Research Article
Moral Limit and Possibility in World Politics
- Richard Price
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- Published online by Cambridge University Press:
- 03 April 2008, pp. 191-220
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At what point does one reasonably concede that the “realities” of world politics require compromise from cherished principles or moral ends, and how does one know when an ethical limit has been reached? Since social constructivist analyses of the development of moral norms explain how moral change occurs in world politics, that agenda should provide insightful leverage on the ethical question of “what to do.” This article identifies contributions of a constructivist research agenda for theorizing moral limit and possibility in global political dilemmas.
I thank the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada for its support of a workshop on Moral Limit and Possibility in World Politics, held at the University of British Columbia in Vancouver in September 2005. I thank the participants of that workshop for their input into this article; it is part of a collaborative project and their contributions are too numerous to mention by name. Versions of this article were also presented to the University of Minnesota International Relations Colloquium, the University of British Columbia International Relations Colloquium, at the Australian National University, at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting 2006, and at the University of Chicago Program on International Politics, Economics and Security; I am grateful to participants in these venues for their invaluable questions and comments, as well as to the students in my courses upon whom I vetted a number of the ideas in this project. Thanks also to the reviewers and editors of IO for their rigorous comments. Finally, thanks also to Alana Tiemessen and Scott Watson for research assistance along the way.
Assessing the Complex Evolution of Norms: The Rise of International Election Monitoring
- Judith Kelley
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- Published online by Cambridge University Press:
- 03 April 2008, pp. 221-255
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Given that states have long considered elections a purely domestic matter, the dramatic growth of international election monitoring in the 1990s was remarkable. Why did states allow international organizations and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to interfere and why did international election monitoring spread so quickly? Why did election monitoring become institutionalized in so many organizations? Perhaps most puzzling, why do countries invite monitors and nevertheless cheat? This article develops a rigorous method for investigating the causal mechanisms underlying the rise of election monitoring, and “norm cascades” more generally. The evolution and spread of norms, as with many other social processes, are complex combinations of normative, instrumental, and other constraints and causes of action. The rise of election monitoring has been driven by an interaction of instrumentalism, emergent norms, and fundamental power shifts in the international system. By dissecting this larger theoretical complexity into specific subclaims that can be empirically investigated, this article examines the role of each of these causal factors, their mutual tensions, and their interactive contributions to the evolution of election monitoring.
Versions of this article were presented at annual meetings of the International Studies Association and the American Political Science Association, and at a conference at Northwestern University. I thank Michael Barnett, Valarie Bunce, Jeff Checkel, Gary Goertz, Ian Hurd, Bruce Jentleson, Peter Katzenstein, Fritz Mayer, Layna Mosley, Arturo Santa-Cruz, and three anonymous reviewers for comments on earlier drafts. I am grateful to Lenka Siroki and Valentino Nikolova for research assistance. This material is based on work supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. 0550111. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation.
The Logic of Practicality: A Theory of Practice of Security Communities
- Vincent Pouliot
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- 03 April 2008, pp. 257-288
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This article explores the theoretical implications of the logic of practicality in world politics. In social and political life, many practices do not primarily derive from instrumental rationality (logic of consequences), norm-following (logic of appropriateness), or communicative action (logic of arguing). These three logics of social action suffer from a representational bias in that they focus on what agents think about instead of what they think from. According to the logic of practicality, practices are the result of inarticulate know-how that makes what is to be done self-evident or commonsensical. Insights from philosophy, psychology, and sociology provide empirical and theoretical support for this view. Though complementary with other logics of social action, the logic of practicality is ontologically prior because it is located at the intersection of structure and agency. Building on Bourdieu, this article develops a theory of practice of security communities arguing that peace exists in and through practice when security officials' practical sense makes diplomacy the self-evident way to solving interstate disputes. The article concludes on the methodological quandaries raised by the logic of practicality in world politics.
For helpful comments on earlier versions of this article, many thanks to Emanuel Adler, Janice Bially Mattern, Raymond Duvall, Stefano Guzzini, Jef Huysmans, Markus Kornprobst, Jennifer Mitzen, Iver Neumann, Daniel Nexon, David Welch, Alexander Wendt, and Michael Williams, as well as the journal's reviewers.
