¹ See, for example, Deutsch, Karl W., “Integration and Arms Control in the European Political Environment: A Summary Report,” American Political Science Review, 06 1966 (Vol. 60, No. 2), pp. 354–365CrossRefGoogle Scholar(especially the conclusion); also Deutsch, Karl W. and others, France, Germany and the Western Alliance: A Study of Elite Attitudes on European Integration and World Politics (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967), pp. 298–299Google Scholar.

² The literature on the relationships between different attitudes and policy preferences is both large and amorphous. For a brief review of some of this literature see Lane, Robert E. and Sears, David O., Public Opinion (Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice-Hall, 1964), pp. 13–15Google Scholar. A good theoretical discussion of “attitude structure” and politics can be found in Converse, Philip E., “The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics,” in Apter, David E. (ed.), Ideology and Discontent (New York: Free Press, 1964), pp. 207–214Google Scholar.

³ There are probably hundreds of definitions of “nationalism.” As used here, “nationalism” does not refer to any one thing such as a feeling of community, belief in national superiority, or a set of cultural aspirations. “Nationalism” in this article is a general term referring to attitudes on the nature and role of the nation-state. There is no single attitude which is nationalism, but there are many beliefs which are nationalistic. To the extent that an attitude implies more power or a larger role for the nation-state (in contrast to the “international community” or something similar) this attitude is nationalistic. A “hard-core” nationalist as used here refers to an individual who maintains a nationalistic position on a large number of issues.

⁴ A complete description of this data and how it was collected can be found in Deutsch and others. Very briefly, there were 147 respondents in France, 173 in the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany). In both countries military, civil service, political, business, and intellectual leaders were interviewed. This sample is not a random one and there appears to be considerable self-selection. All things considered, there is the distinct possibility that the self-selection process resulted in an understatement of nationalistic views. This should make for caution in interpreting the data, but since this is only a suspicion, nothing can be done but acknowledge the problem. Until a better sample is drawn (if indeed this is possible) analysis will have to make do with what is available. For a discussion of the problems of data collection and the argument for examining only France and West Germany see Chapter 1 of Deutsch and others.

⁵ One point that deserves mention at this time concerns the drawing of conclusions from this data. In the analysis to follow some conclusions about the future of European integration are reached on the basis of simple frequency distributions–the response of each elite member is considered to be of the same importance. This assumption is quite reasonable in mass samplings where differences in political influence are relatively small. When dealing with elites, however, one is always confronted with the possibility that while 99 of 100 say “yes,” the one who says “no” may be a Charles de Gaulle. In cases where one person makes all the decisions statistical analysis of a large sample may not be very useful for predicting future decisions. That there is a numerical majority in favor of limiting national sovereignty does not necessarily imply that this policy is inevitable. This analysis will not attempt to predict specific policies; it is directed toward the more general question of the level and nature of nationalism among elites. Given the fact that both France and West Germany are not one-man dictatorships, answers to this question are relevant to European politics. It seems very unlikely that French or West German decisionmakers can continually ignore the preferences of large numbers of high civil servants, businessmen, military leaders, or other politicians. This is not to say that every decision must conform to the wishes of these non-decisionmakers but rather that in a democracy the sheer size of opposition can place constraints on those few who actually make the final decision. Furthermore, few if any important decisions are made without consulting the relevant elites (e.g., trade associations, civil servants responsible for administering an agreement, etc.) so the content of a policy is affected by die degree of support for alternative solutions (as well as many other factors). In short, though the specifics would be hard to predict, one would expect a nation where ardent nationalists predominate to behave differently from one in which pro-integrationists are in a majority.

⁶ The decision to use only a few questions and to limit tables to two dimensions still produces a large number of possibilities. In the initial analysis of this data most of these possibilities were examined. Though the details may vary from table to table, these other tables support the findings presented here. Similarly, the calculation of percentages across the rows rather than down the columns has no significant effect on the results.

⁷ This conclusion is similar to the positions maintained in the neo-functionalist argument about integration being an ongoing process built on the basis of incremental bargains rather than major political victories. The conclusion reached in this article, however, is inferred from different kinds of data (the relationship between different policy preferences) than is usually found in the neo-functionalist literature. For a further discussion of the neo-functionalist conception of the paths to integration see Lindberg, Leon N., The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1963)Google Scholar; Haas, Ernst B., The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950–1957 (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1958)Google Scholar; and Ernst B. Haas, “Technology, Pluralism and the New Europe,” reprinted in A New Europe?, ed. Stephen R. Graubard (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1964).