¹ For those modes of action, see Bonard, P., Modes of Action Used by Humanitarian Players, ICRC, Geneva, 1999.Google Scholar

² Sassòli, M., “The victim-oriented approach of international humanitarian law and of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)”, Victims, Nouvelles Etudes Pénales, Vol. 7, 1988, pp. 147–180.Google Scholar

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⁴ Draft Article 55.

⁵ For a previous, albeit sometimes confusing, attempt, see Kamenov, T., “The origin of State and entity responsibility for violations of international humanitarian law in armed conflicts”, Kalshoven, F. and Sandoz, Y. (eds), Implementation of International Humanitarian Law, Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1989, in particular p. 170.Google Scholar

⁶ United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, ICJ Reports 1980, p. 3Google Scholar, at p. 38, para. 83, and p. 40, para. 86.

⁷ Draft Article 50(2)(b).

⁸ See notes 19 and 20 below.

⁹ Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (hereinafter: Hague Convention No. IV) and its Annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land (hereinafter: Hague Regulations), The Hague, 18 October 1907, reproduced in Scott, (ed.), The Hague Conventions and Declarations of 1899 and 1907, 3rd edition, New York, 1918, pp. 100–132.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, of 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3–434 (hereinafter: Protocol I).

¹¹ For the broad meaning of armed forces, see Art. 43 of Protocol I, and for its consequences in terms of attribution, see Kalshoven, F., “State responsibility for warlike acts of the armed forces”, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 40, 1991, pp. 847–848CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Kamenov, , op. cit. (note 5), pp. 174–176.Google Scholar

¹² Report, op. cit. (note 3), p. 101 (para. 4 on Draft Art. 10).

¹³ Yearbook of the ILC 1975, Vol. II, p. 69Google Scholar (para. 26 on Draft Art. 10).

¹⁴ Freeman, A. W., “Responsibility of States for unlawful acts of their armed forces”, Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law, Vol. 88, 1955-II, pp. 333–339Google Scholar; Bierzanek, R., “The responsibility of States in armed conflicts”, Polish Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 11, 1981–1982, pp. 96–98Google Scholar; Condorelli, L., “L'imputation à l'Etat d'un fait internationalement illicite: Solutions classiques et nouvelles tendances”, Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law, 189, 1984-VI, pp. 146–148Google Scholar, the three of them with further references; and Kalshoven, , op. cit. (note 11), pp. 837–838Google Scholar, 853; Sandoz, Y., “Unlawful damage in armed conflicts and redress under international humanitarian law”, Revue Internationale de la Croix-Rouge/International Review of the Red Cross, No. 228, 1982, pp. 136–137Google Scholar; Kamenov, , op. cit. (note 5), pp. 174–176Google Scholar; and Boelaert-Suominen, S., “Iraqi war reparations and the laws of war: A discussion of the current work of the United Nations Compensation Commission with specific reference to environmental damage during warfare”, Austrian journal of Public International Law, Vol. 50, 1996, pp. 296–297.Google Scholar

¹⁵ Huber, M. in the Arbitral Award on British Claims in the Spanish Zone of Morocco, UNRIAA. Vol. II, p. 645.Google Scholar

¹⁶ Freeman, , op. cit. (note 14), pp. 336–343Google Scholar; and Sandoz, , op. cit. (note 14), p. 137.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Draft Article 2.

¹⁸ Report, op. cit. (note 3), p. 107 (para. 5 on Art. 8).

¹⁹ Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, ICJ Reports 1986, p. 14, para. 115. The much less restrictive standard applied by the ICJ in its Order of 8 April 1993 in the case Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), ICJ Reports 1993. P. 3. Para. 52 is, in our view, due to the specific primary obligation to prevent the crime of genocide (Ibid., paras 44–45), and is not a development of the secondary rule, as argued by Boelaert-Suominen, , op. cit. (note 14), p. 297.Google Scholar

²⁰ Case IT-94–1, Prosecutor v. Tadic, 1999, paras 116–144; and Sassò;li, M. and Olson, L., “Case Report, Judgment, The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-A, ICTY Appeals Chamber, 15 July 1999”, American journal of International Law, Vol. 94, 2000, p. 575.Google Scholar See also our critique, Sassòli, M. and Olson, L., “The decision of the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Tadic Case: New horizons for international humanitarian and criminal law?”, Revue Internationale de la Croix-Rouge/International Review of the Red Cross, No. 839, 2000, PP. 737–742.Google Scholar

²¹ Report, op. cit. (note 3), pp. 106–107 (para. 5 on Art. 8).

