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Biometric data flows and unintended consequences of counterterrorism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 January 2022

Katja Lindskov Jacobsen
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Abstract

Examining unintended consequences of the makings and processing of biometric data in counterterrorism and humanitarian contexts, this article introduces a two-fold framework through which it analyzes biometric data-makings and flows in Afghanistan and Somalia. It combines Tilley's notion of “living laboratory” and Larkin's notion of infrastructure into a framework that attends to the conditions under which biometric data is made and to subsequent flows of such data through data-sharing agreements or unplanned access. Exploring such unintended consequences, attention needs to be paid to the variety of actors using biometrics for different purposes yet with data flows across such differences. Accordingly, the article introduces the notion of digital intervention infrastructures, with biometric databases as one dimension.

Keywords

biometric datainfrastructurehumanitarian actorscounterterrorismunintended consequencesliving laboratoriesdata-sharing
Type
State responses to terrorism
Information
International Review of the Red Cross , Volume 103 , Issue 916-917: Counterterrorism, sanctions and war , April 2021 , pp. 619 - 652
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the ICRC.

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Footnotes

*

Acknowledgements: This article has been underway for some time and many people have contributed in different ways, during various workshops (thanks to Lucy Suchman, Claudia Aradau, Rocco Bellanova and Linda Monsees among others) and seminars (thanks to several colleagues at the University of Copenhagen, particularly Kevin Heller and Anine Hagemann). The research was carried out as part of a Norwegian Research Council-funded project (DoNoHarm) – in the framework of which I was truly fortunate to work with amazing colleagues Kristin Sandvik (principal investigator) and Larissa Fast. Thanks also to Karl Steinacker for extremely valuable inputs and conversations over the years, to two very helpful student assistants at CMS, to three anonymous reviewers for very helpful and constructive comments, and to Editor-in-Chief Bruno Demeyere.

References

1 Biometric data are “personal data resulting from specific technical processing relating to the physical, physiological or behavioural characteristics of a natural persons, which allow or confirm the unique identification of that natural person”; see European Union (EU), General Data Protection Regulation, Regulation (EU) 2016/679, 27 April 2016, OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, pp. 1–88, Art. 4(14); and EU, Directive (EU) 2016/680, 27 April 2016, OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, pp. 89–131, Art. 3(13). See Kindt, Els, “A First Attempt at Regulating Biometric Data in the European Union”, in Kak, Amba (ed.), Regulating Biometrics: Global Approaches and Urgent Questions, AI Now Institute, September 2020Google Scholar, available at: https://ainowinstitute.org/regulatingbiometrics.html (all internet references were accessed in December 2021).

2 John D. Woodward, “Biometrics: Facing up to Terrorism”, Issue Paper IP-218, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, October 2001, available at: https://www.rand.org/pubs/issue_papers/IP218.html.

3 See the BRIAR Program: Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA), “Biometric Recognition and Identification at Altitude and Range”, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, IARPA, available at: https://www.iarpa.gov/research-programs/briar.

4 GAO, “DOD Biometrics and Forensics: Progress Made in Establishing Long-term Deployable Capabilities, But Further Actions are Needed”, Washington, DC, 7 August 2017, available at: https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-17-580. See also Nina Toft Djanegara, Biometrics and Counter-Terrorism. Case Study of Iraq and Afghanistan, Privacy International, London, May 2021, available at: https://privacyinternational.org/sites/default/files/2021-06/Biometrics%20for%20Counter-Terrorism-%20Case%20study%20of%20the%20U.S.%20military%20in%20Iraq%20and%20Afghanistan%20-%20Nina%20Toft%20Djanegara%20-%20v6.pdf.

5 For a critical assessment of how the collection of biometrics data has “been touted as uniquely suited to twenty-first century threats,” see, for example, the detailed reports published by Privacy International, “Biometrics Collection Under The Pretext Of Counter-Terrorism”, 28 May 2021.

6 Suchman, Lucy, Follis, Karolina and Weber, , “Tracking and Targeting: Sociotechnologies of (In)security,” Science, Technology & Human Values, Vol. 42, No. 6, 2017CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Agius, Christine, “Ordering Without Bordering: Drones, The Unbordering of Late Modern Warfare and Ontological Insecurity”, Postcolonial Studies, Vol. 20, No. 6, 2017CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

7 Following Jasanoff's definition, sociotechnical imaginaries are “collectively held and performed visions of desirable futures” that are “animated by shared understandings of forms of social life and social order attainable through, and supportive of, advances in science and technology.” See Jasanoff, Sheila, “Future Imperfection: Science, Technology, and the Imaginations of Modernity”, in Jasanoff, Sheila and Kim, Sang-Hyun, Dreamscapes of Modernity: Sociotechnical Imaginaries and the Fabrication of Power, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 2015, p. 25CrossRefGoogle Scholar. On biometric data-sharing in the context of counterterror, see, for example, Privacy International, Briefing to the UN Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate on the Responsible Use and Sharing of Biometric Data to Tackle Terrorism, London, June 2019, available at: https://privacyinternational.org/sites/default/files/2019-07/PI%20briefing%20on%20biometrics%20final.pdf.

