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The Biological Weapons Convention: An overview

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 January 2010

Jozef Goldblat
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Extract

Since ancient times, the use in war of poison and pathogenic agents has been considered a treacherous practice. It was condemned by international declarations and treaties, notably by the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) respecting the laws and customs of war on land. Efforts to strengthen this prohibition resulted in the conclusion, in 1925, of the Geneva Protocol which banned the use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, usually referred to as chemical weapons, as well as the use of bacteriological methods of warfare. The latter are now understood to include not only bacteria, but also other biological agents, such as viruses or rickettsiae which were unknown at the time the Geneva Protocol was signed. (On 1 January 1997, 132 States were party to this Protocol.) However, the Geneva Protocol did not prohibit the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and biological weapons. Attempts to achieve a complete ban were made in the 1930s in the framework of the League of Nations, but with no success.

Type
The Convention on Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons: 25 years on
Information
International Review of the Red Cross (1961 - 1997) , Volume 37 , Special Issue 318: The Convention on Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons: 25 Years On , June 1997 , pp. 251 - 265
Copyright
Copyright © International Committee of the Red Cross 1997

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Footnotes

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Jozef Goldblat is an expert on arms control issues, particularly on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. He has written extensively on these subjects and is a consultant to the UN Institute on Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). Formerly, he directed the Programme of Arms Control and Disarmament Studies at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

References

1 For the text of this Convention, as well as the texts of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, which are discussed later in this article, see Goldblat, J., Arms control: A guide to negotiations and agreements, London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi, PRIO and SAGE Publications, 1994, pp. 257, 277 and 370 Google Scholar, or Schindler, D. and Toman, J. (ed), The laws of armed conflicts, 3rd ed., Martinus Nijhoff Publishers/Henry Dunant Institute, Dordrecht/Geneva, 1988.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

2 United Nations General Assembly Resolution No.1, 24 January 1946.

3 As decided in 1948 by the UN Commission on Conventional Armaments, a subsidiary body of the UN Security Council (United Nations document S/C.3/32/Rev.1).

4 United Nations, Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and the effects of their possible use, New York, 1969.Google Scholar

5 World Health Organization, Health aspects of the use of chemical and biological weapons, Geneva, 1970.Google Scholar

6 ACDA, Documents on disarmament 1969, Washington DC, 1970, pp. 592–93.Google Scholar

7 Office of the White House Press Secretary, Press release, Washington DC, 14 02 1970.Google Scholar

8 United Nations document A/2826(XXVI).

9 This interpretation was contained in the note of 18 August 1976 addressed by the US Secretary of State to the Swiss government.

10 Disarmament Conference document CCD/PV. 542.

11 The Australia Group was founded in 1985, in the aftermath of chemical weapons' use in the Iran-Iraq war, to constrain the trade in the technologies and materials of chemical warfare. In 1990, its purview was expanded to include biological weapons.

12 Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the BW Convention, document BWC/CONF.IV/9.

13 Disarmament Conference documents CCD/PV. 585 and 655.

14 Disarmament Conference document CCD/PV. 659.

15 Disarmament Conference document CCD/PV. 666.

16 Ireland (1972), Barbados (1976), Australia (1986), New Zealand (1989), Czechoslovakia (1990), Mongolia (1990), Bulgaria (1991), Canada (1991), Chile (1991), Romania (1991), United Kingdom (1991), Spain (1992), Russia (1992), South Africa (1996), France (1996), Belgium (1997).

17 Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the BW Convention, document BWC/CONF.IV/COW/WP.2.

18 US Congressional Record-Senate, 9 March 1971.

19 United Nations Security Council Resolution 620 (1988). Guidelines and procedures for United Nations investigations were developed by a group of experts and endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 45/57C(1990).

20 Even before the BW Convention entered into force, France — not a signatory — adopted a law (No. 72–467 of 9 June 1972) prohibiting biological and toxin weapons on its territory. The wording of its main provisions is almost identical to that of the Convention. Severe punishment of violators by fines and imprisonment is provided for, and elaborate procedures are intended to ensure that the prohibitions are respected. France acceded to the Convention only in 1984.

21 United States Senate Permanent Sub-Committee on Investigations, Hearings on global proliferation of weapons of mass destruction: A case study on Aum Shinrikyo, 31 10 1995.Google Scholar

22 First and Second Biological Weapons Convention Review Conferences, documents BWC/CONF.I/10 and BWC/CONF.II/13.

23 United Nations Security Council document S/23500, 31 January 1992.

24 See Sur, S., “La résolution A/37/98 D du 13 décembre 1982 et les procedures d'enquête en cas d'usage allégué d'armes chimiques et bactériologiques (biologiques)”, Annuaire français de droit international (AFDI), 1984, pp. 93–109.Google Scholar

25 Disarmament Conference documents CCD/PV. 542 and CCD/PV. 544.

26 Descriptions of these allegations can be found in SIPRI Yearbooks. Allegations of use of biological means of warfare had also been made before the BW Convention entered into force.

27 New York Times, 19 March 1980.

28 First Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference document BWC/CONF.I/SR.12 para 29.

29 For detailed descriptions of the case see Meselson, M., “The biological weapons convention and the Sverdlovsk anthrax outbreak of 1979”, Federation of American scientists public interest report, Vol. 41(7), Washington D.C., 09 1988 Google Scholar; Harris, E., “Sverdlovsk and yellow rain: Two cases of Soviet noncompliance?”, International security, Vol. 11(4), spring 1987, pp. 45–47 Google Scholar; Flowerree, Ch. C., “Possible implications of the anthrax outbreak in Sverdlovsk on future verification of the Biological Weapons Convention: a U.S. perspective”; Lundin, S.J. (ed), Views on possible verification measures for the Biological Weapons Convention, SIPRI, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1991 Google Scholar; V. Issraelyan, “Possible implications of the anthrax outbreak in Sverdlovsk on future verification of the Biological Weapons Convention: a Soviet perspective”, ibid.

30 The White House, Report to the Congress on Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements, Washington D.C., 23 02 1990.Google Scholar

31 Chemical Weapons Convention Bulletin, No.16, 06 1992, pp. 18–19.Google Scholar

32 The allegation was in public for the first time by Secretary of State Haig in September 1981 (US Department of State, press release, 13 September 1981). More details were given in: US Department of State, Chemical warfare in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan, Special Report No.98, Report to the Congress from Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 03 22, 1982 Google Scholar; and US Department of State, Chemical warfare in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan: An update, Special Report No. 104, by Secretary of State George P. Shultz, 11 11, 1982.Google Scholar

33 A UN expert team, dispatched by the Secretary-General in 1981 and 1982, was not able to shed more light on the issue (UN documents A/36/613 Annex and A/37/259).

34 For an analysis of the Yellow Rain case, disputing the allegations, see Robinson, J. P., Guillemin, J., Meselson, M., “Yellow rain in Southeast Asia: The story collapses”, Wright, S. (ed), Preventing a biological arms race, MIT Press, Cambridge Mass., 1990.Google Scholar

35 They might, perhaps, be militarily more useful for area denial.

36 United Nations Security Council document S/1995/864.

37 Statement by the Director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to the BW Convention Review Conference, 26 November 1996.