Earlier versions of this paper were presented by the first author at the Conflict Resolution Seminar of Vale University, 14 January 1977, at the Annual Spring Meeting of the Japan Association of International Relations, Tokyo, 22 May 1977, and at the Joint Sessions of Workshops of the European Consortium for Political Research, Grenoble, 6–12 April 1978. The authors are grateful for the helpful comments on those earlier and other versions made by Hayward R. Alker, Jr., Mitsuo Ezaki, I. N. Galhofer-Saris, Michael Grose, Jeffrey A. Hart, Douglas A. Hibbs, Jr., Kuniko Y. Inoguchi, Harold K. Jacobson, Christer Jonsson, Jean-Christian Lambelet, Frank Langdon, Urs Luterbacher, Kinhide Mushakoji, C. M. Mason, Masatsugu Naya, Frederick L. Pryor, Bruce M. Russett, Hideo Sato, Gunnar Sjostedt, Arild Underdal, Ann Waswo, Taizo Yakushiji and Yoshinobu Yamamoto. The authors are also grateful for the useful comments and suggestions for revisions made by Robert O. Keohane, Wallis Ammerman, and anonymous referees. The revision of the paper was facilitated by a grant to the first author from the Japan Foundation, to which he is grateful. Needless to say, the authors alone take responsiblity for the views expressed in the paper.

¹ It must be noted at the outset that unlike many other studies on negotiation we are not much concerned with bargaining skill and tactics in this paper. In this sense our usage of the term negotiation is somewhat unorthodox. This point will become clear in the course of our treatment of the problem. Studies of international negotiation abound. For a survey of this field, see, for example, Ikle, F., How Nations Negotiate (New York: Harper, 1964)Google Scholar; Sawyer, J. and Guetzkow, H., “Bargaining and Negotiation in International Relations,” in International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis, Kelman, H. C., ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964), pp. 464–520Google Scholar; Druckman, D., ed., Negotiation: A Social Psychological Perspective (New York: Halstead, 1977)Google Scholar; Journal of Conflict Resolution, special issue devoted to negotiation, XXI, 4 (12 1977)Google Scholar; Young, O. R., ed., Bargaining: Formal Theories of Negotiation (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1975)Google Scholar; Rapoport, A and Chammah, A., Prisoner's Dilemma: A Study in Conflict and Cooperation (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1965)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

² As for the transformation in ocean politics and its related topics, see the following: Stevenson, J. R. and Oxman, B. H., “The Perspectives for the Law of the Sea Conference,” American Journal of International Law 68 (1974): 1–13CrossRefGoogle Scholar; “The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The 1974 Caracas Session,” American Journal of International Law 69 (1975): 1–30CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and “The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The 1975 Geneva Session,” American Journal of International Law 69 (1975): 763–797CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Oxman, B. H., “The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The 1976 New York Session,” American Journal of International Law 71 (1977): 247–269CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Swing, J. I., “Who Will Own the Oceans?” Foreign Affairs 54 (1976), 527–546CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Charney, J. I., “Law of the Sea: Breaking the Ocean Deadlock,” Foreign Affairs 55 (1977): 598–629CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Osgood, R. E., ed., Perspectives on Ocean Policy (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975)Google Scholar; Hollick, A. L. and Osgood, R. E., eds., New Era of Ocean Politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974)Google Scholar; Hollick, A. L., “Seabeds Make Strange Politics,” Foreign Policy 9 (1972–1973): 148–70CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and “What to Expect from a Sea Treaty,” Foreign Policy 18 (1975): 68–78Google Scholar; Miles, E., ed., Special Issue: Restructuring Ocean Regimes, International Organization 31 (1977)Google Scholar; and Keohane, R. O. and Nye, J. S. Jr, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little, Brown, 1976)Google Scholar.

³ Osgood, op. cit.; Miles, op. cit.; and Keohane and Nye, op. cit.

⁴ See, for example, Cooper, R. N., “Trade Policy is Foreign Policy,” Foreign Policy 9 (1972): 18–36CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Bergsten, C. F., “Let's Avoid a Trade War,” Foreign Policy 23 (Summer 1976): 24–31CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁵ See, for example, Watanabe, A., “Foreign Policy Making, Japanese Style,” International Affairs 54, 1 (01 1978): 75–88CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ See, for example, Rowe, J. W. F., Primary Commodities in International Trade (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1965)Google Scholar; Rangarajan, L. N., Commodity Conflict: The Political Economy in International Commodity Negotiations (London: Croom Helm, 1978)Google Scholar; Hveem, H., The Political Economy of Third World Producer Associations (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1978)Google Scholar.