²² See in particular UN Security Council Resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373 (2001). For some preliminary thoughts on those events from the standpoint of the rules of attribution, see Condorelli, L., “Les attentats du 11 septembre et leurs suites: Où va le droit international?”, Revue générale de droit international public, Vol. 105, 2001, pp. 838–839.Google Scholar

²³ Art. 4(A)(6) of Convention III (note 33) and Art. 2 of the Hague Regulations.

²⁴ Repon, op. cit. (note 3), p. 92 (para. 2 on Art. 5).

²⁵ Ibid., p. 116 (para. 11 on Art. 10).

²⁶ Ibid., p. 115 (para. 9 on Art. 10) and Art. 1(1) of Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, of 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 609–699 (hereinafter: Protocol II).

²⁷ Report, op. cit. (note 3), p. 118 (para. 16 on Art. 10).

²⁸ See Guggenheim, P., Traité de droit international public, Vol. II, 1st ed., Geneva, Georg, 1954, p. 314Google Scholar; Zorgbibe, C., La guerre civile, Paris, PUF, 1975, pp. 187–189Google Scholar; and the Constitutional Court of Colombia in Case No. C-225/95, partly reproduced in Sassòli, M. and Bouvier, A., How Does Law Protect in War?, ICRC, Geneva, 1999, p. 1361Google Scholar, para. 14.

²⁹ Report, op. cit. (note 3), p. 70 (para. 4 on Art. 2); and Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-first Session, UN Doc. A/54/10, para. 420 (available at:<http://www.un.org/law/ilc/reports/i999/ english/99repfra.htm>).

³⁰ Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Appeals Chamber, Judgment of 1 June 2001, paras 432–445, available at: <http://www.ictr.org>.

³¹ For references, see Yearbook of the ILC 1975, Vol. 2, p. 87; Condorelli, L., op. cit. (note 14), pp. 105–116Google Scholar; Pisillo-Mazzeschi, R., “The due diligence rule and the nature of the international responsibility of States”, German Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 35, 1992, pp. 9–51Google Scholar, and by the same author, “Due diligence” e Responsabilità internazionale degli stati, Gluffrè, Milan, 1989.

³² For example, Art. 13(2) of Convention III (note 33) and Art. 43 of the Hague Regulations.

³³ Arts 47/48/127/144 respectively of the four Geneva Conventions (Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, of 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 31–83 [hereinafter: Convention I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, of 12 August 1949 75 UNTS 85–133 [hereinafter: Convention II]; Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, of 12 August 1949. 75 UNTS 135–285 [hereinafter: Convention III]; Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 287–417 [hereinafter: Convention IV]); and Arts 83 and 87(2) of Protocol I and Art. 19 of Protocol II.

³⁴ Arts 50/51/130/147 respectively of the Conventions, and Arts 11(4), 85 and 86 of Protocol I.

³⁵ Kamenov, , op. cit. (note 5), pp. 179–182Google Scholar, qualifies such responsibility as “semi-direct”; and N. Levrat, “Les conséquences de l'engagement pris par le H.P.C. de ‘faire respecter’ les conventions humanitaires”, in Kalshoven, and Sandoz, , op. cit. (note 5), pp. 274–291Google Scholar, considers that this obligation of conduct has to be fulfilled by the mechanisms foreseen by IHL. For the inter-State aspect of the responsibility to “;ensure respect”, see the text after note 78.

³⁶ Report, op. cit. (note 3), p. 156 (para. 3 on Art. 16).

³⁷ See notes 78–80 below.

³⁸ Draft Articles 20–25. We shall deal here with consent, self-defence, distress and necessity. For countermeasures, see the text after note 88. As for force majeure, If an irresistible force or an unforeseen event beyond the control of a State makes it materially impossible for that State to comply with IHL (see the definition in Draft Article 23), in our view no unlawful act occurs (e.g. if a military aircraft in distress crashes on civilians). In the same sense, see L Condorelli and L. Boisson De Chazournes, “Quelques remarques à propos de l'obligation des États de ‘respecter et faire respecter’ le droit international humanitaire en toutes circonstances”, Studies and Essays on International Humanitarian Law and Red Cross Principles in Honour of lean Pictet, ICRC, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, 1984, p. 22.