8 Larkin, Brian, “The Politics and Poetics of Infrastructure”, Annual Review of Anthropology, Vol. 42, No. 1, October 2013CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Hönke, Jana and Cuesta-Fernandez, Ivan, “Mobilising Security and Logistics Through an African Port: A Controversies Approach to Infrastructure”, Mobilities, Vol. 13, No. 2, January 2018CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

9 Bellanova, Rocco, Irion, Kristina, Jacobsen, Katja Lindskov, Ragazzi, Francesco, Saugmann, Rune and Suchman, Lucy, “Toward a Critique of Algorithmic Violence”, International Politics Sociology, Vol. 15, No. 1, March 2021Google Scholar.

10 Anonymous interview, November 2021.

11 Keren Weitzberg, Biometrics and Counter-Terrorism: Case Study of Somalia, Report, Privacy International, 28 May 2021; Olwig, Karen Fog, Grünenberg, Kristina, Møhl, Perle and Simonsen, Anja, The Biometric Border World: Technology, Bodies and Identities on the Move, 1st ed., Routledge, Oxon and New York, 2020Google Scholar; Jacobsen, Katja Lindskov and Fast, Larissa, “Rethinking Access: How Humanitarian Technology Governance Blurs Control and Care”, Disasters, Vol. 43, No. 2, 2019CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed; Madianou, Mirca, “The Biometric Assemblage: Surveillance, Experimentation, Profit, and the Measuring of Refugee Bodies”, Television & New Media, Vol. 20, No. 6, 2021Google Scholar.

12 Gus Hosein and Carly Nyst, Aiding Surveillance: An Exploration of How Development and Humanitarian Aid Initiatives are Enabling Surveillance in Developing Countries, Report, Privacy International, 2013; Human Rights Watch, “UN Shared Rohingya Data Without Informed Consent”, 15 June 2021, available at: https://international-review.icrc.org/sites/default/files/reviews-pdf/2021-08/2021-guidelines-for-authors-irrc.pdf; Adam Moe Fejerskov, Maria-Louise Clausen and Sarah Seddig, Risks of Technology Use in Humanitarian Settings. Avoiding Harm, Delivering Impact, Policy Brief, Danish Institute for International Studies, 17 August 2021; Elise Thomas, “Tagged, Tracked and in Danger: How the Rohingya Got Caught in the UN's Risky Biometric Database”, WIRED, 12 March 2018, available at: https://www.wired. co.uk/article/united-nations-refugees-biometric-database-rohingya-myanmar-bangladesh.

13 B. Larkin, above note 8. As opposed to a narrower focus on material dimensions only (roads, pipes, cables, etc.), Larkin suggests with his attention to dreams and imaginaries, that immaterial components are also important. In our case, success stories and imaginaries, that biometric infrastructures produce and carry, for example affect the future rollout (or not) of biometric databases.

14 “The SCC [Somalia Cash Consortium] piloted biometric interoperability with WFP's SCOPE in 2018”; see Boniface Owino, Harmonizing Registrations and Identification in Emergencies in Somalia, Development Initiatives, Nairobi, 29 August 2019, available at: https://devinit.org/documents/67/Report_Harmonising-registrations-and-identification-in-emergencies-in-Somalia.pdf.

15 Regarding the conditions under which biometric data is produced, several contexts deserve attention. Scholars have for example explored how force is experienced by Somali individuals in their encounters with biometrics in European asylum systems beyond Somalia: “Forced to have his fingerprints registered, Mukhtaar experienced first-hand what European humanitarian care could entail for asylum-seekers”; see Simonsen, Anja, “Fleeting (Biometric) Encounters: Care and Control at Italian Border Sites”, in Olwig, Karen Fog, Grünenberg, Kristina, Møhl, Perle and Simonsen, Anja (eds), The Biometric Border World: Technology, Bodies and Identities on the Move, 1st ed., Routledge, Oxon and New York, 2019, p. 135Google Scholar.

16 Tilley focuses on colonial Africa and how global power inequalities are (re)made in non-Western laboratories. She unpacks the entanglements of “fact-gathering” (p. 8) research and colonial-time “intelligence” (p. 4) to show how scientific endeavours were linked to broader colonial aims: Helen Tilley, Africa as a Living Laboratory: Empire, Development, and the Problem of Scientific Knowledge, 1870–1950, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 2011.

17 H. Tilley, above note 16, p. 2.

18 Ibid., pp. 1–2.

19 See, for example, Naomi Cohen, “‘Do No Digital Harm’: A Conversation on Handling Sensitive Data”, October 2018, The New Humanitarian, where panelists discuss this issue of consent noting for example how: (a) “We deal with people that sometimes have a very low level of education or data literacy. How can we pass all these messages about new technology or even more basic messages? And from a data protection point of view, it is, how can we say that consent is informed and valid?” (panelist Maria-Elena Ciccolini); and (b) “The humanitarian space is probably home to what must be the biggest power asymmetry between the people who are gathering the data versus the people from whom the data is being gathered … I think the way in which we see the power asymmetry playing out is in ownership of the data.” (panelist Zara Rahman)