Traders, Teachers, and Tyrants: Democracy, Globalization, and Public Investment in Education
- Ben W. Ansell
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- 03 April 2008, pp. 289-322
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This article develops a model of the redistributive political economy of education spending, focusing on the role of democracy and economic openness in determining the provision of education. I argue that democratization should be associated with higher levels of public education spending, lower private education spending, and a shift from tertiary education spending toward primary education spending. Furthermore, I argue that integration with the international economy should lead to higher public education spending, conditioned on regime type and income, and should push the balance between tertiary and primary education toward states' particular comparative advantages. These propositions are tested on a data set of more than one hundred states from 1960 to 2000, using a variety of panel data techniques, including instruments for democracy. The logic of the causal mechanism developed in the formal model is also tested on a number of case histories, including the Philippines, which shows great variation in democracy and openness, and India and Malaysia, which constitute unusual cases that lie “off the diagonal” of open democracies and autarkic autocracies.
The author would like to thank Beth Simmons, Torben Iversen, Michael Hiscox, Jeffry Frieden, Jim Alt, Teri Caraway, John Freeman, Jane Gingrich, David Samuels, W. Phillips Shively, Mark Kayser, John Ahlquist, and Michael Kellerman for highly useful comments and criticisms. In addition, I thank the current and past editors, Lou Pauly, Emanuel Adler, David Stasavage, and Lisa Martin, and three anonymous reviewers for their suggestions.
Monetary Institutions, Partisanship, and Inflation Targeting
- Bumba Mukherjee, David Andrew Singer
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- 03 April 2008, pp. 323-358
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Since 1989, twenty-five countries have adopted a monetary policy rule known as inflation targeting (IT), in which the central bank commits to using monetary policy solely for the purpose of meeting a publicly announced numerical inflation target within a particular time frame. In contrast, many other countries continue to conduct monetary policy without a transparent nominal anchor. The emergence of IT has been almost completely ignored by political scientists, who instead have focused exclusively on central bank independence and fixed exchange rates as strategies for maintaining price stability. We construct a simple model that demonstrates that countries are more likely to adopt IT when there is a conformity of preferences for low-inflation monetary policy between the government and the central bank. More specifically, the combination of a right-leaning government and a central bank without bank regulatory authority is likely to be associated with the adoption of IT. Results from a spatial autoregressive probit model estimated on a time-series cross-sectional data set of seventy-eight countries between 1987 and 2003 provide strong statistical support for our argument. The model controls for international diffusion from neighboring countries by accounting for spatial dependence in the dependent variable, but our results indicate that domestic interests and institutions—rather than the influence of neighboring countries—drive the adoption of IT.
We thank David Bearce, Bill Bernhard, Cristina Bodea, Lawrence Broz, Bill Clark, Nate Jensen, Phil Keefer, David Leblang, Eric Reinhardt, Shanker Satyanath, Jerome Vandenbussche, Robert Walker, Tom Willett, and the editors and anonymous reviewers for helpful comments and suggestions. We also thank Sergio Bejar and Jon Bischof for research assistance. Earlier versions of this article were presented at the first annual International Political Economy Society meeting, the 11th annual conference of the International Society for New Institutional Economics, and the 2007 annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association; we thank the conference participants for their feedback and suggestions. Mukherjee thanks the Niehaus Center for Globalization and Governance at Princeton University for research support.
The European Union, Capacity Building, and Transnational Networks: Combating Violence Against Women Through the Daphne Program
- Celeste Montoya
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- Published online by Cambridge University Press:
- 03 April 2008, pp. 359-372
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One of the ways that international organizations promote policy agendas is through the use of management strategies, including initiatives that focus on domestic capacity building. As the European Union (EU) has evolved, it has used management strategies to expand its influence over a multitude of policy issues in innovative ways. This research note provides an empirical examination of how the EU has used capacity building strategies in an effort to address violence against women. In particular, I focus on EU efforts to build the capacity of domestic advocacy organizations through the distribution of resources and the facilitation of transnational networking. By using data I collected on the Daphne program, the EU's primary mechanism for addressing gender violence, and by employing both qualitative and social network analysis, I provide empirical evidence that demonstrates how the EU has provided new political opportunities for domestic organizations to improve their capacity to combat violence against women.
I would like to acknowledge the following people for their comments and support at various stages of this project: Lee Ann Banaszak, Steven Bloom, Tobin Grant, Phil Habel, Scott McClurg, Emma Moburg-Jones, Meg Rincker, Steve Shulman, Fred Solt, Gina Yannitell Reinhardt, Michelle Wade, and anonymous reviewers.