³⁹ See notes 71–74 below.

⁴⁰ Condorelli, and Chazournes, Boisson de, op. cit. (note 38), pp. 33–34.Google Scholar

⁴¹ Art. 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, UNTS, Vol. 1155, p. 331.

⁴² Arts 6/6/6 and 7, respectively, of the four Conventions.

⁴³ Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, Second Phase, ICJ Reports 1970, p. 3, at p. 32, para. 34.

⁴⁴ Arts 51/52/131 and 148, respectively, of the four Conventions.

⁴⁵ Condorelli, and Chazournes, Boisson De, op. cit. (note 38), pp. 22–23Google Scholar, base this conclusion on the obligation to respect IHL “in all circumstances” foreseen in Article 1 common to the four Conventions.

⁴⁶ Report, op. cit. (note 3), p. 178 (para. 3 on Art. 21).

⁴⁷ See Protocol I, preambular para. 5; the US Military Tribunal at Nuremberg in the case of Withelm List et al., The United Nations War Crimes Commission, Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Vol. VIII, pp. 34–76.Google Scholar See for this case and other references Sassôli, and Bouvier, , op. cit. (note 28), pp. 83–87Google Scholar, 665, 681 and 682; Greenwood, C., “The relationship between jus ad bellum and jus in bello”, Review of International Studies, Vol. 9, 1983, pp. 221–234CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Kolb, R., “Origin of the twin terms jus ad bellum/fus in bello”, Revue Internationale de la Croix-Rouge/International Review of the Red Cross, No. 320, 1997, pp. 553–562Google Scholar; Meyrowitz, H., Le principe de l'égalité des belligérants devant le droit de la guerre, Pedone, Paris, 1970.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, July 8, 1996, ICJ Reports 1996, p. 226, para. 97.

⁴⁹ Draft Article 50(1)(c) in addition explicitly prohibits countermeasures affecting “obligations of a humanitarian character prohibiting reprisals” (see note 93 below).

⁵⁰ Report, op. cit. (note 3), pp. 204–205 (paras 19 and 21 on Art. 25). Similarly Boelaert-Suominen, , op. cit. (note 14), p. 301Google Scholar, with further references. For a view advocating a (strictly limited) general exception for cases of military necessity, see McCoubrey, H., “The nature of the modern doctrine of military necessity”, The Military Law and Law of War Review, Vol. 30, 1991, pp. 216–242.Google Scholar

⁵¹ See, for example, Art. 33(2) of Convention I, Arts 49(2) and (5), 53, 55(3) and 108(2) of Convention IV, and Art. 54(5) of Protocol I.

⁵² “Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its thirty-second session”, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1980, Vol. II, Part Two, p. 46, para. 28.

⁵³ Report, op. cit. (note 3), p. 206 (para. 20 on Art. 25).

⁵⁴ Venturini, G., Necessità e proporzionalità nell'uso della forza militare in diritto interna-zionale, Giuffrè, Milan, 1988, pp. 127–165Google Scholar; O'Brien, W. V., “The meaning of military necessity in international law”, World Polity, Vol. 1, 1957, pp. 138–163Google Scholar; Art. 23(1)(e) and (g) of the Hague Regulations, and Art. 35 (2) of Protocol I.

⁵⁵ Without further explanation, Condorelli and Boisson de Chazournes, op. cit. (note 38), p. 22, consider that distress precludes the wrongfulness of violations of IHL.

⁵⁶ See the former practice of the Israeli High Court of Justice and the Landau Enquiry Commission on “moderate physical pressure” against Palestinians under interrogation, which is contrary to Articles 31, 32 and 147 of Convention IV and which has fortunately been abandoned in the case Wa'al AI Kaaqua et at. v. The State of Israel. See Sassòli, and Bouvier, , op. cit. (note 28), pp. 824–829.Google Scholar See, however, more recently Morris, H., “Israel court ruling confirms denial of prisoners’ rights”, Financial Times, 8 April 2002.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ Art. 2(2) of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 10 December 1984, 1465 UNTS 112.

⁵⁸ See note 9.

⁵⁹ Draft Article 36(1).

⁶⁰ Report, op. cit. (note 3), p. 214 (para. 3 on Art. 28).