20 Observers note that the DoD's goal was to register 80% of the Afghan population: see Annie Jacobsen, First Platoon A Story of Modern War in the Age of Identity Dominance, Penguin, Dutton, 2021. Others note that the DoD “stores biometric data on more than seven million people, mostly from war zones”; see Matthias Monroy, “NATO Establishes Biometric Database, US Military has it Already”, Matthias Monroy, 8 November 2019, available at: https://digit.site36.net/2019/11/08/nato-establishes-biometric-database-us-military-has-it-already/; Thales, “Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) Overview – A Short History”, Thales, 18 June 2021, available at: https://www.thalesgroup.com/en/markets/digital-identity-and-security/government/biometrics/afis-history; Delores M. Etter, Jeniffer Webb and John Howard, “Collecting Large Biometric Datasets: A Case Study in Applying Software Best Practices”, CrossTalk, May/June 2014, available at: http://jjhoward.org/pubs/collecting-large-biometric-datasets.pdf. It remains unknown to what extent the DoD reached its 80% goal.

21 Dave Gershgorn, “Exclusive: This is How the U.S. Military's Massive Facial Recognition System Works”, OneZero Medium, 6 November 2019, available at: https://onezero.medium.com/exclusive-this-is-how-the-u-s-militarys-massive-facial-recognition-system-works-bb764291b96d.

22 Army, Marine Corps, Navy and Air Force, “Biometrics: Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Tactical Employment of Biometrics in Support of Operations”, Air Land Sea Application (ALSA), April 2014, p. 7, available at: https://www.marines.mil/Portals/1/MCRP%203-33.1J%20BIOMETRICS%201.pdf.

23 Thom Shanker, “To Track Militants, U.S. has System that Never Forgets a Face”, New York Times, 13 July 2011, available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/14/world/asia/14identity.html.

24 Ibid.

25 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for highlighting this important point.

26 United States Government Accountability Office, “Defense Biometrics: Additional Training for Leaders and More Timely Transmission of Data Could Enhance the Use of Biometrics in Afghanistan”, GAO Report Number GAO-12-442, 23 April 2012, available at: https://www.gao.gov/assets/600/590318.txt; see also Noah Schactman, “Army Reveals Afghan Biometric ID Plan; Millions Scanned, Carded by May”, WIRED, 24 September 2010, available at: https://www.wired.com/2010/09/afghan-biometric-dragnet-could-snag-millions/.

27 U.S. DHS, “Enhancing Security Through Biometric Identification”, available at: https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/usvisit/usvisit_edu_biometrics_brochure_english.pdf.

28 T. Shanker, above note 23.

29 Ibid.

30 Spencer Ackerman, “Biometrics Help Nab Afghan Prison Escapees”, WIRED, 14 July 2011, available at: https://www.wired.com/2011/07/biometrics-help-nab-afghan-prison-escapees/; T'ash Spenser, “Afghanistan Using Biometrics on Wide Scale for Security”, BiometricUpdate, 9 July 2012, available at: https://www.biometricupdate.com/201207/afghanistan-using-biometrics-on-wide-scale-for-security.

31 Jon Boone, “Afghanistan's Great Escape: How 480 Taliban Prisoners Broke out of Jail”, The Guardian, 25 April 2011, available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/apr/25/afghanistan-great-escape-taliban.

32 T. Shanker, above note 23.

33 Gold, Steve, “Military Biometrics on the Frontline”, Biometric Technology Today, Vol. 2010, No. 10, 2010CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

34 According to NATO, the aim of AABIS is “to monitor movements of militants around Afghanistan, as well as keep Taliban infiltrators out of the Afghan army” (ibid.). “[T]he data captured in the field is collated and used in real time and in the field then batch processed and relayed to Kabul where it is stored centrally and replicated to other databases across Afghanistan and back in the U.S.” (ibid.).

35 The database is maintained at the Ministry of the Interior; see Afghan War News, “Afghan Automated Biometrics Information System (AABIS)”, available at: https://afghanwarnews.info/intelligence/aabis.htm.

36 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), “Mission Afghanistan: Biometrics. A Measure of Progress”, 29 April 2011, available at: https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/mission-afghanistan-biometrics.

37 S. Gold, above note 33.

38 Eileen Guo and Hikmat Noori, “This is the Real Story of the Afghan Biometric Databases Abandoned to the Taliban”, MIT Technology Review, 30 August 2021, available at: https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/08/30/1033941/afghanistan-biometric-databases-us-military-40-data-points/. Critics have argued that this biometric system was, however, not very successful: Zack Kopplin, “Afghanistan Collapsed Because Corruption had Hollowed Out the State”, The Guardian, 30 August 2021, available at: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/aug/30/afghanistan-us-corruption-taliban.

39 “Even the national digital ID, the tazkira, championed by the World Bank since 2018 and required to access public services and jobs and to vote, can expose vulnerable ethnic groups”; see Rina Chandran, “Analysis – Afghan Panic Over Digital Footprints Spurs Call for Data Collection Rethink”, Reuters, 20 August 2021, available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/afghanistan-conflict-tech-idUSL5N2OI06Y.

