Research Article
Coercion Through IOs: The Security Council and the Logic of Information Transmission
- Alexander Thompson
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- 04 January 2006, pp. 1-34
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Why do powerful states often channel coercive policies through international organizations (IOs)? The article explains this phenomenon by theorizing the political advantages of working through a neutral institution, defined as one with heterogeneous and representative member preferences. The argument centers on the notion of strategic information transmission. IO involvement sends information about the coercer's intentions and the consequences of the coercive policy to foreign leaders and their publics, information that determines the level of international support offered to the coercing state. The logic helps explain why the United Nations Security Council plays a unique role in approving and disapproving the use of force. A case study of the 1990–91 Gulf War shows how these information transmission mechanisms work in practice and that the rationalist information argument provides more traction than a legitimacy-based alternative explanation.
For valuable comments on earlier drafts, I would like to thank Charles Glaser, Peter Gourevitch, Lloyd Gruber, Darren Hawkins, Keith Krehbiel, David Lake, Charles Lipson, Daniel Nielson, Kenneth Schultz, Duncan Snidal, Michael Tierney, Daniel Verdier, Erik Voeten, and Joel Westra, as well as participants in the PIPES workshop at the University of Chicago and the conference on Delegation to International Organizations at the University of California, San Diego. I also thank Lisa Martin and two anonymous reviewers for constructive suggestions. I am grateful to Matthew Scherbarth for research assistance and to the Mershon Center at Ohio State University for financial assistance.
Uncommon Ground: Indivisible Territory and the Politics of Legitimacy
- Stacie E. Goddard
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- 04 January 2006, pp. 35-68
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In Jerusalem, Ireland, Kosovo, and Kashmir, indivisible territory underlies much of international conflict. I argue whether or not territory appears indivisible depends on how actors legitimate their claims to territory during negotiations. Although actors choose their legitimations strategically, in order to gain a political advantage at the bargaining table, legitimation strategies have unintended structural consequences: by resonating with some actors and not others, legitimations either build ties between coalitions and allow each side to recognize the legitimacy of each other's claims, or else lock actors into bargaining positions where they are unable to recognize the legitimacy of their opponent's demands. When the latter happens, actors come to negotiations with incompatible claims, constructing the territory as indivisible. I apply this legitimation theory to Ulster, arguing this territory's indivisibility was not inevitable, but a product of actors' legitimation strategies as they battled for support over the issue of Ireland's right to self-rule.
For comments on this article, I thank Fiona Adamson, Tim Crawford, Consuelo Cruz, Ron Hassner, Jeff Herbst, Robert Jervis, Robert Keohane, Ron Krebs, Paul MacDonald, Daniel Nexon, John Padgett, Dan Reiter, Jack Snyder, Monica Toft, two anonymous reviewers, as well as participants in a seminar at the John M. Olin Institute at Harvard University. In addition, the John M. Olin Institute, the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, the Center for International Studies at Princeton University, and the Center for International Studies at the University of Southern California all provided support for this project.
Domestic Influences on International Trade Policy: Factor Mobility in the United States, 1963 to 1992
- Jeffrey W. Ladewig
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- 04 January 2006, pp. 69-103
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The constituent influences on congressional voting patterns for trade policy have long been an important field of study. A central theoretical component (explicitly or implicitly) of all these studies is the level of factor mobility that defines which constituent coalitions will form and how they will be affected. Yet the recent literature offers contradictory evidence on the current level of factor mobility. Using an original data set of economic demographics of House districts and the roll call votes of U.S. House members on trade policies from 1963 to 1992, I argue that factor mobility was relatively low in the 1960s and 1970s but was rising. The relative level of factor mobility, then, reached a pivot point in the late 1970s and was subsequently relatively high in the 1980s and 1990s. I check the robustness of these results on the expected strength of the political parties in supplying these policies and the effects of divided government.
I would like to thank Oksan Bayulgen, Sam Best, Mark Boyer, Stephen Bronars, Walter Dean Burnham, Virginia Hettinger, Alan Kessler, Peter Kingstone, Tse-Min Lin, Robert Moser, Phil Paolino, Dennis Plane, Howard Reiter, Brian Roberts, Ken Scheve, Lyle Scruggs, Mathieu Turgeon, the editor of IO, and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions. Any errors that remain are, of course, my own.