⁶¹ Draft Article 33(2) and Report, op. cit. (note 3), pp. 234–235 (para. 4 on Art. 33).

⁶² Cf. Pictet, J. S. (ed.), Commentary, III, Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, ICRC, Geneva, 1960, p. 630Google Scholar; Sandoz, Y., Swinarski, C. and Zimmermann, B. (eds), Commentary on the Additional Protocols, ICRC/Nijhoff, Geneva, 1987, p. 1056Google Scholar; Report on the Protection of War Victims, prepared by the ICRC, Geneva, June 1993, 4.3., reproduced in Sassòli, and Bouvier, , op. cit. (note 28), p. 457Google Scholar; Contra, based on an analysis of the travaux préparatoires of Art. 3 of Hague Convention No. IV, Kalshoven, , op. cit. (note 11), pp. 830–832Google Scholar; and Boelaert-Suominen (note 14), pp. 294–295.

⁶³ Case concerning the Factory of Chorzów, Claim for Indemnity, Merits, PCIJ, Series A, No. 17, pp. 27–28.

⁶⁴ See text below, after note 97, on Draft Article 48(2)(b).

⁶⁵ See the decisions of US courts in the cases Handel v. Artukovic, US District Court for the Central District of California, 601 F. Supp. 1421, 1985, partly reproduced in Sassóli, and Bouvier, , op. cit. (note 28), pp. 714–719Google Scholar, and Kadic et al. v. Karadzic, International Legal Materials 34 (6), 1995, PP. 1595–1614; partly reproduced in Sassòli, and Bouvier, , op. cit. (note 28), pp. 1274–1251Google Scholar as well as a decision of the Supreme Court of India in the case People's Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, S.C. 1203–1208, partly reproduced in Sassòli, and Bouvier, , op. cit. (note 28), pp. 1399–1401.Google Scholar

⁶⁶ See the Mixed Arbitral Tribunals established under Art. 304 of the Treaty of Versailles and the claims commissions established by the US, the UK and France In their respective occupation zones in Germany after World War II (Freeman, , op. cit. [note 14], PP. 375–389Google Scholar).

⁶⁷ Kalshoven, , op. cit. (note 11), pp. 835–837Google Scholar; Boelaert-Suominen, , op. cit. (note 14), pp. 295Google Scholar; and Kamenov, , op. cit. (note 5), pp. 172–173Google Scholar and 218.

⁶⁸ See note 42.

⁶⁹ For a recent bibliography, see Jørgensen, N., The Responsibility of States for International Crimes, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000, pp. 299–314.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁷⁰ Draft Artices 40 and 41.

⁷¹ Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, op. cit. (note 48), p. 226, at p. 257, para. 79.

⁷² Report, op. cit. (note 3), p. 284 (para. 5 on Art. 40). See also “Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its thirty-second session”, Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1980, Vol. II, Part Two, p. 46, para. 28; and The Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreskic and others, ICTY Trial Chamber, Judgment, The Hague, 14 January 2000, Case No. IT-95–16-T, para. 520; Levrat, , op. cit. (note 35), pp. 270–273Google Scholar, and notes 40–43 above.

⁷³ Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, op. cit. (note 48), para. 83.

⁷⁴ Condorelli, and Chazournes, Boisson de, op. cit. (note 38), pp. 33–34Google Scholar; and Draft Art. 19(3)(c) as adopted on first reading by the ILC, Yearbook of the ILC 1976, Vol. II, Part Two, p. 95.

⁷⁵ Hence the saving clause in Draft Article 41(3) concerning further consequences which such serious breaches may entail under international law.

⁷⁶ See text before note 110 and before note 120.

⁷⁷ See in this Levrat, sense, op. cit. (note 35), pp. 281–291Google Scholar; and Kamenov, , op. cit. (note 5), p. 170.Google Scholar

⁷⁸ Cf. Pictet, , op. cit. (note 62), p. 18Google Scholar; Bothe, M., Partsch, K.J. and Solf, W.A., New Rules for Victims of Armed Conflicts, Nijhoff, The Hague/Boston/London, 1982, p. 43Google Scholar; , Condorelli and Chazournes, Boisson de, op. cit. (note 38), pp. 26–35Google Scholar; Condorelli, L. and Chazournes, L. Boisson de, “Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions revisited: Protecting collective interests”, Revue Internationale de la Croix-Rouge/International Review of the Red Cross, No. 837, 2000, pp. 67–87Google Scholar; Levrat, , op. cit. (note 35), pp. 263–296Google Scholar; Palwankar, U., “Measures available to States for fulfilling their obligations to ensure respect for international humanitarian law”, Revue Internationale de la Croix-Rouge/International Review of the Red Cross, No. 298, 1994, pp. 9–25.Google Scholar