40 Frank Hersey, “25K Afghan Biometric Passports Ready to be Issued, 100K More to Follow”, BiometricUpdate, 7 October 2021, available at: https://www.biometricupdate.com/202110/25k-afghan-biometric-passports-ready-to-be-issued-100k-more-to-follow.

41 E. Guo and H. Noori, above note 38.

42 WFP, “Afghanistan Annual Country Report 2019. Country Strategic Plan 2018–2022”, July 2020, p. 19, available at: https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000113807/download/.

43 The UNHCR sub-contracted the Pakistan National Database & Registration Authority (NADRA) to register the refugees, which means that the data was with the Pakistani Government and shared with the UNHCR. This is standard procedure until today. See UNHCR, “Government Delivered First New Proof of Registration Smartcards to Afghan Refugees”, UNHCR, 25 May 2021, available at: https://www.unhcr.org/pk/12999-government-to-deliver-first-new-por-smartcards-to-afghan-refugees.html.

44 Kim Helfrich, “Top Islamic State Official Dies in Airstrike”, defenceWeb, 15 April 2019, available at: https://www.defenceweb.co.za/security/national-security/top-islamic-state-official-dies-in-airstrike/.

45 Karl Wiest, “Commander of United States Africa Command Visits Somalia”, United States Africa Command, 27 November 2018, available at: https://www.africom.mil/article/31366/commander-of-united-states-africa-command-visits-somalia.

46 In 2017, US troops returned to Somalia for the first time since 1993, where eighteen US Special Forces died in a combat encounter. US troops were recently withdrawn, but US military engagements in Somalia continue by other means including drone strikes; see The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, “Drone Strikes in Somalia”, The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, available at: https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/projects/drone-war/somalia; Amnesty International, “Somalia: US Must Not Abandon Civilian Victims of its Air Strikes After Troop Withdrawal”, Amnesty International, 7 December 2020, available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/12/somalia-us-must-not-abandon-civilian-victims-of-its-air-strikes-after-troop-withdrawal/.

47 Anthony Kimery, “Biometrics Play Significant Role in New US Army Intelligence Doctrine”, BiometricUpdate, 22 September 2018, available at: https://www.biometricupdate.com/201809/biometrics-play-significant-role-in-new-us-army-intelligence-doctrine.

48 Ibid.

49 Ibid.

50 Home Office, “Country Policy and Information Note. Somalia: Al Shabaab”, UK Home Office, November 2020, p. 35, available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/933800/Somalia-_Al_Shabaab_-_CPIN_-_V3.0e.pdf.

51 Kyle Rempfer, “US Troops, Non-Profit Trainers and a ‘Lightning Brigade’ Battle for Somalia”, Military Times, 21 May 2019, available at: https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-army/2019/05/21/us-troops-nonprofit-trainers-and-a-lightning-brigade-battle-for-somalia/.

52 WFP Somalia, “Somalia Databases and Beneficiary Registries for Cash Transfer Programming”, World Food Programme, October 2018, available at: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/1555331373.Somalia%20Databases%20and%20Beneficiary%20Registries%20for%20Cash%20Transfer%20Programming.pdf.

53 More recent data is not easy to get. Even interview persons working on biometrics with the WFP did not have updated numbers ready to hand.

54 FAO of the UN, “Biometrics Information Transfer System”, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, available at: https://www.itu.int/net4/wsis/archive/stocktaking/Project/Details?projectId=1386768611. A UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) describes this “biometrics-based fishermen database system in Puntland” as one of many counter-piracy initiatives, alongside “support Kenyan prisons.” See UNSCR, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation with Respect to Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea off the Coast of Somalia, UN Doc. S/2013/623, 21 October 2013, p. 8. Adding to this is INTERPOL's database of Somali piracy suspects.

55 Anonymous interview, December 2019.

56 The IOM has deployed MIDAS “IOM Upgrades Biometric Fingerprint Scanners to Enhance Somalia's Border Management”, Reliefweb, 6 June 2018, available at: https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/iom-upgrades-biometric-fingerprint-scanners-enhance-somalia-s-border-management, which was developed for the Sahel. It has also supported for years the government in the issuance of ID cards; see Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, “Somalia: Identification Documents, Including National Identity Cards, Passports, Driver's Licenses, and Any Other Document Required to Access Government Services; Information on the Issuing Agencies and the Requirements to Obtain Documents (2013–July 2015)”, SOM105248.E, 17 March 2016, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/571f16dc4.html; FindBiometrics, “US-Backed NGO Project Enhances Biometric Border Screening in Mogadishu”, FindBiometrics, 13 June 2018, available at: https://findbiometrics.com/us-backed-ngo-project-enhances-biometric-border-screening-mogadishu-506133/.

57 Regarding this “trial”: “The insurgent safe haven was walled off, and only those who submitted to biometrics were allowed in and out”; see T. Shanker, above note 23.

58 N. Toft Djanegara, above note 4, p. 6.

59 T. Shanker, above note 23.

60 Ibid.

61 Ibid. Further, it was observed that “the US military has made some mistakes with its biometrics technology, such as in Iraq, where soldiers collated a vast amount of data on civilians they encountered, but then discovered that one data-base does not work with another”: S. Gold, above note 33.

