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Force versus law: The International Committee of the Red Cross and chemical warfare in the Italo-Ethiopian war 1935–1936
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 23 November 2010
Extract
During World War I, chemical warfare agents were widely used for the first time on all major fronts with an unprecedented number of casualties, and immediately after the war attempts were made to outlaw this latest weapon. Responsibility for the drafting of specific laws fell to the League of Nations, reflecting the belief that this was a matter of concern for the whole world, not just for the victors in the war. On 17 June 1925, the Geneva Protocol for the prohibition of the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and of bacteriological methods of warfare was signed by 26 States.3 It contained a categorical prohibition to resort to chemical and biological warfare. The signature of the Protocol raised high hopes of an effective ban on chemical warfare, but adherence progressed slowly. A number of States, visibly not trusting the Protocol to be implemented in the forthright manner suggested by the text, made major reservations.
- Type
- Research Article
- Information
- International Review of the Red Cross (1961 - 1997) , Volume 38 , Issue 322 , March 1998 , pp. 81 - 104
- Copyright
- Copyright © International Committee of the Red Cross 1998
References
1 “lln'y a plus de possibilité de “caritas inter arma”, c'est la guerre à outrance pure et simple, sans distinction aucune entre l'armée nationale et la population civile, et quant a lapauvre Croix-Rouge, il est Men naturel qu'elle soit engloutie dans lesflots.” Archives of the International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva (hereafter “ICRC Archives”), Rapports des délégués. No. 13, 25 March 1936 Google Scholar . — Note: all translations of original French extracts from ICRC Archives by the author.
2 “M”e Odier: (…) Comment concilier le devoir du silence et celui d'exprimer les avis de la conscience humaine? Tel est le problème. Le Président: Nous nous sommes tus parce que nous ne connaissions pas la vérité. “ICRC Archives, PV Séances plénières, 1935–36, 3 July 1936.
3 For the sake of convenience, “1925 Geneva Protocol” or “1925 Protocol” is generally used in this article. Also, instead of the technically correct “chemical warfare agent”, the more familiar “poison gas” is the term used whenever appropriate.
4 Le Comité international de la Croix-Rouge aux Belligérants, Appel contre l'emploi des gaz vénéneux, 6 February 1918, ICRC Archives, CR 210, 1125.Google Scholar
5 The two main sources for this calculation are Rochat, Giorgio, “L'impiego dei gas nella guerra d'Etiopia 1935–1936” in Guerre italiane in Libia e in Etiopia, Pagus Edizioni, Paese, 1991, pp. 157–168 Google Scholar , and Gentilli, Roberto, Guerra aerea sull'Etiopia 1935–1939, EDAI, Firenze, 1992, pp. 95 and 100.Google Scholar
6 MacFie, J.W.S., An Ethiopian diary: A record of the British Ambulance Service in Ethiopia, Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1936, p. 77.Google Scholar
7 Letter from John Melly to K.N., 12 April 1936, in Nelson, K. and Sullivan, A., John Melly of Ethiopia, Faber & Faber, London, 1937, p. 240.Google Scholar
8 Sidney H. Brown (1898–1970) left the ICRC under unclear circumstances after his mission, while Marcel Junod (1904–1961) made a career in the ICRC, first as a delegate and later as member and vice-president of the ICRC.
9 The ICRC had proposed this inquiry after both sides had accused each other of misusing the Red Cross emblem.
10 Chenevière, Jacques, Retours et images, Éditions Rencontre, Lausanne, 1966, p. 254 Google Scholar . Translation by the author. — Burckhardt, in his own account of the meeting with Mussolini, described the audience quite differently and did not mention Huber's reference to poison gas. Burckhardt, Carl J., Vom Krieg und Frieden, Festschrift der Universität Zürich zum 70. Geburtstag von Max Huber, Schulthess & Co AG, Zürich, 1944, pp. 260–261.Google Scholar
11 The Italians monitored not only the internal communications of the Ethiopians through the military authorities in East Africa, but also foreign telegram traffic to and from Addis Ababa through the Ministry of Internal Affairs' special listening service. Most ICRC telegrams, including the one mentioned, can be found in Archivio Centrale dello Stato (thereafter ACS), Ministero delFInterno, Roma, P.S. 1936, Busta 1 A.
