Andrew Bearpark is the Director General of the British Association of Private Security Companies (BAPSC), an independent trade association representing the leading companies in the specialist private security and risk management sector in the United Kingdom. The association aims to raise the standards of its members and the emergent industry as a whole and ensure compliance with the rules and principles of international humanitarian law and human rights. Prior to taking up his position, Mr. Bearpark served as Director of Operations and Infrastructure for the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq. From 1998 to 2003, he was Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General in charge of the European Union Pillar of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and was previously Deputy High Representative based in Sarajevo and responsible for the Reconstruction and Return Task Force, a grouping of international organizations facilitating minority return in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Before taking up his positions in Bosnia and Kosovo, Mr. Bearpark held a series of senior positions in the UK, such as Head of the Information and Emergency Aid Departments of the Overseas Development Administration (ODA) and Private Secretary to Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.

Although long hidden from the public gaze of international humanitarian law, military entrepreneurialism has played a key role in the global organization of legitimate violence. By examining historical changes in the role and legal treatment of military entrepreneurs, the author sheds light on the contemporary “resurfacing” of privately organized violence in the form of private military companies, and its broader implications for international humanitarian law.

The threat to human rights posed by non-state actors is of increasing concern. The author addresses the international obligations of belligerents, national liberation movements and insurgent entities, looks at the growing demands that such armed groups respect human rights norms and considers some of the options for holding private military companies accountable with regard to human rights abuses. The argument developed throughout this article is that all sorts of non-state actors are increasingly expected to comply with principles of international human rights law.

Recent years have witnessed an increase in the number of private military and security companies (PMCs/PSCs) operating in situations of armed conflict, as well as a change in the nature of their activities, which are now increasingly close to the heart of military operations and which often put them in close proximity to persons protected by international humanitarian law. It is often asserted that there is a vacuum in the law when it comes to their operations. In situations of armed conflict, however, there is a body of law that regulates both the activities of the staff of PMCs/PSCs and the responsibilities of the states that hire them. Moreover, other states also have a role to play in promoting respect for international humanitarian law by such companies. This article examines the key legal issues raised by PMCs/PSCs operating in situations of armed conflict, including the status of the staff of these companies and their responsibilities under international humanitarian law; the responsibilities of the states that hire them; and those of the states in whose territory PMCs/PSCs are incorporated or operate.

States are increasingly hiring private military companies to act in zones where armed conflicts are occurring. The predominant feeling in the international community is that it would be best to regulate such companies. Cognizant of much confusion as to the status of the employees of private military companies under international humanitarian law, this article explains the laws on mercenaries, combatants and civilians and explores how private military companies' employees may fall into any of those categories. It demonstrates that the concept of mercenarism is unhelpful for regulating these companies and that it is unlikely that many of the employees of these companies can be considered to have combatant status. The article considers possible consequences of private military companies' employees having the status of civilians under international humanitarian law and their potential impact on regulating these companies effectively.

Corporate actors are taking on an increasingly significant role in the prosecution of modern warfare. Traditionally, an analysis of the law applicable to corporate actors in armed conflict commences with inquiry into the law as it applies to mercenaries. As such, the rise of the private military industry invites a reconsideration of the conventional approach to mercenaries under international law. This article critically surveys the conventional law as it applies to mercenaries, and considers the extent to which corporate actors might meet the legal definitions of a “mercenary”. It demonstrates that even mercenaries receive protection under international humanitarian law.

Private security and military companies have become a ubiquitous part of modern armed conflict and post-conflict reconstruction. Their diverse clients include governments in the developed and developing world alike, non-state belligerents, international corporations, non-governmental organizations, the United Nations, and private individuals. The implications of this proliferation of private security and military companies for international humanitarian law and human rights are only beginning to be appreciated, as potential violations and misconduct by their employees have come to light in Iraq and Afghanistan. The author critically examines the theoretical risks posed by private military and security company activity with respect to violations of international humanitarian law and human rights, together with the incentives that these companies have to comply with those norms. Empirical evidence is also presented to expand on this theoretical framework. Taking a multidisciplinary approach, the author draws on law, international relations theory, criminology, economics, corporate strategy and political economy, as well as psychology and sociology, to analyse the competing “risk-factors” and “compliance levers” that interact at each level of private military and security company activity to enhance or reduce the likelihood of a violation occurring. These findings are then applied by the author to assess emergent measures to deal with private security and military companies outside the legal sphere, including a programme of the International Committee of the Red Cross and the advent of the International Peace Operations Association.

Key issues raised by the use and operation of private military and security companies, particularly in conflict areas, are their accountability and how to control them. National regulation, however, is still rare. States have a role to play first as contractors. Considered selection, contracting and oversight procedures and standards may help promote respect for human rights and international humanitarian law by companies and their staff. Secondly, territorial and exporting states may consider adopting regulations to increase control and promote accountability. In view of this still largely unregulated phenomenon, this contribution considers elements of contracting and regulatory options.

The fact that international humanitarian law violations are in the vast majority of cases prosecuted in criminal courts does not mean that a civil liability for these violations does not exist. This article seeks to explore the concept of civil liability of corporations involved in violations of international humanitarian law by providing an overview of the different legal issues raised by this concept and its implementation in both common law and continental law systems.