¹ See Bulletin international des Sociétés de la Croix-Rouge. ICRC, Geneva, April 1918.Google Scholar

² Vifluege, a village near Ypres.

³ The opinion has been expressed that this article XXIII (a) does not apply to gas: “it has not been applied generally by States in connexion with poison gas. One reason is that article XXIII (a) was formulated when the experience of mankind did not encompass poison in terms of gas but in terms of poisoned water or food, or poisoned arrows. This codification of custom reflected the past, not the unknown future.” ( Kelly, Major J. Burns, “Gas Warfare in International Law”, Military Law Review, Washington, 1960, p. 44).Google Scholar

⁴ Cf. inter alia, Major J. Burns Kelly, op. cit., p. 59.Google Scholar

⁵ Resolution XXIII of the International Conference on Human Rights (Teheran, April–May 1968), in its fourth preambular paragraph, mentions napalm: “Considering, also, that the widespread violence and brutality of our times, including massacres, summary executions, tortures, inhuman treatment of prisoners, killing of civilians in armed conflicts and the use of chemical and biological means of warfare, including napalm bombing, erode human rights and engender counter-brutality…”

⁶ Cf. Fischer, Georges: “L'emploi des armes chimiques et bactériologiques” in Le Monde Diplomatique, 01 1970.Google Scholar

⁷ On tear gas, Professor Meselson of Harvard University expressed the following opinion in Bulletin of Atomic Scientists (01 1970, p. 31):Google Scholar

“I would like to express the opinion that the question of tear gas might be approached as follows. On the one hand, there is no question that there is a danger of escalation when any gas is used.

On the other hand, it might be felt that tear gas is a useful weapon and under some conditions might actually cause less fatalities than other means.

I would point out that one should expect any gas to be used in conjunction with other weapons, and that, therefore, even tear gas, although it is non-lethal, would, under the conditions of war, be used to enhance the effectiveness of lethal weapons”.

⁸ “Les armes B étaient, en 1925, à peine connues. On a done interdit une arme future, et on l'a prohibée sans restriction, sans tenir compte des possibilités de développement dont cette arme était capable, et sachant évidemment qu'il existe des bactéries banales à effet simplement incapacitant.” ( Meyrowitz, H., Les armes biologiques et le droit international, Paris, Ed. Pedone, 1968, p. 40 Google Scholar). For a contrary opinion cf. Major J. Burns Kelly, op. cit.

⁹ Cf. Meyrowitz, H., op. cit.; especially pp. 84 et seq.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Likewise, it has been held that the principles of the Hague Conventions and Regulations of 1907 were—and still are—customary law, whereas those of the 1949 Geneva Conventions might have become customary law (Cf. UN Secretary-General Report “Respect for Human Rights in Time of Armed Conflict”, A/7720, 20 Nov. 69; and C. Pilloud: “The Geneva Conventions—an important anniversary—1949–1969” in International Review of the Red Cross, 08 1969, p. 399 Google Scholar. See also April 1962, p. 207, and July 1966, p. 386.

¹¹ See annex for resolutions adopted on this subject by the International Conferences of the Red Cross. The more recent resolutions cover weapons of mass destruction as a whole.

Article 14 of the “Draft Rules for the Limitation of the Dangers incurred by the Civilian Population in Time of War”, submitted to the XIXth International Conference of the Red Cross in New Delhi, 1957, by the ICRC, reads as follows: “Without prejudice to the present or future prohibition of certain specific weapons, the use is prohibited of weapons whose harmful effects—resulting in particular from the dissemination of incendiary, chemical, bacteriological, radio-active or other agents—could spread to an unforeseen degree or escape, either in space or in time, from the control of those who employ them, thus endangering the civilian population.

This prohibition also applies to delayed-action weapons, the dangerous effects of which are liable to be felt by the civilian population.”

See also “The Legal Protection of Civilian Populations against the Dangers of Indiscriminate Warfare” (ICRC Reports, June 1963 and March 1965).

On the same subject, the Institute of International Law, at its Edinburgh Session, in September 1969, adopted a resolution entitled “The distinction between military objectives and non-military objects in general and particularly the problems associated with weapons of mass destruction”, operative paragraph 7 of which states that:

“Existing international law prohibits the use of all weapons which, by their nature, affect indiscriminately both military objectives and non-military objects, or both armed forces and civilian populations. In particular, it prohibits the use of weapons the destructive effect of which is so great that it cannot be limited to specific military objectives or is otherwise uncontrollable (self-generating weapons) as well as of blind weapons.”

¹² See International Review of the Red Cross, 02 1967, p. 59 Google Scholar, and January 1968, p. 3.

¹³ These resolutions were adopted as follows:

No. 2162 B: For 91; Against 0; Abstentions 26.

No. 2444: unanimously.

No. 2454: For 107; Against 0; Abstentions 26.

These three resolutions are to be found in the annex to our report DS4 a, b, e: “Reaffirmation and Development of the Laws and Customs applicable in Armed Conflicts”.

¹⁴ Report of the Secretary-General on Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of their Possible Use. A/7575, 1 July 1969.

¹⁵ No. 2603A. Adopted by 80 in favour, 3 against, with 36 abstentions.

¹⁶ According to ICRC Press Release No. 829, of 2 June 1967: “…the ICRC doctors, on arrival at the site, immediately gave treatment to some of the wounded and collected indications pointing to the use of poison gas. Extremely disturbed and concerned by these methods of warfare which are absolutely forbidden by codified international and customary law, the ICRC at once communicated its delegates' reports to all authorities concerned… requesting them to take the solemn engagement not to resort in any circumstances whatsoever to the use of asphyxiating gases or any other similar toxic substances”.

¹⁷ Non-Governmental Organizations in Consultative Status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council.

¹⁸ Several of the consultants had already submitted papers to the London Conference on Biological and Chemical Warfare (cf. International Review of the Red Cross, 03 1970).Google Scholar

¹⁹ See Health Aspects of Chemical and Biological Weapons, pp. 20–21, Section 9.Google Scholar

²⁰ It would be unjust not to mention the remarkable studies carried out by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), which will shortly be bringing out a six-volume publication The problem of chemical and biological warfare. Part I—History; Part II—Weapons, military doctrines, national policies; Part III—CBW at the League of Nations and the United Nations, 1920–1969; Part IV—Verification; Part V—International Law; Part VI—Possible steps to avoid CB warfare.