⁷⁹ Military and Paramilitary Activities, op. cit. (note 19), para. 220. See on the latter aspect specifically Kessler, B., Die Durchset-zung der Genfer Abkommen von 1949 in nicht-internationalen bewaffneten Konflikten auf Grundlage ihres gemeinsamen Art. 1, Duncker und Humblot, Berlin, 2001.Google Scholar

⁸⁰ Cf. Security Council Resolution 681 (1990), operative para. 5; UN General Assembly Resolutions ES-10/2 of 5 May 1997, ES-10/3 of 30 July 1997, ES-10/4 of 19 November 1997, ES-10/6 of 24 February 1999 and the Report of the Chairman of an Experts’ meeting held on the Fourth Geneva Convention in Geneva, 27–29 October, 1998 (all of them reproduced in Sassòli, and Bouvier, , op. cit. [note 28], pp. 852–868Google Scholar), and recently the Declaration adopted by a Conference of the High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention convened on the basis of common Article 1 in Geneva, 5 December 2001, available at: <http://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/e/home/foreign/hupol/4gc.html>, in which 114 States Parties participated.

⁸¹ The Rapporteur, J. Crawford, stressed that “the international community includes entities in addition to States: for example, the European Union, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the United Nations itself” (International Law Commission, Fifty-third Session, Fourth report on State Responsibility, UN Doc. A/CN.4/517, para. 36, available at: <http://www.un.org/law/ilc/archives/statfra.html>).

⁸² See in this Levrat, sense, op. cit. (note 35), pp. 274–275Google Scholar, who wrote, however, at a time when the ILC was still advocating a much wider concept of “injured State” and who considers that the injured State may only resort to measures provided for in IHL. For Art. 89 of Protocol I, see text after note 104.

⁸³ Report, op. cit. (note 3), p. 295 (para. 2 on Art. 42).

⁸⁴ Ibid., note 703.

⁸⁵ The S.S. Wimbledon, PCIJ, Series A, No. 1, p. 7, for the Treaty of Versailles.

⁸⁶ Yearbook of the ILC 1985, Vol. II, Part Two, p. 25 (First reading Draft Art. 40 (2)(e)(iii) and (3)). Even under those rules, differences in the entitlement of directly injured States and of only legally injured States were suggested (see Sachariew, K., “States’ entitlement to take action to enforce international humanitarian law”, Revue Internationale de la Croix-Rouge/International Review of the Red Cross, No. 270, 1989, pp. 180Google Scholar, 184–188).

⁸⁷ See text after note 97.

⁸⁸ See text after note 57.

⁸⁹ Report, op. cit. (note 3), p. 325 (para. 3 before Art. 49).

⁹⁰ Draft Article 49.

⁹¹ Draft Article 51.

⁹² Draft Article 53.

⁹³ Report, op. cit. (note 3), p. 336 (para. 8 on Art. 50), and Arts 46/47/13 (35/33 (3), respectively of the four Conventions and Arts 20, 51(6), 52(1), 53(c), 54(4), 55(2) and 56(4) of Protocol I.

⁹⁴ Draft Article so(1)(b).

⁹⁵ See note 47 above.

⁹⁶ Report, op. cit. (note 3), p. 335 (para. 7 on Art. 50) and UN Doc. E/C.12/1997/8, 5 December 1997, para. 4.

⁹⁷ Report, op. cit. (note 3), p. 335 (para. 7 on Art. 50).

⁹⁸ Condorelli and Boisson de Chazournes (note 38), p. 29; Ragazzi, M., The Concept of International Obligations Erga Omnes, Clarendon, Oxford, 1997, pp. 152–153Google Scholar; Kamenov, , op. cit. (note 5), p. 206.Google Scholar

⁹⁹ Draft Article 48(2).

¹⁰⁰ Report, op. cit. (note 3), p. 320 (para. 4 on Art. 48).