⁸ Lee, C. J., Japan Faces China: Political and Economic Relations in the Post-War Era (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976)Google Scholar; and Hoadley, J. S. and Hasegawa, S., “Sino-Japanese Relations 1950–1970: An Application of the Linkage Model of International Politics,” International Studies Quarterly 15, 2 (06 1971): 131–157CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁹ About the concept of near decomposability, see Simon, H. A. and Ando, A., “Aggregation of Variables in Dynamic Systems,” Econometrica 29 (04 1961): 11–138CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Fisher, F. M., “On the Cost of Approximate Specification in Simultaneous Equation,” Econometrica 29 (04 1961): 139–170CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Fisher, F. M. and Ando, A., “Two Theorems in Ceteris Paribus in the Analysis of Dynamic Systems,” American Political Science Review 61 (03 1962): 103–113Google Scholar; and Simon, H. A., The Science of the Artificial (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1969), Chapter 4Google Scholar. Most briefly, in nearly decomposable systems, “the interactions among the subsystems are weak but not negligible” and “the subsystems only interact in an aggregate form.” (Simon, , op. cit., 1969, pp. 100 and 107)Google Scholar.

¹⁰ On this point, see, for example, Inoguchi, T., “Measuring Friendship and Hostility among Communist Powers: Some Unobtrusive Measures of Esoteric Communication,” Social Science Research 1 (04 1972): 79–105CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹¹ See, for example, Kurth, J., “A Widening Gap: The Logic of American Weapons Procurement,” Public Policy XIX (1971): 373–405Google Scholar; and Gourevitch, P. A., “International Trade, Domestic Coalitions, and Liberty: Competitive Responses to the Crisis of 1873–1896,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History VIII, 3 (Autumn 1977): 281–313CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹² The following works provide the most useful and detailed historical accounts of Japanese fishing and its position in the world after World War II. Kenzo, Kawakami, Sengo kokusai gyogyo seidoshi (A History of Post-World War II International Fisheries Institutions) (Tokyo: Dai Nihon Suisan Kai, 1975)Google Scholar; Borgstrom, G., Japan's World Success in Fishing (London: Fishing News, 1964)Google Scholar; Shimbun, Nihon Keizai, Kaiyo Nihon no shumatsu (The End of Maritime Japan) (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 1977)Google Scholar; Shimbun, Mainichi, Nihyaku kairi sakana senso (200-mile Fish War) (Tokyo: Mainichi Shimbun, 1977)Google Scholar, Johnson, B. and Langdon, F., “Two Hundred Mile Zones: The Politics of North Pacific Fishes,” Pacific Affairs 49 (1976): 5–27CrossRefGoogle Scholar, provides a good summary of the historical background of fishing in the North Pacific. Also see Young, O. R., Resource Management at the International Level: The Case of the North Pacific (New York: Nichols 1977)Google Scholar; and Alexander, L. M., “Regional Arrangements in the Oceans,” American Journal of International Law 71 (1977): 84–109CrossRefGoogle Scholar. As for the day-to-day accounts of the 1977 negotiations, see major Japanese newspapers, e.g., Nihon Keizai Shimbun from December 1976 to August 1977. It may be interesting to compare the Soviet-Japanese fishery conflict of 1977 with other cases such as the Anglo-Icelandic Cod War of 1972–1973. On the Cod War, see Hart, J., The Anglo-Icelandic Cod War of 1972–1973: A Case Study of Fishery Dispute (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1976)Google Scholar.

¹³ As for Soviet-Japanese relations, see Hellman, D. C., Japanese Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics: The Peace Agreement with the Soviet Union (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969)Google Scholar; Vishwanathan, S., Normalization of Japanese-Soviet Relations, 1945–1970 (Tallahassee, Florida: The Diplomatic Press, 1973)Google Scholar; Kim, Y. C., The Soviet-Japanese Relations: Interactions of Politics, Economics and National Security, The Washington Papers No. 21 (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1974)Google Scholar; Berezin, V. N., Kurs na dobrososedstvo i sotrudnichestvo i ego protivniki: iz istorii normalizatsii otnoshenii SSSR s poslevoennyi Iaponiei (The Course of Friendship and Cooperation and Its Enemies: From the History of the Normalization of the USSR's Relationship with Post-War Japan) (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo ‘Mezhdunarodnoe Otnoshenie” 1977)Google Scholar. As for Mao's reference to the Kurile Islands, see Lee, C. J., op. cit., p. 67Google Scholar.

¹⁴ As for Japanese budgeting, see Cambell, John C., Contemporary Japanese Budget Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977)Google Scholar. As for American budgeting, see, for example, Wildavsky, A., The Politics of the Budgetary Process (Boston: Little, Brown, 1964)Google Scholar.

¹⁵ Etzioni, A., The Active Society (New York: Free Press, 1968)Google Scholar.

¹⁶ A. Wildavsky, op. cit.; Davis, O. A., Dempster, M. A. H., and Wildavsky, A., “A Theory of the Budgetary Process,” American Political Science Review 60 (1966): 529–547CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Cyert, R. M. and March, J. G., A Behavioral Theory of the Firm (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1962)Google Scholar; Crecine, J. P., Governmental Problem-Solving: A Computer Simulation of Municipal Budgeting (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969)Google Scholar; Hoole, F. W., Politics and Budgeting in the World Health Organization (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1977)Google Scholar.