62 Concerning this pilot, the World Bank notes: “The existing legal and regulatory framework would need to be strengthened to fill existing gaps in terms of data privacy and consumer protection.” The World Bank, “Combined Project Information Documents/Integrated Safeguards Datasheet (PID/ISDS)”, The World Bank, 18 February 2019, p. 8, available at: https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/591601550669552595/pdf/Project-Information-Document-Integrated-Safeguards-Data-Sheet-Payments-Automation-and-Integration-of-Salaries-in-Afghanistan-PAISA-P168266.pdf.

63 The World Bank, ibid., p. 8.

64 Katja Lindskov Jacobsen and Karl Steinacker, “Contingency Planning in the Digital Age. Biometric Data of Afghans Must Be Reconsidered”, PRIO Blogpost, 26 August 2021, available at: https://blogs.prio.org/2021/08/contingency-planning-in-the-digital-age-biometric-data-of-afghans-must-be-reconsidered/.

65 Irwin Loy, “Biometric Data and the Taliban: What are the Risks?” The New Humanitarian, 2 September 2021, available at: https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/interview/2021/2/9/the-risks-of-biometric-data-and-the-taliban.

66 Jacobsen, Katja Lindskov, “Experimentation in Humanitarian Locations: UNHCR and Biometric Registration of Afghan Refugees”, Security Dialogue, Vol. 46, No. 2, 2015CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

67 G. Hosein and C. Nyst, above note 12, p. 81.

68 Katrin Fakiri, “Building a Gateway to Digital Payments in Afghanistan: The World Food Programme's E-Voucher Initiative”, Case Study, Better Than Cash Alliance, New York, May 2016, available at: https://btca-production-site.s3.amazonaws.com/documents/185/english_attachments/Afghanistan_Case_Study_May2016.pdf?1463507198.

69 See also, WFP SCOPE, “WFP's Beneficiary and Management System”, WFP SCOPE, 16 January 2018, available at: https://www.globalinnovationexchange.org/innovation/scope-wfp-s-beneficiary-and-management-system.

70 K. Fakiri, above note 68.

71 Ibid.

72 Jacobsen, Katja Lindskov, “Making Design Safe for Citizens: A Hidden History of Humanitarian Experimentation”, Citizenship Studies, Vol. 14, No. 1, 2010CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

73 Keren Weitzberg, Margie Cheesman, Aaron Martin and Emrys Schoemaker, “Between Surveillance and Recognition: Rethinking Digital Identity in Aid”, Big Data & Society, Vol. 8, No. 1, 2021.

74 Anonymous interview, September 2021.

75 ACE, “Iris Biometric Voter Registration in Somaliland”, ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, 3 December 2014, available at: https://aceproject.org/electoral-advice/archive/questions/replies/413937370.

76 Stephen Mayhew, “Notre Dame Researchers Using Iris Recognition to Improve Accuracy of Somaliland Election Process”, BiometricUpdate, 21 August 2014, available at: https://www.biometricupdate.com/201408/notre-dame-researchers-using-iris-recognition-to-improve-accuracy-of-somaliland-election-process.

77 Steven Saggese, Yunting Zhao, Tom Kalisky, Courtney Avery, Deborah Forster, Lilia Edith Duarte-Vera, Lucila Alejandra Almada-Salazar, Daniel Perales-Gonzalez, Alexandra Hubenko, Michael Kleeman, Enrique Chacon-Cruz and Eliah Aronoff-Spencer, “Biometric Recognition of Newborns and Infants by Non-Contact Fingerprinting: Lessons Learned”, Gates Open Research, Vol. 3, 2019.

78 Ben Parker, “Betting on Biometrics to Boost Child Vaccination Rates”, The New Humanitarian, 18 July 2019, available at: https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2019/07/18/betting-biometrics-boost-child-vaccination-rates.

79 Aviva Rutkin, “We Now Have the Tech to Fingerprint Babies – But Should We?”, New Scientist,, 15 June 2016, available at: https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg23030782-200-we-now-have-the-tech-to-fingerprint-babies-but-should-we/.

80 The New Humanitarian, “Syria Cash Aid Freeze, Somali Biometrics, and Poverty Porn: The Cheat Sheet”, The New Humanitarian, 26 April 2019, available at: https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/cheat-sheet/2019/04/26/syria-cash-aid-freeze-somali-biometrics-and-poverty-porn-cheat-sheet.

81 Ibid.

82 Unicef, “Biometrics: UNICEF Guidance on the Use of Biometrics in Children-Focused Services”, Unicef, October 2019, available at: https://data.unicef.org/resources/biometrics/.

83 An anonymous interviewee described how UN Mine Action “came into Somalia very early due to the nature of their work.”

84 Interview, December 2019. See also U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2011, Washington, DC, 2012, p. 538.

85 Human Recognition Systems, “Case Study UN Somalia”, available at: https://www.hrsid.com/case-study-un-somalia?__hstc=90097796.566aa022561b6cdf11fa359f1b3a830f.1579511311374.1579511311374.1579511311374.1&__hssc=90097796.1.1579511311374&__hsfp=2488122038.

86 S. Gold, above note 33.

87 K. Weitzberg, above note 11.

88 FBI, “Mission Afghanistan: Biometrics. Part 4: A Measure of Progress”, FBI, 29 April 2011, available at: https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/mission-afghanistan-biometrics.

