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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 May 2009
The paper examines the role of the world's fishery technocrats and experts in international fisheries management. The system of management provided by the regionally based international fisheries commissions is organized on transgovern-mental and transnational lines. Political delegates to the commissions are usually government technocrats, suggesting that the system is basically transgovernmental. However, the role of scientific advisers to the commissions is studied, since the group may preempt political control through its control on expertise. Results of a questionnaire sent to 900 scientists throughout the world are given, using the data from a structured sample of 84 scientists. Most were found to be trained as natural scientists, and most were employed directly by national governments or through government reseaich institutes. “Elite” scientists in the group, and some executive heads of commissions were also analyzed, and found to have a generally cautious approach to problems of fishery ownership and management. In sum, the transgovernmental system itself was found to allow yet set the limits of transnational role playing by fishery experts.
1 See Political Handbook and Atlas of the World, Councilon Foreign Relations, (New York:, 1970)Google Scholar.
2 For fuller definitions of these terms see Nye, Joseph S. Jr. and Keohane, Robert o., “Transnational Relations and World Politics”, International Organization, vol. 25, no. 3 (Summer 1971), pp. 329–50Google Scholar; and Keohane, Robert O. and Nye, Joseph S., “Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations”, World Politics, vol. 22, no. 1 (10 1974)Google Scholar.
3 Twelve of the total of 20 non-coastal memberships are accounted for by the composition of the International Commission for Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, since only Canada, Denmark, and the US can be considered “coastal” members. The International Whaling Commission, though included in subsequent calculations, was excluded from this summary because it lacks a regionally-specific mandate.
4 If the Socialist bloc and FAO-sponsored commissions are included the total would jump to 71 states sharing 148 memberships. The bulk of these memberships, however, ismade up of states who do not rank among the top twenty-four fishing nations, and their inclusion in table 1 would not change the totals appreciably for the countries which do appear there. These commissions are not discussed subsequently because biographical information on the commissioners was too spotty to allow systematic comparison.
5 Data are based primarily on biographical analysis of the world's fishery commissioners and also on personal interviews with several commissioners.
6 This figure was determined by checking how many of the commissioners were listed in the International Directory of Marine Scientists (FAO, Rome, 1970)Google Scholar. This gives us a general measure of the expertise of the group and also draws a distinction between individuals who still have active scientific careers and those who have scientific backgrounds but are now primarily administrators. Figures include a Brazilian scientist who serves on the Atlantic Tuna Commission, an agency not included in our nine.
7 See, for example, Larkin, P., “A Confidential Memorandum on Fisheries Science” in Rothschild, B. (ed.), World Fisheries Policy: Multidisciplinary Views (Seattle, 1972), p. 193Google Scholar.
8 Adjudicatory functions are involved whenever the scientific staff of a commission concludes that the regulations are likely to affect a member state disproportionately. In such instances, the staff may propose appropriate remedies to the commissioners, as happens in the Salmon Commission. Estimates of the acceptability of such recommendations range from 90 percent (by a staff member) to 50 percent (by a commissioner). Some staff members suggest that the commissioners actually act as a collective buffer between the industries concerned andthe scientific staff in the instances of the two Canadian-American commissions.
9 This subgroup was selected by a reputational method or what could be called peer nomination. Respondents were asked “who among scientists have the most influence in helping settle issues concerning the allocation, management and regulation of world fisheries?” The number of times a name was nominated plus its order of appearance was used in assessing rank. The top 50 nominations were selected, and the fifteen of those who were also questionnaire respondents formed the group that was analyzed. While the nominations were made bya structured sample, the group of fifteen was in no way structured.
10 Four of the five executive heads interviewed had been appointed withinthe previous two years at the time of interviewing, thus were still working out their roles. These four indicated uncertainty about role relationships in one sphere or another.
11 The history of these organizations does not support Crane's assertion that scientists are more influential in the administration than in the creation of scientific international organizations. See Crane, D., “Transnational Networks in Basic Science”, International Organization, vol. 25, no. 3 (Summer 1971), p. 597CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
12 Of 22 commissions and councils now active, seventeen were created since 1945, eight since 1960. Budgetary data permitting longitudinal comparisons were obtained for the following commissions, the percentage indicating the growth of the budget in 1970 as compared to 1960: Whaling (53 percent); Northwest Atlantic (12 percent); Halibut (75 percent); Salmon (86 percent); North Pacific (65 percent); North Pacific Fur Seal (12 percent); Inter-American Tropical Tuna (76 percent); Northeast Atlantic (116 percent).
13 It should be recalled that the world fish catch increased from 33 million metric tons in 1958 to 64 million metric tons in 1968. The doubling in the economic importance of the product, however, was not accompanied by any dramatic increase in the staff and facilities of the commissions. Nor did growing concern about depletion or the argument about inefficient and inequitable social and economic allocation find an echo in a different modus operandiof the commissions.
14 Ruggio's argument that the growth of international organization is determined by a balance between the need to become dependent upon others for the performance of tasks and also the desire to keep that dependence to a minimum level makes a similar point.See Ruggie, J. G., “Collective Goods and Future International Collaboration”, American Political Science Review, vol. 66, nc. 3 (09 1972), pp. 874–901CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
15 See Gulland, J., Fishery Management and the Needs ofDeveloping Countries in Rothschild, B. D. (ed.), World Fisheries Policy (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1972), p. 182Google Scholar.
