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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2022
Seven years ago, a political report published by Echo of Iran raised the issue of the difficulty with which the Iranian political elite distinguishes between criticism and subversion. There is still only a hazy boundary separating treason from the lesser evil. Just one example of this level of debate was the suggestion by the “opposition” Mardom Party Newspaper that to attribute administrative misdemeanors to either ministers or to the Imperial Inspectorate was to commit treason.
One of the distressing effects of the failure to make this distinction in contemporary Iran is that a generation may appear which is loyal to the monarchy but which holds attitudes counter-productive to the espoused long-run political goals of the Shah. The attitudes to which I refer include the rejection of policy-oriented political activity and a flexible bargaining stance in the resolution of social problems. This writer met a number of young people in Iran who saw general disorder as the only alternative to the tight rein with which the Shah attempts to guide political activity.
1. Political Reports, 388 (Echo of Iran, 1963).
2. Mehre Iran, May 22, 1968.
3. Throughout Mission For My Country (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961)Google Scholar, the Shah discusses the “political immaturity” which makes policy discussion difficult.
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5. All prescriptions for developing countries do not regard more open decision-making circles as an unmitigated blessing, but most consider seriously the problems presented by a narrow basis for policy development. In fact, political development is usually defined as including expanded participation in decision-making. LaPalombara, J. and Weiner, M. Political Parties and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, Pye, Lucian and Verba, S. Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton U. Press, 1969)Google Scholar, Esman, Milton “The Politics of Development Administration,” in Siffen, Wm. and Montgomery, J. D. eds., Approaches to Development Politics, Administration and Change (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966)Google Scholar, and Pye, Lucian W. Aspects of Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966).Google Scholar
6. The revolutionaries’ willingness to compromise with the throne is seen not only in the Constitution but also in such behavior as asking the Shah's consent before seeking bast. Browne, E. G. The Persian Revolution of 1905-1909 (London: F. Cass, 1966), p. 118.Google Scholar
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16. The new Export-Import rules announced by Under-secretary of Economy Rokneddin Tehrani call for the formation of an exporters’ association which business men would be required to join. Because it was stimulated by the government's interest in coordinating export activities, the prospective association could hardly be described as a private, voluntary organization with all that that designation implies.
17. One example of such directed development is President Nasser's deliberate expansion of the U.A.R. legislators’ activity and prerogatives. Dekmejian, R. H. “The U.A.R. National Assembly: A Pioneering Experiment,” Middle Eastern Studies, IV, 4 (1968), pp. 361-375.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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20. “I want to find inspiration from you, advice from you. Your criticisms should be on a much higher level.” Kayhan International, March 8, 1969.
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22. Kayhan International, December 6, 1969. It is note-worthy that such caucuses take place after Cabinet action rather than before.
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25. The findings reported here are presented in detail in this author's “Recruitment and Behavior of Iranian Legislators: The Influence of Social Background” (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1969).Google Scholar The category “educated” includes all those deputies with college and Islamic schooling. The remainder are termed “non-educated.” This discussion is arbitrary in the sense that it reflects no judgment about the exact chronological point at which one can claim to have received an education. The educated population was overrepresented in the Majles by an index of ; the educated deputies by only 1.3. The “index of overrepresentation” is simply the percentage of any characteristic found in a sub-population relative to its distribution in the total population. Matthews, Donald R. U.S. Senators and Their World (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1960), p. 273.Google Scholar
26. Using the same index, the salaried (government and professional) population was overrepresented in the Majles by 5.4 and in the leadership by 1.2.
27. Political party membership, where relevant, bore little relationship to the attainment of a committee chairmanship. This finding, however, can be attributed to the irrelevancy of political parties to policy considerations as well as to that of the committees.
28. Binder, Leonard Iran: Political Development in a Changing Society, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962), p. 240.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
29. Kayhan, May 15, 1967.
30. Kayhan, November 22, 1967.
31. Huitt, Ralph K. “Congress, The Durable Partner,” in Wise, Sidney and Schier, Richard F. Studies on Congress (new York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1969).Google Scholar
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