89 AABIS: Afghan War News, above note 35. The centrality of such “data sharing with DoD and the Federal Bureau of Investigation” is also described by other sources, including a DoD report; see Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Justification for FY 2022 Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF)”, May 2021, p. 42, available at: https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2022/FY2022_ASFF_Justification_Book.pdf.

90 E. Guo and H. Noori, above note 38.

91 Krisztina Huszti-Orbán and Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, Use of Biometric Data to Identify Terrorists: Best Practice or Risky Business?, Human Rights Center at the University of Minnesota, July 2020; UN S/RES/2396(2017), 21 December 2017.

92 Since 1985 the UNHCR has concluded and renewed memoranda of understanding (MoUs) at a global level; the last version is of 2018. See UNHCR and WFP, “Addendum on Data Sharing to the January 2011 Memorandum of Understanding between the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the World Food Programme (WFP)”, 17 September 2018, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/5bbcac014.html. It includes, for the first time, provisions on data-sharing and states that both parties may give each other “access to biometric data of head of household and alternative assistance collector, and in exceptional cases, transfer of biometrics”; see UNHCR and WFP, “Annex 1: Matrix of Personal Data, Non-Personal Data and Information”, 17 September 2018, available at: https://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain/opendocpdf.pdf?reldoc=y&docid=5bbcac204.

93 WFP, above note 42.

94 B. Owino, above note 14.

95 K. Fakiri, above note 68.

96 K. Weitzberg, above note 11.

97 FindBiometrics, “The DHS and UNHCR are Sharing Biometric Data of Refugees”, FindBiometrics, 23 August 2019, available at: https://findbiometrics.com/dhs-unhcr-sharing-biometric-data-refugees-082304/. “Under the 2019 MOU, UNHCR is now directly sharing biometric and associated biographic information with DHS Office of Biometric Identity Management (OBIM) Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT) (soon to be replaced by Homeland Advanced Recognition Technology (HART)).”; see U.S. DHS, Privacy Impact Assessment for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Information Data Share DHS/USCIS/PIA-081, 13 August 2019, p. 1, available at https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy-pia-uscis081-unhcr-august2019.pdf.

98 U.S. DHS, Privacy Impact Assessment for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Information Data Share DHS/USCIS/PIA-081, 13 August 2019, available at: https://www.dhs.gov/publication/dhsuscispia-081-united-nations-high-commissioner-refugees-unhcr-information-data-share.

99 Eric Weiss, “DHS and UNHCR are Sharing Biometric Data of Refugees”, Find Biometrics, 23 August 2019, available at: https://findbiometrics.com/dhs-unhcr-sharing-biometric-data-refugees-082304/. Qualifying this, an interviewee noted that “The Trump years were somewhat different. During the Obama years, 90% or more of the referred cases were accepted.” (Interview, November 2021)

100 Ibid.

101 Thales Group, “DHS's Automated Biometric Identification System IDENT – The Heart of Biometric Visitor Identification in the USA”, Thales Group, 19 January 2021, available at: https://www.thalesgroup.com/en/markets/digital-identity-and-security/government/customer-cases/ident-automated-biometric-identification-system.

102 National Independent Electoral Commission, Federal Republic of Somalia. “Voter Registration Feasibility Study Report”, UNSOM, UNDP, Mogadishu, Somalia, November 2017, p. 31, available from: https://www.ec-undp-electoralassistance.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/24/2019/03/VR-Feasibility-Study-Report-Eng.pdf.

103 The New Humanitarian, “Head to Head: Biometrics and Aid. One Timely Topic, Two Opinionated Views”, The New Humanitarian, 17 July 2019, available at: https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/opinion/2019/07/17/head-head-biometrics-and-aid. In this opinion piece, for example, note the following: “In 2019 the WFP's partnership with Palantir (a US company working with anti-terrorism efforts, the CIA, the police, and the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement) raised serious questions. Many believe that aid agencies are being naïve when entering into data partnerships with corporations and do not fully understand the implications.”

104 ICRC, “Policy on the Processing of Biometric Data by the ICRC”, 28 August 2019, available at: https://www.icrc.org/en/download/file/106620/icrc_biometrics_policy_adopted_29_august_2019_.pdf.

105 Kevin P. Donovan and Carly Nyst “Privacy for the Other 5 Billion: Western-Backed Biometrics Programs for the Developing World Could Put Data in the Wrong Hands”, Slate, 17 May 2013, available at: https://slate.com/technology/2013/05/aadhaar-and-other-developing-world-biometrics-programs-must-protect-users-privacy.html.

106 Sean McDonald, “From Space to Supply Chains: A Plan for Humanitarian Data Governance”, SSRN, 12 August 2019, available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3436179.

107 Madianou, Mirca, “The Biometric Assemblage: Surveillance, Experimentation, Profit, and the Measuring of Refugee Bodies”, Television & New Media, Vol. 20, No. 6, 2019CrossRefGoogle Scholar, available at: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1527476419857682.