12 ACS, Fondo Graziani, Busta 18, Fasc. 21/6, 29 March 1936.
13 Joseph Avenol to the President of the ICRC, 8 April 1936, ICRC Archives, CR 210, 1042.
14 Guillaume Favre to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, 9 April 1936, ICRC Archives, CR 210, 1054.
15 Salvador de Madariaga to the President of the ICRC, 18 April 1936, ICRC Archives, CR 210, 1102.
16 Max Huber to Salvador de Madariaga, 24 April 1936, ICRC Archives, CR 210, 1123.
17 Spencer, John H., Ethiopia at bay, Reference Publications, Michigan, 1984, p. 50.Google Scholar
18 Giuseppe Motta to Légation de Suisse, Rome, 19 June 1936, Bundesarchiv Bern, E 2200 Rom 22, Schachtel 9, Question de la Croix-Rouge.
19 Paul Ruegger to Giuseppe Motta, 14 April 1936, Nachlass Paul Ruegger, Archiv fur Zeitgeschichte, ETH, Zurich, III, 15.3.3. Paul Ruegger, a student and a friend of Max Huber, joined the ICRC later and served as its President from 1948 to 1955.
20 Bugnion, Francis, Le Comité international de la Croix-Rouge et la protection des victimes de la guerre, ICRC, Geneva, 1994, p. 126.Google Scholar
21 ICRC Archives, Commission d'Éthiopie, PV 61, 8 April 1936, p. 3. The head of the secretariat, Etienne Clouzot, doubted Italy's waging of chemical warfare despite the fact that he had access to all relevant first-hand news from the field and to restricted information at headquarters. He was considered by Vinci as “our friend”, ACS, Croce Rossa Italiana (CRI), Busta 189, Fasc.10. In this context it is interesting to note that in November 1935, one month after the outbreak of the war, Clouzot was awarded the order of “Cavaliere Ufficiale de la Corona d'ltalia” in honour of his service within the ICRC and the International Relief Union. ACS, CRI, Busta 189, Fasc.1.
22 ICRC Archives, Commission d'Éthiopie, No.61, 8 April 1936, p. 2.Google Scholar
23 ICRC Archives, PV Séances plénières, 1935–36, 23 April 1936, p. 2.Google Scholar
24 Letter from Max Huber to Carl J. Burckhardt, 25 May 1936, Nachlass Max Huber, Zentralbibliothek Zürich, 2.75, Umschlag IV/1936.
25 Max Huber to Filippo Cremonesi, 12 April 1936, ICRC Archives, CR 210, 1073.
26 Some 100 tonnes of mustard gas bombs were used during this period, according to a detailed breakdown made by Gentilli, op. cit. (note 5), pp. 182–183. In the ICRC documents consulted, there is no mention of continuing chemical warfare in Ethiopia after 5 May 1936.
27 Filippo Cremonesi to Max Huber, 11 May 1936, ICRC Archives, CR 210, 1203. — Original: Italian.
28 In fact, this justification was a pure lie. The possibility of chemical warfare had been envisaged from the beginning when the first preparations were made. During the war, Mussolini justified the use of gas “as ultima ratio to overcome enemy resistance” (27 October 1935), “for supreme reasons of defence” (16 December 1935) and even just “in case of necessity” (9 January 1936). Arguments such as “the enemy's methods of war” were not used until 28 December 1935. Giorgio, Rochat, Il colonialismo italiano, Loescher editore, Torino, pp. 168–169.Google Scholar
29 Max Huber to Cremonesi, 26 May 1936, ICRC Archives, CR 210, 1249.
30 19 May 1936, ICRC Archives, CR 210, 1237.
31 As soon as the Italians reached Addis Ababa, the fate of the Ethiopian Red Cross Society was sealed. It ceased to exist officially on 3 June 1936.
32 Note by Max Huber, 25 May 1936, ICRC Archives, CR 210, 1243.
33 Carl J. Burckhardt to Felix Moeschlin, 12 February 1940, Carl Jacob Burckhardt Archiv, University of Basel, B II 46 a).
34 With respect to gas warfare, ICRC policy underwent a complete change after World War II. In 1967, in the Yemeni conflict, the ICRC was confronted with the use of poison gas by one party, as in the Italo-Ethiopian war, and this was corroborated by ICRC staff in the field. They did not witness its use directly, but gathered substantial evidence. This time, the ICRC did not remain silent on a matter of methods of warfare. Twice it publicly condemned the use of such a means and it followed up with a memorandum to the signatories of the Geneva Conventions. Bugnion, op. cit. (note 20), p. 1103.
35 Bugnion, op. cit. (note 20), p. 172.