Information, Uncertainty, and the Decision to Secede
- Barbara F. Walter
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- 04 January 2006, pp. 105-135
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Since 1980 almost half of all armed conflicts have been fought between governments and ethnic minority groups over self-determination, yet surprisingly little is known about when and why these conflicts occur. The few studies that do exist focus on the deep injustices and structural conditions that may cause some groups to seek greater autonomy or independence and others not. I argue that ethnic groups are much more strategic than current theories allow. Ethnic groups decide whether to challenge based in part on whether the government has made concessions in the past, and whether the government can be expected to do so again in the future. Data on all ethnic groups for the years 1940 to 2000 reveal that ethnic groups are significantly more likely to seek self-determination if the government has acquiesced to an earlier group of separatists, and if the government is unlikely to encounter additional ethnic challengers in the future. Grievances and opportunity matter, but so does the larger strategic environment in which the government and its ethnic groups operate.
I thank Jon Caverley, Rui de Figueiredo Jr., Tanisha Fazal, Zoltan Hajnal, Oliver Kaplan, Jack Snyder, and participants at the Program on International Politics, Economics and Security at the University of Chicago for their very helpful comments and suggestions; Ted Gurr and David Quinn for their detailed information about the CIDCM data set; and Kathleen Cunningham and Idean Salehyan for excellent research assistance. Finally, I wish to thank the National Science Foundation for their support in funding this research.
Democratization and International Organizations
- Edward D. Mansfield, Jon C. Pevehouse
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- 04 January 2006, pp. 137-167
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International organizations (IOs) have become increasingly pervasive features of the global landscape. While the implications of this development have been studied extensively, relatively little research has examined the factors that prompt states to enter IOs. We argue that democratization is an especially potent impetus to IO membership. Democratizing countries are likely to enter IOs because leaders have difficulty credibly committing to sustain liberal reforms and the consolidation of democracy. Chief executives often have an incentive to solidify their position during democratic transitions by rolling back political liberalization. Entering an IO can help leaders in transitional states credibly commit to carry out democratic reforms, especially if the organization is composed primarily of democratic members. Tests of this hypothesis, based on a new data set of IOs covering the period from 1965 to 2000, confirm that democratization spurs states to join IOs.
Earlier versions of this article were presented at the 2004 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago; the 2004 annual convention of the International Studies Association, Montreal; and seminars at the State University of New York at Albany and Yale University. For helpful comments and suggestions, we are grateful to participants in these seminars and to Marc Busch, Benjamin Fordham, Yoram Haftel, Lisa Martin, Timothy McKeown, Helen Milner, Ronald Mitchell, Andrew Moravcsik, B. Peter Rosendorff, Bruce Russett, and two anonymous referees.
War as a Commitment Problem
- Robert Powell
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- 04 January 2006, pp. 169-203
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Although formal work on war generally sees war as a kind of bargaining breakdown resulting from asymmetric information, bargaining indivisibilities, or commitment problems, most analyses have focused on informational issues. But informational explanations and the models underlying them have at least two major limitations: they often provide a poor account of prolonged conflict, and they give an odd reading of the history of some cases. This article describes these limitations and argues that bargaining indivisibilities should really be seen as commitment problems. The present analysis then shows that a common mechanism links three important kinds of commitment problem: (1) preventive war, (2) preemptive attacks arising from first-strike or offensive advantages, and (3) conflicts resulting from bargaining over issues that affect future bargaining power. In each case, large, rapid shifts in the distribution of power can lead to war. Finally, the analysis elaborates a distinctly different mechanism based on a comparison of the cost of deterring an attack on the status quo with the expected cost of trying to eliminate the threat to the status quo.
For helpful comments and criticisms, I thank James Fearon, Hein Goemans, Lisa Martin, Sebastian Mazzuca, Branislav Slantchev, and seminar participants at the University of Montreal–McGill Research Group in International Security, the Institute in Mathematical Behavioral Sciences, University of California, Irvine, and University of California, Santa Barbara. I also gratefully acknowledge the support of the National Science Foundation (SES-0315037).