108 Privacy International, “One of the UN's Largest Aid Programmes Just Signed a Deal with the CIA-Backed Data Monolith Palantir”, Privacy International, 12 February 2019, available at: https://privacyinternational.org/news-analysis/2712/one-uns-largest-aid-programmes-just-signed-deal-cia-backed-data-monolith.

109 Mahoney, Charles W., “United States Defence Contractors and the Future of Military Operations”, Defense & Security Analysis, Vol. 36, No. 2, 2020, p. 192CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

110 Steven Overly, “Peter Thiel's Company Palantir Defense Could Win Contracts Under Donald Trump”, Financial Review, 9 November 2016, available at: https://www.afr.com/technology/peter-thiels-company-palantir-defense-could-win-contracts-under-donald-trump-20161109-gskz92.

111 For the Palantir project in Somalia, see https://www.palantir.com/philanthropy-engineering/learn-more/wfp.html. The other two projects were in South Sudan and Uganda.

112 WFP, “Palantir and WFP Partner to Help Transform Global Humanitarian Delivery”, World Food Programme, 5 February 2019, available at: https://www.wfp.org/news/palantir-and-wfp-partner-help-transform-global-humanitarian-delivery.

113 Linda Raftree, “A Discussion on WFP-Palantir and the Ethics of Humanitarian Data Sharing”, Medium, 5 March 2019, available at: https://medium.com/data-stewards-network/a-discussion-on-wfp-palantir-and-the-ethics-of-humanitarian-data-sharing-4fc1499f81d8.

114 I. Loy, above note 65.

115 Andrew Young, “A Discussion on WFP-Palantir and the Ethics of Humanitarian Data Sharing”, MEDIUM, 5 March 2019, available at: https://medium.com/data-stewards-network/a-discussion-on-wfp-palantir-and-the-ethics-of-humanitarian-data-sharing-4fc1499f81d8.

116 I. Loy, above note 65.

117 Emrys Schoemaker, “Digital Identity for Development – and Protection”, Global Policy, 14 September 2021, available at: https://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/14/09/2021/digital-identity-development-and-protection.

118 Ibid.

119 Siddharthya Roy and Richard Miniter, “Exclusive: First-Ever Interview With Terror Leader who's Hunting Americans and Allies in Afghanistan”, Zenger News, 28 August 2021, available at: https://www.zenger.news/2021/08/28/taliban-team-is-using-us-made-biometric-database-and-scanners-to-hunt-american-and-afghan-enemies/.

120 K. L. Jacobsen and K. Steinacker, above note 64.

121 T. Shanker, above note 23.

122 K. Huszti-Orbán and F. Ní Aoláin, above note 91, pp. 6–7.

123 K. Huszti-Orbán and F. Ní Aoláin, above note 91.

124 Thomas Macaulay, “Fears Grow Over Taliban Using Biometric Systems to Identify US Collaborators”, TNW News, 18 August 2021, available at: https://thenextweb.com/news/fears-taliban-has-seized-us-biometric-systems-will-target-vulnerable-people-afghanistan.

125 Sean McDonald, “From Space to Supply Chains: A Plan for Humanitarian Data Governance,” SSRN, 12 August 2019, available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3436179.

126 Anonymous interview, August 2020.

127 Ben Parker, “Exclusive: The Cyber-Attack the UN Tried to Keep Under Wraps”, The New Humanitarian, 29 January 2020, available at: https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/investigation/2020/01/29/united-nations-cyber-attack.

128 Ibid.

129 Jacobsen, Katja Lindskov and Fast, Larissa, “Rethinking Access: How Humanitarian Technology Governance Blurs Control and Care,” Disasters, Vol. 43, No. 2, 2019CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed.

130 Ben Parker, “Security Lapses at Aid Agency Leave Beneficiary Data at Risk”, The New Humanitarian, 27 November 2017, available at: https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/investigations/2017/11/27/security-lapses-aid-agency-leave-beneficiary-data-risk.

131 Anja Kaspersen and Charlotte Lindsey-Curtet, “The Digital Transformation of the Humanitarian Sector,” Humanitarian Law & Policy, 5 December 2016, available at: https://blogs.icrc.org/law-and-policy/2016/12/05/digital-transformation-humanitarian-sector/.

132 K. Huszti-Orbán and F. Ní Aoláin, above note 91, p. 11, footnote 67.

133 B. Parker, above note 78.

134 Indicative of how the use of biometrics may come with new forms of insecurity in other contexts too is, for example, the case of biometric data flows producing risks to Rohingya refugees. Looking beyond Afghanistan and Somalia, flows of biometric data produced by humanitarian actors have been documented in other contexts and shown to have negative implications. As argued in a Human Rights Watch report, the UNHCR has put Rohingya refugees “at risk of forced return” by sharing biometric data with authorities in Myanmar, the State from which these refugees had fled: Human Rights Watch, “UN Refugee Agency Data Sharing Puts Rohingya at Risk of Forced Return”, 2021, available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/06/15/un-shared-rohingya-data-without-informed-consent. Though the contexts differ, the case still illustrates how the UNHCR data-sharing agreements (here with Bangladesh, who subsequently signed a data-sharing agreement with Myanmar) entails risks to individuals who the UNHCR is mandated to protect. On how “biometric data UNHCR collected from Rohingya refugees was shared with the country they fled, Myanmar”, see also Zara Rahman, “The UN's Refugee Data Shame”, The New Humanitarian, 21 June 2021, available at: https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/opinion/2021/6/21/rohingya-data-protection-and-UN-betrayal; and Kate Hodal, “UN put Rohingya ‘at Risk’ by Sharing Data Without Consent, Says Rights Group”, The Guardian, 15 June 2021, available at: https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/jun/15/un-put-rohingya-at-risk-by-sharing-data-without-consent-says-rights-group.

