analysis is useful in answering these questions. Despite recent concessions by developed states, continued stalemate in the negotiations is likely. The Group of 77's position has hardened as it has become increasingly united behind demands for a New International Economic Order for the seabeds. Short of a breakthrough on ISRA, neither the ISRA negotiations nor the Law of the Sea Conference can succeed. Such a breakthrough might be generated either by verbal acceptance of the NIEO by the North, or by side payments.

Type
Research Article
Information
International Organization , Volume 31 , Issue 2 , Spring 1977 , pp. 343 - 384
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 1977

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References

1 The statement by the knowledgeable Minister for Law of the Sea Questions of Norway, Mr. Jens Evensen, is typical: “But we must nevertheless realize that here… [on the ISRA issue]… we face possibly the most difficult outstanding problem of negotiation. A law of the sea convention may stand or fall on the outcome of this issue.” Statement to the Storting On Questions Relating to Fishing Limits and the Law of the Sea on 28 May 1976 (mimeo). On the other hand, at least at an earlier stage in the negotiations, Hansen, Roger D. stated his belief that there is a “low probability of a North-South split being remembered as the dominant configuration of the law of the sea debate.…” “The North-South Split and the Law of the Sea Debate,” Perspectives on Ocean Policy: Conference on Conflict and Order in Ocean Relations, October 1974, (Washington: GPO, 1974), p. 121Google Scholar.

2 In this paper all references to “the developing,” or the “South” will be used to mean the “Group of 77,” the organized caucusing group in the UN system which attempts to coordinate member positions on issues that relate to the interest of developing states as a whole.

3 The terms are Robert Axelrod's. See his Conflict of Interest (Chicago: Markham, 1970), pp. 158–64Google Scholar.

4 For discussions of positive sum games (one of two subsets of variable sum games) and their application to bargaining, see Boulding, Kenneth E., Conflict and Defense: A General Theory (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), p. 44Google Scholar; Zartman, I. William, “The Analysis of Negotiation,” The 50 Percent Solution, Zaitman, I. William, ed., (Garden City, New York: Anchor, 1976), p. 10Google Scholar.

5 On side payments see Zartman, , “The Analysis of Negotiation,” or Abram DeSwaan, Coalition Theories and Cabinet Formations (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1973), p. 101Google Scholar.

6 A more detailed discussion of our method can be found in Appendix A of the version of this paper presented at the American Political Science Association, September 1976. A limited number of copies of the complete paper will be available, at cost, from the Institute for Marine and Coastal Studies, University of Southern California. Earlier stages of our method development can be found in R. L. Friedheim, J. B. Kadane, with the assistance of JrGamble, J. K., “Quantitative Content Analysis of the United Nations Seabed Debates: Methodology and a Continental Shelf Case Study,” International Organization (Summer 1970): 479–502Google Scholar; Friedheim, R. L. and Kadane, J. K., “Ocean Science in the U.N. Political Arena,” Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce Vol. 3, No. 3 (04 1972): 473–502Google Scholar. We are also producing a book on the subject, Forecasting Multilateral Negotiations (forthcoming).

7 Normally we prefer to display publicly our issue-variables and explain why we scaled them as we did. For reasons of space we cannot explain our ordering on all of the issue-variables we will use, but we have included them in Appendix B of the original paper.

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12 Several different lists of the demands that make up the New International Economic Order agenda can be found in Howe, James W., “Power in the Third World,” Journal of International Affairs Vol. 29, No. 2 (1975): 113–27Google Scholar.

13 A recent conference of mostly Western economists meeting at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology seems to have concluded that the New International Economic Order proposals are primarily political and ideological, not economic, in their intent. As such they must be dealt with by political means. “Poor Nations Advised Their Gains Must Have Others' Backing,” New York Times, May 24, 1976. The opposing case is well made by Jahangir Amuzegar, “The North-South Dialogue: From Conflict to Compromise,” Foreign Affairs Vol. 54, No. 3 (04 1976): 557Google Scholar.