Funding Self-Sustaining Development: The Role of Aid, FDI and Government in Economic Success
- Stephen Kosack, Jennifer Tobin
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- 04 January 2006, pp. 205-243
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This article challenges a long-held development-policy assumption that aid and foreign-direct investment (FDI) serve as substitutes or complements in accelerating the development of the world's poorer countries. We show both theoretically and empirically that aid and FDI affect development differently. Aid contributes powerfully to both economic growth and human development, and the higher the level of human capital in a country, the more aid contributes. By contrast, FDI, at best, has no effect on economic growth and actually slows the rate of human development in less-developed countries. We find no evidence that the degree of democratic responsiveness in government conditions the effectiveness of either aid or FDI, although we do find that democracy independently increases human development in all but the most developed countries. Our results demonstrate that FDI and aid are not, and cannot be, substitutes in the development of the world's poorer countries. Nor even can they be thought of as complements—certainly not at mid to low levels of development. In the end, poor countries need democracy and aid, not FDI.
We are extremely grateful to Susan Rose-Ackerman, Gustav Ranis, Frances Rosenbluth, Kenneth Scheve, and participants at the Leitner Political Economy Seminar at Yale University in December 2003 for very helpful comments. We also received valuable suggestions from two anonymous reviewers. Stephen Kosack would like to thank the National Science Foundation for the support of a Graduate Research Fellowship.
RESEARCH NOTES
Institutions, Expectations, and Currency Crises
- David Leblang, Shanker Satyanath
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- 04 January 2006, pp. 245-262
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Currency crises are costly phenomena that have been exceptionally difficult to explain and predict. We comprehensively examine the relationship between political institutions and currency crises and emphasize the causal linkage between institutions, expectations, and crises. Specifically, we argue that institutional variables—particularly divided government and government turnover—increase the variance of expectations held by speculators thereby increasing the likelihood of currency crises. We test these hypotheses using three existing economic models of currency crises and find that institutional variables are not only statistically significant, but also substantially improve the ability of these models to forecast crises.
We are grateful to Helen Milner, Charles Cameron, William Bernhard, and seminar participants at the University of Wisconsin and the University of Southern California for helpful comments. Lisa Martin and our referees provided feedback that helped dramatically improve our arguments and exposition. Andy Rose, Steve Kamin, Mathieu Bussiere, and Marcel Fratzscher generously provided data and advice that helped us replicate their findings. David Leblang acknowledges financial support from the National Science Foundation (SES-0136866).
Interest Groups, Veto Points, and Electricity Infrastructure Deployment
- Witold J. Henisz, Bennet A. Zelner
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- Published online by Cambridge University Press:
- 04 January 2006, pp. 263-286
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In this article we examine the effects of interest group pressure and the structure of political institutions on infrastructure deployment by state-owned electric utilities in a panel of seventy-eight countries during the period 1970–94. We consider two factors that jointly influence the rate of infrastructure deployment: (1) the extent to which the consumer base consists of industrial consumers, which are capable of exerting discipline on political actors whose competing incentives are to construct economically inefficient “white elephants” to satisfy the demands of concentrated geographic interests, labor unions, and national engineering and construction lobbies; and (2) veto points in formal policymaking structures that constrain political actors, thereby reducing these actors' sensitivity to interest group demands. A higher fraction of industrial customers provides political actors with stronger incentives for discipline, reducing the deployment of white elephants and thus the infrastructure growth rate, ceteris paribus. Veto points reduce political actors' sensitivity to interest group demands in general and thus moderate the relationship between industrial interest group pressure and the rate of infrastructure deployment.
Both authors contributed equally and list their names alphabetically on this joint work. Both authors acknowledge funding for this research from the University of California Energy Institute. Zelner acknowledges additional funding from the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation and the Edgar F. Kaiser Chair at the Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley. Henisz acknowledges additional funding from the Reginald H. Jones Center for Management Policy, Strategy, and Organization at the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. Thanks to Severin Borenstein, Rachel Croson, José de la Torre, Alexander Dyck, Tom Gilligan, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Edward Mansfield, Mathew McCubbins, Will Mitchell, David Mowery, Jeffrey Nugent, Dennis Quinn, George Tsebelis, Joel Waldfogel, Oliver Williamson, and Jan Zabojnik for their comments on previous drafts. Any errors are the responsibility of the authors.