135 Oxfam, “Oxfam Biometric & Foundational Identity Policy”, 2021, available at: https://oxfam.app.box.com/v/OxfamBiometricPolicy.

136 ICRC, above note 104.

137 See, for example, UNHCR, “Planning and Preparing Registration and Identity Management Systems: 3.6. Registration Tools”, available at: https://www.unhcr.org/registration-guidance/chapter3/registration-tools/.

138 Jacobsen, Katja Lindskov, “On Humanitarian Refugee Biometrics and New Forms of Intervention”, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, Vol. 11, No. 4, 2017CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

139 I. Loy, above note 65. It has also been argued that biometric data should be “deleted once it has served its purpose”; see Kerrie Holloway, Reem Al Masri and Afnan Abu Yahia, “Digital Identity, Biometrics and Inclusion in Humanitarian Responses to Refugee Crises”, Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG) Working Paper, ODI, London, October 2021, pp. 34–5, available at: https://cdn.odi.org/media/documents/Digital_IP_Biometrics_case_study_web.pdf.

140 E. Schoemaker, above note 117.

141 This point was also made by an anonymous interviewee: Anonymous interview, September 2021.

142 Anonymous interview, November 2021.

143 Arguably, another commonplace distinction that biometric system may also challenge is that of individual/relationships, given that many new biometric systems on the market enable identification not only of individuals but of lineages.

144 Suchman, Lucy, “Algorithmic Warfare and the Reinvention of Accuracy”, Critical Studies on Security, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2020CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

145 S. Gold, above note 33.

146 Ibid.

147 There have always been numerous refugees who decided not to register with aid agencies, also before the advent of biometrics. Thus, biometrics is one of many factors affecting whether refugees seek registration or not; there are indeed other factors which might encourage refugees not to register.

148 Katja Lindskov Jacobsen, “UNHCR, Accountability and Refugee Biometrics”, in Kristin Bergtora Sandvik and Katja Lindskov Jacobsen (eds), UNHCR and the Struggle for Accountability, Routledge, London and New York, 2016.

149 NRC, “The Consequences of Limited Legal Status for Syrian Refugees in Lebanon”, NRC Lebanon Field Assessment, NRC Lebanon, March 2014, p. 6.

150 K. L. Jacobsen, above note 148.

151 WFP/UNHCR, “Joint Assessment Mission – Kenya Refugee Operation: Dadaab (23–27 June 2014) and Kakuma (30 June–1 July 2014) Refugee Camps”, 2014, p. 18, available at: https://www.unhcr.org/54d3762d3.pdf. Many other examples, including more recent ones, deserve attention. See, for example, Belkis Willie, “A Cautionary Tale: When Humanitarian Data Collection/Transfer Harms Beneficiaries”, NetHope 20th Anniversary Summit, 15–19 November 2021, available at: nethopeglobalsummit.org.

152 NRC, above note 149.

153 K. L. Jacobsen, above note 148.

154 Simon Davies, “How a United Nations Agency Buried a Security Report that Warned of Potential Genocide”, The Privacy Surgeon, 2012, available at: http://www.privacysurgeon.org/blog/incision/ how-a-united-nations-agency-buried-a-security-report-that-warned-of-potentialgenocide/.

155 I am very grateful to the two anonymous reviewers who stressed the importance of accentuating the impact on people whose biometric data is being processed and shared, and of the need for more attention to the perspective of those affected, particularly since their voices are often ignored.

156 B. Owino, above note 14.

157 Guichaoua, Yvan, "The Bitter Harvest of French Interventionism in the Sahel", International Affairs, Vol. 96, No. 4, 2020CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

158 Chris Burt, “IOM Installing 10-Digit Fingerprint Readers at Somalian Ports of Entry”, BiometricUpdate.com, 7 June 2018, available at: https://www.biometricupdate.com/201806/iom-installing-10-digit-fingerprint-readers-at-somalian-ports-of-entry.

159 Thanks to Marijn Hoijtink for hosting a workshop that facilitated these discussions. Thanks to Debbie Lisle, for highlighting this during fruitful workshop discussions.

160 K. Huszti-Orbán and F. Ní Aoláin, above note 91, p. 7; The Engine Room and Oxfam, “Biometrics in the Humanitarian Sector”, March 2018, available at: https://www.theengineroom.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Engine-Room-Oxfam-Biometrics-Review.pdf; Sandvik, Kristin Bergtora, Jacobsen, Katja Lindskov and McDonald, Sean Martin, “Do No Harm: A Taxonomy of the Challenges of Humanitarian Experimentation”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 99, No. 904, 2017CrossRefGoogle Scholar.