¹⁰¹ Contra, Sachariew, , op. cit. (note 86), pp. 180Google Scholar, 194–195.

¹⁰² International Law Commission, Fifty-second Session, J. Crawford, Third Report on State Responsibility, UN Doc. A/CN.4/507/Add. 4, para. 406, available at: <http://www.un.org/law/ilc/archives/statfra.htm>.

¹⁰³ See ILC, Fifty-second Session, State Responsibility, Draft Articles Provisionally Adopted by the Drafting Committee on Second Reading, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.600, Art. 54(2), available at: <http://www.un.org/law/ilc/archives/statfra.htm>.

¹⁰⁴ Report, op. cit. (note 3), p. 355 (para. 6 on Art. 54).

¹⁰⁵ Officiai Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law applicable in Armed Conflicts, Geneva (1974–1977), Berne, 1978, Vol. III, p. 304 (proposal by Syria), Vol. VI, p. 80 (Spain), 345–349 (discussion), 371 (France), 374–375 (Indonesia), 376–377 (Italy), 382 (Peru).

¹⁰⁶ , Condorelli and Chazournes, Boisson de, “Common Article 1”, op. cit. (note 78), p. 78.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁷ Sandoz, , Swinarski, and Zimmermann, , op. cit. (note 62), p. 1053.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁸ Gaja, G., “Jus cogens beyond the Vienna Convention”, Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law 172, 1981-III, p. 299Google Scholar, implies that Art. 89 constitutes a legal basis for countermeasures. , Condorelli and Chazournes, Boisson de, op. cit. (note 38), pp. 31–32Google Scholar, seem to suggest, without further explanation, that Art. 89 refers exclusively to coordinated measures through the institutionalized mechanisms of the UN. They do not rule out, however, the possibility of individual counter-measures, as do Sachariew, op. cit. (note 86), pp. 180 and 192–194, and Kamenov, , op. cit. (note 5), pp. 210–211.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁹ Official Records (note 105), Vol. VI, p. 347 (Syria).

¹¹⁰ Report, op. cit. (note 3), pp. 286–287 (para. 2 on Art. 41).

¹¹¹ See note 103 above.

¹¹² Report, op. cit. (note 3), pp. 286–287 (para. 2 on Art. 41).

¹¹³ For the legal basis of the Conference and its final Declaration, see note 80 above.

¹¹⁴ Report, op. cit. (note 3), pp. 286–287 (paras 2 and 3 on Art. 41).

¹¹⁵ See, for example, the reaction of Switzerland to recent violations of IHL by Israel, , “Rüstungskooperation mit Israel unter Druck”, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 10 April 2002, p. 13.Google Scholar

¹¹⁶ See on this issue notes 96 and 97 above.

¹¹⁷ , Condorelli and Chazournes, Boisson de, “Common Article 1”, op. cit. (note 78), pp. 77–82.Google Scholar

¹¹⁸ Report, op. cit. (note 3), p. 350 (para. 2 on Art. 54) and Draft Articles 57 and 59.

¹¹⁹ See the Resolution adopted by the Institut de droit international on 1 September 1995 in Annuaire de l'Institut de droit international 1996, Vol. 66–11, p. 448, Art. 6; Reports by Higgins, R. in Annuaire de l'Institut de droit international 1995, Vol. 66–1, pp. 281–283Google Scholar and 410–413; and after thorough analysis of possible legal grounds for such responsi-bility, Klein, P., La responsabilité des organisations internationales dans les ordres juridiques internes et en droit des gens, Bruylant, Brussels, 1998, pp. 430–520.Google Scholar More nuanced is Shihata, I., Annuaire de l'Institut de droit international 1995, loc. cit., pp. 291Google Scholar and 312, as well as K. Zemanek, Ibid., p. 327.

¹²⁰ See calls in UN General Assembly Resolutions ES-10/2 of 5 May 1997, operative para. 7, and ES-10/6 of 24 February 1999, operative paras 3 and 4.

¹²¹ See “Kimberley process reaches an agreement on control system in the fight against conflict diamonds, US Congress at the same time accepts clean diamonds act”, available at: <http://www.conflictdiamonds.com/pages/Interface/newsframe.html>, and the measures taken by Switzerland regarding trade in rough diamonds, available at: <http://www.eda.admin.ch/sub_ecfin/f/home/docus/diaman.html>.