14 For descriptions of the nodules, the mining methods, charts of their locations, the economic implications of nodule mining, and the views of the mining companies see: Mero, John L., “The Great Nodule Controversy,” Law of the Sea: Caracas and Beyond, JrChristy, F. T., JrCingan, T. A., JrGamble, J. K., Knight, H. G. and Miles, E., eds., (Cambridge: Ballinger, 1975), pp. 325–55Google Scholar; Ocean International (December 1971): 27–30; Barkenbus, Jack N., “International Implications of Manganese Nodule Mining,” World Affairs Vol. 136, No. 4 (Spring 1974): 306–20Google Scholar; National Academy of Sciences, Mining in the Outer Continental Shelf and in the Deep Ocean (Washington: National Academy of Sciences, 1975), pp. 69–88Google Scholar; United Nations, Third Conference on the Law of the Sea, Economic Implications of Seabed Mineral Development in the International Area: Report of the Secretary-General, 22 May 1974 (A/CONF. 62/25). Hereafter all references to UN documents will be by document number only.

15 Henkin, Louis, “The Changing Law of Sea-Mining,” Interuniversity program of Research on Ferromanganese Deposits of the Ocean Floor,” (–National Science Foundation, International Decade of Ocean Exploration, Phase I Report, 04 1973), pp. 337–51.Google Scholar

16 However, some early fears of extensive claim jumping are exaggerated, according to a study originally sponsored by the US Treasury. Sweeny, R.J., Tollison, R. D., and Willett, T. D., “Market Failure, The Common-Pool Problem, and Ocean Resource Exploitation,” Journal of Law and Economics Vol. 27, No. 1 (04 1974): 179–92CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For a broad review of the economics of ocean mining and its regulation, see Eckert, Ross D., “Exploitation of Deep Ocean Minerals: Regulatory Mechanisms and United States Policy,” Journal of Law and Economics Vol. 17, No. 1 (04 1974): 143–77CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

17 The proposals discussed can be found in: US (A/AC. 138/25); UK (A/AC. 138/26); France (A/AC. 138/27); Tanzania (A/AC. 138/33); Poland (A/AC. 138/44); Latin America (A/AC. 138/49); Landlocked and Shelflocked (A/AC. 138/55); Canada (A/AC. 138/59); US (A/CONF. 62/C.1/L.6); Group of 77 (A/CONF. 62/C.1/L.8); Japan (A/CONF. 62/C.1/L.9); SNT '75 (A/CONF. 62/WP.8/Part 1); SNT '76 (A/CONF. 62/WP.8/Rev. 1/Part I).

18 “U.S. Achieves Victories at UN Sea Conference,” Washington Post, May 7, 1976. Also see the editorial “Diplomacy and the Deep Sea,” Washington Post, April 11, 1976 as well as the New York Times story, “U.N. Talks Seeking a Sea-Law Accord Close With Differences Unresolved,” May 8, 1976.

19 US acceptance of the form of production controls found in SNT '76 was announced by Secretary of State Kissinger personally in a speech to the Foreign Policy Association, April 8, 1976. The text of the speech is reprinted in US Congress, Senate Congressional Record 1976, S.5223–S.5226.

20 The term “disadvantaged” refers here specifically to states that are either landlocked, or shelf-locked (unable to claim an offshore area that extends beyond the 200 meter isobath). The term “advantaged” refers to states with open coasts, which we divide into two groups: those with wider than average continental shelves (“broad” shelf states) and those with narrower than average shelves (“narrow” shelf states). The average continental shelf is 30 nautical miles wide. (US Department of State, Geographic Bulletin No. 3, “Sovereignty of the Sea,” 10 1969, P. 9Google Scholar.)

21 These should not be confused with the regional groups (Africa, Asia, Latin America, Eastern Europe, and Western Europe and Others). In this paper, the term “geographic group” is used only to refer to the groups defined in note 20, above.

22 Since discussion of the economic zone began in earnest only in 1971, we have only two periods for analysis. For substantive interpretation of scores on these variables see the complete issue-variable listings of Appendix B in the earlier version of this paper.

23 See note 18 for the reportage on the bargaining at the New York session, Spring 1976.

24 Zartman, I. William, “Negotiations: Theory and Reality,” Journal of International Affairs Vol. 9, No. 1 (1974): 71Google Scholar.

25 All packages constructed for this analysis can be found in Appendix B, Table 3B of the earlier version of this paper.