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¹⁸ As for a “crucial test,” see Platt, J. R., “Strong Inference,” in The Step to Man (New York: Wiley, 1966), pp. 19–36Google Scholar. It is interesting to see that Ostrom has recently tested a Richardson type arms race model and a Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky type organizational politics model as applied to U.S. defense budgeting, with indistinguishable, indeterminate results. This fact might indicate the necessity for a more careful conceptual examination before the “crucial test.” See Ostrom, C. W. Jr, “Evaluating Alternative Politics Model: An Empirical Test between an Arms Race Model and Organizational Politics Model,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 21 (1977): 215–266CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁹ See, for instance, Thayer, N. B., “Competition and Conformity: An Inquiry into the Structure of the Japanese Newspapers,” in Vogel, E. F., ed., Modem Japanese Organization and Decision-Making (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), pp. 284–303Google Scholar.

²⁰ The Nihon Keizai Shimbun is a Japanese Wall Street Journal or Financial Times. The coverage of the negotiations does not differ very much from one newspaper to another among big newspapers in Japan. However, the Nihon Keizai Shimbun seems to provide a most dispassionate reporting about them.

²¹ Nisso gyogyo iinkai ni tsuite (Tokyo: Fishery Agency, Government of Japan, 1976)Google Scholar.

²² Shohisha bukka shisu nempo (Tokyo: Bureau of Statistics, Office of Prime Minister, Government of Japan).

²³ The data set may be obtained from the authors upon request.

²⁴ It must be noted that the JIP, SIP, and SP equations do not produce the estimated values of 1962 and 1963 because we have to exclude the 1962 and 1963 values. The 1962 policy intervention changed the definition of the regulated areas and thus the equations which encompass the pre-1962 and post-1962 years cannot include the 1962 and 1963 values due to the inclusion of two-year lagged variables.

²⁵ When we look at the observed values of the JIP and SIP in Figures 3 and 4, we are not too discouraged by the two low R²s for the 1957–1976 period. There are some reasons for them. First, the Japanese initial proposal of 1959 was more than 150,000 metric tons, which was “too high” when compared to the Soviet initial proposal of 1959, which was 50,000 metric tons. Second, the Soviet initial proposals did not change at all during the 1959–1961 period, perhaps in an attempt to make Japan aware of the Soviet message not to make too high a proposal on the Japanese side. We can do nothing about these facts and the two low R²s for the 1957–1976 period do not make the analysis particularly less strong.

²⁶ The problem here is posed largely by a small number of observations, which is inherent in the research design. We could have included another (probably dummy) variable to account for this “anomaly” of the 1959–1961 period. However, this has not been done, in part because the number of observations of this period is only three. If we have a two-year lag term in an equation, when the number of observations for the whole period (sixteen or thirteen) is already very small, the degree of freedom is even further reduced. There is no point in introducing another variable into the equation if it is not certain that the variable is very powerful. When it is a dummy variable, that variable does not contribute to a better explanation of the dependent variable even if its introduction makes the results look better. Also it has not been done because we have wanted to keep the model as simple as possible. Thus the problem of the two low R²s is not so severe as to vitiate the analysis.

²⁷ As for the problem of how to deal with serial correlation in a time series analysis, see, for example,Rao, P. and Miller, R. L., Applied Econometrics (Belmont, California: Wadsworth, 1971)Google Scholar; and Hibbs, D. A. Jr, “Problems of Statistical Estimation and Causal Inference in Time-Series Regression Models,” in Sociological Methodology 1973–1974, Costner, H. L., ed. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1974), pp. 252–308Google Scholar.

²⁸ For the same reasons mentioned in footnote 26 we have not attempted to “save” this somewhat slightly discouraging phenomenon. The problem is inherent in the research design and the resulting problem is not so severe as to vitiate the analysis.

²⁹ On this figure, both newspaper accounts and a Fishery Agency official whom the first author of this paper interviewed in 1977 concurred.

³⁰ As for an interesting study of Japanese negotiating style, drawing from the pre-World War II Japanese negotiations, seeBlaker, M., Japanese International Negotiating Style (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977)Google Scholar.

³¹ See the Nihon Keizai Shimbun or any other major Japanese newspapers from December 1976 to August 1977 for the day-to-day accounts of the sequence of the 1977 negotiations. See also Masatsugu, Naya, “Ukemi gaiko no kozo: Nihon no kaiyo seisaku tenkan o megutte” (The Structure of a Passive Diplomacy: The Case of Japan's Changing Ocean Policy), a graduate seminar paper, Sophia University, Tokyo, 1977Google Scholar; and Inoguchi, T. and Miyatake, N., “The Politics of Decrementalism: The Case of Soviet-Japanese Salmon Catch Negotiations, 1957–1977,” Behavioral Science IS (11 1978): 457–469Google Scholar.