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Three models of the future

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 May 2009

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Extract

Edward Hallet Carr observed that “the science of economics presupposes a given political order, and cannot be profitably studied in isolation from politics.” Throughout history, the larger configurations of world politics and state interests have in large measure determined the framework of the international economy. Succeeding imperial and hegemonic powers have sought to organize and maintain the international economy in terms of their economic and security interests.

Type
Section I
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 1975

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References

1 Carr, Edward Hallet, The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919–1939 (London: Macmillan and Co., 1951), p. 117Google Scholar.

2 This theme is developed in Robert Gilpin, “The Politics of Transnational Economic Relations”, International Organization 25 (Summer 1971): 398419Google Scholar. This article was part of a special issue of the journal, entitled “Transnational Relations and World Politics”, which was edited by Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., and was subsequently published under the same title as a book by Harvard University Press in 1972.

3 Preeg, Ernest, Traders and Diplomats (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1970), p. lGoogle Scholar.

4 Bergsten, C. Fred, “The New Economics and U.S. Foreign Policy”, Foreign Affairs 50 (01 1972): 199222Google Scholar.

5 Vernon, Raymond, Sovereignty at Bay (New York: Basic Books, 1971)Google Scholar.

6 Johnson, Harry G., International Economic Questions Facing Britain, the United States, and Canada in the 70's, British-North American Research Association, 06 1970, p. 24Google Scholar.

7 Huntington, Samuel, “Transnational Organizations in World Politics”, World Politics 25 (04 1973): 361CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

8 Morse, Edward, “Crisis Diplomacy, Interdependence, and the Politics of International Economic Relations”, World Politics 24, supplement (Spring 1972): 123–50CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

9 Keohane and Nye.

10 Morgenthau, Hans, “Western Values and Total War”, Commentary, 10 1961, p. 280Google Scholar.

11 Quoted, in New York Times Magazine, 29 10 1972, p. 58Google Scholar.

12 Diebold, John, “Multinational Corporations-Why be Scared of Them?”, Foreign Policy, no. 12 (Fall 1973): 7995CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

13 The Future of International Business”, The Economist, 22 01 1972Google Scholar.

14 Diebold, p. 87.

15 The literature on dependencia, or underdevelopment, has now become legend. One of the better statements of this thesis is Sunkel, Osvaldo, “Big Business and ‘Dependencia’: A Latin American View”, Foreign Affairs 50 (04 1972): 517–31Google Scholar. For an excellent and critical view of the dependencia thesis, see Cohen, Benjamin J., The Question of Imperialism-The Political Economy of Dominance and Dependence (New York: Basic Books, 1973)Google Scholar, chapter 6.

16 “The Multinational Corporation and the Law of Uneven Development”, in Economics and World Order-From the 1970's to the 1990's, ed. Bhagwati, Jagdish (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1972), p. 113Google Scholar and passim.

17 Ibid., 114.

18 Quoted in Cohen, pp. 190–91.

19 Monopoly Capital—An Essay on the American Economic and Social Order (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1966)Google Scholar.

20 Vaitsos, Constantine, ‘Transfer of Resources and Preservation of Monopoly Rents”, Economic Development Report No. 168, Development Advisory Service, Harvard University, 1970Google Scholar. (Mimeographed.)

21 See, for example,Calleo, David and Rowland, Benjamin, America and the World Political Economy (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1973)Google Scholar. Mercantilism is also the real theme ofMandel's, ErnestEurope vs. America-Contradictions of Imperialism (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970)Google Scholar.

22 Vietnam-generated inflation was also a factor in the decline of American competitiveness in the late 1960s. But mercantilists and others (such as Richard Nelson and Michael Boretsky) respond that it is precisely because the US has lost much of its technological lead in products and industrial processes that pure competition has become so important. For an analysis of this debate, seeBoffey, Philip, “Technology and World Trade: Is There Cause for Alarm?”, Science, 2 04 1971Google Scholar.

23 I have benefited very much from the as yet unpublished writings of Kendall Myers on this subject. Myers's manuscript entitled “Appeasement and Nazi Germany-Regional Blocs or Universalism” was the basis of a seminar held at the Lehrman Institute in New York. See also the reflections of Kuznets, Simon, Modern Economy Growth (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966)Google Scholar. The issue, of course, is fundamental to the radical and Marxist critique of capitalism.

24 Ernest Mandel, in his Europe vs. America, is more malevolent mercantilist than Marxist in his argument.

25 Calleo and Rowland.

26 For a recent analysis of this issue, see Preeg, Ernest, Economic Blocs and U.S. Policy (Washington, D.C.: National Planning Association, 1974)Google Scholar.

27 This paradox is analyzed by Staley, Eugene, World Economy in Transition(New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1939), chapter 6, especially p. 15Google Scholar.

28 For an excellent examination of this relationship, see Huntington.

29 SeeBergsten, C. Fred, “The Threat From The Third World”, Foreign Policy, no. 11 (Summer 1973): 102–24CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

30 See, for example,Safarian, A. E., Foreign Ownership of Canadian Industry (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973)Google Scholar.

31 This point is developed in US Congress, Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, The Multinational Corporation and the National Interest (report prepared for the Committee), 93rd Cong., 1st sess., 1973, Committee print.

32 Marx, Karl, “The Future Results of British Rule in India”, in Karl Marx on Colonialism and Modernization, ed. Avineri, Shlomo (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1968), pp. 125–31Google Scholar.

33 Cohen, chapter 6.

34 This distinction is developed byGriffin, Keith, Underdevelopment in Spanish America (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1969), p. 117Google Scholar.

35 For a more detailed analysis of the distinction, seeGould, J. D., Economic Growth in History (London: Methuen and Co., 1972)Google Scholar, chapter 1.

36 A forceful statement of this position is Raymond Vernon'sRogue Elephant in the Forest: An appraisal of Transatlantic Relations”, Foreign Affairs 51 (04 1973): 573–87CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

37 SeeSchmidt, Helmut, “The Struggle for the Global Product”, Foreign Affairs 52 (04 1974): 437–51CrossRefGoogle Scholar.